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r 
ARISTOTLE'S 

POLITICS 

TRANSLATED BY 

BENJAMIN JOWETT 

WITH INTRODUCTION, ANALYSIS AND INDEX BY 

H. W. C. DAVIS, M.A. 

FELLOW OF BALLIOL 



IVUJ J 



H& 




OXFORD 
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 
1908 



HENRY FROWDE, M.A. 

PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD 

LONDON, EDINBURGH, NEW YORK 

TORONTO AND MELBOURNE 



CONTENTS 



Introduction 
Analysis . 

The Politics. 
Book I . 
II 
III 
IV 
V 
VI 
VII 
VIII 

Index 



page 

i 



25 

54 
100 

145 
187 

237 
257 
300 
319 



" 






INTRODUCTION 

The life of Aristotle, so far as it illustrates this treatise, 
may be summarized in a few words. He was by birth a 
Greek, but a native of the small city of Stageira which stood 
upon the fringe of the Greek world ; he was therefore well 
fitted by his origin to be an impartial, yet sympathetic critic, 
of the more famous city-states of Greece. In his youth he 
studied philosophy at Athens under Plato, thus coming at the 
most impressionable period of his life into close relations with 
the profoundest thinker whom Greece had yet produced. 
After the death of Plato (347), he quitted Athens to spend 
some years in the service of the new race of monarchs whose 
mission it was to diffuse Greek culture through the East and 
at the same time to complete the destruction of all that was 
most valuable and characteristic in the political life of Greece. 
At the court of Hermias, the obscure tyrant of the obscure 
city of Atarneus, Aristotle had the opportunity of observing 
the once great, but then decadent, despotism of Persia, to 
which he makes some references in the Politics, In 343 or 
342 he migrated to Macedonia, joined the court of Philip, 
and acted for three years or so as tutor to the youthful 
Alexander. The results of his experience in Macedonia, 
and the drift of the political teaching which he gave to his 
pupil may perhaps be inferred from the comments which, in 
several passages of the Politics, he passes on monarchies 
and tyrannies. About the year 335, on the eve of Alex- 
ander's great campaigns of conquest, the philosopher turned 
his back on Macedonia ; we may infer from what he says of 
empires, that while he realized their possible services to civili- 



2 Introduction 

zation, he was still more alive to the dangers, moral and 
other, which beset the path of a military and aggressive state. 
His sympathies were with the past, not the future ; with 
Sparta and Athens rather than with Macedon ; with Plato 
rather than with Alexander. Settling down at Athens, he 
became the leader of a philosophic school, the director of 
a brilliant academy ; but he incurred the odium to which a 
friend of Macedon was naturally exposed in the city of 
Demosthenes. In 323, after the death of his pupil and patron, 
he was driven into exile by a prosecution for impiety which, 
if he had faced it, would probably have brought upon his head 
the fate of Socrates. He died in the following year at 
Chalcis, a Macedonian stronghold. The semi-barbarians, of 
whose future he doubted, had been more generous to him than 
the Greeks, whose highest thought it had been his life-work 
to interpret and to vindicate. 

Of his literary work in general this is not the place to 
speak. It is enough to say that he aimed at expounding in 
the light of his own philosophic principles all the sciences 
which were then recognized, and that he followed consis- 
tently the method, of which the Politics are a conspicuous 
illustration, of combining induction with deductive reasoning 
from first principles, and of testing his own conclusions 
by a comparison with popular opinions and those of other 
teachers. Encyclopaedic knowledge has never, before or 
since, gone hand in hand with a logic so masculine or with 
speculation so profound. But it is in dealing with the moral 
rather than the natural sciences that he is greatest, most ade- 
quately equipped with facts, and most interested in his subject. 
Of his work in the moral sciences the final results are 
incorporated in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. The 
two treatises are intimately connected. In the Ethics he 



Introduction 



3 



discusses the nature of individual happiness or well-being ; in 
the Politics he treats of the state as one of the chief means 
through which the individual attains to happiness. The 
object of the Politics is both practical and speculative; to 
explain the nature of the ideal city in which the end of happi- 
ness may be completely realized ; to suggest some methods 
of making existent states more useful to the individual citizen 
than they were in Aristotle's time, or had been in the past. 

Aristotle is not, strictly speaking, the founder of political 
science. In the age of Pericles, and earlier still, statesmen 
and philosophers had theorized about the origin of society, 
the relative merits of various constitutions, and other kindred 
topics. Though Socrates was more concerned with ethics 
than with politics, he applied the powerful solvent of his 
dialectic to many of the political ideas which were fashionable 
in his day. The conceptions of utility as the ideal which the 
statesman should pursue, and of scientific knowledge as the 
indispensable equipment of the statesman, would seem to have 
had their birth in the Socratic circle. Plato, the pupil of 
Socrates, not content with developing the suggestions of his 
master and with giving to the Socratic formulae a deeper 
meaning, essayed a more systematic discussion of the nature 
of the state and its right organization. In the Republic he 
describes the state as it would appear if founded and governed 
by philosophers ; in the Laws he offered to the statesmen of 
his age a model more practicable and more nearly related to 
the experience of the past ; a model which the legislator for 
a new colony might follow without undue violence to Greek 
prejudices and opinions. Although the views of Plato are 
sharply, and not always justly, criticized by Aristotle, the 
influence of the Republic and the Laws is perceptible in many 
places of the Politics where they are not mentioned. 

B 2 



4 Introduction 

The Politics, in fact, would not be so valuable as they are 
if they expressed the views of an individual man of genius 
and nothing more. Here as elsewhere it is not the least of 
Aristotle's merits that he epitomized the best thoughts of 
a nation and of a stage in human history. He respected the 
political thinkers of the past, both the statesmen and the 
theorists ; he was loth to admit that any institution or polity 
which had stood the test of time could be altogether bad. 
Hence he appears before us as a mediator in the controversies 
of his own and the preceding ages. It is his wish to lay bare 
the grain of truth which exists at the core of every political 
practice and belief. He interprets even those ideals with which 
he is least in sympathy. And so we learn from him what the 
various types of the city-state signified to the Greek mind ; 
we are admitted under his guidance to the penetralia of their 
political thought. 

The history of the Greek city-state we can study for our- 
selves, with fewer sources of information, it is true, than 
Aristotle had at his command, but also with a more critical 
appreciation of their value and a more scientific method of 
interpretation than was to be learned in Athenian schools of 
the fourth century. We are too in a better position than 
Aristotle to see the true place of the city-state in the evolution 
of society, to appreciate its limitations, to condemn its evils, 
and to draw the moral from its failure. We know, what he 
does not appear to have suspected, that the careers of his 
Macedonian patrons had sealed the death-warrant of the 
community which he regarded as the highest that human 
skill was capable of framing. Ampler experience has shown 
us that slavery is not the indispensable basis of a civilization, 
nor commerce always degrading to the individual and destruc- 
tive of national morality. In the modern world we have 



Introduction 5* 

before us communities which, in defiance of his prophecies, 
have become extensive without becoming disunited. By his 
own methods of induction and comparison we can refute some 
of the laws which he regarded as immutable. 

Still we must start from Aristotle. His account of the 
city-state may be supplemented and corrected, but not super- 
seded. The governing ideas of any polity are always best 
expressed by those to whom they stand for the absolute and 
final truth ; and there is no form of polity which the student of 
political science should study with more care than the city-state. 
Just because it is comparatively simple, just because it is unlike 
the states with which we are personally acquainted, it contains 
the key to many modern problems. Aristotle is the best inter- 
preter of an essential link in the chain of political development. 

But he is something more than this, more than a Greek 
who states the case of Greece. He is also a philosopher 
and a student of human nature. His views as to the origin 
and ultimate structure of society, as to the aims of civic life, 
as to the mutual obligations of the state and the individual, as 
to the nature of political justice, all have a value which is 
independent of his historical position. It is often difficult to 
follow his discussions of these and cognate subjects. His 
arguments are stated with extreme conciseness, and the train 
of thought which leads him from one topic to another is often 
far from clear. But those who have the patience to wrestle 
with his text will find in it theories of perennial value, and 
refutations of fallacies which are always re-emerging. Nor is 
it merely from his more abstract disquisitions that such lessons 
are to be extracted. While there could be no greater mistake 
than to apply his criticisms of democracies and aristocracies 
to modern governments which go by the same names, without 
stopping to enquire how far the names have changed their 



6 Introduction 

meanings, it is on the other hand often apparent that these 
criticisms, when the necessary qualifications have been made, 
are as true of the present as they were of Greece. Of this 
an illustration may be found in the account of revolutions and 
their causes which forms the fifth book of the Politics. 

The Politics should probably be regarded as an unfinished 
work. There are not infrequent repetitions ; some subjects 
which the author promises to treat are never treated ; and we 
are sometimes at a loss for the connecting link between suc- 
cessive books or parts of the same book. The traditional 
order of the books is probably not that which Aristotle con- 
templated, and has been altered by most editors. The pre- 
sent translation follows the order of Bekker's first edition ; 
the numbering of the books in his octavo edition of 1878 has 
been given in brackets wherever it differs from that of the 
first. None of the rearrangements which have been sug- 
gested are completely satisfactory. Whichever of them is 
adopted, the reader will find that positions assumed at an 
earlier are only proved at a later stage of the argument. The 
Politics should be treated as a quarry of arguments and 
theories rather than as an artistically constructed piece of 
literature. It is best studied by the collection and com- 
parison of all the passages which bear upon the same topic. 
It is hoped that for this purpose the subject-headings in the 
Index, which is abridged from that of the translator, may 
be of service. A brief analysis is prefixed to the translation 
with the object of explaining the thread of the argument, where 
such a thread exists, of indicating the natural divisions of the 
text, and of enumerating the chief topics of discussion. 

The thanks of the editor are due to the Master of Balliol 
for his kindness in revising the proof of this Introduction. 

H. W. C. DAVIS. 



BOOK I. 

cc. i, 2. Definition and structure of the State, 

The state is the highest form of community and aims at 
the highest good. How it differs from other communities 
will appear if we examine the parts of which it is composed 
(c. i). It consists of villages which consist of households. 
The household is founded upon the two relations of male and 
female, of master and slave ; it exists to satisfy man's daily 
needs. The village, a wider community, satisfies a wider 
range of needs. The state aims at satisfying all the needs of 
men. Men form states to secure a bare subsistence ; but the 
ultimate object of the state is the good life. The naturalness 
of the state is proved by the faculty of speech in man. In 
the order of Nature the state precedes the household and the 
individual. It is founded on a natural impulse, that towards 
political association (c. 2). 

cc. 3-13. Household economy. The Slave, Property. 
Children and Wives. 

Let us discuss the household, since the state is composed 
of households (c. 3). First as to slavery. The slave is 
a piece of property which is animate, and useful for action 
rather than for production (c. 4). Slavery is natural ; in 
eveiy department of the natural universe we find the relation 
of ruler and subject. There are human beings who, without 
possessing reason, understand it. These are natural slaves 
(c. 5). But we find persons in slavery who are not natural 
slaves. Hence slavery itself is condemned by some ; but 
they are wrong. The natural slave benefits by subjection to 
a master (c. 6). The art of ruling slaves differs from that of 



8 Analysis 

ruling free men but calls for no detailed description ; any one 
who is a natural master can acquire it for himself (c. 7). 

As to property and the modes of acquiring it. This 
subject concerns us in so far as property is an indispensable 
substratum to the household (c. 8). But we do not need 
that form of finance which accumulates wealth for its own 
sake. This is unnatural finance. It has been made possible 
by the invention of coined money. It accumulates money by 
means of exchange. Natural and unnatural finance are often 
treated as though they were the same, but differ in their aims 
(c. 9) ; also in their subject matter ; for natural finance is 
only concerned with the fruits of the earth and animals 
(c. 10). Natural finance is necessary to the householder; 
he must therefore know about live stock, agriculture, possibly 
about the exchange of the products of the earth, such as 
wood and minerals, for money. Special treatises on finance 
exist, and the subject should be specially studied by statesmen 

(C. II). 

Lastly, we must discuss and distinguish the relations of 
husband to wife, of father to child (c. 12). In household 
management persons call for more attention than things ; free 
persons for more than slaves. Slaves are only capable of an 
inferior kind of virtue. Socrates was wrong in denying that 
there are several kinds of virtue. Still the slave must be 
trained in virtue. The education of the free man will be 
subsequently discussed (c. 13). 

BOOK II. 

cc. 1-8. Ideal Commonwealths — Plato, Phaleas, Hippodamus. 

To ascertain the nature of the ideal state we should start 
by examining both the best states of history and the best that 



Analysis 9 

theorists have imagined. Otherwise we might waste our 
time over problems which others have already solved. 

Among theorists, Plato in the Republic raises the most 
fundamental questions. He desires to abolish private property 
and the family (c. 1). But the end which he has in view is 
wrong. He wishes to make all his citizens absolutely alike ; 
but the differentiation of functions is a law of nature. There 
can be too much unity in a state (c. 2). And the means by 
which he would promote unity are wrong. The abolition of 
property will produce, not remove, dissension. Communism 
of wives and children will destroy natural affection (c. 3). 
Other objections can be raised ; but this is the fatal one 
(c. 4). To descend to details. The advantages to be 
expected from communism of property would be better 
secured if private property were used in a liberal spirit to 
relieve the wants of others. Private property makes men 
happier, and enables them to cultivate such virtues as 
generosity. The Republic makes unity the result of uni- 
formity among the citizens, which is not the case. The 
good sense of mankind has always been against Plato, and 
experiment would show that his idea is impracticable 

(c 5)- 

Plato sketched another ideal state in the Laws ; it was 
meant to be more practicable than the other. In the Laws 
he abandoned communism, but otherwise upheld the leading 
ideas of the earlier treatise, except that he made the new 
state larger and too large. He forgot to discuss foreign 
relations, and to fix a limit of private property, and to restrict 
the increase of population, and to distinguish between ruler 
and subject. The form of government which he proposed 
was bad (c. 6). 



r o Analysis 

Phaleas of Chalcedon made equal distribution of property 
the main feature of his scheme. This would be difficult 
to effect, and would not meet the evils which Phaleas 
had in mind. Dissensions arise from deeper causes than 
inequality of wealth. His state would be weak against 
foreign foes. His reforms would anger the rich and not 
satisfy the poor (c. 7). 

Hippodamus, who was not a practical politician, aimed 
at symmetry. In his state there were to be three classes, 
three kinds of landed property, three sorts of laws. He 
also proposed to (1) create a Court of Appeal, (2) let juries 
qualify their verdicts, (3) reward those who made discoveries 
of public utility. His classes and his property system were 
badly devised. Qualified verdicts are impossible since jurymen 
may not confer together. The law about discoveries would 
encourage men to tamper with the Constitution. Now laws 
when obsolete and absurd should be changed ; but needless 
changes diminish the respect for law (c. 8). 

cc. 9—12. The best existent states — Sparta, Crete, and 
Carthage — Greek la wgivers , 

The Spartans cannot manage their serf population. Their 
women are too influential and too luxurious. Their property 
system has concentrated all wealth in a few hands. Hence 
the citizen body has decreased. There are points to criticize 
in the Ephorate, the Senate, the Kingship, the common 
meals, the Admiralty. The Spartan and his state are only 
fit for war. Yet even in war Sparta is hampered by the want 
of a financial system (c. 9). 

The Cretan cities resemble Sparta in their constitutions, 
but are more primitive. Their common meals are better 



Analysis 



1 1 



managed. But the Cosmi are worse than the Ephors. The 
Cretan constitution is a narrow and factious oligarchy ; the 
cities are saved from destruction only by their inaccessibility 
(c. 10). 

The Carthaginian polity is highly praised, and not without 
reason. It may be compared with the Spartan; it is an 
oligarchy with some democratic features. It lays stress upon 
wealth ; in Carthage all offices are bought and sold. Also, 
one man may hold several offices together. These are bad 
features. But the discontent of the people is soothed by 
schemes of emigration (c. n). 

Of lawgivers, Solon was the best; conservative when 
possible, and a moderate democrat. About Philolaus, Cha- 
rondas, Phaleas, Draco, Pittacus, and Androdamas there is 
little to be said (c. 12). 

BOOK III. 
cc. 1-5. The Citizen, civic virtue, and the civic body. 

How are we to define a citizen ? He is more than a mere 
denizen ; private rights do not make a citizen. He is ordi- 
narily one who possesses political power ; who sits on juries 
and in the assembly. But it is hard to find a definition which 
applies to all so-called citizens. To define him as the son of 
citizen parents is futile (c. 1). Some say that his civic rights 
must have been justly acquired. But he is a citizen who has 
political power, however acquired (c. 2). Similarly the state 
is defined by reference to the distribution of political power ; 
when the mode of distribution is changed a new state comes 
into existence (c. 3). 

The good citizen may not be a good man ; the good citizen 
is one who does good service to his state, and this state may 



1 z Analysis 

be bad in principle. In a constitutional state the good citizen 
knows both how to rule and how to obey. The good man 
is one who is fitted to rule. But the citizen in a constitu- 
tional state learns to rule by obeying orders. Therefore citizen- 
ship in such a state is a moral training (c. 4). 

Mechanics will not be citizens in the best state. Extreme 
democracies, and some oligarchies, neglect this rule. But cir- 
cumstances oblige them to do this. They have no choice 
(c 5)- 

cc. 6-13. The Classification of Constitutions \ Democracy 
and Oligarchy ; Kingship. 

The aims of the state are two ; to satisfy man's social 
instinct, and to fit him for the good life. Political rule 
differs from that over slaves in aiming primarily at the good 
of those who are ruled (c. 6). Constitutions are bad or good 
according as the common welfare is, or is not, their aim. 
Of good Constitutions there are three : Monarchy, Aris- 
tocracy, and Polity. Of bad there are also three : Tyranny, 
Oligarchy, Extreme Democracy. The bad are perversions 
of the good (c. 7). 

Democracies and Oligarchies are not made by the numeri- 
cal proportion of the rulers to the ruled. Democracy is the 
rule of the poor ; oligarchy is that of the rich (c. 8). 
Democrats take Equality for their motto ; oligarchs believe 
that political rights should be unequal and proportionate to 
wealth. But both sides miss the true object of the state, 
which is virtue. Those who do most to promote virtue 
deserve the greatest share of power (c. 9). On the same 
principle, Justice is not the will of the majority or of the 
wealthier, but that course of action which the moral aim of 



Analysis 1 3 

the state requires (c. 10). But are the Many or the Few 
likely to be the better rulers ? It would be unreasonable to 
give the highest offices to the Many. But they have a 
faculty of criticism which fits them for deliberative and 
judicial power. The good critic need not be an expert ; 
experts are sometimes bad judges. Moreover, the Many have 
a greater stake in the city than the Few. But the governing 
body, whether Few or Many, must be held in check by the 
laws (c. 11). On what principle should political power be 
distributed ? Granted that equals deserve equal shares ; who 
are these equals ? Obviously those who are equally able to 
be of service to the state (c. 1 2). Hence there is something 
in the claims advanced by the wealthy, the free born, the 
noble, the highly gifted. But no one of these classes should 
be allowed to rule the rest. A state should consist of men 
who are equal, or nearly so, in wealth, in birth, in moral and 
intellectual excellence. The principle which underlies Ostra- 
cism is plausible. But in the ideal state, if a pre-eminent 
individual be found, he should be made a king (c. 13). 

cc. 14-18. The Forms of Monarchy, 
Of Monarchy there are five kinds, (1) the Spartan, (2) the 
Barbarian, (3) the elective dictatorship, (4) the Heroic, (5) 
Absolute Kingship (c. 14). The last of these forms might 
appear the best polity to some ; that is, if the king acts as the 
embodiment of law. For he will dispense from the law in 
the spirit of the law. But this power would be less abused if 
reserved for the Many. Monarchy arose to meet the needs 
of primitive society ; it is now obsolete and on various grounds 
objectionable (c. 15). It tends to become hereditary; it 
subjects equals to the rule of an equal. The individual 



1 4 Analysis 

monarch may be misled by his passions, and no single man 
can attend to all the duties of government (c. 16). One case 
alone can be imagined in which Absolute Kingship would be 
just (c. 17). 

Let us consider the origin and nature of the best polity, 
now that we have agreed not to call Absolute Kingship the 
best (c. 18). 

BOOK IV (VI). 

cc. I— 10. Variations of the main types of Constitutions. 

Political science should study (1) the ideal state, (2) those 
states which may be the best obtainable under special circum- 
stances, and even (3) those which are essentially bad. For 
the statesman must sometimes make the best of a bad Con- 
stitution (c. 1). Of our six main types of state, Kingship 
and Aristocracy have been discussed (cf. Bk. Ill, c. 14 fol.). 
Let us begin by dealing with the other four and their divisions, 
enquiring also when and why they may be desirable (c. 2). 

First as to Democracy and Oligarchy. The common 
view that Democracy and Oligarchy should be taken as the 
main types of Constitution is at variance with our own view 
and wrong (c. 3). So is the view that the numerical propor- 
tion of rulers to ruled makes the difference between these two 
types ; in a Democracy the Many are also the poor, in an 
Oligarchy the Few are also the wealthy. In every state 
the distinction between rich and poor is the most funda- 
mental of class-divisions. Still Oligarchy and Democracy 
are important types ; and their variations arise from differences 
in the character of the rich and the poor by whom they are 
ruled. 

Of Democracies there are four kinds. The worst, ex- 



Analysis i y 

treme Democracy, is that in which all offices are open to 
all, and the will of the people overrides all law (c. 4). Of 
Oligarchies too there are four kinds; the worst is that in 
which offices are hereditary and the magistrates uncontrolled 
by law (c. 5). These variations arise under circumstances 
which may be briefly described (c. 6). 

Of Aristocracy in the strict sense there is but one form, 
that in which the best men alone are citizens (c. 7). 

Polity is a compromise between Democracy and Oligarchy, 
but inclines to the Democratic side. Many so-called Aris- 
tocracies are really Polities (c. 8). There are different 
ways of effecting the compromise which makes a Polity. The 
Laconian Constitution is an example of a successful com- 
promise (c. 9). 

Tyranny is of three kinds: (1) the barbarian despotism, 
and (2) the elective dictatorship have already been discussed ; 
in both there is rule according to law over willing subjects. 
But in (3) the strict form of tyranny, there is the lawless rule 
of one man over unwilling subjects (c. 10). 

cc. 1 1 -1 3. Of the Best State both in general and under special 
circumstances. 
For the average city-state the best constitution will be a 
mean between the rule of rich and poor; the middle-class 
will be supreme. No state will be well administered unless 
the middle-class holds sway. The middle-class is stronger 
in large than in small states. Hence in Greece it has rarely 
attained to power ; especially as democracy and oligarchy 
were aided by the influence of the leading states (c. 11). 
No constitution can dispense with the support of the strongest 
class in the state. Hence Democracy and Oligarchy are the 



1 6 Analysis 

only constitutions possible in some states. But in these cases 
the legislator should conciliate the middle- class (c. 12). 
Whatever form of constitution be adopted there are expedients 
to be noted which may help in preserving it (c. 1 3). 

cc. 14-16. How to proceed in framing a Constitution. 
The legislator must pay attention to three subjects in par- 
ticular ; (a) The Deliberative Assembly which is different in 
each form of constitution (c. 14). (b) The Executive. 
Here he must know what offices are indispensable and which 
of them may be conveniently combined in the person of one 
magistrate ; also whether the same offices should be supreme 
in every state ; also which of the twelve or more methods of 
making appointments should be adopted in each case (c. 15). 
(c) The Courts of Law. Here he must consider the kinds 
of law-courts, their spheres of action, their methods of 
procedure (c. 16). 

BOOK V (VIII). 
cc. 1-4. Of Revolutions, and their causes in general. 

Ordinary states are founded on erroneous ideas of justice, 
which lead to discontent and revolution. Of revolutions 
some are made to introduce a new Constitution, others to 
modify the old, others to put the working of the Constitution 
in new hands. Both Democracy and Oligarchy contain 
inherent flaws which lead to revolution, but Democracy is the 
more stable of the two types (c. 1). 

We may distinguish between the frame of mind which 
fosters revolution, the objects for which it is started, and the 
provocative causes (c. 2). The latter deserve a more detailed 
account (c. 3). Trifles may be the occasion but are never 



Analysis 1 7 

the true cause of a sedition. One common cause is the 
aggrandizement of a particular class ; another is a feud be- 
tween rich and poor when they are evenly balanced and 
there is no middle-class to mediate. As to the manner of 
effecting a revolution ; it may be carried through by force or 
fraud (c. 4). 

cc. 5~ 12 ' Revolutions in particular States, and honv 
revolutions may be avoided. 

(a) In Democracies revolutions may arise from a persecu- 
tion of the rich ; or when a demagogue becomes a general, or 
when politicians compete for the favour of the mob (c. 5). 
(£) In Oligarchies the people may rebel against oppression ; 
ambitious oligarchs may conspire, or appeal to the people, 
or set up a tyrant. Oligarchies are seldom destroyed except 
by the feuds of their own members ; unless they employ 
a mercenary captain, who may become a tyrant (c. 6). (c) 
In Aristocracies and Polities the injustice of the ruling class 
may lead to revolution, but less often in Polities. Aristo- 
cracies may also be ruined by an unprivileged class, or an 
ambitious man of talent. Aristocracies tend to become 
oligarchies. Also they are liable to gradual dissolution ; 
which is true of Polities as well (c. 7). 

The best precautions against sedition are these : to avoid 
illegality and frauds upon the unprivileged ; to maintain good 
feeling between rulers and ruled ; to watch destructive agen- 
cies ; to alter property qualifications from time to time ; to let 
no individual or class become too powerful ; not to let magis- 
tracies be a source of gain ; to beware of class-oppression (c. 8). 
In all magistrates we should require loyalty, ability, and jus- 
tice ; we should not carry the principle of the constitution 



1 8 Analysts 

to extremes ; we should educate the citizens in the spirit of 
a constitution (c. 9). 

(d) The causes which destroy and the means which pre- 
serve a Monarchy must be considered separately. Let us 
first distinguish between Tyranny and Kingship. Tyranny 
combines the vices of Democracy and Oligarchy. Kingship 
is exposed to the same defects as Aristocracy. But both 
these kinds of Monarchy are especially endangered by the 
insolence of their representatives and by the fear or contempt 
which they inspire in others. Tyranny is weak against both 
external and domestic foes ; Kingship is strong against inva- 
sion, weak against sedition (c. 10). Moderation is the best 
preservative of Kingship. Tyranny may rely on the traditional 
expedients of demoralizing and dividing its subjects, or it may 
imitate Kingship by showing moderation in expenditure, and 
courtesy and temperance in social relations, by the wise 
use of ministers, by holding the balance evenly between the 
rich and poor (c. 11). But the Tyrannies of the past have 
been short-lived. 

Plato's discussion of revolutions in the Republic is inade- 
quate ; e.g. he does not explain the results of a revolution 
against a tyranny, and could not do so on his theory ; nor is 
he correct about the cause of revolution in an Oligarchy ; 
nor does he distinguish between the different varieties of 
Oligarchy and Democracy (c. 1 2). 

BOOK VI (VII). 

cc. 1-8. Concerning the proper organization of Democracies 

and Oligarchies. 

(A) Democracies differ inter se (1) according to the character 

of the citizen body, (2) according to the mode in which the 



Analysis 1 9 

characteristic features of democracy are combined (c. 1). 
Liberty is the first principle of democracy. The results of 
liberty are that the numerical majority is supreme, and that 
each man lives as he likes. From these characteristics we 
may easily infer the other features of democracy (c. 2). In 
oligarchies it is not the numerical majority, but the wealthier 
men, who are supreme. Both these principles are unjust if 
the supreme authority is to be absolute and above the law. 
Both numbers and wealth should have their share of 
influence. But it is hard to find the true principles of political 
justice, and harder still to make men act upon them (c. 3). 
Democracy has four species (cf. Bk. IV, c. 4). The best 
is (1) an Agricultural Democracy, in which the magistrates 
are elected by, and responsible to, the citizen body, while 
each office has a property qualification proportionate to its 
importance. These democracies should encourage agriculture 
by legislation. The next best is (2) the Pastoral Democracy. 
Next comes (3) the Commercial Democracy. Worst of all is 
(4) the Extreme Democracy with manhood suffrage (c. 4). 

It is harder to preserve than to found a Democracy. To 
preserve it we must prevent the poor from plundering the 
rich ; we must not exhaust the public revenues by giving pay 
for the performance of public duties ; we must prevent the 
growth of a pauper class (c. 5). 

(B) The modes of founding Oligarchies call for little ex- 
planation. Careful organization is the best way of preserving 
these governments (c. 6). Much depends on the military 
arrangements ; oligarchs must not make their subjects too 
powerful an element in the army. Admission to the governing 
body should be granted on easy conditions. Office should be 
made a burden, not a source of profit (c. 7). 
c 2 



2 o Analysis 

Both in oligarchies and democracies the right arrangement 
of offices is important. Some kinds of office are necessary in 
every state ; others are peculiar to special types of state 
(c. 8). 



BOOK VII (IV). 

cc. 1-3. The Summum Bonumfor individuals and states. 

Before constructing the ideal state we must know what 
is the most desirable life for states and individuals. True 
happiness flows from the possession of wisdom and virtue, 
and not from the possession of external goods. But a 
virtuous life must be equipped with external goods as 
instruments. These laws hold good of both states and 
individuals (c. 1). But does the highest virtue consist in 
contemplation or in action ? The states of the past have 
lived for action in the shape of war and conquest. But war 
cannot be regarded as a reasonable object for a state (c. 2). 
A virtuous life implies activity, but activity may be speculative 
as well as practical. Those are wrong who regard the life of 
a practical politician as degrading. But again they are wrong 
who treat political power as the highest good (c. 3). 

cc. 4-12. A picture of the Ideal State, 

We must begin by considering the population and the 
territory. The former should be as small as we can 
make it without sacrificing independence and the capacity 
for a moral life. The smaller the population the more 
manageable it will be (c. 4). The territory must be large 
enough to supply the citizens with the means of living 
liberally and temperately, with an abundance of leisure. 



Analysis 



21 



The city should be in a central position (c. 5). Communica- 
tion with the sea is desirable for economic and military 
reasons ; but the moral effects of sea-trade are bad. If the 
state has a marine, the port town should be at some distance 
from the city (c. 6). 

The character of the citizens should be a mean between that 
of Asiatics and that of the northern races ; intelligence and 
high spirit should be harmoniously blended as they are in 
some Greek races (c. 7). We must distinguish the members 
of the state from those who are necessary as its servants, 
but no part of it. There must be men who are able to 
provide food, to practise the arts, to bear arms, to carry 
on the work of exchange, to supervise the state religion, 
to exercise political and judicial functions (c. 8). But of 
these classes we should exclude from the citizen body (1) the 
mechanics, (2) the traders, (3) the husbandmen. Warriors, 
rulers, priests remain as eligible for citizenship. The same 
persons should exercise these three professions, but at 
different periods of life. Ownership of land should be 
confined to them (c. 9). Such a distinction between a ruling 
and a subject class, based on a difference of occupation, is 
nothing new. It still exists in Egypt, and the custom 
of common meals in Crete and Italy proves that it formerly 
existed there. Most of the valuable rules of politics have 
been discovered over and over again in the course of history. 

In dealing with the land of the state we must distinguish 
between public demesnes and private estates. Both kinds 
of land should be tilled by slaves or barbarians of a servile 
disposition (c. 10). The site of the city should be chosen 
with regard (1) to public health, (2) to political convenience, 
(3) to strategic requirements. The ground -plan of the city 



2 2 Analysis 

should be regular enough for beauty, not so regular as to 
make defensive warfare difficult. Walls are a practical neces- 
sity (c. 1 1). It is well that the arrangement of the buildings 
in the city should be carefully thought out (c. 12). 

cc. 13-17. The Educational System of the Ideal State, its aim, 
and early stages. 

The nature and character of the citizens must be determined 
with reference to the kind of happiness which we desire them 
to pursue. Happiness was defined in the Ethics as the perfect 
exercise of virtue, the latter term being understood not in the 
conditional, but in the absolute sense. Now a man acquires 
virtue of this kind by the help of nature, habit, and reason 
(c. 1 3). Habit and reason are the fruits of education, which 
must therefore be discussed. 

The citizens should be educated to obey when young 
and to rule when they are older. Rule is their ultimate 
and highest function. Since the good ruler is the same as 
the good man, our education must be so framed as to produce 
the good man. It should develop\ all man's powers and 
fit him for all the activities of life ; but the highest powers 
and the highest activities must be the supreme care of 
education. An education which is purely military, like the 
Laconian, neglects this principle (c. 14). The virtues of 
peace (intellectual culture, temperance, justice) are the most 
necessary for states and individuals ; war is nothing but 
a means towards securing peace. But education must follow 
the natural order of human development, beginning with the 
body, dealing next with the appetites, and training the 
intellect last of all (c. 15). 

To produce a healthy physique the legislator must fix 



Analysis 23 

the age of marriage, regulate the physical condition of the 
parents, provide for the exposure of infants, and settle the 
duration of marriage (c, 16). He must also prescribe a 
physical training for infants and young children. For their 
moral education the very young should be committed to 
overseers ; these should select the tales which they are told, 
their associates, the pictures, plays, and statues which they 
see. From five to seven years of age should be the period 
of preparation for intellectual training (c. 17). 

BOOK VIII (V). 

cc. 1-7. The Ideal Education continued. Its Music and 
Gymnastic. 

Education should be under state-control and the same for 
all the citizens (c. i). It should comprise those useful studies 
which every one must master, but none which degrade the 
mind or body (c. 2). Reading, writing, and drawing havt 
always been taught on the score of their utility ; gymnastic as 
producing valour. Music is taught as a recreation, but it 
serves a higher purpose. The noble employment of leisure 
is the highest aim which a man can pursue ; and music is 
valuable for this purpose. The same may be said of drawing, 
and other subjects of education have the same kind of value 

(c 3). 

Gymnastic is the first stage of education ; but we must not 
develop^ the valour and physique of our children at the 
expense of the mind, as they do in Sparta. Until puberty, 
and for three years after, bodily exercise should be light 
(c. 4). Music, if it were a mere amusement, should not 
be taught to children ; they would do better by listening 



24 Analysis 

to professionals. But music is a moral discipline and a 
rational enjoyment (c. 5). By learning music children become 
better critics and are given a suitable occupation. When of 
riper age they should abandon music ; professional skill is not 
for them ; nor should they be taught difficult instruments 
(c. 6). The various musical harmonies should be used for 
different purposes. Some inspire virtue, others valour, others 
enthusiasm. The ethical harmonies are those which children 
should learn. The others may be left to professionals. The 
Dorian harmony is the best for education. The Phrygian is 
bad ; but the Lydian may be beneficial to children. 

Cetera desuni. 



THE POLITICS 
BOOK I 

Every state is a community of some kind, and every *• 1 
community is established with a view to some good ; for Rekker 
mankind always act in order to obtain that which they 1252 a 
think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, 
the state or political community, which is the highest of all, 
and which embraces all the rest, aims, and in a greater 
degree than any other, at the highest good. 

Now there is an erroneous opinion 1 that a statesman, king, 2 
householder, and master are the same, and that they differ, 
not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For 
example, the ruler over a few is called a master ; over more, 
the manager of a household; over a still larger number, 
a statesman or king, as if there were no difference between 
a great household and a small state. The distinction which 
is made between the king and the statesman is as follows : 
When the government is personal, the ruler is a king ; when, 
according to the principles of the political science, the citizens 
rule and are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman. 

But all this is a mistake ; for governments differ in kind, 
as will be evident to any one who considers the matter 
according to the method 2 which has hitherto guided us. 
As in other departments of science, so in politics, the com- I 
pound should always be resolved into the simple elements or \ 
least pans of the whole. We must therefore look at the ' 
1 Cp. Plato, Politicus, 258 e foil. a Cp. c. 8. § 1. 



26 Logical Analysis of the State 

I. 1 elements of which the state is composed, in order that we 
may see * in what they differ from one another, and whether 
any scientific distinction can be drawn between the different 
kinds of rule \ 
2 He who thus considers things in their first growth and 
origin, whether a state or anything else, will obtain the 

2 clearest view of them. In the first place (i) there must be 
a union of those who cannot exist without each other ; for 
example, of male and female, that the race may continue ; and 
this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but 
because, in common with other animals and with plants, man- 
kind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of 
themselves. And (2) there must be a union of natural ruler 
and subject, that botr?*may be preserved. For he who can 

I foresee with his mind is by _naiure intended to be lord and 
l master, and he who can work with his body is a subject, 

3 and by nature a slave ; hence master and slave have the same 
1252 b interest. Nature, however, has distinguished between the 

female and the slave. For she is not niggardly, like the 
smith who fashions the Delphian knife for many uses ; she 
makes each thing for a single use, and every instrument is / 
best made when intended for one and not for many uses.- 

4 But among barbarians no distinction is made between women 
and slaves, because there is no natural ruler among them : 
they are a community of slaves, male and female. Wherefore 
the poets say, — 

* It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians 2 ;' 

1 Or, with Bernays, * how the different kinds of rule differ from one 
another, and generally whether any scientific result can be attained about 
each one of them.' 

3 Eurip. Iphig. in Aulid. 1400. 



Growth of the State 27 

as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were I. 2 
by nature one. 

Out of these two relationships between man and woman, 5 j 
master and slave, the family first arises, and Hesiod is right 1 
when he says, — 

* First house and wife and an ox for the plough V 
for the ox is the poor man's slave. The family is the associa- I 
tion established by nature for the supply of men's every-day \ 
wants, and the members of it are called by Charondas * com- 
panions of the cupboard' [ofiocwrvovsjy and by Epimenides 
the Cretan, ' 2 companions of the manger 2 ' [ofjiOKanovs]. 
But when several families are united, and the association f 
aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, \ 
then comes into existence the village. And the most natural 6 
form of the village appears to be that of a colony from the 
family, composed of the children and grandchildren, who are 
said to be i suckled with the same milk.' And this is the 
reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by 
kings ; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before 
they came together, as the barbarians still are. Every family 
is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies of 
the family the kingly form of government prevailed because 
they were of the same blood. As Homer says [of the 7 
Cyclopes] : — 

' Each one gives law to his children and to his wives V 
For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient 

1 Op. et Di. 405. 

2 Or, reading with the old translator (William of Moerbek) 6fxo- 
kclttpovs, 'companions of the hearth.' 

3 Od. ix. 1 14, quoted by Plato, Laws, iii. 680, and in N. Elh. x. 9. § 1 3. 



\ * 



28 Man a Political Animal 

I. 2 times. Wherefore men say that the Gods have a king, 
because they themselves either are or were in ancient times 
under the rule of a king. For they imagine, not only the 
forms of the Gods, but their ways of life to be like their 
own. 

8 When several villages are united in a single community, 
' perfect and large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, 

the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs 
of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good 
life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are 
natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the 
[completed] nature is the end. For what each thing is when 
fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking 

9 of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and 
/end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end 

12531 and the best. 

» Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, 
i jand that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by 
nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either 
above humanity, or below it ; he is the 

4 Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one,' 
io whom Homer ' denounces — the outcast who is a lover of 
war ; he may be compared to an unprotected piece in the 
game of draughts. 

Now the reason why man is more of a political animal 

than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, 

as we often say, makes nothing in vain 2 , and man is the 

only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of 

i r speech 8 . And whereas mere sound is but an indication 

1 II. ix. 63. ' 2 Cp. c 8. § 12. a Cp. vii. 13. § 12. 



Man a Political Animal 29 

of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals I. 2 
(for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and 
pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no 
further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the 
expedient and inexpedient, and likewise the just and the 
unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone |5 
has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the 
association of living beings who have this sense makes a' 
family and a state. 

Thus the state is by nature clearly prior to the family 
and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity 13 
prior to the part ; for example, if the whole body be 
destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an 
equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand ; for 
when destroyed the hand will be no better. But things are 
defined by their working and power ; and we ought not 
to say that they are the same when they are no longer 
the same, but only that they have the same name. The 14 
proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the 
individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self- 
sufficing ; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the 
whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has 
no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a 
beast or a god : he is no part of a state. A social instinct is t& 
implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded 
the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when! 
perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from j 
law and justice, he is the worst of all ; since armed injustice 16 
is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with the | 
arms of intelligence and with moral qualities which he may 
use for the worst ends. Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he 



30 The Parts of the Household 

I. 2 is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most 
full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in 
states, and the administration of justice, which is the determina- 
tion of what is just *, is the principle of order in political society. 
3 Seeing then that the state is made up of households, before 
speaking of the state we must speak of the 2 management 
1253 b of the household 2 . The parts of the household are the 
persons who compose it, and a complete household consists 
of slaves and freemen. Now we should begin by examining 
everything in its least elements ; and the first and least parts 
/ of a family are master and slave, husband and wife, father 
/ and children. We have therefore to consider what each 
a of these three relations is and ought to be : — I mean the 
relation of master and servant, of husband and wife, and 
thirdly of parent and child. [I say yaynKr] and tckvotiol^tlkt]^ 
there being no words for the two latter notions which ade- 

3 quately represent them.] And there is another element 
of a household, the so-called art of money-making, which, 
according to some, is identical with household management, 
according to others, a principal part of it ; the nature of 
this art will also have to be considered by us. 

Let us first speak of master and slave, looking to the 
needs of practical life and also seeking to attain some better 

4 theory of their relation than exists at present. For some are 
of opinion that the rule of a master is a science, and that the 
management of a household, and the mastership of slaves, 
and the political and royal rule, as I was saying at the out- 
set 3 , are all the same. Others affirm that the rule of a master 

1 Cp, N. Eth. v. 6. § 4. 

3 Reading wilh the MSS. olfcovofiias. 

3 Plato in Pol. 25S e foil., referred to already in c. 1. § 2. 



Slavery — Necessary 3 1 



over slaves is contrary to nature, and that the distinction I. 3 
between slave and freeman exists by law only, and not 
by nature ; and being an interference with nature is therefore 
unjust. 

Property is a part of the household, and therefore the art 4 
of acquiring property is a part of the art of managing the 
household ; for no man can live well, or indeed live at all, 
unless he be provided with necessaries. And as in the arts 
which have a definite sphere the workers must have their own 
proper instruments for the accomplishment of their work, so 
it is in the management of a household. Now, instruments 2 
are of various sorts ; some are living, others lifeless ; in the 
rudder, the pilot of a ship has a lifeless, in the look-out man, 
a living instrument ; for in the arts the servant is a kind 
of instrument. Thus, too, a possession is an instrument 
for maintaining life. And so, in the arrangement of the 
family, a slave is a living possession, and property a number 
of such instruments ; and the servant is himself an instrument, 
which takes precedence of all other instruments. For if 3 
every instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying or 
anticipating the will of others, like the statues of Daedalus, 
or the tripods of Hephaestus, which, says the poet J , 

4 of their own accord entered the assembly of the Gods ' ; 

if, in like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum 
touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen 
would not want servants, nor masters slaves. Here, how- 1254 a 
ever, another distinction must be drawn : the instruments 4 
commonly so called are instruments of production, whilst 
a possession is an instrument of action. The shuttle, for 

1 Horn. II. xviii. 376. 



32 Slavery — Is it also Natural? 

I. 4 example, is not only of use, but something else is made by 
it, whereas of a garment or of a bed there is only the use. 
Further, as production and action are different in kind, 
and both require instruments, the instruments which they 

5 employ must likewise differ in kind. But life is action 
and not production, and therefore the slave is the minister of 
action [for he ministers to his masters life]. Again, a 
possession is spoken of as a part is spoken of; for the part 
is not only a part of something else, but wholly belongs 
to it; and this is also true of a possession. The master 
is only the master of the slave ; he does not belong to 
him, whereas the slave is not only the slave of his master, 

6 but wholly belongs to him. Hence we see what is the 
nature and office of a slave ; he who is by nature not his 
own but another's and yet a man, is by nature a slave ; and 
he may be said to belong to another who, being a human 
being, is also a possession. And a possession may be 
defined as an instrument of action, separable from the 
possessor. 

5 But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, 
/ and for whom such a condition is expedient and right, or 
rather is not all slavery a violation of nature ? 

There is no difficulty in answering this question, on 

2 grounds both of reason and of fact. For that some should 

i rule and others be ruled is a thing, not only necessary, but 

I expedient ; from the hour of their birth, some are marked 

* out for subjection, others for rule. 

And whereas there are many kinds both of rulers and 
subjects, that rule is the better which is exercised over better 
subjects — for example, to rule over men is better than to 
rule over wild beasts. The work is better which is executed 



Slavery — Justified 3 3 

by better workmen ; and where one man rules and another is I, 5 
ruled, they may be said to have a work. In all things 
which form a composite whole and which are made up of 
parts, whether continuous or discrete, a distinction between 
the ruling and the subject element comes to light. Such a 4 
duality exists in living creatures, but not in them only ; 
it originates in the constitution of the universe ; even in 
things which have no life, there is a ruling principle, as 
1 in musical harmony l . But we are wandering from the 
subject. We will, therefore, restrict ourselves to the living 
creature which, in the first place, consists of soul and body : 
and of these two, the one is by nature the ruler, and the 
other the subject. But then we must look for the intentions 5 
of nature in things which retain their nature, and not in 
things which are corrupted. And therefore we must study 
the man who is in the most perfect state both of body and 
soul, for in him we shall see the true relation of the two ; 
although in bad or corrupted natures the body will often 1254 b 
appear to rule over the soul, because they are in an evil 
and unnatural condition. First then we may observe in living 6 
creatures both a despotical and a constitutional rule ; for the 
soul rules the body with a despotical rule, whereas the intel- 
lect rules the appetites with a constitutional and royal rule. 
And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and 
of the mind and the rational element over the passionate is 
natural and expedient ; whereas the equality of the two or the 
rule of the inferior is always hurtful. The same holds good 7 
of animals as well as of men ; for tame animals have a better 
nature than wild, and all tame animals are better off when 
they are ruled by man ; for then they are preserved. Again, 
1 Or, ( of harmony [in music].' 

DAVIS D 



34 Slavery — Both Sides of the Question 

I. 5 the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior ; and 
the one rules, and the other is ruled ; this principle, of 

8 necessity, extends to all mankind* Where then there is such 
a difference as that between soul and body, or between men 
and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use 
their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort 
are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all 

9 inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master. For 

Ihe who can be, and therefore is another's, and he who 
participates in reason enough to apprehend, but not to have, 
reason, is a slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals 
cannot even apprehend reason ; they obey their instincts. 
And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals 
is not very different ; for both with their bodies minister to 
io the needs of life. Nature would like to distinguish betweeR 
the bodies of freemen and slaves, making the one strong 
for servile labour, the other upright, and although useless 
for such services, useful for political life in the arts both 
of war and peace. But this does not hold universally : for 
some slaves have the souls and others have the bodies of 
freemen. And doubtless if men differed from one another in 
the mere forms of their bodies as much as the statues of the 
Gods do from men, all would acknowledge that the inferior class 
ir should be slaves of the superior. And if there is a difference 
in the body, how much more in the soul ! But the beauty of the 
1255 a body is seen, whereas the beauty of the soul is not seen. It is 
clear, then, that some men are by nature free, and others slaves, 
and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right. 
6 But that those who take the opposite view have in a certain 
way right on their side, may be easily seen. For the words 
slavery and slave are used in two senses. There is a slave 



Slavery — Both Sides of the Question 3 y 

or slavery by law as well as by nature. The law of which j m q 
I speak is a sort of convention, according to which whatever 
is taken in war is supposed to belong to the victors. But 2 
this right many jurists impeach, as they would an orator who 
brought forward an unconstitutional measure : they detest the 
notion that, because one man has the power of doing violence 
and is superior in brute strength, another shall be his slave 
and subject. Even among philosophers there is a difference 
of opinion. The origin of the dispute, and the reason why 3 
the arguments cross, is as follows : Virtue, when furnished 
with means, may be deemed to have the greatest power of 
doing violence : and as superior power is only found where 
there is superior excellence of some kind, power is thought to 
imply virtue. But does it likewise imply justice ? — that is the 
question. And, in order to make a distinction between them, 4 
some assert that justice is benevolence : to which others reply 
that justice is nothing more than the rule of a superior. If 
the two views are regarded as antagonistic and exclusive [i. e. 
if the notion that justice is benevolence excludes the idea of 
a just rule of a superior], the alternative [viz. that no one 
should rule over others x ] has no force or plausibility, because 
it implies that not even the superior in virtue ought to rule, or 
be master. Some, clinging, as they think, to a principle of 5 
justice (for law and custom are a sort of justice), assume that 
slavery in war is justified by law, but they are not consistent. 
For what if the cause of the war be unjust ? No one would j 
ever say that he is a slave who is unworthy to be a slave. I 
Were this the case, men of the highest rank would be slaves 
and the children of slaves if they or their parents chance to 
have been taken captive and sold. Wherefore Hellenes do 6 

1 Cp. § a. 
D 2 



1 6 When Natural^ when ^Unnatural 

I. 6 not like to call themselves slaves, but confine the term to 
barbarians. Yet, in using this language, they really mean the 
natural slave of whom we spoke at first; for it must be 
admitted that some are slaves everywhere, others nowhere. 

7 The same principle applies to nobility. Hellenes regard them- 
selves as noble everywhere, and not only in their own country, 
but they deem the barbarians noble only when at home, 
thereby implying that there are two sorts of nobility and 
freedom, the one absolute, the other relative. The Helen 
of Theodectes says : — 

1 Who would presume to call me servant who am on both 
sides sprung from the stem of the Gods ? ' 

8 What does this mean but that they distinguish freedom and 
slavery, noble and humble birth, by the two principles of 

1255 b good and evil ? They think that as men and animals beget 
men and animals, so from good men a good man springs. 
But this is what nature, though she may intend it, often fails 
to accomplish. 

9 We see then that there is some foundation for this differ- 
ence of opinion, and that some actual slaves and freemen are 
not so by nature, and also that there is in some cases a marked 
distinction between the two classes, rendering it expedient and 
right for the one to be slaves and the others to be masters : 
the one practising obedience, the others exercising the autho- 

io rity which nature intended them to have. The abuse of this 
authority is injurious to both ; for the interests of part and 
whole \ of body and soul, are the same, and the slave is a part 
of the master, a living but separated part of his bodily frame. 
Where the relation between them is natural they arc friends 

i Cp. c. 4 . § 5. 



The J^ule of the Household 37 

and have a common interest, but where it rests merely on law I. 6 
and force the reverse is true. 

The previous remarks are quite enough to show that the 7 
rule of a master is not a constitutional rule, and therefore that 
all the different kinds of rule are not, as some affirm, the 
same with each other *. For there is one rule exercised over 
subjects who are by nature free, another over subjects who 
are by nature slaves. The rule of a household is a monarchy, 
for every house is under one head : whereas constitutional rule 
is a government of freemen and equals. The master is not 2 
called a master because he has science, but because he is of 
a certain character, and the same remark applies to the slave 
and the freeman. Still there may be a science for the master 
and a science for the slave. The science of the slave would 
be such as the man of Syracuse taught, who made money by 
instructing slaves in their ordinary duties. And such a know- 3 
ledge may be carried further, so as to include cookery and 
similar menial arts. For some duties are of the more neces- 
sary, others of the more honourable sort ; as the proverb says, 
' slave before slave, master before master.' But all such 4 
branches of knowledge are servile. There is likewise a science 
of the master, which teaches the use of slaves ; for the master 
as such is concerned, not with the acquisition, but with the use 
of them. Yet this so-called science is not anything great or 
wonderful ; for the master need only know how to order that 
which the slave must know how to execute. Hence those 5 
who are in a position which places them above toil, have 
stewards who attend to their households while they occupy 
themselves with philosophy or with politics. But the art of 
acquiring slaves, I mean of justly acquiring them, differs both 
1 Plato Pol. 258 E foil., referred to already in c. I. § 2. 



3 8 Property — What Place in the Household 

I. 7 from the art of the master and the art of the slave, being 
a species of hunting or war K Enough of the distinction 
between master and slave. 
1256 a Let us now enquire into property generally, and into the 
art of money-making, in accordance with our usual method 
[of resolving a whole into its parts 2 ], for a slave has been 
shown to be a part of property. The first question is whether 
the art of money-making is the same with the art of managing 
a household or a part of it, or instrumental to it ; and if the 
last, whether in the way that the art of making shuttles is 
instrumental to the art of weaving, or in the way that the 
casting of bronze is instrumental to the art of the statuary, for 
they are not instrumental in the same way, but the one pro- 

2 vides tools and the other material ; and by material I mean 
the substratum out of which any work is made ; thus wool is 
the material of the weaver, bronze of the statuary. Now it 
is easy to see that the art of household management is not 
identical with the art of money-making, for the one uses the 
material which the other provides. And the art which uses 
household stores can be no other than the art of household 
management. There is, however, a doubt whether the art of 
money-making is a part of household management or a distinct 

3 art. [They appear to be connected] ; for the money-maker 
has to consider whence money and property can be procured ; 
but there are many sorts of property and wealth : — there is 
husbandry and the care and provision of food in general ; are 

4 these parts of the money-making art or distinct arts ? Again, 
there are many sorts of food, and therefore there are many 
kinds of lives both of animals and men ; they must all have 
food, and the differences in their food have made differences 

1 Cp. vii. 14. § 21. a Cp. c. 1. § 3. 



Property — l{ests on a Physical Basis 39 

in their ways of life. For of beasts, some are gregarious, I. 8 
others are solitary ; they live in the way which is best adapted 5 
to sustain them, accordingly as they are carnivorous or her- 
bivorous or omnivorous : and their habits are determined for 
them by nature in such a manner that they may obtain with 
greater facility the food of their choice. But, as different 
individuals have different tastes, the same things are not 
naturally pleasant to all of them ; and therefore the lives of 
carnivorous or herbivorous animals further differ among them- 
selves. In the lives of men too there is a great difference. 6 
The laziest are shepherds, who lead an idle life, and get 
their subsistence without trouble from tame animals ; their 
flocks having to wander from place to place in search of pas- 
ture, they are compelled to follow them, cultivating a sort of 
living farm. Others support themselves by hunting, which is 7 
of different kinds. Some, for example, are pirates, others ; 
who dwell near lakes or marshes or rivers or a sea in which 
there are fish, are fishermen, and others live by the pursuit of 
birds or wild beasts. The greater number obtain a living from 
the fruits of the soil. Such are the modes of subsistence 8 
which prevail among those a whose industry is employed 
immediately upon the products of nature \ and whose food is 
not acquired by exchange and retail trade — there is the shep- 1256 b 
herd, the husbandman, the pirate, the fisherman, the hunter. 
Some gain a comfortable maintenance out of two employ- 
ments, eking out the deficiencies of one of them by another : 
thus the life of a shepherd may be combined with that of 
a brigand, the life of a farmer with that of a hunter. Other 9 
modes of life are similarly combined in any way which the 
needs of men may require. Property, in the sense of a bare 
1 Or, * whose labour is peisonal.' 



4-o Property — Natural Acquisition 

I. 8 livelihood, seems to be given by nature herself to all, both 
io when they are first born, and when they are grown up. For 
some animals bring forth, together with their offspring, so 
much food as will last until they are able to supply themselves ; 
of this the vermiparous or oviparous animals are an instance ; 
and the viviparous animals have up to a certain time a supply 
of food for their young in themselves, which is called milk. 

1 1 In like manner we may infer that, after the birth of animals, 
plants exist for their sake, and that the other animals exist 
for the sake of man, the tame for use and food, the wild, if 
not all, at least the greater part of them, for food, and for the 

12 provision of clothing and various instruments. Now if nature 
makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in vain, the inference 
must be that she has made all animals and plants for the sake 
of man. And so, in one point of view, the art of war is 
a natural art of acquisition, for it includes hunting, an art 
which we ought to practise against wild beasts, and against 
men who, though intended by nature to be governed, will not 
submit ; for war of such a kind is naturally just 1 . 

13 Of the art of acquisition then there is one kind 2 which is 
natural and is a part of the management of a household 2 . 
Either we must suppose the necessaries of life to exist pre- 
viously, or the art of household management must provide 
a store of them for the common use of the family or state. 

14 They are the elements of true wealth ; for the amount of 
property which is needed for a good life is not unlimited, 
although Solon in one of his poems says that, 

' No bound to riches has been fixed for man V 

1 Cp. c. 7. § 5, and vii. 14. § 21. 

2 Or, with Bernays, ' which by nature is a part of the management 
of a household.' 3 Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Solon, 13. v. 71. 



Property — Money-making 4 1 

But there is a boundary fixed, just as there is in the arts ; for I. 8 
the instruments of any art are never unlimited, either in ! 5 
number or size, and wealth may be defined as a number of 
instruments to be used in a household or in a state. And so 
we see that there is a natural art of acquisition which is prac- 
tised by managers of households and by statesmen, and what 
is the reason of this. 

There is another variety of the art of acquisition which is 9 
commonly and rightly called the art of making money, and 1257 a 
has in fact suggested the notion that wealth and property have 
no limit. Being nearly connected with the preceding, it is 
often identified with it. But though they are not very different, 
neither are they the same. The kind already described is 
given by nature, the other is gained by experience and art. 

Let us begin our discussion of the question with the fol- a 
lowing considerations : — 

Of everything which we possess there are two uses : both 
belong to the thing as such, but not in the same manner, for 
one is the proper, and the other the improper or secondary 
use of it. For example, a shoe is used for wear, and is used 
for exchange ; both are uses of the shoe. He who gives 3 
a shoe in exchange for money or food to him who wants 
one, does indeed use the shoe as a shoe, but this is not its 
proper or primary purpose, for a shoe is not made to be an 
object of barter. The same may be said of all possessions, 
for the art of exchange extends to all of them, and it 4 
arises at first in a natural manner from the circumstance 
that some have too little, others too much. Hence we may 
infer that retail trade is not a natural part of the art of money- 
making ; had it been so, men would have ceased to exchange 
when they had enough. And in the first community, which 5 



42 Property — Coined Money 

I. 9 is the family, this art is obviously of no use, but only begins 
to be useful when the society increases. For the members 
of the family originally had all things in common ; in a more 
divided state of society they J still shared in many things, but 
they were different things 1 which they had to give in ex- 
change for what they wanted, a kind of barter which is still 

6 practised among barbarous nations who exchange with one 
another the necessaries of life and nothing more ; giving and 
receiving wine, for example, in exchange for corn and the 
like. This sort of barter is not part of the money-making 
art and is not contrary to nature, but is needed for the satis- 

7 faction of men's natural wants. The other or more complex 
form of exchange grew out of the simpler. When the in- 
habitants of one country became more dependent on those of 
another, and they imported what they needed, and exported 

8 the surplus, money necessarily came into use. For the various 
necessaries of life are not easily carried about, and hence men 
agreed to employ in their dealings with each other something 
which was intrinsically useful and easily applicable to the 
purposes of life, for example, iron, silver, and the like. Of 
this the value was at first measured by size and weight, but in 
process of time they put a stamp upon it, to save the trouble 
of weighing and to mark the value. 

1257 b When the use of coin had once been discovered, out of the 

9 barter of necessary articles arose the other art of money- 
making, namely, retail trade ; which was at first probably 
a simple matter, but became more complicated as soon as men 
learned by experience whence and by what exchanges the 

io greatest profit might be made. Originating in the use of coin, 
the art of money-making is generally thought to be chiefly 
1 Or, more simply, ( shared in many more things.' 



Property: True Notion of Wealth 43 

concerned with it, and to be the art which produces wealth I. 
and money ; having to consider how they may be accumulated. 
Indeed, wealth is assumed by many to be only a quantity of 
coin, because the art of money-making and retail trade are 
concerned with coin. Others maintain that coined money is 1 1 
a mere sham, a thing not natural, but conventional only, 
which would have no value or use for any of the purposes of 
daily life if another commodity were substituted by the users. 
And, indeed, he who is rich in coin may often be in want of 
necessary food. But how can that be wealth of which a man 
may have a great abundance and yet perish with hunger, like 
Midas in the fable, whose insatiable prayer turned everything 
that was set before him into gold ? 

Men seek after a better notion of wealth and of the art of 1 2 
making money than the mere acquisition of coin, and they 
are right. For natural wealth and the natural art of money- 
making are a different thing ; in their true form they are part 
of the management of a household ; whereas retail trade is 
the art of producing wealth, not in every way, but by 
exchange. And it seems to be concerned with coin ; for 
coin is the starting-point and the goal of exchange. And 13 
there is no bound to the wealth which springs from this art 
of money-making 1 . As in the art of medicine there is no 
limit to the pursuit of health, and as in the other arts there is 
no limit to the pursuit of their several ends, for they aim 
at accomplishing their ends to the uttermost; (but of the 
means there is a limit, for the end is always the limit), so, 
too, in this art of money -making there is no limit of the end, 
which is wealth of the spurious kind, and the acquisition of 
money. But the art of household management has a limit; 14 
1 Cp. c. 8. § 14. 



44 ^foney -making in Excess Unnatural 

I. 9 the unlimited acquisition of money is not its business. And, 
therefore, in one point of view, all wealth must have a limit ; 
nevertheless, as a matter of fact, we find the opposite to be 
the case ; for all money-makers increase their hoard of coin 
without limit. The source of the confusion is the near 

15 connexion between the two kinds of money-making; in either, 
the instrument [i. e. wealth] is the same, although the use is 
different, and so they pass into one another ; for each is a use 
of the same property J , but with a difference : accumulation is 
the end in the one case, but there is a further end in the other. 
Hence some persons are led to believe that making money is 
the object of household management, and the whole idea of 
their lives is that they ought either to increase their money 

16 without limit, or at any rate not to lose it. The origin of 
1258 a this disposition in men is that they are intent upon living only, 

and not upon living well ; and, as their desires are unlimited, 
they also desire that the means of gratifying them should be 
without limit. Even those who aim at a good life seek the 
means of obtaining bodily pleasures ; and, since the enjoyment 
of these appears to depend on property, they are absorbed in 
making money : and so there arises the second species of 

17 money-making. For, as their enjoyment is in excess, they 
seek an art which produces the excess of enjoyment ; and, if 
they are not able to supply their pleasures by the art of 
money-making, they try other arts, using in turn every faculty 
in a manner contrary to nature. The quality of courage, for 
example, is not intended to make money, but to inspire con- 
fidence ; neither is this the aim of the general's or of the 
physician's art ; but the one aims at victory and the other at 

18 health. Nevertheless, some men turn every quality or art 

1 Reading KTrjaecus XM^ 15 - 



Money-making: the True iQnd 45- 

into a means of making money ; this they conceive to be I. 9 
the end, and to the promotion of the end all things must 
contribute. 

Thus, then, we have considered the art of money-making, 
which is unnecessary, and why men want it; and also the 
necessary art of money-making, which we have seen to be 
different from the other, and to be a natural part of the art of 
managing a household, concerned with the provision of food, 
not, however, like the former kind, unlimited, but having 
a limit. 

And we have found the answer to our original question 1 , 10 
Whether the art of money-making is the business of the 
manager of a household and of the statesman or not their 
business ? — viz. that it is an art which is presupposed by them. 
/ For political science does not make men, but takes them from 
nature and uses them ; and nature provides them with food 
from the element of earth, air, or sea. At this stage begins 
the duty of the manager of a household, who has to order the 
things which nature supplies ; — he may be compared to the 2 
weaver who has not to make but to use wool, and to know 
what sort of wool is good and serviceable or bad and un- 
serviceable. Were this otherwise, it would be difficult to see 
why the art of money-making is a part of the management 
of a household and the art of medicine not ; for surely the 
members of a household must have health just as they must 
have life or any other necessary. And as from one point 3 
of view the master of the house and the ruler of the state 
have to consider about health, from another point of view not 
they but the physician ; so in one way the art of household 
management, in another way the subordinate art, has to 
x Cp. c. 8. § 1. 



\6 Kinds of Money-making 

1 t 10 consider about money. But, strictly speaking, as I have 
already said, the means of life must be provided beforehand 
by nature; for the business of nature is to furnish food to 
that which is born, and the food of the offspring always 

4 remains over in the parent l . Wherefore the art of making 
money out of fruits and animals is always natural. 

Of the two sorts of money-making one, as I have just 
said, is a part of household management, the other is retail 
trade : the former necessary and honourable, the latter a kind 
1258 b of exchange which is justly censured ; for it is unnatural, 
and a mode by which men gain from one another. The most 
hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury, which 
makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural use 

5 of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange, but 
not to increase at interest. And this term usury [roW], 
which means the birth of money from money, is applied 
to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the 
parent. Wherefore of all modes of making money this is 
the most unnatural. 

11 Enough has been said about the theory of money-making ; 
we will now proceed to the practical part. 2 The discussion 
of such matters is not unworthy of philosophy, but to be 
engaged in them practically is illiberal and irksome 3 . The 
useful parts of money-making are, first, the knowledge of 
live-stock, — which are most profitable, and where, and 
how, — as, for example, what sort of horses or sheep or 
oxen or any other animals are most likely to give a return. 
2 A man ought to know which of these pay better than others, 

1 Cp. c 8. § io. 

2 Or, ' We are free to speculate about them, but in practice we are 
limited by circumstances.' (Bernavs.) 



IQnds of Money-making 47 

and which pay best in particular places, for some do better in 1. 11 
one place and some in another. Secondly, husbandry, which 
may be either tillage or planting, and the keeping of bees and 
of fish, or fowl, or of any animals which may be useful to 
man. These are the divisions of the true or proper art of 3 
money- making and come first. Of the other, which consists 
in exchange, the first and most important division is commerce 
(of which there are three kinds — commerce by sea, commerce 
by land, selling in shops — these again differing as they are 
safer or more profitable), the second is usury, the third, 
service for hire — of this, one kind is employed in the 4 
mechanical arts, the other in unskilled and bodily labour. 
There is still a third sort of money-making intermediate 
between this and the first or natural mode which is partly 
natural, but is also concerned with exchange of the fruits and 
other products of the earth. Some of these latter, although 
they bear no fruit, are nevertheless profitable ; for example, 
wood and minerals. The art of mining, by which minerals 5 
are obtained, has many branches, for there are various kinds 
of things dug out of the earth. Of the several divisions of 
money-making I now speak generally; a minute considera- 
tion of them might be useful in practice, but it would be 
tiresome to dwell upon them at greater length now. 

Those occupations are most truly arts in which there is 6 
the least element of chance ; they are the meanest in which 
the body is most deteriorated, the most servile in which there 
is the greatest use of the body, and the illiberal in which 
there is the least need of excellence. 

Works have been written upon these subjects by various 7 
persons; for example, by Chares the Parian, and Apollodorus 
the Lemnian, who have treated of Tillage and Planting, 



48 Economic Tales 

I. 11 while others have treated of other branches ; any one who 

1259 a cares for such matters may refer to their writings. It 

would be well also to collect the scattered stones of the ways 

in which individuals have succeeded in amassing a fortune ; 

8 for all this is useful to persons who value the art of making 
money. There is the anecdote of Thales the Milesian and 
his financial device, which involves a principle of universal 
application, but is attributed to him on account of his reputa- 

9 tion for wisdom. He was reproached for his poverty, 
which was supposed to show that philosophy was of no use. 
According to the story, he knew by his skill in the stars 
while it was yet winter that there would be a great harvest of 
olives in the coming year ; so, having a little capital, he gave 
earnest-money for the use of all the olive-presses in Chios and 
Miletus, which he hired at a low price because no one bid 
against him. When the harvest-time came, and many wanted 
them all at once and of a sudden, he let them out at any rate 
which he pleased, and made a quantity of money. Thus he 
showed the world that philosophers can easily be rich if 

10 they like, but that their ambition is of another sort. He is 
supposed to have given a striking proof of his wisdom, but, as 
I was saying, his device for getting money is of universal 
application, and is nothing but the creation of a monopoly. 
It is an art often practised by cities when they are in want of 
money ; they make a monopoly of provisions. 

11 There was a man of Sicily, who, having money deposited 
with him, bought up all the iron from the iron mines ; after- 
wards, when the merchants from their various markets came 
to buy, he was the only seller, and without much increasing 

12 the price he gained 200 per cent. Which when Dionysius 
heard, he told him that he might take away his money, but 



Household Government 49 

that he must not remain at Syracuse, for he thought that the I. 11 
man had discovered a way of making money which was 
injurious to his own interests. He had the same idea 1 as 
Thales ; they both contrived to create a monopoly for them- 
selves. And statesmen ought to know these things; for a 13 
state is often as much in want of money and of such devices 
for obtaining it as a household, or even more so ; hence some 
public men devote themselves entirely to finance. 

Of household management we have seen 2 that there are 12 
three parts — one is the rule of a master over slaves, which 
has been discussed already 3 , another of a father, and the 
third of a husband. A husband and father rules over wife 
and children, both free, but the rule differs, the rule over 
his children being a royal, over his wife a constitutional rule. 1259b 
For although there may be exceptions to the order of nature, 
the male is by nature fitter for command than the female, just 
as the elder and full-grown is superior to the younger and 
more immature. But in most constitutional states the citizens * 
rule and are ruled by turns, for the idea of a constitutional 
state implies that the natures of the citizens are equal, and 
do not differ at all 4 . Nevertheless, when one rules and the 
other is ruled we endeavour to create a difference of outward 
forms and modes of address and titles of respect, which may 
be illustrated by the saying of Amasis about his foot-pan 6 . 
The relation of the male to the female is of this kind, but 3 
there the inequality is permanent. The rule of a father over 
his children is royal, for he receives both love and the respect 
due to age, exercising a kind of royal power. And therefore 

1 Reading €vprjp.a with Bernays. 2 Cp. c. 3. § 1 . 

s Cp. c. 3-7. 4 Cp. ii. 2. § 6; iii. 17. § 4. 

6 Herod, ii. 172, and note on this passage. 

DAVIS E 



1.12 



13 



\ 



So Virtue in the Subject Classes 

Homer has appropriately called Zeus ' father of Gods and 
men/ because he is the king of them all. For a king is the 
natural superior of his subjects, but he should be of the same 
kin or kind with them, and such is the relation of elder and 
younger, of father and son. 

Thus it is clear that household management attends more 
to men than to the acquisition of inanimate things, and to 
human excellence more than to the excellence of property 
which we call wealth, and to the virtue of freemen more than 
to the virtue of slaves. A question may indeed be raised, 
whether there is any excellence at all in a slave beyond merely 
instrumental and ministerial qualities — whether he can have 
the virtues of temperance, courage, justice, and the like ; or 
whether slaves possess only bodily and ministerial qualities. 
And, whichever way we answer the question, a difficulty 
arises ; for, if they have virtue, in what will they differ from 
freemen ? On the other hand, since they are men and share 
in reason, it seems absurd to say that they have no virtue. 
A similar question may be raised about women and children, 
whether they too have virtues : ought a woman to be tem- 
perate and brave and just, and is a child to be called temperate, 
and intemperate, or not ? So in general we may ask about 
the natural ruler, and the natural subject, whether they have 
the same or different virtues. For a noble nature is equally 
required in both, but if so, why should one of them always 
rule, and the other always be ruled ? Nor can we say that 
this is a question of degree, for the difference between ruler 
and subject is a difference of kind, and therefore not of 
degree ; yet how strange is the supposition that the one 
ought, and that the other ought not, to have virtue ! For if 
the ruler is intemperate and unjust, how can he rule well ? 



Virtues not the same for All 5-1 

if the subject, how can he obey well ? If he be licentious I. 13 
and cowardly, he will certainly not do his duty. It is evident, a 

/therefore, that both of them must have a share of virtue, but 
'varying according to their various natures. And this is at 6 
once indicated by the soul, in which one part naturally rules, 
and the other is subject, and the virtue of the ruler we main- 
tain to be different from that of the subject ; — the one being 
the virtue of the rational, and the other of the irrational part. 
Now, it is obvious that the same principle applies generally, 
and therefore almost all things rule and are ruled according to 
nature. But the kind of rule differs ; — the freeman rules over 7 
the slave after another manner from that in which the male 
rules over the female, or the man over the child; although, 
the parts of the soul are present in all of them, they are pre-j 
sent in different degrees. For the slave has no deliberative 
faculty at all ; the woman has, but it is * without authority 1 
and the child has, but it is immature. So it must necessarily 8 
be with the moral virtues also ; all may be supposed to partake 
of them, but only in such manner and degree as is required by 
each for the fulfilment of his duty. Hence the ruler ought 
to have moral virtue in perfection, for his duty is entirely 
that of a master artificer, and the master artificer is reason ; 
the subjects, on the other hand, require only that measure of 
virtue which is proper to each of them. Clearly, then, moral 9 
virtue belongs to all of them ; but the temperance of a man 
and of a woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of 
a woman, are not, as Socrates maintained 2 , the same ; the 
courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in 
obeying. And this holds of all other virtues, as will be more 10 
clearly seen if we look at them in detail, for those who say 
1 Or, with Bernays, ' inconclusive.' 2 Plato Meno, 71-73. 

K 2 



fi The Slave and the Artisan 

I. 13 generally that virtue consists in a good disposition of the 
soul, or in doing rightly, or the like, only deceive themselves. 
Far better than such definitions is their mode of speaking, 
ii who, like Georgias l , enumerate the virtues. All classes 
must be deemed to have their special attributes ; as the poet 
says of women, 

'Silence is a woman's glory 2 ,' 

but this is not equally the glory of man. The child is imper- 
fect, and therefore obviously his virtue is not relative to him- 

12 self alone, but to the perfect man and to his teacher 3 , and in 
like manner the virtue of the slave is relative to a master. 
Now we determined that a slave is useful for the wants of 
life, and therefore he will obviously require only so much 
virtue as will prevent him from failing in his duty through 
cowardice and intemperance. Some one will ask whether, if 
what we are saying is true, virtue will not be required also in 
the artisans, for they often fail in their work through miscon- 

13 duct. But is there not a great difference in the two cases? 
For the slave shares in his master's life ; the artisan is less 
closely connected with him, and only attains excellence in 
proportion as he becomes a slave, [i. e. is under the direction 
of a master]. The meaner sort of mechanic has a special 

1260 b and separate slavery; and whereas the slave exists by nature, 

14 not so the shoemaker or other artisan. It is manifest, then, 
that the master ought to be the source of excellence in the 
slave ; but not merely because he possesses the art which trains 
him in his duties 4 . Wherefore they are mistaken who forbid 
us to converse with slaves and say that we should employ 

1 Plato Meno, 71-73. 2 Soph. Aj. 293. 

s ' His father who guides him' (Bernays), * Cp. c. 7. § 4. 



End of Preliminary Enquiry 5-3 

command only \ for slaves stand even more in need of admoni- I. 13 
tion than children. 

The relations of husband and wife, parent and child, their 15 
several virtues, what in their intercourse with one another is 
good, and what is evil, and how we may pursue the good and 
escape the evil, will have to be discussed when we speak of 
the different forms of government. For, inasmuch as every 
family is a part of a state, and these relationships are the 
parts of a family, the virtue of the part must have regard to 
the virtue of the whole. And therefore women and children 
must be trained by education with an eye to the state 2 , if the 
virtues of either of them are supposed to make any difference 
in the virtues of the state. And they must make a difference : 16 
for the children grow up to be citizens, and half the free 
persons in a state are women 3 . 

Of these matters, enough has been said ; of what remains, 14 
let us speak at another time. Regarding, then, our present 
enquiry as complete, we will make a new beginning. And, 
first, let us examine the various theories of a perfect state. 

1 Plato Laws, vi. 777. 2 Cp. v. 9. §§ 11-15 ; viii. 1. § 1. 

3 Plato Laws, vi. 781 b. 



BOOK II 

II. 1 Our purpose is to consider what form of political commu- 
nity is best of all for those who are most able to realize their 
ideal of life. We must therefore examine not only this but 
other constitutions, both such as actually exist in well-governed 
states, and any theoretical forms which are held in esteem ; 
that what is good and useful may be brought to light. And 
let no one suppose that in seeking for something beyond them 
1 we at all want to philosophize at the expense of truth * ; we 
only undertake this enquiry because all the constitutions with 
which we are acquainted are faulty. 

3 We will begin with the natural beginning of the subject. 
fThree alternatives are conceivable : The members of a state 
I must either have (i) all things or (2) nothing in common, or 

f (3) some things in common and some not. That they should 

have nothing in common is clearly impossible, for the state is 

a community, and must at any rate have a common place — 

1261 a one city will be in one place, and the citizens are those who 

3 share in that one city. But should a well-ordered state have 
all things, as far as may be, in common, or some only and 
not others ? For the citizens might conceivably have wives 
and children and property in common, as Socrates proposes 
in the Republic of Plato 2 . Which is better, our present 
condition, or the proposed new order of society ? 

1 Or, as Bernays, taking ttclvtojs with cro(pi£ec9ai fiovXofitvoji', ( we 
are anxious to make a sophistical display at any cost/ 

2 Rep. v. 457 c. 



False Conception of Unity >-$- 

There are many difficulties in the community of women. II. 
The principle on which Socrates rests the necessity of such 
an institution does not appear to be established by his argu- 
ments ; and then again as a means to the end which he ascribes 
to the state, taken literally, it is impossible, and how we are to 
limit and qualify it is nowhere precisely stated. I am speak- a 
ing of the premiss from which the argument of Socrates pro- ! 
ceeds, ' that the greater the unity of the state the better.' Is 
it not obvious that a state may at length attain such a degree 
of unity as to be no longer a state ? — since the nature of a 
state is to be a plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from 
being a state, it becomes a family, and from being a family, 
an individual ; for the family may be said to be more one 
than the state, and the individual than the family. So that 
we ought not to attain this greatest unity even if we could, for 
it would be the destruction of the state. Again, a state is 3 
not made up only of so many men, but of different kinds of 
men ; for similars do not constitute a state. It is not like 
a military alliance, of which the usefulness depends upon 
its quantity even where there is no difference in quality. 
Foi in that mutual protection is the end aimed at; and the 
question is the same as about the scales of a balance : which 
is the heavier ? 

In like manner, a state differs from a nation, whenever in 
a nation the people are not dispersed in villages, but are in 
the condition of the Arcadians ; in a state the elements out of 
which the unity is to be formed differ in kind. Wherefore 4 
the principle of reciprocity *, as I have already remarked in 
the Ethics 2 , is the salvation of states. And among freemen 
and equals this is a principle which must be maintained, for 

1 Or, * reciprocal proportion.' 3 N. Eih. v. 8. § 6. 



f6 Plato's Republic: 

II. 2 they cannot all rule together, but must change at the end of 
a year or some other period of time or in some order of suc- 

5 cession. The result is that upon this plan they all govern ; 
[but the manner of government is] just as if shoemakers and 
carpenters were to exchange their occupations, and the same 
persons did not always continue shoemakers and carpenters. 

6 And it is clearly better that, as in business, so also in politics 
there should be continuance of the same persons where this 

1261 b is possible. But where this is not possible by reason of the 
natural equality of the citizens, and it would be unjust that 
any one should be excluded from the government (whether 
to govern be a good thing or a bad *), then it is better, 
instead of all holding power, to adopt a principle of rotation, 
equals giving place to equals, as the original rulers gave place 

7 to them 2 . Thus the one party rule and the others are ruled 
in turn, as if they were no longer the same persons. In like 
manner there is a variety in the offices held by them. Hence 
it is evident that a city is not by nature one in that sense 
which some persons affirm ; and that what is said to be the 
greatest good of cities is in reality their destruction ; but 
surely the good of things must be that which preserves them 3 . 

S Again, in another point of view, this extreme unification 
of the state is clearly not good ; for a family is more self- 
sufficing than an individual, and a city than a family, and 
a city only comes into being when the community is large 
enough to be self-sufficing. If then self-sufficiency is to be 
desired, the lesser degree of unity is more desirable than the 
greater. 

3 But, even supposing that it were best for the community to 

1 Cp. PI. Rep. i. 345-6. 3 Cp. i. 12. § 2; iii. 17. § 4. 

' Cp. PI. Rep. 1,352. 



False Conception of "Unity 57 

\ have the greatest degree of unity, this unity is by no means II. 3 
(indicated by the fact 'of all men saying "mine" and u not 
smine" at the same instant of time,' which, according to 
Socrates *, is the sign of perfect unity in a state. For the 2 
word ( all ' is ambiguous. If the meaning be that every indi- 
vidual says ' mine ' and * not mine ' at the same time, then 
perhaps the result at which Socrates aims may be in some 
degree accomplished ; each man will call the same person his 
own son and his own wife, and so of his property and of all 
that belongs to him. This, however, is not the way in which 
people would speak who had their wives and children in 
common ; they would say ' all ' but not ( each.' In like man- 3 
ner their property would be described as belonging to them, 
not severally but collectively. There is an obvious fallacy in 
the term ' all ' : like some other words, ' both/ * odd,' ' even,' 
it is ambiguous, and in argument becomes a source of logical 
puzzles. That all persons call the same thing mine in the 
sense in which each does so may be a fine thing, but it is 
impracticable ; or if the words are taken in the other sense 
[i. e. the sense which distinguishes ' all ' from * each '], such 
a unity in no way conduces to harmony. And there is 4 
another objection to the proposal. For that which is common , 
to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. ' 
Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the 
common interest ; and only when he is himself concerned as 
an individual. For besides other considerations, everybody is 
more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to 
fulfil ; as in families many attendants are often less useful than 
a few. Each citizen will have a thousand sons who will not 5 
be his sons individually, but anybody will be equally the son 
1 PI. Rep. v. 462 c. 



y8 Plato 3 s Republic: 

II. 3 of anybody, and will therefore be neglected by all alike. 
a Further, upon this principle, every one will call another 
* mine ' or ; not mine ' according as he is prosperous or the 
reverse ;— however small a fraction he may be of the whole 
number, he will say of every individual of the thousand, or 
whatever be the number of the city, * such a one is mine,' 
' such a one his ' ; and even about this he will not be posi- 
tive ; for it is impossible to know who chanced to have a 
child, or whether, if one came into existence, it has survived. 

6 But which is better — to be able to say ' mine ' about every 
one of the two thousand or the ten thousand citizens, or to 
use the word * mine ' in the ordinary and more restricted 

7 sense ? For usually the same person is called by one man 
his son whom another calls his brother or cousin or kinsman 
or blood-relation or connexion by marriage either of himself 
or of some relation of his, and these relationships he distin- 
guishes from the tie which binds him to his tribe or ward ; 
and how much better is it to be the real cousin of somebody 

8 than to be a son after Plato's fashion ! Nor is there any 
way of preventing brothers and children and fathers and 
mothers from sometimes recognizing one another; for chil- 
dren are born like their parents, and they will necessarily be 

9 finding indications of their relationship to one another. Geo- 
graphers declare such to be the fact; they say that in Upper 
Libya, where the women are common, nevertheless the chil- 
dren who are born are assigned to their respective fathers on 
the ground of their likeness 1 . And some women, like the 
females of other animals — for example mares and cows — 
have a strong tendency to produce offspring resembling their 

1 Cp. Herod, iv. 180. 



Community of Women and Children f$ 

parents, as was the case with the Pharsalian mare called II. 3 
Dicaea (the Just) 1 . 

Other evils, against which it is not easy for the authors of 4 
such a community to guard, will be assaults and homicides, 
voluntary as well as involuntary, quarrels and slanders, all 
which are most unholy acts when committed against fathers 
and mothers and near relations, but not equally unholy when 
there is no relationship. Moreover, they are much more 
likely to occur if the relationship is unknown, and, when they 
have occurred, the customary expiations of them cannot 
be made. Again, how strange it is that Socrates, after 3 
having made the children common, should hinder lovers 
from carnal intercourse only, but should permit familiarities 
between father and son or between brother and brother, 
than which nothing can be more unseemly, since even 
without them, love of this sort is improper. How strange, 3 
too, to forbid intercourse for no other reason than the violence 
of the pleasure, as though the relationship of father and son 
or of brothers with one another made no difference. 

This community of wives and children seems better 4| 
suited to the husbandmen than to the guardians, for if they J 
have wives and children in common, they will be bound 1262 b 
to one another by weaker ties, as a subject class should be, 
and they will remain obedient and not rebel 2 . In a word, the 5 
result of such a law would be just the opposite of that which 
good laws ought to have, and the intention of Socrates 
in making these regulations about women and children would 
defeat itself. For friendship we believe to be the greatest good 
of states 3 and the preservative of them against revolutions ; 

1 Cp. Hist. Anim. vii. 6, p. 586 a. 13. 
a Cp. vii. 10. § 13. * Cp. N. Eth. viii. I. § 4. 



60 Plato's Republic: 

II. 4 neither is there anything which Socrates so greatly lauds as 
the unity of the state which he and all the world declare 
to be created by friendship. But the unity which he com- 
mends l would be like that of the lovers in the Sympo- 
sium 2 , who, as Aristophanes says, desire to grow together 
in the excess "of their affection, and from being two to 

7 become one, in which case one or both would certainly 
perish. Whereas [the very opposite will really happen ;] in 
a state having women and children common, love will be 
watery ; and the father will certainly not say ' my son,' or 

8 the son ' my father V As a little sweet wine mingled with 
a great deal of water is imperceptible in the mixture, so, 
in this sort of community, the idea of relationship which 
is based upon these names will be lost ; there is no reason 
why the so-called father should care about the son, or 
the son about the father, or brothers about one another. 

9 Of the two qualities which chiefly inspire regard and affection 
— that a thing is your own and that you love it — neither 
can exist in such a state as this. 

Again, the transfer of children as soon as they are born 
from the rank of husbandmen or of artisans to that of 
guardians, and from the rank of guardians into a lower rank 4 , 
will be very difficult to arrange ; the givers or transferrers 
cannot but know whom they are giving and transferring, and 
io to whom. And the previously mentioned evils, such as 
assaults, unlawful loves, homicides, will happen more often 
amongst those who are transferred to the lower classes, 
or who have a place assigned to them among the guardians ; 
for they will no longer call the members of any other class 

1 Cp. c. 2. a Symp. 189-193. 3 Cp. c. 3. 

* Rep. iii. 415. 



Community of Property 6\ 

brothers, and children, and fathers, and mothers, and will II. 4 
not, therefore, be afraid of committing any crimes by reason 
of consanguinity. Touching the community of wives and 
children, let this be our conclusion. 

Next let us consider what should be our arrangements 5 
about property : should the citizens of the perfect state have 
their possessions in common or not ? This question may 2 
be discussed separately from the enactments about women 
and children. Even supposing that the women and children 1268 a 
belong to individuals, according to the custom which is at 
present universal, may there not be an advantage in having and 
using possessions in common ? Three cases are possible : 
(1) the soil may be appropriated, but the produce may be 
thrown for consumption into the common stock ; and this is 
the practice of some nations. Or (2), the soil may be j 
common, and may be cultivated in common, but the produce J 
divided among individuals for their private use ; this is a form I 
of common property which is said to exist among certain J 
barbarians. Or (3), the soil and the produce may be alike ■' 
common. 

When the husbandmen are not the citizens, the case will 3 
be different and easier to deal with ; but when the citizens till 
the ground themselves the question of ownership will give a 
world of trouble. If they do not share equally in enjoyments \ 
and toils, those who labour much and get little will necessarily \ 
complain of those who labour little and receive or consume \ 
much. There is always a difficulty in men living together and 4 
having things in common, but especially in their having 
common property. The partnerships of fellow-travellers are 
an example to the point ; for they generally fall out by 
the way and quarrel about any trifle which turns up. So 



6z Plato's Republic: 



II. 5 with servants : we are most liable to take offence at those 
with whom we most frequently come into contact in daily 
life. 
5 These are only some of the disadvantages which attend 
the community of property ; the present arrangement, if im- 
proved as it might be by good customs and laws, would be 
far better, and would have the advantages of both systems. 
Property should be in a certain sense common, but, as a 
general rule, private ; for, when every one has a distinct 
interest 1 , men will not complain of one another, and they 
will make more progress, because every one will be attending 
to his own business. And yet among the good, and in 
respect of use, ' Friends/ as the proverb says, i will have all 
things common V Even now there are traces of such a 
principle, showing that it is not impracticable, but, in well- 
ordered states, exists already to a certain extent and may 

7 be carried further. For, although every man has his own 
property, some things he will place at the disposal of his 
friends, while of others he shares the use with them. The 
Lacedaemonians, for example, use one another's slaves, and 
horses and dogs, as if they were their own ; and when they 
happen to be in the country, they appropriate in the fields 

8 whatever provisions they want. It is clearly better that property 
should be private, but the use of it common ; and the special 
business of the legislator is to create in men this benevolent 
disposition. Again, how immeasurably greater is the pleasure, 

1263 b when a man feels a thing to be his own ; for the love of self 3 
is a feeling implanted by nature and not given in vain, 

9 although selfishness is rightly censured ; this, however, is not 

1 Cp. Rep. ii. 374. 2 Cp. Rep. iv. 424 a. 

3 Cp. N. Eth. ix. S. § 6. 



Community of Property 0*3 

the mere love of self, but the love of self in excess, like II. 5 
the miser's love of money ; for all, or almost all, men love 
money, and other such objects in a measure. And further, 
there is the greatest pleasure in doing a kindness or service to 
friends or guests or companions, which can only be rendered 
when a man has private property. The advantage is lost by 10 
the excessive unification of the state. Two' virtues are 
annihilated in such a state : first, temperance towards women 
(for it is an honourable action to abstain from another's wife 
for temperance sake) ; secondly, liberality in the matter of 
property. No one, when men have all things in common, ? 
will any longer set an example of liberality or do any 
liberal action ; for liberality consists in the use which is made 
of property x . 

Such legislation may have a specious appearance of 11 
benevolence ; men readily listen to it, and are easily induced 
to believe that in some wonderful manner everybody will 
become everybody's friend, especially when some one 2 is ( 
heard denouncing the evils now existing in states, suits 4 
about contracts, convictions for perjury, flatteries of rich men \ 
and the like, which are said to arise out of the possession of \ 
private property. These evils, however, are due to a very 12 
different cause — the wickedness of human nature. Indeed, 
we see that there is much more quarrelling among those 
who have all things in common, though there are not many / 
of them when compared with the vast numbers who have \ 
private property. 

Again, we ought to reckon, not only the evils from 13 
which the citizens will be saved, but also the advantages 
which they will lose. The life which they are to lead "appears 
1 Cp. N, Eth. iv. 1. § I. a Rep. v. 464, 465. 



6 4 Plato's Republic: 

II. 5 to be quite impracticable. The error of Socrates must be 

<*- ^ attributed to the false notion of unity from which he starts. 

V . 1 f Unity there should be, both of the family and of the state, 

\ but in some respects only. For there is a point at which 

a state may attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a 

state, or at which, without actually ceasing to exist, it will 

become an inferior state, like harmony passing into unison, 

15 or rhythm which has been reduced to a single foot. The 
state, as I was saying, is a plurality *, which should be 
united and made into a community by education ; and it 
is strange that the author of a system of education, which 
he thinks will make the state virtuous, should expect to 
improve his citizens by regulations of this sort, and not 
by philosophy or by customs and laws, like those which 
prevail at Sparta and Crete respecting common meals, where- 

1264 a by the legislator has [to a certain degree] made property 

16 common. Let us remember that we should not disregard the 
experience of ages ; in the multitude of years these things, if 
they were good, would certainly not have been unknown ; for 
almost everything has been found out, although sometimes 

f they are not put together ; in other cases men do not use the 

17 knowledge which they have. Great light would be thrown on 
this subject if we could see such a form of government in the 
actual process of construction ; for the legislator could not 
form a state at all without distributing and dividing the citizens 
into associations for common meals, and into phratries and 
tribes. But all this legislation ends only in forbidding 
agriculture to the guardians, a prohibition which the Lace- 
daemonians try to enforce already. 

18 Again, Socrates has not said, nor is it easy to decide, 

1 Cp. c 2. § 2. 



Miscellaneous Criticisms 6? 

what in such a community will be the general form of the II. 5 
state. The citizens who are not guardians are the majority, 
and about them nothing has been determined : are the 
husbandmen, too, to have their property in common ? Or, 
besides the common land which he tills, is each individual 
to have his own ? and are their wives and children to 
be individual or common ? If, like the guardians, they are to 19 
have all things in common, in what do they differ from them, 
or what will they gain by submitting to their government ? 
Or, upon what principle would they submit, unless indeed 
the governing class adopt the ingenious policy of the Cretans, 
who give their slaves the same institutions as their own, 
but forbid them gymnastic exercises and the possession of 
arms. If, on the other hand, the inferior classes are too 20 
like other cities in respect of marriage and property, what will 
be the form of the community? Must it not contain two 
states in one 1 , each hostile to the other ? 2 One class will 
consist of the guardians, who are a sort of watchmen ; 
another, of the husbandmen, and there will be the artisans and 
the other citizens 2 . But [if so] the suits and quarrels, and all 21 
the evils which Socrates affirms s to exist in other states, will 
exist equally among them. He says indeed that, having so 
good an education, the citizens will not need many laws, for 
example, laws about the city or about the markets 4 ; but then 
he confines his education to the guardians. Again, he makes 22 
the husbandmen owners of the land upon condition of their 
paying a tribute *\ But in that case they are likely to be much 

1 Cp. Rep. iv. 422 e. 

3 Or (with Bernays), ' He makes the guardians into a mere occupying 
garrison, while the husbandmen and artisans and the rest are the real 
citizens ; ' see note. 

8 Rep. v. 464, 465. 4 Rep. iv. 425 D. • Rep. v. 464 c. 

DAVIS F 



66 Plato's Republic: 



II. 5 more unmanageable and conceited than the Helots, or 

23 Penestae, or slaves in general 1 . And whether community 
of wives and property be necessary for the lower equally 
with the higher class or not, and the questions akin to this, 
what will be the education, form of government, laws of 
the lower class, Socrates has nowhere determined : neither 
is it easy, though very important, to discover what should 
be the character of the inferior classes, if the common life of 
the guardians is to be maintained. 

1264 b Again, if Socrates makes the women common, and retains 

2 4 private property, the men will see to the fields, but who 
will see to the house ? 2 And what will happen if the 
agricultural class have both their property and their wives 
in common 2 ? Once more ; it is absurd to argue, from 
the analogy of the animals, that men and women should 
follow the same pursuits 3 ; for animals have not to manage 

25 a household. The government, too, as constituted by 
/ Socrates, contains elements of danger ; for he makes the same 
I persons always rule. And if this is often a cause of dis- 
turbance among the meaner sort, how much more among high- 

26 spirited warriors ? But that the persons whom he makes 
rulers must be the same is evident ; for the gold which the 
God mingles in the souls of men is not at one time given to 
one, at another time to another, but always to the same : as 
he says, * God mingles gold in some, and silver in others, 
from their very birth ; but brass and iron in those who are 

27 meant to be artisans and husbandmen V Again, he deprives 
the guardians of happiness, and says that the legislator ought 
to make the whole state happy 5 . But the whole cannot 

1 Cp. c. 9. § 2. 2 These words are bracketed by Bekker. 

* Cp. Rep. v. 451 d. 4 Cp. Rep. iii. 415 a, 5 Rep. iv. 419, 420. 



Criticisms 6j 

be happy unless most, or all, or some of its parts enjoy II. 5 
happiness 1 . In this respect happiness is not like the even 
principle in numbers, which may exist only in the whole, 
but in none of the parts ; not so happiness. And if the 28 
guardians are not happy, who are ? Surely not the artisans, 
or the common people. The Republic of which Socrates 
discourses has all these difficulties, and others quite as 
great. 

The same, or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato's 6 
later work, the Laws, and therefore we had better examine 
briefly the constitution which is therein described. In the 
Republic, Socrates has definitely settled in all a few questions 
only; such as the community of women and children, the 
community of property, and the constitution of the state. 
The population is divided into two classes — one of husband- 2 
men, and the other of warriors ; from this latter is taken 
a third class of counsellors and rulers of the state. But 3 
Socrates has not determined whether the husbandmen and 
artisans are to have a share in the government, and whether 
they, too, are to carry arms and share in military service, 
or not. He certainly thinks that the women ought to share 
in the education of the guardians, and to fight by their side. 
The remainder of the work is filled up with digressions 
foreign to the main subject, and with discussions about the 
education of the guardians. In the Laws there is hardly !265 a 
anything but laws; not much is said about the constitution. * 
This, which he had intended to make more of the ordinary 
type, he gradually brings round to the other or ideal form. 
For with the exception of the community of women and 5 
property, he supposes everything to be the same in both 

1 Cp. vii. 9. § 7. 
F 2 



6% Plato 3 s Laws: 

II. 6 states ; there is to be the same education ; the citizens of 
both are to live free from servile occupations, and there are to 
be common meals in both. The only difference is that in the 
Laws, the common meals are extended to women \ and 
the warriors number about 5000 2 , but in the Republic only 

IOOO 3 . 

6 The discourses of Socrates are never commonplace ; they 
always exhibit grace and originality and thought ; but perfec- 

J tion in everything can hardly be expected. We must not 
overlook the fact that the number of 5000 citizens, just now 
mentioned, will require a territory as large as Babylonia, or 
some other huge country, if so many persons are to be sup- 
ported in idleness, together with their women and attendants, 

7 who will be a multitude many times as great. [In framing 
an ideal] we may assume what we wish, but should avoid 
impossibilities 4 . 

It is said [in the Laws] that the legislator ought to have 
his eye directed to two points, — the people and the country 5 . 
But neighbouring countries also must not be forgotten by 
him 6 , if the state for which he legislates is to have a true 
political life 7 . For a state must have such a military force 
as will be serviceable against her neighbours, and not merely 

8 useful at home. Even if the life of action is not admitted to 
be the best, either for individuals or states 8 , still a city should 
be formidable to enemies, whether invading or retreating. 

There is another point : Should not the amount of pro- 
perty be defined in some clearer way ? For Socrates says 

1 Laws, vi. 781. 2 Laws, v. 737 e. 

3 Rep. iv. 423 a (but see note on this passage). 

* Cp. vii. 4. § 2. 5 Perhaps Laws, 703-707 and 747 d (?). 

6 Cp. c. 7. § 14. 7 Cp, vii. 6. § ?. 8 Cp. vii. c. 2 and 3. 



Criticisms 6$ 

that a man should have so much property as will enable him II. 6 
to live temperately \ which is only a way of saying ' to live 
well ' ; this would be the higher or more general conception. 
But a man may live temperately and yet miserably. A better 9 
definition would be that a man must have so much property 
as will enable him to live not only temperately but liberally 2 ; 
if the two are parted, liberality will combine with luxury ; toil 
will be associated with temperance. For liberality and tem- 
perance are the only virtues 3 which have to do with the use 
of property. A man cannot use property with mildness or 
courage, but temperately and liberally he may ; and therefore 
the practice of these virtues is inseparable from property. 
There is an inconsistency, too, in equalizing the property and 10 
not regulating the number of the citizens 4 ; the population is 
to remain unlimited, and he thinks that it will be sufficiently 
equalized by a certain number of marriages being unfruitful, 
however many are born to others, because he finds this to be 1265 b 
the case in existing states. But [in Plato's imaginary state] 1 1 
greater care will be required than now ; for among ourselves, 
whatever may be the number of citizens, the property is always 
distributed among them, and therefore no one is in want ; but, 
if the property were incapable of division [as in the Laws], 
the supernumeraries, whether few or many, would get nothing. 
One would have thought that it was even more necessaiy to 1 2 
limit population than property; and that the limit should be 
fixed by calculating the chances of mortality in the children, 
and of sterility in married persons. The neglect of this sub- 13 
ject, which in existing states is so common, is a never-failing 

1 Laws, v. 737 D. 3 Cp. vii. 5. § 1. 

3 Omitting e^eis and reading dp^rai with the MSS., or, reading with 
Bekk. i£ets alp€rai } * eligible qualities.' * But see Laws, v. 740. 



jo Plato' \r Laws: 

II. 6 cause of poverty among the citizens ; and poverty is the parent 
of revolution and crime. Pheidon the Corinthian, who was 
one of the most ancient legislators, thought that the families 
and the number of citizens ought to remain the same, although 
originally all the lots may have been of different sizes ; but in 

14 the Laws, the opposite principle is maintained. What in our 
opinion is the right arrangement will have to be explained 
hereafter * . 

There is another omission in the Laws ; Socrates does not 
tell us how the rulers differ from their subjects ; he only says 
that they should be related as the warp and the woof, which 

15 are made out of different wools 2 . He allows that a man's 
whole property may be increased fivefold 3 , but why should not 
his land also increase to a certain extent ? Again, will the 
good management of a household be promoted by his arrange- 
ment of homesteads ? for he assigns to each individual two 

16 homesteads in separate places 4 , and it is difficult to live in two 
houses. 

The whole system of government tends to be neither demo- 
cracy nor oligarchy, but something in a mean between them, 
which is usually called a polity, and is composed of the heavy 
armed soldiers. Now, if he intended to frame a constitution 
which would suit the greatest number of states, he was very 
likely right, but not if he meant to say that this constitutional 
form came nearest to his first or ideal state ; for many would 

17 prefer the Lacedaemonian, or, possibly, some other more aris- 
tocratic government. Some, indeed, say that the best consti- 

1 Cp. vii. 5. § 1 ; 10. § 11 ; 16. § 15 ; but the promise is hardly 
fulfilled. 

3 Laws, v. 734 e, 735 a. 3 Laws, v. 744 e. 

1 Laws, v. 745, but cp. infra, vii. 10. § 11. 



The Form of Government 71 

tution is a combination of all existing forms, and they praise the II. 
Lacedaemonian 1 because it is made up of oligarchy, monarchy, 
democracy, the king forming the monarchy, and the council 
of elders the oligarchy, while the democratic element is 
represented by the Ephors ; for the Ephors are selected from 
the people. Others, however, declare the Ephoralty to be 
a tyranny, and find the element of democracy in the common 
meals and in the habits of daily life. In the Law 2 , it is 
maintained that the best state is made up of democracy and 
tyranny, which are either not constitutions at all, or are the 
worst of all. But they are nearer the truth who combine j 
many forms; for the state is better which is made up off| 
more numerous elements. The constitution proposed in the 
Laws has no element of monarchy at all ; it is nothing but 
oligarchy and democracy, leaning rather to oligarchy. This 19 
is seen in the mode of appointing magistrates 3 ; for although 
the appointment of them by lot from among those who have 
been already selected combines both elements, the way in 
which the rich are compelled by law to attend the assembly 4 
and vote for magistrates or discharge other political duties, 
while the rest may do as they like, and the endeavour to have 
the greater number of the magistrates appointed out of the 
richest classes and the highest officers selected from those 
who have the greatest incomes, both these are oligarchical 20 
features. The oligarchical principle prevails also in the 
choice of the council ° ; for all are compelled to choose, but 
the compulsion extends only to the choice out of the first 

1 C P . iv. § 7; 7. § 4; 9. §§ 7-9- 2 vi - 75 6 E J C P- iv - l l °> 

3 Laws, vi. 755, 763 e, 765. 

4 Laws, vi. 764 a; and Pol. iv. 9. § 2 ; 14. § 12. 
8 Laws, vi. 756 b-e. 



72 Plato's Laws: 

II. 6 class, and of an equal number out of the second class and out 
of the third class, but not in this latter case to all the voters 
of the third and forth class ; and the selection of candidates 
out of the fourth class l is only compulsory on the first and 

21 second. Then, he says that there ought to be an equal 
number of each class selected. Thus a preponderance will 
be given to the better sort of people, who have the larger 

• incomes, because many of the lower classes, not being com- 

22 pelled, will not vote. These considerations, and others which 
will be adduced when the time comes for examining similar 
polities, tend to show that states like Plato's should not be 
composed of democracy and monarchy. There is also a 
danger in electing the magistrates out of a body who are 
themselves elected ; for, if but a small number choose to com- 
bine, the elections will always go as they desire. Such is the 
constitution which is described in the Laws. 

7 Other constitutions have been proposed ; some by private 
persons, others by philosophers and statesmen, which all 
come nearer to established or existing ones than either of 
Plato's. No one else has introduced such novelties as the 
community of women and children, or public tables for women : 

2 other legislators begin with what is necessary. In the 
/opinion of some, the regulation of property is the chief point 

/ of all, that being the question upon which all revolutions turn. 
\ This danger was recognized by Phaleas of Chalcedon, who 
* was the first to affirm that the citizens of a state ought to have 

3 equal possessions. He thought that in a new colony the 
1266 b equalization might be accomplished without difficulty, not so 

easily when a state was already established ; and that then 
the shortest way of compassing the desired end would be for 

1 Omitting either rov maprov or tot TtT&prwv, 



Pbaleas — Equality of Property 73 

the rich to give and not to receive marriage portions, and for II. 
the poor not to give but to receive them. 

Plato in the Laws was of opinion that, to a certain extent, 4 
accumulation should be allowed, forbidding, as I have already 
observed 1 , any citizen to possess more than five times the 
minimum qualification. But those who make such laws should 5 
remember what they are apt to forget — that the legislator 1 
who fixes the amount of property should also fix the number/ 
of children ; for, if the children are too many for the property, * 
the law must be broken. And, besides the violation of the 
law, it is a bad thing that many from being rich should 
become poor ; for men of ruined fortunes are sure to stir up 
revolutions. That the equalization of property exercises an 6 
influence on political society was clearly understood even by 
some of the old legislators. Laws were made by Solon and 
others prohibiting an individual from possessing as much land 
as he pleased ; and there are other laws in states which forbid 
the sale of property : among the Locrians, for example, there 
is a law that a man is not to sell his property unless he can 
prove unmistakably that some misfortune has befallen him. 7 
Again, there have been laws which enjoin the preservation of 
the original lots. Such a law existed in the island of Leucas, 
and the abrogation of it made the constitution too democratic, 
for the rulers no longer had the prescribed qualification. 
Again, where there is equality of property, the amount may 
be either too large or too small, and the possessor may be 
living either in luxury or penury. Clearly, then, the legis- 
lator ought not only to aim at the equalization of properties, 8 
but at moderation in their amount. And yet, if he prescribe 
this moderate amount equally to all, he will be no nearer the 
1 c. 6. § 15, 



74 Phaleas, 

II. 7 mark ; for it is not the possessions but the desires of mankind 

I which require to be equalized 1 , and this is impossible, unless 

a sufficient education is provided by the state. But Phaleas 

will probably reply that this is precisely what he means ; and 

that, in his opinion, there ought to be in states, not only equal 

9 property, but equal education. Still he should tell us what 

will be the character of his education ; there is no use in 

having one and the same for all, if it is of a sort that predis- 

io poses men to avarice, or ambition, or both. Moreover, civil 

troubles arise, not only out of the inequality of property, but 

out of the inequality of honour, though in opposite ways. For 

1267 a the common people quarrel about the inequality of property, the 

higher class about the equality of honour ; as the poet says — 

4 The bad and good alike in honour share V 

ii There are crimes of which the motive is want; and for 
these Phaleas expects to find a cure in the equalization of 
property, which will take away from a man the temptation to 

12 be a highwayman, because he is hungry or cold. But want 
is not the sole incentive to crime ; men desire to gratify some 
passion which preys upon them, or they are eager to enjoy the 
pleasures which are unaccompanied with the pain of desire, 
and therefore they commit crimes. 

Now what is the cure of these three disorders ? Of the first, 
moderate possessions and occupation ; of the second, habits 
of temperance ; as to the third, if any desire pleasures which 
depend on themselves, they will find the satisfaction of their 
desires nowhere but in philosophy ; for all other pleasures 

13 we are dependent on others. The fact is that the greatest 
crimes are caused by excess and not by necessity. Men do 

1 Cp. c 5. § 12. a u. ix. 319. 



His Errors and Omissions 7S 

not become tyrants in order that they may not suffer cold ; II. 
and hence great is the honour bestowed, not on him who kills 
a thief, but on him who kills a tyrant. Thus we see that the 
institutions of Phaleas avail only against petty crimes. 

There is another objection to them. They are chiefly M 
designed to promote the internal welfare of the state. But 
the legislator should consider also its relation to neighbouring 
nations, and to all who are outside of it \ The government 
must be organized with a view to military strength ; and of 
this he has said not a word. And so with respect to pro- 15 
perty ; there should not only be enough to supply the internal 
wants of the state, but also to meet dangers coming from 
without. The property of the state should not be so large 
that more powerful neighbours may be tempted by it, while, 
the owners are unable to repel the invaders ; nor yet so small i 
that the state is unable to maintain a war even against states 
of equal power, and of the same character. Phaleas has not 1 
laid down any rule ; and we should bear in mind 2 that a cer- 
tain amount of wealth 2 is an advantage. The best limit will 
probably be, not so much as will tempt a more powerful neigh- 
bour, or make it his interest to go to war with you. There 1 7 
is a story that Eubulus, when Autophradates was going to 
besiege Atarneus, told him to consider how long the opera- 
tion would take, and then reckon up the cost which would 
be incurred in the time. ' For,' said he, ' I am willing for 
a smaller sum than that to leave Atarneus at once/ These 
words of Eubulus made an impression on Autophradates, and 
he desisted from the siege. 

One advantage gained by the equalization of property is 18 
that it prevents the citizens from quarrelling. Not that the 

1 Cp. c. 6. § 7. a Or reading 6 ti, * what amount of wealth/ 



76 Phaleas and Hippodamus 

II. 7 gain in this direction is very great. For the nobles will be 

dissatisfied because they do not receive the honours which 

,™*, they think their due; and this is often found to be a cause 
1267 b J . . ' 

I9 of sedition and revolution \ And the avarice of mankind 

is insatiable ; at one time two obols was pay enough, but 

now, when this sum has become customary, men always 

want more and more without end ; for it is of the nature 

of desire not to be satisfied, and most men live only for 

the gratification of it. 2 The beginning of reform 2 is not so 

|20 much to equalize property as to train the nobler sort of 

natures not to desire more, and to prevent the lower from 

getting more ; that is to say, they must be kept down, but not 

21 illtreated. Besides, the equalization proposed by Phaleas is 
imperfect; for he only equalizes land, whereas a man may be 
rich also in slaves, and cattle, and money, and in the abun- 
dance of what are called his movables. Now either all these 
things must be equalized, or some limit must be imposed on 

22 them, or they must all be let alone. It would appear that 
Phaleas is legislating for a small city only, if, as he supposes, 
all the artisans are to be public slaves and not to form a part 

23 of the population of the city. But if there is a law that 
artisans are to be public slaves, it should only apply to those 
engaged on public works 3 , as at Epidamnus, or at Athens on 
the plan which Diophantus once introduced. 

From these observations any one may judge how far Phaleas 
was wrong or right in his ideas. 
8 Hippodamus, the son of Euryphon, a native of Miletus, the 

1 Cp. § 10. 

2 Or, reading with Be mays d'tff/, ' the remedy for such evils.' 

3 Putting a comma after uiai and removing the comma after 



Hippodamus — His Constitution and Laws 77 

same who invented the art of planning cities, and who also II. 8 
laid out the Piraeus — a strange man, whose fondness for dis- 
tinction led him into a general eccentricity of life, which 
made some think him affected (for he would wear flowing hair 
and expensive ornaments ; and yet he dressed himself in the 
same cheap warm garment both in winter and summer) ; he, 
besides aspiring to be an adept in the knowledge of nature, 
was the first person not a statesman who made enquiries about 
the best form of government. 

The city of Hippodamus was composed of 10,000 citizens 2 
divided into three parts — one of artisans, one of husbandmen, 
and a third of armed defenders of the state. He also divided 3 
the land into three parts, one sacred, one public, the third 
private : the first was set apart to maintain the customary 
worship of the gods, the second was to support the warriors, 
the third was the property of the husbandmen. He also 4 
divided his laws into three classes, and no more, for he main- 
tained that there are three subjects of lawsuits — insult, 
injury, and homicide. He likewise instituted a single final 
court of appeal, to which all causes seeming to have been 
improperly decided might be referred ; this court he formed 
of elders chosen for the purpose. He was further of opinion 1268 a 
that the decisions of the courts ought not to be given by the 5 
use of a voting pebble, but that every one should have a tablet 
on which he might not only write a simple condemnation, or 
leave the tablet blank for a simple acquittal ; but, if he partly 
acquitted and partly condemned, he was to distinguish accord- 
ingly. To the existing law he objected that it obliged the 
judges to be guilty of perjury, whichever way they voted. 
He also enacted that those who discovered anything for the 6 
good of the state should be rewarded ; and he provided that 



7 8 Hippodamus — His Confusions 

II. 8 the children of citizens who died in battle should be main- 
tained at the public expense, as if such an enactment had 
never been heard of before, yet it actually exists at Athens * 

7 and in other places. As to the magistrates, he would have 
them all elected by the people, that is, by the three classes 
already mentioned, and those who were elected were to watch 
over the interests of the public, of strangers and of orphans. 
These are the most striking points in the constitution of 
Hippodamus. There is not much else. 

The first of these proposals to which objection may be 

8 taken, is the threefold division of the citizens. The artisans, 
and the husbandmen, and the warriors, all have a share in the 
government. But the husbandmen have no arms, and the 
artisans neither arms nor land, and therefore they become all 

9 but slaves of the warrior class. That they should share in 
all the offices is an impossibility ; for generals and guardians 
of the citizens, and nearly all the principal magistrates, must 
be taken from the class of those who carry arms. Yet, if the 
two other classes have no share in the government, how can 
they be loyal citizens ? It may be said that those who have 
arms must necessarily be masters of both the other classes, 
but this is not so easily accomplished unless they are numer- 

io ous ; and if they are, why should the other classes share in the 
government at all, or have power to appoint magistrates ? 
Artisans there must be, for these are wanted in every city, 
and they can live by their craft, as elsewhere ; and the hus- 
bandmen, too, if they really provided the warriors with food, 
might fairly have a share in the government. But in the 
republic of Hippodamus they are supposed to have land of 
their own, which they cultivate for their private benefit. 
1 Cp. Thuc. ii. c. 46. 



Courts of Law: Inventions 79 

Again, as to this common land out of which the soldiers are II. 8 
maintained, if they are themselves to be the cultivators of it, 1 1 
the warrior class will be identical with the husbandmen, 
although the legislator intended to make a distinction between 
them. If, again, there are to be other cultivators distinct 
both from the husbandmen, who have land of their own, and 
from the warriors, they will make a fourth class, which has 
no place in the state and no share in anything. Or, if the 12 
same persons are to cultivate their own lands and those of the 
public as well, they will have a difficulty in supplying the 
quantity of produce which will maintain two households : and 1268 b 
why, in this case, should there be any division, for they 
might find food themselves and give to the warriors from the 
same lots ? There is surely a great confusion in all this. 

Neither is the law to be commended which says that the 13 
judges, when a simple issue is laid before them, should dis- 
tinguish in their judgment; for the judge is thus converted 
into an arbitrator. Now, in an arbitration, although the 
arbitrators are many, they confer with one another about the 
decision, and therefore they can distinguish ; but in courts of 
law this is impossible, and, indeed, most legislators take pains 
to prevent the judges from holding any communication with 
one another. Again, will there not be confusion if the judge 14 
thinks that damages should be given, but not so much as the 
suitor demands ? He asks, say, for twenty minae, and the 
judge allows him ten minae, or one judge more and another 
less ; one five, another four minae. In this way they will go 
on apportioning the damages, and some will grant the whole 
and others nothing: how is the final reckoning to be taken ? 15 
Again, no one who votes for a simple acquittal or condemna- 
tion is compelled to perjure himself, if the indictment is quite 



80 Should Laws be Changed? 

II. 8 simple and in right form ; for the judge who acquits does not 
decide that the defendant owes nothing, but that he does not 
owe the twenty minae. He only is guilty of perjury who 
thinks that the defendant ought not to pay twenty minae, and 
yet condemns him. 

1 6 To reward those who discover anything which is useful to 
the state is a proposal which has a specious sound, but cannot 
safely be enacted by law, for it may encourage informers, and 
perhaps even lead to political commotions. This question 
involves another. It has been doubted whether it is or is not 

{ expedient to make any changes in the laws of a country, even 

17 if another law be better. Now, if all changes are inexpedient, 
we can hardly assent to the proposal of Hippodamus ; for, 
under pretence of doing a public service, a man may introduce 
measures which are really destructive to the laws or to the 
constitution. But, since we have touched upon this subject, 

18 perhaps we had better go a little into detail, for, as I was 
saying, there is a difference of opinion, and it may sometimes 
seem desirable to make changes. Such changes in the other 
arts and sciences have certainly been beneficial ; medicine, for 
example, and gymnastic, and every other art and science have 
departed from traditional usage. And, if politics be an art, 

19 change must be necessary in this as in any other art. The 
need of improvement is shown by the fact that old customs 
are exceedingly simple and barbarous. For the ancient 
Hellenes went about armed 1 and bought their wives of each 

20 other. The remains of ancient laws which have come down 
1269 a to us are quite absurd ; for example, at Cumae there is a law 

about murder, to the effect that if the accuser produce a certain 
number of witnesses from among his own kinsmen, the accused 
1 Cp. Thucyd. i. c. 5 and 6. 



Should Laws be Changed? 81 

shall be held guilty. Again, men in general desire the good, II. 8 
and not merely what their fathers had. But the primaeval 21 
inhabitants *, whether they were born of the earth, or were 
the survivors of some destruction, may be supposed to have 
been no better than ordinary foolish people among ourselves 1 
(such is certainly the tradition 2 concerning the earth-born 
men) ; and it would be ridiculous to rest contented with their 
notions. Even when laws have been written down, they 
ought not always to remain unaltered. As in other arts, so in 22 
making a constitution, it is impossible that all things should be 
precisely set down in writing; for enactments must be uni- 
versal, but actions are concerned with particulars 8 . Hence we 
infer that sometimes and in certain cases laws may be changed ; 
but when we look at the matter from another point of view, 
great caution would seem to be required. For the habit of 23 
lightly changing the laws is an evil, and, when the advantage 
is small, some errors both of lawgivers and rulers had better 
be left ; the citizen will not gain so much by the change as he 
will lose by the habit of disobedience. The analogy of the 24 
arts is false ; a change in a law is a very different thing from 
a change in an art. For the law has no power to command } 
obedience except that of habit, which can only be given by 
time, so that a readiness to change from old to new laws 
enfeebles the power of the law. Even if we admit that the 25 
laws are to be changed, are they all to be changed, and in 
every state ? And are they to be changed by anybody who 

1 Or, referring dpo'iovs to yrjyevtis, 'whether they were born of the 
earth or were the survivors of some destruction, who were no better 
(dpoiovs) than earth-born men, may be supposed to have been ordinary 
foolish people.' 

3 Cp. Plato, Laws, iii. 677 a; Polit. 271 a ; Tim. 22 c, 

3 Cp. Plato, Polit. 295 a. 

DAVIS G 



82 Sparta; the Helots; 

II. 8 likes, or only by certain persons ? These are very important 

questions ; and therefore we had better reserve the discussion 

of them to a more suitable occasion. 

9 In the governments of Lacedaemon and Crete, and indeed 

in all governments, two points have to be considered ; first, 

| whether any particular law is good or bad, when compared 

1 with the perfect state ; secondly, whether it is or is not con- 
| sistent with the idea and character which the lawgiver has set 

2 before his citizens l . That in a well-ordered state the citizens 
should have leisure and not have to provide for their daily 
wants is generally acknowledged, but there is a difficulty in 
seeing how this leisure is to be attained. [For, if you employ 
slaves, they are liable to rebel.] The Thessalian Penestae 
have often risen against their masters, and the Helots in like 
manner against the Lacedaemonians, for whose misfortunes 

3 they are always lying in wait. Nothing, however, of this 
1269 b ki n d has as yet happened to the Cretans ; the reason probably 

is that the neighbouring cities, even when at war with one 
another, never form an alliance with rebellious serfs, rebellions 
not being for their interest, since they themselves have a de- 
pendent population 2 . Whereas all the neighbours of the 
Lacedaemonians, whether Argives, Messenians, or Arcadians, 
are their enemies [and the Helots are always revolting to 
them]. In Thessaly, again, the original revolt of the slaves 
occurred at a time when the Thessalians were still at war with 
the neighbouring Achaeans, Perrhaebians, and Magnesians. 

4 Besides, if there were no other difficulty, the treatment or 
management of slaves is a troublesome affair ; for, if not kept 
in hand, they are insolent, and think that they are as good as 
their masters, and, if harshly treated, they hate and conspire 

1 Or ( himself (Bernays). 3 Cp, c. io. § 5. 



Licence of the Wometi 8 3 

against them. Now it is clear that when these are the re- II, 9 
suits the citizens of a state have not found out the secret of* 
managing their subject population. 

Again, the licence of the Lacedaemonian women defeats 5 
the intention of the Spartan constitution, and is adverse to the 
good order of the state. For a husband and a wife, being 
each a part of every family, the state may be considered as 
about equally divided into men and women ; and, therefore, in 
those states in which the condition of the women is bad, half 
the city l may be regarded as having no laws. And this is 6 
what has actually happened at Sparta ; the legislator wanted to 
make the whole state hardy and temperate, and he has carried 
out his intention in the case of the men, but he has neglected 
the women, who live in every sort of intemperance and luxury. 
The consequence is that in such a state wealth is too highly 7 
valued, especially if the citizens fall under the dominion of 
'heir wives, after the manner of all warlike races, except the 
elts and a few others who openly approve of male loves. 
The old mythologer would seem to have been right in uniting 8 
Ares and Aphrodite, for all warlike races are prone to the 
love either of men or of women. This was exemplified among 
:he Spartans in the days of their greatness ; many things were 
-nanaged by their women. But what difference does it make 9 
whether women rule, or the rulers are ruled by women ? The I 
result is the same. Even in regard to courage, which is of no 
ase in daily life, and is needed only in war, the influence of 
:he Lacedaemonian women has been most mischievous. The 10 
2vil showed itself in the Theban invasion, when, unlike the 
women in other cities, they were utterly useless and caused 
more confusion than the enemy. This licence of the Lacedae- 
1 C P . i. 13. § 16. 
G 2 



84 Sparta: Inequality of Property $ 

II. 9 monian women existed from the earliest times, and was only 
1270 a what might be expected. For, during the wars of the Lace 
daemonians, first against the Argives, and afterwards against 
the Arcadians and Messenians, the men were long away from 
home, and, on the return of peace, they gave themselves into 
the legislator's hand, already prepared by the discipline of 
a soldier's life (in which there are many elements of virtue), 
to receive his enactments. But, when Lycurgus, as tradition 
says, wanted to bring the women under his laws, they resisted, 

12 and he gave up the attempt. They, and not he, are to blame 
for what then happened, and this defect in the constitution is 
clearly to be attributed to them. We are not, however, con- 
sidering what is or is not to be excused, but what is right or 

13 wrong ; and the disorder of the women, as I have already said, 
not only of itself gives an air of indecorum to the state, but 
tends in a measure to foster avarice. 

The mention of avarice naturally suggests a criticism on the 

14 inequality of property. While some of the Spartan citizens 
have quite small properties, others have very large ones ; hence 
the land has passed into the hands of a few. And here is 
another fault in their laws ; for, although the legislator rightly 
holds up to shame the sale or purchase of an inheritance, he 

15 allows anybody who likes to give and bequeath it. Yet both 
practices lead to the same result. And nearly two-fifths oi 
the whole country are held by women ; this is owing to the 
number of heiresses and to the large dowries which are cus- 
tomary. It would surely have been better to have given nc 
dowries at all, or, if any, but small or moderate ones. As the 
law now stands, a man may bestow his heiress on any one 
whom he pleases, and, if he die intestate, the privilege oj 

16 giving her away descends to his heir. Hence, although the 



Criticism of the Ephoralty 8y 

country is able to maintain 1500 cavalry and 30,000 hoplites, II. 9 
the whole number of Spartan citizens [at the time of the 
Theban invasion] fell below 1000. The result proves the 
faulty nature of their laws respecting property ; for the city 
sank under a single defeat ; the want of men was their ruin. 
There is a tradition that, in the days of their ancient kings, 17 
they were in the habit of giving the rights of citizenship to 
strangers, and therefore, in spite of their long wars, no lack of 
population was experienced by them; indeed, at one time 
Sparta is said to have numbered not less than 10,000 citizens. 
Whether this statement is true or not, it would certainly have 
been better to have maintained their numbers by the equaliza- 
tion of property. Again, the law which relates to the pro- 18 
creation of children is adverse to the correction of this 
inequality. For the legislator, wanting to have as many 1270 b 
Spartans as he could, encouraged the citizens to have large 
families ; and there is a law at Sparta that the father of three 
sons shall be exempt from military service, and he who has 
four from all the burdens of the state. Yet it is obvious that, jg 
if there were many children, the land being distributed as it is, 
many of them must necessarily fall into poverty. 

The Lacedaemonian constitution is defective in another 
point ; I mean the Ephoralty. This magistracy has authority 
in the highest matters, but the Ephors are all chosen from the 
people, and so the office is apt to fall into the hands of very 
poor men, who, being badly off, are open to bribes. There 2p 
have been many examples at Sparta of this evil in former 
times; and quite recently, in the matter of the Andrians, 
certain of the Ephors who were bribed did their best to ruin 
the state. And so great and tyrannical is their power, that 
even the kings have been compelled to court them ; through 



8 6 Sparta: Criticism of the Council of Elders; 

IT. 9 their influence the constitution has de teriora ted, and from 

2i being an aristocracy has turned into a democracy. The 

.Ephoralty certainly does keep the state together; for the 

'- people are contented when they have a share in the highest 

office, and the result, whether due to the legislator or to 

22 chance, has been advantageous. For if a constitution is to be 
permanent, all the parts of the state must wish that it should 
exist and be maintained 1 . This is the case at Sparta, where 
the kings desire permanence because they have due honour in 
their own persons ; the nobles are represented in the council 
of elders (for the office of elder is a reward of virtue) ; and 

23 the people in the Ephoralty, for all are eligible to it. The 
election of Ephors out of the whole people is perfectly right, 
but ought not to be carried on in the present fashion, which is 
too childish. Again, they have the decision of great causes, 
although they are quite ordinary men, and therefore they should 
not determine them merely on their own judgment, but accord- 

24 ing to written rules, and to the laws. Their way of life, too, 
is not in accordance with the spirit of the constitution — they 
have a deal too much licence; whereas, in the case of the 
other citizens, the excess of strictness is so intolerable that 
they run away from the law into the secret indulgence of 
sensual pleasures. 

25 Again, the council of elders is not free from defects. It 
may be said that the elders are good men and well trained in 
manly virtue ; and that, therefore, there is an advantage to the 
state in having them. But that judges of important causes 
should hold office for life is not a good thing, for the mind 

1271 a grows old as well as the body. And when men have been 
educated in such a manner that even the legislator himself 
1 Cp. iv. 9. § 10; v. 9. § 5. 



Further Criticisms 87 

cannot trust them, there is real danger. Many of the elders II, 9 
are well known to have taken bribes and to have been guilty of 2 ^ 
partiality in public affairs. And therefore they ought not to f 
be irresponsible ; yet at Sparta they are so. But (it may be ' 
replied), 'All magistracies are accountable to the Ephors.' 
Yes, but this prerogative is too great for them, and we main- 
tain that the control should be exercised in some other manner. 
Further, the mode in which the Spartans elect their elders is 27 
childish ; and it is improper that 1 the person to be elected 
should canvass for the office ; the worthiest should be ap- 
pointed, whether he chooses or not. And here the legislator 28 
clearly indicates the same intention which appears in other 
parts of his constitution ; he would have his citizens ambitious, 
and he has reckoned upon this quality in the election of the 
elders ; for no one would ask to be elected if he were not. 
Yet ambition and avarice, almost more than any other passions, 
are the motives of crime. 

Whether kings are or are not an advantage to states, I will 29 
consider at another time 3 ; they should at any rate be chosen, 
not as they are now, but with regard to their personal life and 
conduct. The legislator himself obviously did not suppose 3° 
that he could make them really good men ; at least he shows 
a great distrust of their virtue. For this reason the Spartans 
used to join enemies in the same embassy, and the quarrels 
between the kings were held to be conservative of the state. 

Neither did the first introducer of the common meals, called 
'phiditia/ regulate them well. The entertainment ought to 31 
have been provided at the public cost, as in Crete 8 ; but 

1 Reading rb avrov, not to*/, as Bekker, 2nd edit., apparently by 
a misprint. 

2 Cp. iii. 14 foil. 3 Cp. c. 10. §§ 7, 8. 



8 8 Sparta : Further Criticisms 

II. 9 among the Lacedaemonians every one is expected to contri- 
bute, and some of them are too poor to afford the expense ; 

3 2 thus the intention of the legislator is frustrated. The common 
meals were meant to be a popular institution, but the existing 
manner of regulating them is the reverse of popular. For the 
very poor can scarcely take part in them ; and, according to 
ancient custom, those who cannot contribute are not allowed 
to retain their rights of citizenship. 

33 The law about the Spartan admirals has often been censured, 
and with justice ; it is a source of dissension, for the kings are 
perpetual generals \ and this office of admiral is but the setting 
up of another king. 

1271b The charge which Plato brings, in the Laws 2 , against the 

34 intention of the legislator, is likewise justified ; the whole con- 
Istitution has regard to one part of virtue only — the virtue of 
the soldier, which gives victory in war. And so long as they 
were at war, their power was preserved, but when they had 
attained empire they fell 3 , for of the arts of peace they knew 
nothing, and had never engaged in any employment higher 

35 than war. There is another error, equally great, into which 
they have fallen. Although they truly think that the goods 
for which they contend are to be acquired by virtue rather than 
by vice, they err in supposing that these goods are to be pre- 
ferred to the virtue which gains them. 

36 Once more : the revenues of the state are ill-managed ; 
there is no money in the treasury, although they are obliged 
to carry on great wars, and they are unwilling to pay taxes. 
The greater part of the land being in the hands of the Spar- 
tans, they do not look closely into one another's contributions. 

1 Reading aldiois. 2 Laws, i. 630. 

3 Cp. vii. 14. § 22. 



Sparta and Crete 89 

The result which the legislator has produced is the reverse of II. 9 
beneficial ; for he has made his city poor, and his citizens 37 
greedy. 

Enough respecting the Spartan constitution, of which these 
are the principal defects. 

The constitutions of the Cretan cities nearly resemble the 10 
Spartan, and in some few points are quite as good ; but for the 
most part less perfect in form. The older constitutions are 
generally less elaborate than the later, and the Lacedaemonian 
is said to be, and probably is, in a very great measure, a copy 2 
of those in Crete. According to tradition, Lycurgus, when 
he ceased to be the guardian of King Charilaus, went abroad 
and spent a long time in Crete. For the two countries are 
nearly connected; the Lyctians are a colony of the Lacedae- 
monians, and the colonists, when they came to Crete, adopted 
the constitution which they found existing among the inhabi- 3 
tants. Even to this day the Perioeci, or subject population of 
Crete, are governed by the original laws which Minos enacted. 
The island seems to be intended by nature for dominion in 
Hellas, and to be well situated ; it extends right across the 
sea, around which nearly all the Hellenes are settled ; and 
while one end is not far from the Peloponnese, the other 
almost reaches to the region of Asia about Triopium and 4 
Rhodes. Hence Minos acquired the empire of the sea, sub- 
duing some of the islands and colonizing others ; at last he 
invaded Sicily, where he died near Camicus. 5 

The Cretan institutions resemble the Lacedaemonian. The 
Helots are the husbandmen of the one, the Perioeci of the 1272 a 
other, and both Cretans and Lacedaemonians have common 
meals, which were anciently called by the Lacedaemonians not 
* phiditia ' but * andria ' ; and the Cretans have the same word, 



$>o Crete and Sparta 

II. 10 the use of which proves that the common meals [or syssitia] 

6 originally came from Crete. Further, the two constitutions 
are similar [in many particulars] ; for the office of the Ephors 
is the same as that of the Cretan Cosmi, the only difference 
being that whereas the Ephors are five, the Cosmi are ten in 
number. The elders, too, answer to the elders in Crete, who 
are termed by the Cretans the council. And the kingly office 
once existed in Crete, but was abolished, and the Cosmi have 

7 now the duty of leading them in war. All classes share in 
the ecclesia, but it can only ratify the decrees of the elders 
and the Cosmi. 

The common meals of Crete are certainly better managed 
than the Lacedaemonian ; for in Lacedaemon every one pays 
so much per head, or, if he fails, the law, as I have already 
explained, forbids him to exercise the rights of citizenship. 

8 But in Crete they are of a more popular character. There, of 
all the fruits of the earth, of cattle, of the public revenues, and 
of the tribute which is paid by the Perioeci, one portion is 
assigned to the gods and to the service of the state, and 
another to the common meals, so that men, women, and 

9 children are all supported out of a common stock \ The 
legislator has many ingenious ways of securing moderation in 
eating which he conceives to be a gain ; he likewise encourages 
the separation of men from women, lest they should have too 
many children, and the companionship of men with one another 
— whether this is a good or bad thing I shall have an oppor- 
tunity of considering at another time 2 . But that the Cretan 
common meals are better ordered than the Lacedaemonian 
there can be no doubt. 

On the other hand, the Cosmi are even a worse institution 
1 Cp. vii. lo. § io. 2 vii. 16 (?). 



Cretan Cosmi and Elders 91 

than the Ephors, of which they have all the evils without the II. 10 
good. Like the Ephors, they are any chance persons, but in IO 
Crete this is not counterbalanced by a corresponding political 
advantage. At Sparta every one is eligible, and . the body of 
the people, having a share in the highest office, want the state 
to be permanent \ But in Crete the Cosmi are elected out of 
certain families, and not out of the whole people, and the 
elders out of those who have been Cosmi. 

The same criticism may be made about the Cretan, which 1 1 
has been already made about the Lacedaemonian elders. 
Their irresponsibility and life tenure is too great a privilege, 
and their arbitrary power of acting upon their own judgment, 
and dispensing with written law, is dangerous. It is no proof 1 2 
of the goodness of the institution that the people are not 
discontented at being excluded from it. For there is no 
profit to be made out of the office ; and, unlike the Ephors, 1272 b 
the Cosmi, being in an island, are removed from temptation. 

The remedy by which they correct the evil of this institu- 13 
tion is an extraordinary one, suited rather to a close oligarchy 
than to a constitutional state. For the Cosmi are often ex- 
pelled by a conspiracy of their own colleagues, or of private 
individuals ; and they are allowed also to resign before their 
term of office has expired. Surely all matters of this kind 
are better regulated by law than by the will of man, which is 
a very unsafe rule. Worst of all is the suspension of the 14 
office of Cosmi, a device to which the nobles often have 
recourse when they will not submit to justice. This shows 
that the Cretan government, although possessing some of the 
characteristics of a constitutional state, is really a close 
oligarchy. 

1 Cp. supra, c. 9. § 21. 



p 2 Carthage: Merits and 

II. 10 The Cretans have a habit, too, of setting up a chief; they 
get together a party among the common people and gather 
their friends and then quarrel and fight with one another. 

15 What is this but the temporary destruction of the state and 
dissolution of society ? A city is in a dangerous condition 
when those who are willing are also able to attack her. But, 
as I have already said, the island of Crete is saved by her 
situation ; distance has the same effect as the Lacedaemonian 

16 prohibition of strangers ; and the Cretans have no foreign 
dominions. This is the reason why the Perioeci are contented 
in Crete, whereas the Helots are perpetually revolting. But 
when lately foreign invaders found their way into the island, 
the weakness of the Cretan constitution was revealed. Enough 
of the government of Crete. 

11 The Carthaginians are also considered to have an excellent 
form of government, which differs from that of any other 
state in several respects, though it is in some very like the 
Lacedaemonian. Indeed, all three states — the Lacedaemonian, 
the Cretan, and the Carthaginian — nearly resemble one another, 
and are very different from any others. Many of the Cartha- 

2 ginian institutions are excellent. The superiority of their 
constitution is proved by the fact that, although containing an 
element of democracy, it has been lasting ; the Carthaginians 
have never had any rebellion worth speaking of, and have 
never been under the rule of a tyrant. 

3 Among the points in which the Carthaginian constitution 
resembles the Lacedaemonian are the following: — The com- 
mon tables of the clubs answer to the Spartan phiditia, and 
their magistracy of the 104 to the Ephors ; but, whereas the 
Ephors are any chance persons, the magistrates of the Cartha- 
ginians are elected according to merit — this is an improvement. 



Defects of the Constitution 93 

They have also their kings and their gerusia, or council of II. 11 
elders, who correspond to the kings and elders of Sparta. 
Their kings, unlike the Spartan, are not always of the same 4 
family, and this an ordinary one, but if there is some dis- 
tinguished family they are selected out of it and not appointed 
by seniority — this is far better. Such officers have great 
power, and therefore, if they are persons of little worth, do 
a great deal of harm, and they have already done harm at 1273 a 
Lacedaemon. 

Most of the defects or deviations from the perfect state, for 5 
which the Carthaginian constitution would be censured, apply 
equally to all the forms of government which we have men- 
tioned. But of the deflections from aristocracy and constitu- 
tional government, some incline more to democracy and some to 
oligarchy. The kings and elders, if unanimous, may determine 
whether they will or will not bring a matter before the people, 
but when they are not unanimous, the people may decide' 
whether or not the matter shall be brought forward. And 6 
whatever the kings and elders bring before the people is not 
only heard but also determined by them, and any one who likes 
may oppose it ; now this is not permitted in Sparta and Crete. 
That the magistracies of live who have under them many 7 
important matters should be co-opted, that they should choose 
the supreme council of 100, and should hold office longer than 
other magistrates (for they are virtually rulers both before and 
after they hold office) — these are oligarchical features ; their 
being without salary and not elected by lot, and any similar 
points, such as the practice of having all suits tried by the 
magistrates 1 , and not some by one class of judges or jurors 
and some by another, as at Lacedaemon, are characteristic of 
1 Cp. iii. I. §§ 10, II ; and see note at end. 



94 Carthage a Plutocracy: 

II, 11 aristocracy. The Carthaginian constitution deviates from 

8 aristocracy and inclines to oligarchy, chiefly on a point where 
popular opinion is on their side. For men in general think 
that magistrates should be chosen not only for their merit, but 
for their wealth : a man, they say, who is poor cannot rule well 

9 — he has not the leisure. If, then, election of magistrates for 
their wealth be characteristic of oligarchy, and election for 
merit of aristocracy, there will be a third form under which the 
constitution of Carthage is comprehended; for the Cartha- 
ginians choose their magistrates, and particularly the highest 
of them — their kings and generals — with an eye both to merit 
and to wealth. 

io But we must acknowledge that, in thus deviating from 
aristocracy, the legislator has committed an error. Nothing is 
more absolutely necessary than to provide that the highest class, 
not only when in office, but when out of office, should have leisure 
and not demean themselves in any way ; and to this his atten- 
tion should be first directed. Even if you must have regard to 
wealth, in order to secure leisure, yet it is surely a bad thing 
that the greatest offices, such as those of kings and generals, 

ii should be bought. The law which allows this abuse makes 

wealth of more account than virtue, and the whole state 

becomes avaricious. For, whenever the chiefs of the state 

deem anything honourable, the other citizens are sure to follow 

1273 b their example ; and, where virtue has not the first place, there 

i2 aristocracy cannot be firmly established. Those who have 
been at the expense of purchasing their places will be in the 
habit of repaying themselves ; and it is absurd to suppose that 
a poor and honest man will be wanting to make gains, and that 
a lower stamp of man who has incurred a great expense will 
not. Wherefore they should rule who are able to rule best 



Preserved by Accident y$ 

\apmTapxciv\. And even if the legislator does not care to II. 11 
protect the good from poverty, he should at any rate secure 
leisure for those in office *. 

It would seem also to be a bad principle that the same 13 
person should hold many offices, which is a favourite practice 
among the Carthaginians, for one business is better done by 
one man 2 . The legislator should see to this and should not 
appoint the same person to be a flute-player and a shoemaker. 
Hence, where the state is large, it is more in accordance both 14 
with constitutional and with democratic principles that the 
offices of state should be distributed among many persons. 
For, as I was saying, this arrangement is more popular, and 
any action familiarized by repetition is better and sooner per- 
formed. We have a proof in military and naval matters ; the 
duties of command and of obedience in both these services 
extend to all. 

The government of the Carthaginians is oligarchical, but 15 
they successfully escape the evils of oligarchy by their wealth, 
which enables them from time to time to send out some 
portion of the people 3 to their colonies. This is their 
panacea and the means by which they give stability to the 
state. Accident favours them, but the legislator should be 
able to provide against revolution without trusting to accidents. 
As things are, if any misfortune occurred, and the people 16 
revolted from their rulers, there would be no way of restoring 
peace by legal methods. 

1 Cp. c. 9. § 2. a Cp. Plato, Rep. ii. 374 a. 

8 Or, removing the comma after irKovriTv, and adding one after fJiepos, 
' by enriching one portion of the people after another whom they send to 
their colonies.' Cp. vi. 5. § 9, which tends to confirm this way of 
taking the words. 



9 6 Solon and the Athenian Constitution 

II. 11 Such is the character of the Lacedaemonian, Cretan, and 
Carthaginian constitutions, which are justly celebrated. 
12 Of those who have treated of governments, some have 
never taken any part at all in public affairs, but have passed 
their lives in a private station ; about most of them, what was 
worth telling has been already told. Others have been law- 
givers, either in their own or in foreign cities, whose affairs 
they have administered ; and of these some have only made 
laws, others have framed constitutions ; for example, Lycurgus 

2 and Solon did both. Of the Lacedaemonian constitution 
I have already spoken. As to Solon, he is thought by some 
to have been a good legislator, who put an end to the ex- 
clusiveness of the oligarchy, emancipated the people, established 
the ancient Athenian democracy, and harmonized the different 
elements of the state. According to their view, the council 
of Areopagus was an oligarchical element, the elected magis- 

1274 a tracy, aristocratical, and the courts of law, democratical. The 
truth seems to be that the council and the elected magistracy 

3 existed before the time of Solon, and were retained by him, 
but that he formed the courts of law out of all the citizens, 
thus creating the democracy, which is the very reason why he 
is sometimes blamed. For in giving the supreme power to the 
law courts, which are elected by lot, he is thought to have 

4 destroyed the non-democratic element. When the law courts 
grew powerful, to please the people, who were now playing 
the tyrant, the old constitution was changed into the existing 
democracy. Ephialtes and Pericles curtailed the power of the 
Areopagus ; they also instituted the payment of the juries, and 
thus every demagogue in turn increased the power of the 

5 democracy until it became what we now see. All this is true; 
it seems however to be the result of circumstances, and not to 



Famous Lawgivers 97 

have been intended by Solon. For the people having been II. 12 
instrumental in gaining the empire of the sea in the Persian 
War *, began to get a notion of itself, and followed worthless 
demagogues, whom the better class opposed. Solon himself 
appears to have given the Athenians only that power of electing 
to offices and calling to account the magistrates, which was 
absolutely necessary 3 ; for without it they would have been 
in a state of slavery and enmity to the government. All the 6 
magistrates he appointed from the notables and the men of 
wealth, that is to say, from the pentacosio-medimni, or from 
the class called zeugitae (because they kept a yoke of oxen), or 
from a third class of so-called knights or cavalry. The fourth 
class were labourers who had no share in any magistracy. 

Mere legislators were Zaleucus, who gave laws to the Epi- 
zephyrian, Locrians, and Charondas, who legislated for his 
own city of Catana, and for the other Chalcidian cities in 
Italy and Sicily. Some persons attempt 3 to make out that 7 
Onomacritus was the first person who had any special skill in 
legislation s , and that he, although a Locrian by birth, was 
trained in Crete, where he lived in the exercise of his prophetic 
art ; that Thales was his companion, and that Lycurgus and 
Zaleucus were disciples of Thales, as Charondas was of 
Zaleucus. But their account is quite inconsistent with 8 
chronology. 

There was also a Theban legislator, whose name was 
Philolaus, the Corinthian. This Philolaus was one of the 
family of the Bacchiadae, and a lover of Diodes, the Olympic 
victor, who left Corinth in horror of the incestuous passion 

1 Cp. v. 4. § 8; via. 6. § 11. 2 Cp. iii. 11. § 8. 

8 Or (with Bernays), ' to make out an unbroken series of great legis- 
lators, Onomacritus being considered the first.' 

DAVIS H 



98 Famous Lawgivers 

II. 12 which his mother Halcyone had conceived for him, and retired 
to Thebes, where the two friends together ended their days. 
9 The inhabitants still point out their tombs, which are in full 
view of one another, but one looks towards Corinth, the other 
not. Tradition says that the two friends arranged them in 
this way, Diodes out of horror at his misfortunes, so that the 
land of Corinth might not be visible from his tomb ; Philolaus 
1274 b that it might. This is the reason why they settled at Thebes, 

10 and so Philolaus legislated for the Thebans, and, besides some 
other enactments, gave them laws about the procreation of 
children, which they call the ' Laws of Adoption.' These 
laws were peculiar to him, and were intended to preserve the 
number of the lots. 

11 In the legislation of Charondas there is nothing remarkable, 
except the laws about false witnesses. He is the first who 
instituted actions for perjury. His laws are more exact and 
more precisely expressed than even those of our modern 
legislators. 

12 Characteristic of Phaleas is the equalization of property; of 
Plato, the community of women, children, and property, the 
common meals of women, and the law about drinking, that 
the sober shall be masters of the feast * ; also the training of 
soldiers to acquire by practice equal skill with both hands, so 
that one should be as useful as the other 2 . 

13 Draco has left laws, but he adapted them to a constitution 
which already existed, and there is no peculiarity in them 
which is worth mentioning, except the greatness and severity 
of the punishments. 

Pittacus, too, was only a lawgiver, and not the author of 
a constitution ; he has a law which is peculiar to him, that, if 
1 Cp. Laws, ii. 671 D-672 a. 3 Cp. Laws, vii. 794 d. 



Famous Lawgivers 99 

a drunken man strike another, he shall be more heavily II. 
punished than if he were sober * ; he looked not to the excuse 
which might be offered for the drunkard, but only to expedi- 
ency, for drunken more often than sober people commit acts 
of violence. 

Androdamas of Rhegium gave laws to the Chalcidians of r 4 
Thrace. Some of them relate to homicide, and to heiresses ; 
but there is nothing remarkable in them. 

And here let us conclude our enquiry into the various con- 
stitutions which either actually exist, or have been devised by 
theorists. 

1 Cp. N. Eth. iii. 5. § 8. 



H 2 



BOOK III 

III. 1 He who would enquire into the nature and various kinds of 
government must first of all determine ' What is a state ? ' At 
present this is a disputed question. Some say that the state has 
done a certain act ; others, no, not the state \ but the oligarchy 
or the tyrant. And the legislator or statesman is concerned 
entirely with the state ; a constitution or government being an 
a arrangement of the inhabitants of a state. But a state is com- 
posite, and, like any other whole, made up of many parts ; — 
these are the citizens, who compose it. It is evident, there- 

1275 a fore, that we must begin by asking, Who is the citizen, and 
what is the meaning of the term ? For here again there may 
be a difference of opinion. He who is a citizen in a demo- 

3 cracy will often not be a citizen in an oligarchy. Leaving out 
of consideration those who have been made citizens, or who 
have obtained the name of citizen in any other accidental 
manner, we may say, first, that a citizen is not a citizen 

4 because he lives in a certain place, for resident aliens and 
slaves share in the place ; nor is he a citizen who has no legal 
right except that of suing and being sued ; for this right may 
be enjoyed under the provisions of a treaty. Even resident 
aliens in many places possess such rights, although in an 
imperfect form ; for they are obliged to have a patron. 

5 Hence they do but imperfectly participate in citizenship, and 
we call them citizens only in a qualified sense, as we might 
apply the term to children who are too young to be on the 

1 Cp. c 3 . § i. 



The Definition of Citizenship in Theory 101 

register, or to old men who have been relieved from state III. 1 
duties. Of these we do not say simply that they are citizens, 
but add in the one case that they are not of age, and in the 
other, that they are past the age, or something of that sort ; 
the precise expression is immaterial, for our meaning is clear. 
Similar difficulties to those which I have mentioned may be 
raised and answered about deprived citizens and about exiles. 
But the citizen, whom we are seeking to define, is a citizen in 
the strictest sense, against whom no such exception can be 
taken, and his special characteristic is that he shares in the 
administration of justice, and in offices. Now of offices some 6 
have a limit of time, and the same persons are not allowed to 
hold them twice, or can only hold them after a fixed interval ; 
others have no limit of time — for example, the office of dicast 
or ecclesiast \ It may, indeed, be argued that these are not 7 
magistrates at all, and that their functions give them no share 
in the government. But surely it is ridiculous to say that 
those who have the supreme power do not govern. Not to 
dwell further upon this, which is a purely verbal question, 
what we want is a common term including both dicast and 
ecclesiast. Let us, for the sake of distinction, call it 'inde- 
terminate office,' and we will assume that those who share in 
such office are citizens. This is the most comprehensive 8 
definition of a citizen, and best suits all those who are generally 
so called. 

But we must not forget that things of which the underlying 
notions differ in kind, one of them being first, another second, 
another third, have, when regarded in this relation, nothing, 
or hardly anything, worth mentioning in common. Now we 9 

1 * Dicast* = juryman and judge in one: ' ecclesiast ' = member of the 
ecclesia or assembly of the citizens. 



102 The Definition of Citizenship in Practice 

III. 1 see that governments differ in kind, and that some of them 

1275 b are prior and that others are posterior ; those which are faulty 

or perverted are necessarily posterior to those which are 

perfect. (What we mean by perversion will be hereafter 

explained 1 .) The citizen then of necessity differs under each 

ib form of government ; and our definition is best adapted to the 

\ citizen of a democracy ; but not necessarily to other states. 
For in some states the people are not acknowledged, nor have 
they any regular assembly, but only extraordinary ones ; and 
suits are distributed in turn among the magistrates. At Lace- 
daemon, for instance, the Ephors determine suits about con- 
tracts, which they distribute among themselves, while the 
elders are judges of homicide, and other causes are decided 

ii by other magistrates. A similar principle prevails at Car- 
thage 2 ; there certain magistrates decide all causes. We may, 
indeed, modify our definition of the citizen so as to include 
these states. [But strictly taken it only applies in democracies.] 
In other states it is the holder of a determinate, not of an 
indeterminate, office who legislates and judges, and to some 
or all such holders of determinate offices is reserved the right 
of deliberating or judging about some things or about all 

*j 2 things. The conception of the citizen now begins to clear up. 
He who has the power to take part in the deliberative or 

' judicial administration of any state is said by us to be a citizen 
f | of that state ; and speaking generally, a state is a body of 
f I citizens sufficing for the purposes of life. 

2 But in practice a citizen is defined to be one of whom both 

■ the parents are citizens ; others insist on going further back ; 
say to two or three or more grandparents. This is a short 
and practical definition ; but there are some who raise the 
1 Cp. c. 6. § ii. 3 Cp. ii. ii. § 7. 



Difficulties Created by Revolutions 103 

further question : How this third or fourth ancestor came to III, 2 
be a citizen ? Gorgias of Leontini, partly because he was in 
a difficulty, partly in irony, said — ( Mortars are made by the 
mortar-makers, and the citizens of Larissa are also a manu- 
factured article, made, like the kettles which bear their name 
[XapiaaToij, by the magistrates V Yet the question is really 3 
simple, for if, according to the definition just given, they 
shared in^the government 2 , they were citizens. [This is a 
better definition than the other.] For the words, l born of 
a father or mother, who is a citizen,' cannot possibly apply to 
the first inhabitants or founders of a state. 

There is a greater difficulty in the case of those who have 
been made citizens after a revolution, as by Cleisthenes at 
Athens after the expulsion of the tyrants, for he enrolled in 
tribes a number of strangers and slaves and 3 resident aliens. 
The doubt in these cases is, not who is, but whether he, who 4 
is, ought to be a citizen ; and there will still be a further 1276 a 
doubt, whether he who ought not to be a citizen is one in 
fact, for what ought not to be is what is false and is not. 
Now, there are some who hold office, and yet ought not to 5 
hold office, whom we call rulers, although they rule unjustly. 
And the citizen was defined by the fact of his holding some 
kind of rule or office — he who holds a judicial or legislative 
office fulfils our definition of a citizen. It is evident, there- 
fore, that the citizens about whom the doubt has arisen must 

1 An untranslatable play upon the word tyfHovpyoi, which means 
either f a magistrate* or 'an artisan.' 

3 Cp. c. 1. § 12. 

3 Inserting kcu before pfToifcovs with Bekker in his second edition. If 
xai is omitted, as in all the MSS., we must translate — * he enrolled in 
tribes many metics, both strangers and slaves* : or, 'he enrolled in tribes 
many strangers, and metics who had been slaves.' 



104 When is a State the Same? 

III. 2 be called citizens; whether they ought to be so or not is 

a question which is bound up with the previous enquiry \ 

3 A parallel question is raised respecting the state whether 

a certain act is or is not an act of the state ; for example, in 

the transition from an oligarchy or a tyranny to a democracy. 

2 In such cases persons refuse to fulfil their contracts or any 
other obligations on the ground that the tyrant, and not the 
state, contracted them ; they argue that some constitutions are 

, established by force, and not for the sake of the common 
good. But this would apply equally to democracies, for they 
too may be founded on violence, and then the acts of the 
democracy will be neither more nor less legitimate than those 

3 of an oligarchy or of a tyranny. This question runs up into 
another — When shall we say that the state is the same, and 
when different ? It would be a very superficial view which 
considered only the place and the inhabitants ; for the soil and 
the population may be separated, and some of the inhabitants 

4 may live in one place and some in another. This, however, 
is not a very serious difficulty ; we need only remark that the 
word i state ' is ambiguous, meaning both state and city. 

It is further asked : When are men, living in the same 
place, to be regarded as a single city — what is the limit ? 

5 Certainly not the wall of the city, for you might surround all 
Peloponnesus with a wall. But a city, having such vast 
circuit, would contain a nation rather than a state, like Baby- 
lon 2 , which, as they say, had been taken for three days before 

6 some part of the inhabitants became aware of the fact. This 
difficulty may, however, with advantage be deferred 3 to 
another occasion ; the statesman has to consider the size of 

1 Cp. c. i. § i. 2 Cp. ii. 6. § 6. 

3 Cp. vii. c. 4 and c. 5. 



When is a State the Same? ioj 



the state, and whether it should consist of more than one III, 3 
nation or not. *c 6 1 

Again, shall we say that while the race of inhabitants, as 
well as their place of abode, remain the same, the city is also 
the same, although the citizens are always dying and being 
born, as we call rivers and fountains the same, although the 
water is always flowing away and coming again ? Or shall 
we say that the generations of men, like the rivers, are the 
same, but that the state changes ? For, since the state is 1276 b 
a community of citizens united by sharing in one form of ' 
government, when the form of the government changes and 
becomes different, then it may be supposed that the state is 
no longer the same, just as a tragic differs from a comic 
chorus, although the members of both may be identical. And 8 
in this manner we speak of every union or composition of 
elements, when the form of their composition alters ; for 
example, harmony of the same sounds is said to be different, 
accordingly as the Dorian or the Phrygian mode is employed. 
And if this is true it is evident that the sameness of the state 9 
consists chiefly in the sameness of the constitution, and may 
be called or not called by the same name, whether the inhabi- 
tants are the same or entirely different. It is quite another 
question, whether a state ought or ought not to fulfil engage- 
ments when the form of government changes. 

There is a point nearly allied to the preceding : Whether 4 
the virtue of a good man and a good citizen is the same or I 
not 1 . But, before entering on this discussion, we must first 
obtain some general notion of the virtue of the citizen. Like 
the sailor, the citizen is a member of a community. Now, 2 
sailors have different functions, for one of them is a rower, 
1 Cp. N. Eth. v. 2, § 11. 



io6 The Good Man and 

III. 4 another a pilot, a third a look-out man, and a fourth is 
described by some similar term ; and while the precise 
definition of each individual's virtue applies exclusively to him, 
there is, at the same time, a common definition applicable to 
them all. For they have all of them a common object, which 

3 is safety in navigation. Similarly, one citizen differs from 
j another, but the salvation of the community is the common 

business of them all. This community is the state ; the virtue 

/of the citizen must therefore be relative to the constitution of 

' which he is a member. If, then, there are many forms of 

government, it is evident that the virtue of the good citizen 

cannot be the one perfect virtue. But we say that the good 

4 man is he who has perfect virtue. Hence it is evident that 
the good citizen need not of necessity possess the virtue 
which makes a good man. 

The same question may also be approached by another road, 

5 from a consideration of the perfect state. If the state cannot 
be entirely composed of good men, and each citizen is expected 
to do his own business well, and must therefore have virtue, 

1277 a inasmuch as all the citizens cannot be alike, the virtue of the 
citizen and of the good man cannot coincide. All must have 
the virtue of the good citizen — thus, and thus only, can the 
state be perfect ; but they will not have the virtue of a good 
man, unless we assume that in the good state all the citizens 
must be good. 

6 Again, the state may be compared to the living being : as 
the first elements into which the living being is resolved are 
soul and body, as the soul is made up of reason and appetite, 
the family of husband and wife, property of master and slave, 
so out of all these, as well as other dissimilar elements, the 
state is composed ; and, therefore, the virtue of all the 



the Good Citizen 107 

citizens cannot possibly be the same, any more than the III, 4 
excellence of the leader of a chorus is the same as that of the 
performer who stands by his side. I have said enough to 7 
show why the two kinds of virtue cannot be absolutely and 
always the same. 

But will there then be no case in which the virtue of the 
good citizen and the virtue of the good man coincide ? To 
this we answer [not that the good citizen, but] that the good 
ruler is a good and wise man, and that he who would be 
a statesman must be a wise man. And some persons say that 8 
even the education of the ruler should be of a special kind ; 
for are not the children of kings instructed in riding and 
military exercises ? As Euripides says : 

'No subtle arts for me, but what the state requires 1 .' 
As though there were a special education needed by a ruler. 
If then the virtue of a good ruler is the same as that of a good 9 
man, and we assume further that the subject is a citizen as 
well as the ruler, the virtue of the good citizen and the virtue 
of the good man cannot be always the same, although in some 
cases [i. e. in the perfect state] they may ; for the virtue of 
a ruler differs from that of a citizen. It was the sense of this 
difference which made Jason say that ' he felt hungry when he 
was not a tyrant/ meaning that he could not endure to live in 
a private station. But, on the other hand, it may be argued io 
that men are praised for knowing both how to rule and how 
to obey, and he is said to be a citizen of approved virtue who 
is able to do both. Now if we suppose the virtue of a good 
man to be that which rules, and the virtue of the citizen to 
include ruling and obeying, it cannot be said that they are 

1 Fragment from the Aeolus, quoted in Stobaeus, 45. 13. 



ro8 The Good Man and 

III. 4 equally worthy of praise. Since, then, it is occasionally held 

11 that the ruler and the ruled should learn different things and 
not the same things, and that the citizen must know and share 
in both ; the inference is obvious l . There is, indeed, the 
rule of a master which is concerned with menial offices 2 , — the 
master need not know how to perform these, but may employ 
others in the execution of them : anything else would be 

12 degrading; and by anything else I mean the menial duties 
which vary much in character and are executed by various 
classes of slaves, such, for example, as handicraftsmen, who, 
as their name signifies, live by the labour of their hands : — 

1277 b under these the mechanic is included. Hence in ancient 
times, and among some nations, the working classes had no 
share in the government — a privilege which they only acquired 

13 under the extreme democracy. Certainly the good man and 
the statesman and the good citizen ought not to learn the 
crafts of inferiors except for their own occasional use 3 ; if 
they habitually practise them, there will cease to be a distinc- 
tion between master and slave. 

14 This is not the rule of which we are speaking ; but there 
is a rule of another kind, which is exercised over freemen and 
equals by birth — a constitutional rule, which the ruler must 
learn by obeying, as he would learn the duties of a general of 
cavalry by being under the orders of a general of cavalry, or 
the duties of a general of infantry by being under the orders 
of a general of infantry, or by having bad the command of 
a company or brigade. It has been well said that ' he who 

15 has never learned to obey cannot be a good commander.' The 

1 Viz. that some kind of previous subjection is an advantage to the 
ruler. Cp. infra, § 14. 

2 Cp. i. 7. §§ 2-5. s Cp. viii. 2. § 5. 



the Good Citizen 109 

two are not the same, but the good citizen ought to be capable III. 4 
of both ; he should know how to govern like a freeman, and 
how to obey like a freeman — these are the virtues of a citizen. 
And, although the temperance and justice of a ruler are dis- 16 
tinct from those of a subject, the virtue of a good man will 
include both ; for the good man, who is free and also a subject, 
will not have one virtue only, say justice, but he will have 
distinct kinds of virtue, the one qualifying him to rule, the 
other to obey, and differing as the temperance and courage of 
men and women differ 1 . For a man would be thought a 17 
* coward if he had no more courage than a courageous woman, 
and a woman would be thought loquacious if she imposed no 
more restraint on her conversation than the good man ; and 
indeed their part in the management of the household is 
different, for the duty of the one is to acquire, and of the 
other to preserve. Practical wisdom only is characteristic of 
the ruler 2 : it would seem that all other virtues must equally 
belong to ruler and subject. The virtue of the subject is 18 
certainly not wisdom, but only true opinion ; he may be com- 
pared to the maker of the flute, while his master is like the 
flute-player or user of the flute 8 . 

From these considerations may be gathered the answer to 
the question, whether the virtue of the good man is the same 
as that of the good citizen, or different, and how far the same, 
and how far different 4 . 

There still remains one more question about the citizen : 6 

Is he only a true citizen who has a share of office, or is the 

mechanic to be included ? If they who hold no office are to 

be deemed citizens, not every citizen can have this virtue of 

1 Cp. i. 13. § 9. 2 Cp. Rep. iv. 428. 3 Cp. Rep. x. 601 d, e. 
4 Cp. c. 5. § 10; c. 18. § 1 ; iv. 7. § a ; vii. 14. § 8. 



no Are Mechanics Citizens ? 

III. 5 ruling and obeying 1 which makes a citizen \ And if none of 

the lower class are citizens, in which part of the state are 

they to be placed ? For they are not resident aliens, and they 

1278 a are not foreigners. To this objection may we not reply, that 

2 there is no more absurdity in excluding them than in excluding 
slaves and freedmen from any of the above-mentioned classes ? 
It must be admitted that we cannot consider all those to be 
citizens who are necessary to the existence of the state ; for 
example, children are not citizens equally with grown up men, 
who are citizens absolutely, but children, not being grown up, 

3 are only citizens in a qualified sense. Doubtless in ancient 
times, and among some nations, the artisan class were slaves 
or foreigners, and therefore the majority of them are so now. 
The best form of state will not admit them to citizenship ; 
but if they are admitted, then our definition of the virtue of 
a citizen will apply to some citizens and freemen only, and 

4 not to those who work for their living. The latter class, to 
whom toil is a necessity, are either slaves who minister to the 
wants of individuals, or mechanics and labourers who are the 
servants of the community. These reflections carried a little 
further will explain their position ; and indeed what has been 
said already is of itself explanation enough. 

5 Since there are many forms of government there must be 
many varieties of citizens, and especially of citizens who are 
subjects ; so that under some governments the mechanic and 
the labourer will be citizens, but not in others, as, for example, 

1 Or, * for this man (i.e. the meaner sort of man) is a citizen and does 
not exercise rule ' (see below, § 3, d Bi kcli ovros ttoXIttjs). According 
to the way of taking the passage which is followed in the text, ovto$=* 
ixw r ^l v ToiavTtjv ap(T7)v : according to the second way, it refers to 
ftavavaos. 



Different Kinds of Citizens 1 1 1 

in aristocracy or the so-called government of the best (if there III. 
be such an one), in which honours are given according to 
virtue and merit ; for no man can practise virtue who is living 
the life of a mechanic or labourer. In oligarchies the qualifi- 6 
cation for office is high, and therefore no labourer can ever be 
a citizen ; but a mechanic may, for many of them are rich. 
At Thebes * there was a law that no man could hold office 7 
who had not retired from business for ten years. In many 
states the law goes to the length of admitting aliens ; for in 
some democracies a man is a citizen though his mother only 
be a citizen [and his father an alien] ; and a similar principle 
is applied to illegitimate children ; the law is relaxed when 8 
there is a dearth of population. But when the number of 
citizens increases, first the children of a male or a female slave 
are excluded ; then those whose mothers only are citizens ; 
and at last the right of citizenship is confined to those whose 
fathers and mothers are both citizens. 

Hence, as is evident, there are different kinds of citizens ; 9 
and he is a citizen in the highest sense who shares in the 
honours of the state. In the poems of Homer [Achilles 
complains of Agamemnon treating him] * like some dishonoured 
stranger 2 ; ' for he who is excluded from the honours of the 
state is no better than an alien. But when this exclusion is 
concealed, then the object is to deceive one's fellow-country- 
men. 

As to the question whether the virtue of the good man is the 1278 b 
same as that of the good citizen, the considerations already IO 
adduced prove that in some states the two are the same, and 
in others different. When they are the same it is not the 
virtue of every citizen which is the same as that of the good 
1 Cp. vi. 7. § 4, 3 II. ix. 648. 



ii2 Government True and Perverted 

III. 5 man, but only the virtue of the statesman and of those who 
have or may have, alone or in conjunction with others, the 
conduct of public affairs. 

6 Having determined these questions, we have next to con- 
sider whether there is only one form of government or many, 
and if many, what they are, and how many, and what are the 
differences between them. 

A constitution is the arrangement of magistracies in a state 1 , 

f especially of the highest of all. The government is every- 
where sovereign in the state, and the constitution is in fact the 

2 government. For example, in democracies the people are 
supreme, but in oligarchies, the few; and, therefore, we say 
that these two forms of government are different : and so in 
other cases. 

First, let us consider what is the purpose of a state, and 
how many forms of government there are by which human 

3 society is regulated. We have already said, in the former 
part of this treatise 2 , when drawing a distinction between 
household-management and the rule of a master, that man is 
by nature a political animal. And therefore, men, even when 
they do not require one another's help, desire to live together 
all the same, and are in fact brought together by their common 
interests in proportion as they severally attain to any measure 

4 of well-being. This is certainly the chief end, both of indi- 
viduals and of states. And also for the sake of mere life (in 
which there is possibly some noble element) mankind meet 
together and maintain the political community, so long as the 

5 evils of existence do not greatly overbalance the good 3 . And 
we all see that men cling to life even in the midst of 

1 Cp. c. i. § i ; iv. i. § io. 3 Cp. i. 2. §§ 9, 10. 

s Cp. Plato, Polit. 302 A. 



Government True and Perverted 113 

misfortune, seeming to find in it a natural sweetness and III. 6 
happiness. 

There is no difficulty in distinguishing the various kinds of 
authority; they have been often defined already in popular 
works \ The rule of a master, although the slave by nature 6 
and the master by nature have in reality the same interests, is 
nevertheless exercised primarily with a view to the interest of 
the master, but accidentally considers the slave, since, if the 
slave perish, the rule of the master perishes with him. On 7 
the other hand, the government of a wife and children and of 
a household, which we have called household-management, is 
exercised in the first instance for the good of the governed or 
for the common good of both parties, but essentially for the 
good of the governed, as we see to be the case in medicine, 1279 a 
gymnastics, and the arts in general, which are only accidentally 
concerned with the good of the artists themselves 2 . (For 
there is no reason why the trainer may not sometimes practise 
gymnastics, and the pilot is always one of the crew.) The 8 
trainer or the pilot considers the good of those committed to 
his care. But, when he is one of the persons taken care of, 
he accidentally participates in the advantage, for the pilot is 
also a sailor, and the trainer becomes one of those in training. 
And so in politics : when the state is framed upon the prin- 9 
ciple of equality and likeness, the citizens think that they 
ought to hold office by turns. In the order of nature every 
one would take his turn of service ; and then again, somebody 
else would look after his interest, just as he, while in office, 
had looked after theirs 8 . [That was originally the way.] 
But nowadays, for the sake of the advantage which is to be *° 

1 Or, *in our popular works.' 3 Cp. Plato, Rep. i. 341 d. 

3 Cp. ii. 2. §§ 6, 7. 

DAVIS j 



ii4 Classification of Governments 

III. 6 gained from the public revenues and from office, men want to 
be always in office. One might imagine that the rulers, being 
sickly, were only kept in health while they continued in office; 
in that case we may be sure that they would be hunting 
1 1 after places. The conclusion is evident : that governments, 
i which have a regard to the common interest, are constituted 
/ in accordance with strict principles of justice, and are there- 
fore true forms ; but those which regard only the interest of 
the rulers are all defective and perverted forms, for they are 
despotic, whereas a state is a community of freemen. 
7 Having determined these points, we have next to consider 
how many forms of government there are, and what they are ; 
and in the first place what are the true forms, for when they 
are determined the perversions of them will at once be 

2 apparent. The words constitution and government have the 
same meaning, and the government, which is the supreme 
authority in states, must be in the hands of one, or of a few, 
or of many. The true forms of government, therefore, are 
those in which the one, or the few, or the many, govern with 
a view to the common interest ; but governments which rule 
with a view to the private interest, whether of the one, or of 
the few, or of the many, are perversions 1 . For citizens, if 
they are truly citizens, ought to participate in the advantages 
of a state. Of forms of government in which one rules, we 

3 call that which regards the common interests, kingship or 
royalty ; that in which more than one, but not many, rule, 
aristocracy [the rule of the best] ; and it is so called, either 
because the rulers are the best men, or because they have at 
heart the best interests of the state and of the citizens. But 
when the citizens at large administer the state for the common 

1 Cp. Eth. viii. io 



Classification of Governments 1 1 y 

interest, the government is called by the generic name — a III. 7 
constitution [rroXtrWa]. And there is a reason for this use of 
language. One man or a few may excel in virtue; but of 4 
virtue there are many kinds : and as the number increases it 
becomes more difficult for them to attain perfection in every 1279 b 
kind, though they may in military virtue, for this is found in 
the masses. Hence, in a constitutional government the 
fighting-men have the supreme power, and those who possess ■ 
arms are the citizens. 

Of the above-mentioned forms, the perversions are as 5 
follows : — of royalty, tyranny ; of aristocracy, oligarchy ; of 
constitutional government, democracy. For tyranny is a kind 
of monarchy which has in view tfie interest of the monarch 
only ; oligarchy has in view the interest of the wealthy ; 
democracy, of the needy : none of them the common good 
of all. 

But there are difficulties about these forms of government, 8 
and it will therefore be necessary to state a little more at 
length the nature of each of them. For he who would make 
a philosophical study of the various sciences, and does not 
regard practice only, ought not to overlook or omit anything, 
but to set forth the truth in every particular. Tyranny, as 2 
I was saying, is monarchy exercising the rule of a master 
over political society ; oligarchy is when men of property have 
the government in their hands; democracy, the opposite, 
when the indigent, and not the men of property, are the 
rulers. And here arises the first of our difficulties, and it 3 
relates to the definition just given. For democracy is said to 
be the government of the many. But what if the many are 
men of property and have the power in their hands ? In like 
manner oligarchy is said to be the government of the few; but 

T 2 



n6 Oligarchy and Democracy Defined 

III. 8 what if the poor are fewer than the rich, and have the power 
in their hands because they are stronger ? In these cases the 
distinction which we have drawn between these different forms 
of government would no longer hold good. 

4 Suppose, once more, that we add wealth to the few and 
poverty to the many, and name the governments accordingly — 
an oligarchy is said to be that in which the few and the 
wealthy, and a democracy that in which the many and the 

5 poor are the rulers — there will still be a difficulty. For, if 
the only forms of government are the ones already mentioned, 
how shall we describe those other governments also just 
mentioned by us, in which the rich are the more numerous 
and the poor are the fewer, and both govern in their re- 
spective states ? 

6 The argument seems to show that, whether in oligarchies , 
or in democracies, the number of the governing body, whether I 
the greater number, as in a democracy, or the smaller number, 
as in an oligarchy, is an accident due to the fact that the rich 
everywhere are few, and the poor numerous. But if so, 
there is a misapprehension of the causes of the difference < 

7 between them. For the real difference between democracy 
1280 i and oligarchy is poverty and wealth. Wherever men rule 

by reason of their wealth, whether they be few or many, that 
is an oligarchy, and where the poor rule, that is a demo- 
cracy. But as a fact the rich are few and the poor many : 
for few are well-to-do, whereas freedom is enjoyed by all, 
and wealth and freedom are the grounds on which the 
oligarchical and democratical parties respectively claim power 
in the state. 
9 Let us begin by considering the common definitions of 
oligarchy and democracy, and what is justice oligarchical and 




ai 



Political Justice 

democratical. For all men cling to justice of some kind, but III. 9 
their conceptions are imperfect and they do not express the 
whole idea. For example, justice is thought by them to be, | 
and is, equality, not, however, for all, but only for equals. j 
And inequality is thought to be, and is, justice ; neither is 2 
this for all, but only for unequals. When the persons are 
omitted, then men judge erroneously. The reason is that 
they are passing judgment on themselves, and most people 
are bad judges in their own case. And whereas justice 3 
implies a relation to persons as well as to things, and a just 
distribution, as I have already said in the Ethics 1 , embraces 
alike persons and things, they acknowledge the equality of the 
things, but dispute about the merit of the persons, chiefly for 
the reason which I have just given — because they are bad 
judges in their own affairs; and secondly, because both the 
parties to the argument are speaking of a limited and partial 
justice, but imagine themselves to be speaking of absolute 
justice. For those who are unequal in one respect, for 4 
example wealth, consider themselves to be unequal in all ; 
and any who are equal in one respect, for example freedom, 
consider themselves to be equal in all. But they leave out 
the capital point. For if men met and associated out of 5 
regard to wealth only, their share in the state would be 
proportioned to their property, and the oligarchical doctrine 
would then seem to carry the day. It would not be just 
that he who paid one mina should have the same share of 
a hundred minae, 2 whether of the principal or of the profits 2 , 
as he who paid the remaining ninety-nine. But a state 6 

1 N. Eth. v. 3. § 4. 

3 Or, with Bernays, f either in the case of the original contributors 
or their successors.' 



1 1 8 The End of the State 

III. 9 exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life 
only : if life only were the object, slaves and brute animals 
might form a state, but they cannot, for they have no share 
in happiness or in a life of free choice. Nor does a state 
exist for the sake of alliance and security from injustice 1 , nor 
yet for the sake of exchange and mutual intercourse; for then 
the Tyrrhenians and the Carthaginians, and all who have 
commercial treaties with one another, would be the citizens of 

7 one state. True, they have agreements about imports, and en- 
gagements that they will do no wrong to one another, and 

1280 b written articles of alliance. But there are no magistracies 
common to the contracting parties who will enforce their 
engagements ; different states have each their own magistracies. 
Nor does one state take care that the citizens of the other 
are such as they ought to be, nor see that those who come 
under the terms of the treaty do no wrong or wickedness at 
all, but only that they do no injustice to one another. 

8 Whereas, those who care for good government take into 
consideration [the larger question of] virtue and vice in states. 
Whence it may be further inferred that 2 virtue must be the 
serious care of a state which truly deserves the name 2 : for 
[without this ethical end] the community becomes a mere 
alliance which differs only in place from alliances of which 
the members live apart ; and law is only a convention, ' a 
surety to one another of justice,' as the sophist Lycophron 
says, and has no real power to make the citizens good and 
just. 

9 This is obvious ; for suppose distinct places, such as 

1 Cp. c i. § 4 . 

2 Or, * virtue must be the care of a state which is truly so called, and 
not merely in name.' 



The End of the State 119 

Corinth and Megara, to be united by a wall, still they would m, 9 
not be one city, not even if the citizens had the right to 10 
intermarry, which is one of the rights peculiarly characteristic 
of states. Again, if men dwelt at a distance from one 
another, but not so far off as to have no intercourse, and 
there were laws among them that they should not wrong 
each other in their exchanges, neither would this be a state. 
Let us suppose that one man is a carpenter, another a 
husbandman, another a shoemaker, and so on, and that their 
number is ten thousand : nevertheless, if they have nothing in 
common but exchange, alliance, and the like, that would not 
constitute a state. Why is this ? Surely not because they 1 1 
are at a distance from one another : for even supposing that 
such a community were to meet in one place, and that each 
man had a house of his own, which was in a manner his 
state, and that they made alliance with one another, but only 
against evil-doers ; still an accurate thinker would not deem 
this to be a state, if their intercourse with one another was of 
the same character after as before their union. It is clear \i 2 
then that a state is nok a mere society, having a common I 
place, established for the prevention of crime and for the sake I 
of exchange. These are conditions without which a state 
cannot exist; but all of them together do not constitute 
a state, which is a community of well-being in families and 
aggregations of families, for the sake of a perfect and self- 
s ufficing l ife. Such a community can only be established 13 
among those who live in the same place and intermarry. 
Hence arise in cities family connexions, brotherhoods, 
common sacrifices, amusements which draw men together. 
They are created by friendship, for friendship is the motive 
of society. The end is the good life, and these are the 



120 



Sovereignty 



III. 9 means towards it. And the state is the union of families and 
x 4 villages having for an end a perfect and self-sufficing life, by 
which we mean a happy and honourable life 1 , 
/ Our conclusion, then, is that political society exists for the 
i5%ake of noble actions, and not of mere companionship. And 
they who contribute most to such a society have a greater 
share in it than those who have the same or a greater freedom 
or nobility of birth but are inferior to them in political virtue ; 
or than those who exceed them in wealth but are surpassed 
by them in virtue. 

From what has been said it will be clearly seen that all the 
partisans of different forms of government speak of a part of 
justice only. 
10 There is also a doubt as to what is to be the supreme 
power in the state: — Is it the multitude? Or the wealthy? 
Or the good ? Or the one best man ? Or a tyrant ? Any 
of these alternatives seems to involve disagreeable conse- 
quences. If the poor, for example, because they are more in 
number, divide among themselves the property of the rich, 
is not this unjust ? No, by heaven (will be the reply), for 

2 the lawful authority [i. e. the people] willed it. But if this is 
not injustice, pray what is ? Again, when [in the first 
division] all has been taken, and the majority divide anew the 
property of the minority, is it not evident, if this goes on, 
that they will ruin the state ? Yet surely, virtue is not the 
ruin of those who possess her, nor is justice destructive of 
a state 2 ; and therefore this law of confiscation clearly cannot 

3 be just. If it were, all the acts of a tyrant must of necessity 
be just ; for he only coerces other men by superior power, 
just as the multitude coerce the rich. But is it just, then, 

1 Co. i. 2. § 8 ; N. Eth. i. 7. § 6. 2 Cp. Plato, Rep. i. 351. 352. 



Sovereignty of the People 



121 



that the few and the wealthy should be the rulers ? And III. 10 
what if they, in like manner, rob and plunder the people — is 
this just ? If so, the other case [i. e. the case of the 
majority plundering the minority] will likewise be just. But 4 
there can be no doubt that all these things are wrong and 
unjust. 

Then ought the good to rule and have supreme power ? 
But in that case everybody else, being excluded from power, 
will be dishonoured. For the offices of a state are posts of 
honour ; and if one set of men always hold them, the rest 
must be deprived of them. Then will it be well that the one 5 
best man should rule ? Nay, that is still more oligarchical, 
for the number of those who are dishonoured is thereby 
increased. Some one may say that it is bad for a man, 
subject as he is to all the accidents of human passion, to 
have the supreme power, rather than the law. But what if the 
law itself be democratical or oligarchical, how will that help 
us out of our difficulties * ? Not at all ; the same conse- 
quences will follow. 

Most of these questions may be reserved for another 11 
occasion. The principle that the multitude ought to be 
supreme rather than the few best is capable of a satisfactory j 
explanation, and, though not free from difficulty, yet seems to \ 
contain an element of truth. For the many, of whom each a 
individual is but an ordinary person, when they meet together 1281 b 
may very likely be better than the few good, if regarded not 
individually but collectively, just as a feast to which many 
contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single 
purse. For each individual among the many has a share 
of virtue and prudence, and when they meet together they 
1 Cp. c. II. § 20. 



t 2 2 Reasons for and against 

III. 11 become in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, 
and senses ; that is a figure of their mind and disposition. 

3 Hence the many are better judges than a single man of music 
and poetry ; for some understand one part, and some another, 

4 and among them, they understand the whole. There is 
a similar combination of qualities in good men, who differ 
from any individual of the many, as the beautiful are said 
to differ from those who are not beautiful, and works of 
art from realities, because in them the scattered elements are 
combined, although, if taken separately, the eye of one person 
or some other feature in another person would be fairer than 

5 in the picture. Whether this principle can apply to every 
democracy, and to all bodies of men, is not clear. Or rather, 
by heaven, in some cases it is impossible of application ; for 
the argument would equally hold about brutes ; and wherein, 
it will be asked, do some men differ from brutes ? But there 
may be bodies of men about whom our statement is neverthe- 

6 less true. And if so, the difficulty which has been already 
raised, and also another which is akin to it — viz. what power 
should be assigned to the mass of freemen and citizens, who 
are not rich and have no personal merit — are both solved. 

7 There is still a danger in allowing them to share the great 
! offices of state, for their folly will lead them into error, and 

their dishonesty into crime. But there is a danger also in not 
letting them share, for a state in which many poor men are 

8 excluded from office will necessarily be full of enemies. The 
only way of escape is to assign to them some deliberative and 
judicial functions. For this reason Solon 1 and certain other 
legislators give them the power of electing to offices, and 
of calling the magistrates to account, but they do not allow 

1 Cp. ii. 12. § 5. 



Sovereignty of the People 123 

them to hold office singly. When they meet together their III. 11 
perceptions are quite good enough, and combined with the 9 
better class they are useful to the state (just as impure 
food when mixed with what is pure sometimes makes the 
entire mass more wholesome than a small quantity of the 
pure would be), but each individual, left to himself, forms 
an imperfect judgment. On the other hand, the popular 10 
form of government involves certain difficulties. In the first 
place, it might be objected that he who can judge of the 
healing of a sick man would be one who could himself 
heal his disease, and make him whole — that is, in other 
words, the physician ; and so in all professions and arts. 1282 a. 
As, then, the physician ought to be called to account by 
physicians, so ought men in general to be called to account 
by their peers. But physicians are of three kinds : — there 1 1 
is the apothecary, and there is the physician of the higher 
class, and thirdly the intelligent man who has studied the 
art : in all arts there is such a class ; and we attribute 
the power of judging to them quite as much as to professors 
of the art. Now, does not the same principle apply to 12 
elections ? For a right election can only be made by those 
who have knowledge; a geometrician, for example, will 
choose rightly in matters of geometry, or a pilot in matters 
of steering ; and, even if there be some occupations and 
arts with which private persons are familiar, they certainly 
cannot judge better than those who know. So that, according 13 
to this argument, neither the election of magistrates, nor the 
calling of them to account, should be entrusted to the many. 14 
Yet possibly these objections are to a great extent met by 
our old answer, that if the people are not utterly degraded, 
although individually they may be worse judges than those 



124 Treasons for and against 

III. 11 who have special knowledge — as a body they are as good 
or better. Moreover, there are some artists whose works 
are judged of solely, or in the best manner, not by them- 
selves, but by those who do not possess the art ; for example, 
the knowledge of the house is not limited to the builder 
only; the user, or, in other words, the master, of the 
house will even be a better judge than the builder, just as 
the pilot will judge better of a rudder than the carpenter, 
and the guest will judge better of a feast than the cook. 

15 This difficulty seems now to be sufficiently answered, but 
there is another akin to it. That inferior persons should 
have authority in greater matters than the good would appear 
to be a strange thing, yet the election and calling to account 
of the magistrates is the greatest of all. And these, as 
I was saying, are functions which in some states are assigned 
to the people, for the assembly is supreme in all such matters. 

16 Yet persons of any age, and having but a small property 
qualification, sit in the assembly and deliberate and judge, 
although for the great officers of state, such as controllers and 
generals, a high qualification is required. This difficulty may 
be solved in the same manner as the preceding, and the 
present practice of democracies may be really defensible, 

17 For the power does not reside in the dicast, or senator, 
or ecclesiast, but in the court and the senate, and the 
assembly, of which individual senators, or ecclesiasts, or 

18 dicasts, are only parts or members. And for this reason 
the many may claim to have a higher authority than the 
few ; for the people, and the senate, and the courts consist of 
many persons, and their property collectively is greater than 
the property of one or of a few individuals holding great 
offices. But enough of this. 



L 



Equality and Inequality ny 

The discussion of the first question 1 shows nothing so III. 11 
clearly as that laws, when good, should be supreme; and ! 9 
that the magistrate or magistrates should regulate those 
matters only on which the laws are unable to speak with 
precision owing to the difficulty of any general principle 
embracing all particulars 2 . But what are good laws has 20 
not yet been clearly explained ; the old difficulty remains 3 . 
The goodness or badness, justice or injustice, of laws is 
of necessity relative to the constitutions of states. But if 21 
so, true forms of government will of necessity have just laws, 
and perverted forms of government will have unjust laws. 

In all sciences and arts the end is a good, and especially and 12 
above all in the highest of all * — this is the political science j 
of which the good is justice, in other words, the common £ 
interest. All men think justice to be a sort of equality ; and 
to a certain extent B they agree in the philosophical distinctions 
which have been laid down by us about Ethics 6 . For 
they admit that justice is a thing having relation to persons, 
and that equals ought to have equality. But there still re- 2 
mains a question — equality or inequality of what ? Here is a 
difficulty which the political philosopher has to resolve. For 
very likely some persons will say that offices of state ought 
to be unequally distributed according to superior excellence, 
in whatever respect, of the citizen, although there is no other 
difference between him and the rest of the community ; for 
that those who differ in any one respect have different rights 
and claims. But, surely, if this is true, the complexion or 3 
height of a man, or any other advantage, will be a reason 

1 Cp. c. 10. § 1. 2 Cp. N. Eth. v. 10. § 4. 

8 Cp. c. 10. § 5. 4 Cp. i. 1. § 1 ; N. Eth. i. 1. § I. 

6 Cp. c. 9. § 1. 8 Cp. N. Eth. v. 3. 



ii6 Conflicting Claims 

III. 12 for his obtaining a greater share of political rights. The 

4 error here lies upon the surface, and may be illustrated from 
the other arts and sciences. When a number of flute-players 
are equal in their art, there is no reason why those of them 
who are better born should have better flutes given to them ; 
for they will not play any better on the flute, and the superior 
instrument should be reserved for him who is the superior 
artist. If what I am saying is still obscure, it will be made 

5 clearer as we proceed. For if there were a superior flute- 
player who was far inferior in birth and beauty, although 
either of these may be a greater good than the art of flute- 
playing, and persons gifted with these qualities may excel the 
flute-player in a greater ratio than he excels them in his art, 

1283 a still he ought to have the best flutes given to him, unless 
the advantages of wealth and birth contribute to excellence 

6 in flute-playing, which they do not. Moreover upon this 
principle any good may be compared with any other. For 
if a given height, then height in general may be measured 
either against height or against freedom. Thus if A excels in 
height more than B in virtue, and height in general is more 
excellent than virtue, all things will be commensurable 
[which is absurd] ; for if a certain magnitude is greater 
than some other, it is clear that some other will be equal. 

7 But since no such comparison can be made, it is evident that 
there is good reason why in politics men do not ground their 
claim to office on every sort of inequality any more than 
in the arts. For if some be slow, and others swift, that 
is no reason why the one should have little and the others 
much ; it is in gymnastic contests that such excellence is 

8 rewarded. Whereas the rival claims of candidates for office 
can only be based on the possession of elements which enter 



to Sovereign Power 127 

into the composition of a state, [such as wealth, virtue, etc.]. III. 12 
And therefore the noble, or freeborn, or rich, may with 
good reason claim office ; for holders of offices must be 
freemen and tax-payers : a state can be no more composed 
entirely of poor men than entirely of slaves. But if wealth 9 
and freedom are necessary elements, justice and valour are 
equally so l ; for without the former a state cannot exist 
at all, without the latter not well. 

If the existence of the state is alone to be considered, then 13 
it would seem that all, or some at least, of these claims 
are just ; but, if we take into account a good life, as I have 
already said 2 , education and virtue have superior claims. 
As, however, those who are equal in one thing ought not to 
be equal in all, nor those who are unequal in one thing to I 
be unequal in all, it is certain that all forms of govern- * 
ment which rest on either of these principles are perversions. 
All men have a claim in a certain sense, as I have already 2 
admitted, but they have not an absolute claim. The rich claim 
because they have a greater share in the land, and land is the 
common element of the state ; also they are generally more 
trustworthy in contracts. The free claim under the same 
title as the noble ; for they are nearly akin. And the noble 
are citizens in a truer sense than the ignoble, since good 
birth is always valued in a man's own home and country*. 
Another reason is, that those who are sprung from better 3 
ancestors are likely to be better men, for nobility is excellence 
of race. Virtue, too, may be truly said to have a claim, for 
justice has been acknowledged by us to be a social * virtue, 
and it implies all others 6 . Again, the many may urge their 4 

1 Cp. iv. 4. §§ 12-16. 2 Cp. c 9. §§ 14, 15. 

3 Cp. i. 6. § 7. * Cp. i. 2. § 16. 5 Cp. N. Eth. v. 1. § 15. 



128 Cotiflictmg claims to Power 

III. 13 claim against the few ; for, when taken collectively, and 

compared with the few, they are stronger and richer and 

1283 b better. But, what if the good, the rich, the noble, and the 

other classes who make up a state, are all living together in 

the same city; will there, or will there not, be any doubt 

5 who shall rule ? — No doubt at all in determining who ought 
to rule in each of the above-mentioned forms of government. 
For states are characterized by differences in their governing 
bodies — one of them has a government of the rich, another 
of the virtuous, and so on. But a difficulty arises when all 

6 these elements coexist. How are we to decide ? Suppose 
the virtuous to be very few in number : may we consider 
their numbers in relation to their duties, and ask whether they 
are enough to administer the state, or must they be so many as 
will make up a state ? Objections may be urged against all 

7 the aspirants to political power. For those who found their 
claims on wealth or family have no basis of justice; on this 
principle, if any one person were richer than all the rest, it is 
clear that he ought to be the ruler of them. In like manner 
he who is very distinguished by his birth ought to have the 
superiority over all those who claim on the ground that they are 

8 freeborn. In an aristocracy, or government of the best, a like 
difficulty occurs about virtue ; for if one citizen be better than 
the other members of the government, however good they 
may be, he too, upon the same principle of justice, should rule 
over them. And if the people are to be supreme because they 
are stronger than the few, then if one man, or more than one, 
but not a majority, is stronger than the many, they ought to 
rule, and not the many. 

9 All these considerations appear to show that none of 
the principles on which men claim to rule, and hold all 



Conflicting Claims to Power 129 

other men in subjection to them, are strictly right. To III. 13 
those who claim to be the masters of state on the ground IO 
of their virtue or their wealth, the many might fairly answer 
that they themselves are often better and richer than the 
few — I do not say individually, but collectively. And n 
another ingenious objection which is sometimes put forward 
may be met in a similar manner. Some persons doubt 
whether the legislator who desires to make the justest laws 
ought to legislate with a view to the good of the higher 
classes or of the many, when the case which we have 
mentioned occurs [i. e. when all the elements coexist *]. 
Now what is just or right is to be interpreted in the sense ia 
of * what is equal ' ; and that which is right in the sense 
of being equal is to be considered with reference to the 
advantage of the state, and the common good of the citizens. 
And a citizen is one who shares in governing and being 
governed. He differs under different forms of government, 1284 a 
but in the best state he is one who is able and willing to be 
governed and to govern with a view to the life of virtue. 

If, however, there be some one person, or more than one, 13 
although not enough to make up the full complement of a 
state, whose virtue is so pre-eminent that the virtues or the 
political capacity of all the rest admit of no comparison with 
his or theirs, he or they can be no longer regarded as part of 
a state ; for justice will not be done to the superior, if he is 
reckoned only as the equal of those who are so far inferior to 
him in virtue and in political capacity. Such an one may 
truly be deemed a God among men. Hence we see that 14 
legislation is necessarily concerned only with those who are 
equal in birth and in power ; and that for men of pre-eminent 
1 C P . § 4. 

DAVIS K 



130 The One Best Man 

III. 13 virtue there is no law — they are themselves a law. Any one 
would be ridiculous who attempted to make laws for them : 
they would probably retort what, in the fable of Antisthenes, 
the lions said to the hares [' where are your claws ? '], 
when in the council of the beasts the latter began haranguing 

15 and claiming equality for all. And for this reason democratic 
states have instituted ostracism ; equality is above all things 
their aim, and therefore they ostracise and banish from 
the city for a time those who seem to predominate too much 
through their wealth, or the number of their friends, or 

16 through any other political influence. Mythology tells us that 
the Argonauts left Heracles behind for a similar reason ; the 
ship Argo would not take him because she feared that he would 
have been too much for the rest of the crew. Wherefore 
those who denounce tyranny and blame the counsel which 
Periander gave to Thrasybulus cannot be held altogether just in 

17 their censure. The story is that Periander, when the herald 
was sent to ask counsel of him, said nothing, but only cut off 
the tallest ears of corn till he had brought the field to a level. 
The herald did not know the meaning of the action, but 
came and reported what he had seen to Thrasybulus, who 
understood that he was to cut off the principal men in the 

x g state 1 ; and this is a policy not only expedient for tyrants 
or in practice confined to them, but equally necessary in 
oligarchies and democracies. Ostracism 2 is a measure of the 
same kind, which acts by disabling and banishing the most 

19 prominent citizens. Great powers do the same to whole 
cities and nations, as the Athenians did to the Samians, 
Chians, and Lesbians ; no sooner had they obtained a firm 
grasp of the empire, than they humbled their allies contrary 

1 C P . v. 10. §13. a Cp. v. 3. §3. 



Ostracism 131 

to treaty ; and the Persian king has repeatedly crushed the HI, 13 
Medes, Babylonians, and other nations, when their spirit has 1284 b 
been stirred by the recollection of their former greatness. 

The problem is a universal one, and equally concerns all 20 
forms of government, true as well as false; for, although 
perverted forms with a view to their own interests may 
adopt this policy, those which seek the common interest do 
so likewise. The same thing may be observed in the arts 21 
and sciences 1 ; for the painter will not allow the figure to 
have a foot which, however beautiful, is not in proportion, 
nor will the ship-builder allow the stern or any other part 
of the vessel to be unduly large, any more than the chorus- 
master will allow any one who sings louder or better than all 
the rest to sing in the choir. 2 Monarchs, too, may practise 22 
compulsion and still live in harmony with their cities, if 
their government is for the interest of the state 2 . Hence 
where there is an acknowledged superiority the argument in 
favour of ostracism is based upon a kind of political justice. 
It would certainly be better that the legislator should from the 33 
first so order his state as to have no need of such a remedy. 
But if the need arises, the next best thing is that he should 
endeavour to correct the evil by this or some similar measure. 
The principle, however, has not been fairly applied in states ; 
for, instead of looking to the public good, they have used 
ostracism for factious purposes. It is true that under perverted 24 
forms of government, and from their special point of view, 
such a measure is just and expedient, but it is also clear that 
it is not absolutely just. In the perfect state there would be 

1 Cp. v. 3. § 6; 9. § 7 ; vii. 4. § 10 ; Rep. iv. 420. 
a Or, * Monarchies do not differ in this respect (i. e. the employment 
of compulsion) from free states, but their government must be/ etc. 
K 2 



1 3 2 Ki n $y Rule 

III. 13 great doubts about the use of it, not when applied to excess 
in strength, wealth, popularity, or the like, but when used 
against some one who is pre-eminent in virtue, — what is to 
25 be done with him ? Mankind will not say that such an 
one is to be expelled and exiled ; on the other hand, he 
ought not to be a subject — that would be as if men should 
claim to rule over Zeus on the principle of rotation of 
office. The only alternative is that all should joyfully obey 
such a ruler, according to what seems to be the order of 
nature, and that men like him should be kings in their state 
for life. 
14 The preceding discussion, by a natural transition, leads 
to the consideration of royalty, which we admit to be one 
of the true forms of government 1 , Let us see whether in 
order to be well governed a state or country should be under 
the rule of a king or under some other form of government ; 
and whether monarchy, although good for some, may not be 

2 bad for others. But first we must determine whether there is 
1285 a one species of royalty or many. It is «W easy to see that 

there are many, and that the manner of government is not the 
same in all of them. 

3 (1) Of royalties according to law, the Lacedaemonian is 
thought to answer best to the true pattern ; but there the royal 
power is not absolute, except when the kings go on an 
expedition, and then they take the command. Matters of 

4 religion are likewise committed to them. The kingly office is 
in truth a kind of generalship, irresponsible and perpetual. 
The king has not the power of life and death, except 3 

1 ii. 9. § 29. 

2 Omitting iv rtvi BactXdq, which is bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd 
edit. 



Varieties of F^ingly Tiide 133 

when upon a campaign and in the field ; after the manner of III. 14 
the ancients which is described in Homer. For Agamemnon 
is patient when he is attacked in the assembly, but when the 
army goes out to battle he has the power even of life and 
death. Does he not say ? — 5 

' When I find a man skulking apart from the battle, nothing 
shall save him from the dogs and vultures, for in my hands is 
death V 

This, then, is one form of royalty — a generalship for life : 
and of such royalties some are hereditary and others elective. 

(2) There is another sort of monarchy not uncommon 6 
among the barbarians, which nearly resembles tyranny. But 
even this is legal and hereditary. For barbarians, being more 
servile in character than Hellenes, and Asiatics than 
Europeans, do not rebel against a despotic government. Such 7 
royalties have the nature of tyrannies because the people are 
by nature slaves 2 ; but there is no danger of their being 
overthrown, for they are hereditary and legal. Wherefore 
also their guards are such as a king and not such as a tyrant 
would employ, that is to say, they are composed of 
citizens, whereas the guards of tyrants are mercenaries 3 . For j 
kings rule according to law over voluntary subjects, but / 
tyrants over involuntary ; and the one are guarded by their 
fellow-citizens, the others are guarded against them. 

These are two forms of monarchy, and there was a 8 
third (3) which existed in ancient Hellas, called an Aesym- 
netia or dictatorship. This may be defined generally as an 
elective tyranny, which, like the barbarian monarchy, is legal, 

1 II. ii. 391-393. The last clause is not found in our Homer. 
3 Cp. i. 2. § 4. 8 Cp. v. 10. § 10, 



134 Kj n Z s i n the Heroic -dges 

III. 14 but differs from it in not being hereditary. Sometimes the 
9 office is held for life, sometimes for a term of years, or until 
certain duties have been performed. For example, the 
Mitylenaeans elected Pittacus leader against the exiles, who 
io were headed by Antimenides and Alcaeus the poet. And 
Alcaeus himself says in one of his * irregular songs \ ' They 
chose Pittacus tyrant/ and he reproaches his fellow-citizens 
for 

' having made the low-born Pittacus tyrant of the spiritless 
1285 b and ill-fated city, with one voice shouting his praises.' 

1 1 These forms of government have always had the character 
of despotism, because they possess tyrannical power; but 
inasmuch as they are elective and acquiesced in by their 
subjects, they are kingly. 

(4) There is a fourth species of kingly rule — that of the 
heroic times — which was hereditary and legal, and was exer- 

12 cised over willing subjects. For the first chiefs were bene- 
factors of the people 2 in arts or arms ; they either gathered 
them into a community, or procured land for them ; and thus 
they became kings of voluntary subjects, and their power was 
inherited by their descendants. They took the command in 
war and presided over the sacrifices, except those which 
required a priest. They also decided causes either with or 
without an oath ; and when they swore, the form of the oath 

j 3 was the stretching out of their sceptre. In ancient times their 
power extended to all things whatsoever, in city and country, 
as well as in foreign parts ; but at a later date they relin- 
quished several of these privileges, and others the people took 
from them, until in some states nothing was left to them 

1 Or, ' banquet-odes,' aftoXia. a Cp. v. c, 10, § 3. 



Is Monarchy a Good? 13^ 

but the sacrifices ; and where they retained more of the III. 14 
reality they had only the right of leadership in war beyond 
the border. 

These, then, are the four kinds of royalty. First the 14 
monarchy of the heroic ages ; this was exercised over volun- 
tary subjects, but limited to certain functions ; the king was 
a general and a judge, and had the control of religion. The 
second is that of the barbarians, which is an hereditary 
despotic government in accordance with law. A third is the 
power of the so-called Aesymnete or Dictator; this is an 
elective tyranny. The fourth is the Lacedaemonian, which 
is in fact a generalship, hereditary and perpetual. These 15 
four forms differ from one another in the manner which 
I have described. 

There is a fifth form of kingly rule in which one has the 
disposal of all, just as each tribe or each state has the disposal 
of the public property; this form corresponds to the control 
of a household. For as household management is the kingly 
rule of a house, so kingly rule is the household management 
of a city, or of a nation, or of many nations. 

Of these forms we need only consider two, the Lacedae- 15 
monian and the absolute royalty ; for most of the others lie in 
a region between them, having less power than the last, and 
more than the first. Thus the enquiry is reduced to two 2 
points : first, is it advantageous to the state that there should 
be a perpetual general, and if so, should the office be confined 
to one family, or open to the citizens in turn ? Secondly, is 1286 a 
it well that a single man should have the supreme power in all 
things ? The first question falls under the head of laws 
rather than of constitutions ; for perpetual generalship might 
equally exist under any form of government, so that this 3 



i 3 6 Is not the Rule of Many Better ? 

III. 15 matter may be dismissed for the present. The other kind of 
royalty is a sort of constitution ; this we have now to con- 
sider, and briefly to run over the difficulties involved in it. 
We will begin by enquiring whether it is more advantageous 
to be ruled by the best man or by the best laws 1 . 

4 The advocates of royalty maintain that the laws speak only 
in general terms, and cannot provide for circumstances ; and 
that for any science to abide by written rules is absurd. Even 
in Egypt the physician is allowed to alter his treatment after 
the fourth day, but if sooner, he takes the risk. Hence it is 
argued that a government acting according to written laws is 

5 plainly not the best. Yet surely the ruler cannot dispense with 
the general principle which exists in law ; and he is a better 
ruler who is free from passion than he who is passionate. 
Whereas the law is passionless, passion must ever sway the 
heart of man. 

6 Yes, some one will answer, but then on the other hand an 
individual will be better able to advise in particular cases. [To 
whom we in turn make reply :] A king must legislate, and 
laws must be passed, but these laws will have no authority 
when they miss the mark, though in all other cases retaining 
their authority. [Yet a further question remains behind :] 
When the law cannot determine a point at all, or not well, 

7 should the one best man or should all decide ? According to 
our present practice assemblies meet, sit in judgment, deliberate 
and decide, and their judgments all relate to individual cases. 
Now any member of the assembly, taken separately, is cer- 
tainly inferior to the wise man. But the state is made up of 
many individuals. And as a feast to which all the guests 
contribute is better than a banquet furnished by a single man 2 , 

1 Cp. Plato, Polit. pp. 293-295. 3 Cp. supra, c. II. § 2. 



Constitutional History of Greece 137 

so a multitude is a better judge of many things than any III. 15 
individual. 

Again, the many are more incorruptible than the few ; they 8 
are like the greater quantity of water which is less easily cor- 
rupted than a little. The individual is liable to be overcome 
by anger or by some other passion, and then his judgment is 
necessarily perverted ; but it is hardly to be supposed that a 
great number of persons would all get into a passion and go 
wrong at the same moment. Let us assume that they are 9 
freemen, never acting in violation of the law, but filling up the 
gaps which the law is obliged to leave. Or, if such virtue is 
scarcely attainable by the multitude, we need only suppose 
that the majority are good men and good citizens, and ask 
which will be the more incorruptible, the one good ruler, or 
the many who are all good ? Will not the many ? But, you 1286 b 
will say, there may be parties among them, whereas the one 
man is not divided against himself. To which we may 10 
answer that their character is as good as his. If we call the 
rule of many men, who are all of them good, aristocracy, and 
the rule of one man royalty, then aristocracy will be better for 
states than royalty, whether the government is supported by 
force or not *, provided only that a number of men equal in 
virtue can be found. 

The first governments were kingships, probably for this 11 
reason, because of old, when cities were small, men of eminent 
virtue were few. They were made kings because they were 
benefactors 2 , and benefits can only be bestowed by good 
men. But when many persons equal in merit arose, no longer 
enduring the pre-eminence of one, they desired to have a 
commonwealth, and set up a constitution. The ruling class I3 
1 Cp. infra, § 15. 2 Cp. c. 14. § 12. 



138 Constitutional History of Greece 

III. 15 soon deteriorated and enriched themselves out of the public 
treasury ; riches became the path to honour, and so oligar- 
chies naturally grew up. These passed into tyrannies and 
tyrannies into democracies ; for love of gain in the ruling 
classes was always tending to diminish their number, and so 
to strengthen the masses, who in the end set upon their 
masters and established democracies. Since cities have 

13 increased in size, no other form of government appears to 
be any longer possible I . 

Even supposing the principle to be maintained that kingly 
power is the best thing for states, how about the family of the 
king ? Are his children to succeed him ? If they are no 

14 better than anybody else, that will be mischievous. But 
[says the lover of royalty] the king, though he might, will 
not hand on his power to his children. That, however, is 
hardly to be expected, and is too much to ask of human 
nature. There is also a difficulty about the force which he 
is to employ ; should a king have guards about him by whose 

1 5 aid he may be able to coerce the refractory ? but if not, how 
will he administer his kingdom ? Even if he be the lawful 
sovereign who does nothing arbitrarily or contrary to law, 
still he must have some force wherewith to maintain the law. 

16 In the case of a limited monarchy there is not much difficulty 
in answering this question ; the king must have such force as 
will be more than a match for one or more individuals, but 
not so great as that of the people. The ancients observed 
this principle when they gave the guards to any one whom 
they appointed dictator or tyrant. Thus, when Dionysius 
asked the Syracusans to allow him guards, somebody advised 
that they should give him only a certain number. 

1 Cp. iv. 6. § 5; 13. § 10. 



The 1{ule of One is thought ^Unnatural 139 

At this place in the discussion naturally follows the enquiry III. 16 
respecting the king who acts solely according to his own a 

will ; he has now to be considered. The so-called limited 
monarchy, or kingship according to law, as I have already 
remarked \ is not a distinct form of government, for under all 
governments, as, for example, in a democracy or aristocracy, 
there may be a general holding office for life, and one person 
is often made supreme over the internal administration of 
a state. A magistracy of this kind exists at Epidamnus 2 , 
and also at Opus, but in the latter city has a more limited 
power. Now, absolute monarchy, or the arbitrary rule of 3 
a sovereign over all the citizens, in a city which consists of 
equals, is thought by some to be quite contrary to nature ; it 
is argued that those who are by nature equals must have the 
same natural right and worth, and that for unequals to have 
an equal share, or for equals to have an unequal share, in the 
offices of state, is as bad as for different bodily constitutions 
to have the same food and clothing or the same different. 
Wherefore it is thought to be just that among equals every 3 
one be ruled as well as rule, and that all should have their 
turn. We thus arrive at law ; for an order of succession 
implies law. And the rule of the law is preferable to that I 
of any individual. On the same principle, even if it be better 4 
for certain individuals to govern, they should be made only 
guardians and ministers of the law. For magistrates there 
must be, — this is admitted ; but then men say that to give 
authority to any one man when all are equal is unjust. There 
may indeed be cases which the law seems unable to determine, 
but in such cases can a man ? Nay, it will be replied, the 5 
law trains officers for this express purpose, and appoints them 
1 Cp. c. 15. § 2. a Cp. v. 1. §§ 10, 11; 4. § 7. 



140 Law the True l^uler 

III. 16 to determine matters which are left undecided by it to the 
best of their judgment. Further it permits them to make any 
amendment of the existing laws which experience suggests. 
[But still they are only the ministers of the law.] He who 
bids the law rule, may be deemed to bid God and Reason 
alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds an element of the 
beast ; for desire is a wild beast, and passion perverts the 
minds of rulers, even when they are the best of men. The 

6 la w is reas on u naffected by desire. We are told that a patient 
should call in a physician ; he will not get better if he is 

1 doctored out of a book. But the parallel of the arts is 
clearly not in point ; for the physician does nothing contrary 
to reason from motives of friendship ; he only cures a patient 
and takes a fee ; whereas magistrates do many things from 
spite and partiality. And, indeed, if a man suspected the 
physician of being in league with his enemies to destroy him 

8 for a bribe, he would rather have recourse to the book. Even 
1287 b physicians when they are sick, call in other physicians, and 

training-masters when they are in training, other training- 
masters, as if they could not judge truly about their own case 
and might be influenced by their feelings. Hence it is 
evident that in seeking for justice men seek for the mean or 

9 neutral *, and the law is the mean. Again, customary laws 
have more weight, and relate to more important matters, than 
written laws, and a man may be a safer ruler than the written 
law, but not safer than the customary law. 

Again, it is by no means easy for one man to superintend 
many things ; he will have to appoint a number of subordi- 
nates ; and what difference does it make whether these sub- 
ordinates always existed or were appointed by him because he 
1 Cp. N. Eth. v. 4, § 7. 



Many better than One 141 

needed them ? If, as I said before *, the good man has III. 16 
a right to rule because lie is better, then two good men are IO 
better than one : this is the old saying, — 

* two going together 2 ; ' 

and the prayer of Agamemnon, — 

* would that I had ten such counsellors s ! ' 

And at this day there are some magistrates, for example 
judges 4 , who have authority to decide matters which the law 
is unable to determine, since no one doubts that the law would 
command and decide in the best manner whatever it could. 
But some things can, and other things cannot, be com- n 
prehended under the law, and this is the origin of the vexed 
question whether the best law or the best man should rule. 
For matters of detail about which men deliberate cannot be 
included in legislation. Nor does any one deny that the 
decision of such matters must be left to man, but it 
is argued that there should be many judges, and not one 
only. For every ruler 5 who has been trained by the law 12 
judges well ; and it would surely seem strange that a person 
should see better with two eyes, or hear better with two ears, 
or act better with two hands or feet, than many with many ; 
indeed, it is already the practice of kings to make to them- 
selves many eyes and ears and hands and feet. For they 
make colleagues of those who are the friends of themselves 
and their governments. They must be friends of the monarch 13 
and of his government; if not his friends, they will not 
do what he wants; but friendship implies likeness and 
equality ; and, therefore, if he thinks that friends ought to 

1 Cp. c. 13. § 25. 2 II. x. 224. 3 II. ii. 372. * 6 diKaaTrjs, 
5 Cp. for similar arguments c, 15. § 9. 



142 Tet there may be an Exception 

III. 16 rule, he must think that those who are equal to himself and 
like himself ought to rule. These are the principal con- 
troversies relating to monarchy. 
17 But may not all this be true in some cases and not in 
others? l for there is a natural justice and expediency in the 
relation of a master to his servants, or, again, of a king to his 
subjects, as also in the relation of free citizens to one another ; 
whereas there is no such justice or expediency in a tyranny *, 
or in any other perverted form of government, which comes 
1288 a into being contrary to nature. Now, from what has been said, 

2 it is manifest that, where men are alike and equal, it is neither 
expedient nor just that one man should be lord of all, whether 
there are laws, or whether there are no laws, but he himself 
is in the place of law. Neither should a good man be lord 
over good men, or a bad man over bad ; nor, even if he excels 
in virtue, should he have a right to rule, unless in a particular 
case, which I have already mentioned, and to which I will 

^ once more recur 2 . But first of all, I must determine what 
natures are suited for royalties, and what for an aristocracy, 
and what for a constitutional government. 

4 A people who are by nature capable of producing a race 
superior in virtue and political talent are fitted for kingly 
government ; and a people 3 submitting to be ruled as free- 
men by men whose virtue renders them capable of political 

1 Or, * for there are men who are by nature fitted to be ruled by a 
master, others to be ruled by a king, others to live under a consti- 
tutional government, and for whom these several relations are just and 
expedient ; but there are no men naturally fitted to be ruled by a tyrant/ 
etc. 

3 c. 13. § 25, and § 5, infra. 

3 Omitting the words tt\t}6os t ni(pvf(€ <pfp€iv t which appear to be a 
repetition from the previous clause. 



The Rule of the Best Man 143 

command are adapted for an aristocracy : while the people III. 17 
who are suited for constitutional freedom are those among 
whom there naturally exists l a warlike multitude 2 able to 
rule and to obey in turn by a law which gives office to the 
well-to-do according to their desert. But when a whole 5 
family, or some individual, happens to be so pre-eminent in 
virtue as to surpass all others, then it is just that they 
should be the royal family and supreme over all, or that this 
one citizen should be king of the whole nation. For, as 6 
I said before 3 , to give them authority is not only agreeable to 
that ground of right which the founders of all states, whether 
aristocratical, or oligarchical, or again democratical, are 
accustomed to put forward (for these all recognize the claim 
of excellence, although not the same excellence), but accords 
with the principle already laid down *. For it would not 7 
be right to kill, or ostracize, or exile such a person, or 
require that he should take his turn in being governed. The 
whole is naturally superior to the part, and he who has this 
pre-eminence is in the relation of a whole to a part. But 8 
if so, the only alternative is that he should have the supreme 
power, and that mankind should obey him, not in turn, but 
always. These are the conclusions at which we arrive respect- 
ing royalty and its various forms, and this is the answer to the 
question, whether it is or is not advantageous to states, and to 
whom, and how. 

We maintain that the true forms of government are three, 18 
and that the best must be that which is administered by the 
best, and in which there is one man, or a whole family, 

1 Omitting ml iv. a Cp. c. 7. § 4. 

» Cp. c. 9. § 15. 

4 Or, * but differing in the manner already laid down/ 



144 The Perfect State 

III. 18 or many persons, excelling in virtue, and both rulers and 
subjects are fitted, the one to rule, the others to be ruled *, in 
such a manner as to attain the most eligible life. We showed 
at the commencement of our enquiry 2 that the virtue of the 
good man is necessarily the same as the virtue of the citizen 
of the perfect state. Clearly then in the same manner, and 
by the same means through which a man becomes truly good, 
he will frame a state [which will be truly good] whether 
1288 b aristocratical, or under kingly rule, and the same education and 
the same habits will be found to make a good man and a good 
statesman and king. 
2 Having arrived at these conclusions, we must proceed to 
speak of the perfect state, and describe how it comes into 
being and is established. He who would proceed with the 
enquiry in due manner. . . . 3 

1 Omitting not apx* iv > which is inserted, without MS. authority, in 
Bekker's 2nd edit. 

2 Cp. c. 4 . 

s Retaining the words of the^MSS,, 'Avayxr) 6?) rbv fxeWovra irept 
avTtjs woir]<7aa$at ri)u irpQ<?r]KQv<jav GKGxpiv, which are omitted by 
Bekker in his and edit. 



BOOK IV 

In all arts and sciences which embrace the whole of IV. 1 
any subject, and are not restricted to a part only, it is the 
province of a single art or science to consider all that 
appertains to a single subject. For example, the art of 
gymnastic considers not only the suitableness of different 
modes of training to different bodies (2), but what sort is 
absolutely the best (1) (for the absolutely best must suit 
that which is by nature best and best furnished with the 
means of life), and also what common form of training is 
adapted to the great majority of men (4). And if a man 3 
does not desire the best habit of body or the greatest skill in 
gymnastics, which might be attained by him, still the trainer 
or the teacher of gymnastic should be able to impart any 
lower degree of either (3). The same principle equally holds 
in medicine and ship-building, and the making of clothes, and 
in the arts generally \ 

Hence it is obvious that government too is the subject 3 
of a single science, which has to consider what kind of 
government would be best and most in accordance with 
our aspirations, if there were no external impediment, and 
also what kind of government is adapted to particular states. 
For the best is often unattainable, and therefore the true 
legislator and statesman ought to be acquainted, not only 
with (1) that which is best in the abstract, but also with 

1 The numbers in this paragraph are made to correspond with the 
numbers in the next. 

DAVIS L 



1 4<5" Political Problems 

IV. 1(2) that which is best relatively to circumstances. We 

4 should be able further to say how a state may be constituted 
under any given conditions (3); both how it is originally 
formed and, when formed, how it may be longest preserved ; 
the supposed state being so far from the very best that it 
is unprovided even with the conditions necessary for the very 
best ; neither is it the best under the circumstances, but of an 
inferior type. 

5 He ought, moreover, to know (4) the form of govern- 
ment which is best suited to states in general; for political 
writers, although they have excellent ideas, are often un- 

6 practical. We should consider, not only what form of 
government is best, but also what is possible and what is 
easily attainable by all. There are some who would have 
none but the most perfect; for this many natural advantages 

1289 a are required. Others, again, speak of a more attainable form, 
and, although they reject the constitution under which they 
are living, they extol some one in particular, for example 

7 the Lacedaemonian 1 . Any change of government which 
has to be introduced should be one which men will be both 
willing and able to adopt, since there is quite as much trouble 
in the reformation of an old constitution as in the establish- 
ment of a new one, just as to unlearn is as hard as to learn. 
And therefore, in addition to the qualifications of the states- 
man already mentioned, he should be able to find remedies 

8 for the defects of existing constitutions 2 . This he cannot 
do unless he knows how many forms of government there 
are. It is often supposed that there is only one kind of 
democracy and one of oligarchy. But this is a mistake; 
and, in order to avoid such mistakes, we must ascertain what 

1 Cp. ii. 6. § 16. 2 Cp. § 4. 



Governments True and 'Perverted 147 

differences there are in the constitutions of states, and in IV. 1 
how many ways they are combined. The same political 9 
insight will enable a man to know which laws are the best, 
and which are suited to different constitutions ; for the laws 
are, and ought to be, relative to the constitution, and not the 
constitution to the laws. A constitution is the organization of J ° 
offices in a state, and determines what is to be the governing 
body, and what is the end of each community. But * laws 
are not to be confounded with the principles of the constitu- 
tion * : they are the rules according to which the magistrates 
should administer the state, and proceed against offenders. 
So that we must know the number and varieties of the ix 
several forms of government, if only with a view to making 
laws. For the same laws cannot be equally suited to all 
oligarchies and to all democracies, and there is certainly more 
than one form both of democracy and of oligarchy. 

In our original discussion 2 about governments we divided 2 
them into three true forms: kingly rule, aristocracy, and 
constitutional government, and three corresponding per- 
versions — tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. Of kingly 
rule and of aristocracy we have already spoken, for the 
enquiry into the perfect state is the same thing with the 
discussion of the two forms thus named, since both imply 
a principle of virtue provided with external means. We 
have already determined in what aristocracy and kingly rule 
differ from one another, and when the latter should be 
established 3 . In what follows we have to describe the 
so-called constitutional government, which bears the common 

1 Or, Maws, though in themselves distinct, show the character of 
the constitution.' 

2 Book iii. 7 ; N. Eth. viii 10. 3 Cp. iii. 17. § 8. 

L 2 



148 Governments True and Perverted 

IV. 2 name of all constitutions, and the other forms, tyranny, 
oligarchy, and democracy. 

2 It is obvious which of the three perversions is the worst, 
and which is the next in badness. That which is the 
perversion of the first and most divine is necessarily the 

12S9 b worst. And just as a royal rule, if not a mere name, must 
exist by virtue of some great personal superiority in the king, 
so tyranny, which is the worst of governments, is necessarily 
the farthest removed from a well-constituted form ; oligarchy 
is a little better, but along way from aristocracy, and democracy 
is the most tolerable of the three. 

3 A writer l who preceded me has already made these 
distinctions, but his point of view is not the same as mine. 
For he lays down the principle that of all good constitutions 
(under which he would include a virtuous oligarchy and the 
like) democracy is the worst, but the best of bad ones. 
Whereas we maintain that they are all defective, and that 
one oligarchy is not to be accounted better than another, but 
only less bad. 

4 Not to pursue this question further at present, let us begin 
by determining (i) 2 how many varieties of states there 
are (since of democracy and oligarchy there are several) ; 
(2) s what constitution is the most generally acceptable, and 
what is eligible in the next degree 4 after the perfect or 
any other aristocratical and well-constituted form of govern- 
ment — if any other there be — which is at the same time 
adapted to states in general 4 ; (3) 5 of the other forms of 

1 Plato, Polit. 303 a., 3 c. 4-6. s c. 7-9 and 11. 

4 Or, 'after the perfect state; and besides this what other there is 
which is aristocratical and well constituted, and at the same time adapted 
to states in general. 1 5 c. 12. 



A Table of Contents 149 

government to whom each is suited. For democracy may IV. 2 
meet the needs of some better than oligarchy, and conversely. 5 
In the next place (4) 1 we have to consider in what manner 
a man ought to proceed who desires to establish some one 
among these various forms, whether of democracy or of 
oligarchy ; and lastly, (5) 2 having briefly discussed these 6 
subjects to the best of our power, we will endeavour to 
ascertain whence arise the ruin and preservation of states, 
both generally and in individual cases, and to what causes 
they are to be attributed. 

The reason why there are many forms of government 3 
is that every state contains many elements. In the first 
place we see that all states are made up of families, and in 
the multitude of citizens there must be some rich and some 
poor, and some in a middle condition ; 3 the rich are heavy- 
armed, and the poor not 3 . Of the common people, some a 
are husbandmen, and some traders, and some artisans. 
There are also among the notables differences of wealth 
and property — for example, in the number of horses which 
they keep, for they cannot afford to keep them unless they 
are rich. And therefore in old times the cities whose strength 3 
lay in the cavalry were oligarchies, and they used cavalry 4 
in wars against their neighbours ; as was the practice of the 
Eretrians and Chalcidians, and also of the Magnesians on the 
river Maeander, and of other peoples in Asia. Besides 4 
differences of wealth there are differences of rank and merit, 



1 Book vi. 2 Book v. 

3 Or, ' and again both of rich and poor some are armed and some are 
unarmed.' 

4 Reading either iro\{fxov? with v. tr. (Moerbek) and Bekk. 2nd edit., 
or TroAffuofy with the Greek MSS. ; cp. c. 13. § to; vi. c. 7. § 1. 



i 5*0 Why forms of Government Differ 

IV. 3 and there are some other elements which were mentioned 

1290 a by us w ] lcn i n treating of aristocracy we enumerated the 

essentials of a state 1 . Of these elements, sometimes all, 

sometimes the lesser and sometimes the greater number, 

5 have a share in the government. It is evident then that 
there must be many forms of government, differing in kind, 
since the parts of which they are composed differ from 
each other in kind. For a constitution is an organization 
of offices which all the citizens distribute among themselves, 
according to the power which different classes possess, for 
example the rich or the poor, or according to some common 
equality subsisting among them or some power common to 

6 both. There must therefore be as many forms of government 
as there are modes of arranging the offices, according to the 
superiorities and other inequalities of the different parts of 
the state. 

There are generally thought to be two principal forms : 
as men say of the winds that there are but two — north 
and south — and that the rest of diem are only variations 
of these, so of governments there are said to be only two 

7 forms — democracy and oligarchy. For aristocracy is con- 
sidered to be a kind of oligarchy, as being the rule of 
a few, and the so-called constitutional government to be 
really a democracy, just as among the winds we make the 
west a variation of the north, and the east of the south 
wind. Similarly of harmonies there are said to be two 
kinds, the Dorian and the Phrygian ; the other arrangements 
of the scale are comprehended under one of these two. 

8 About forms of government this is a very favourite notion. 
But in either case the better and more exact way is to 

1 Not in what has preceded, but cp. vii. 8. 



De?nocracy and Oligarchy i^i 

distinguish, as I have done, the one or two which are IV. 3 
true forms, and to regard the others as perversions, whether 
of the most perfectly attempered harmony or of the best form 
of government ; we may compare the oligarchical forms to 
the severer and more overpowering modes, and the demo- 
cratic to the more relaxed and gentler ones. 

It must not be assumed, as some are fond of saying, that 4 
democracy is simply that form of government in which 
the greater number are sovereign 1 , for in oligarchies, and 
indeed in every government, the majority rules ; nor again 
is oligarchy that form of government in which a few are 
sovereign. Suppose the whole population of a city to be 2 
1300, and that of these 1000 are rich, and do not allow 
the remaining 300 who are poor, but free, and in all other 
respects their equals, a share of the government — no one 
will say that this is a democracy. In like manner, if the 3 
poor were few and the masters of the rich, who outnumber 
them, no one would ever call such a government, in which 
the rich majority h /e no share of office, an oligarchy. 
Therefore we should rather say that democracy is the 1290 b 
form of government in which the free are rulers, and 
oligarchy in which the rich ; it is only an accident that 4 
the free are the many and the rich are the few. Otherwise 
a government in which the offices were given according to 
stature, as is said to be the case in Ethiopia, or according to 
beauty, would be an oligarchy ; for the number of tall or good- 
looking men is small. And yet oligarchy and democracy 5 
are not sufficiently distinguished merely by these two charac- 
teristics of wealth and freedom. Both of them contain 
many other elements, and therefore we must carry our 
1 C P . iii.8. §§ 3-7. 



1 72 The State Compared to the Animal 

IV. 4 analysis further, and say that the government is not a de- 
mocracy in which the freemen, being few in number, rule 
over the many who art not free, as at Apollonia, on the 
Ionian Gulf, and at Thera (for in each of these states 
the nobles, who were also the earliest settlers, were held in 
chief honour, although they were but a few out of many). 
Neither is it a democracy when the rich have the government, 
because they exceed in number ; as was the case formerly at 
Colophon, where the bulk of the inhabitants were possessed 

6 of large property before the Lydian War. But the form 
of government is a democracy when the free, who are also 
poor and the majority, govern, and oligarchy when the 
rich and the noble govern, they being at the same time few 
in number. 

7 I have said that there are many forms of government, and 
have explained to what causes the variety is due. Why 
there are more than those already mentioned, and what they 
are, and whence they arise, I will now proceed to consider, 
starting from the principle already admitted \ which is that 

8 every state consists, not of one, but of many parts. If we 
were going to speak of the different species of animals, we 
should first of all determine the organs which are indispens- 
able to every animal, as for example some organs of sense 
and instruments of receiving and digesting food, such as the 
mouth and the stomach, besides organs of locomotion. As- 
suming now that there are only so many kinds of organs, but 
that there may be differences in them — I mean different kinds 
of mouths, and stomachs, and perceptive and locomotive 
organs — the possible combinations of these differences will 
necessarily furnish many varieties of animals. (For animals 

* Cp. c. 3. § i. 



Essential Elements of the State i y 3 

cannot be the same which have different kinds of mouths or IV. 4 
of ears.) And when all the combinations are exhausted, 
there will be as many sorts of animals as there are combina- 
tions of the necessary organs. In like manner the forms of 9 
government which have been described, as I have repeatedly 
said, are composed, not of one, but of many elements. One 
element is the food-producing class, who are called husband- 
men ; a second, a class of mechanics, who practise the arts 1291 a 
without which a city cannot exist ; — of these arts some are 
absolutely necessary, others contribute to luxury or to the 
grace of life. The third class is that of traders, and by traders io 
I mean those who are engaged in buying and selling, whether 
in commerce or in retail trade. A fourth class is that of the 
serfs or labourers. The warriors make up the fifth class, and 
they are as necessary as any of the others, if the country is not 
to be the slave of every invader. For how can a state which n 
has any title to the name be of a slavish nature ? The state is 
independent and self-sufficing, but a slave is the reverse of inde- 
pendent. Hence we see that this subject, though ingeniously, 
has not been satisfactorily treated in the Republic *. Socrates 12 
says that a state is made up of four sorts of people who are 
absolutely necessary; these are a weaver, a husbandman, 
a shoemaker, and a builder; afterwards, finding that they 
are not enough, he adds a smith, and again a herdsman, to 
look after the necessary animals ; then a merchant, and then 
a retail trader. All these together form the complement of the J 3 
first state, as if a state were established merely to supply the 
necessaries of life, rather than for the sake of the good, or 
stood equally in need of shoemakers and of husbandmen. 
But he does not admit into the state a military class until the 
1 Rep. ii. 369. 



i ^4 Essential Elements of the State 

IV. 4 country has increased in size, and is beginning to encroach on 
its neighbour's land, whereupon they go to war. Yet even 
amongst his four original citizens, or whatever be the number 
of those whom he associates in the state, there must be some 
one who will dispense justice and determine what is just. 

14 And as the soul may be said to be more truly part of an 
animal than the body, so the higher parts of states, that is to 
say, the warrior class, the class engaged in the administration 
of justice, and in deliberation, which is the special business 
of political common sense, — these are more essential to the 
state than the parts which minister to the necessaries of life. 

15 Whether their several functions are the functions of different 
citizens, or of the same — for it may often happen that the 
same persons are both warriors and husbandmen — is imma- 
terial to the argument. The higher as well as the lower 
elements are to be equally considered parts of the state, and 
if so, the military element must be included. There are also 
the wealthy who minister to the state with their property ; 

16 these form the seventh class. The eighth class is that of 
magistrates and of officers ; for the state cannot exist without 
rulers. And therefore some must be able to take office and to 

17 serve the state, either always or in turn. There only remains 
the class of those who deliberate and who judge between dis- 
putants ; we were just now distinguishing them. If the fair 
and equitable organization of all these elements is necessary to 

1291b states, then there must also be persons who have the ability of 
*8 statesmen. l Many are of opinion that different functions can 
be combined in the same individual 1 ; for example, the war- 
rior may be a husbandman, or an artisan ; or again, the coun- 
sellor a judge. And all claim to possess political ability, and 
1 Or, ' Different functions appear to be often combined,' etc. 



Varieties of Democracy iff 

think that they are quite competent to fill most offices. But IV. 4 
the same persons cannot be rich and poor at the same time. 
For this reason the rich and the poor are regarded in an 19 
especial sense as parts of a state. Again, because the rich 
are generally few in number, while the poor are many, they 
appear to be antagonistic, and as the one or the other prevails 
they form the government. Hence arises the common 
opinion that there are two kinds of government — democracy 
and oligarchy. 

I have already explained 1 that there are many differences 20 
of constitutions, and to what causes the variety is due. Let 
me now show that there are different forms both of democracy 
and oligarchy, as will indeed be evident from what has pre- 
ceded. For both in the common people and in the notables 21 
various classes are included ; of the common people, one class 
are husbandmen, another artisans ; another traders, who are 
employed in buying and selling ; another are the seafaring 
class, whether engaged in war or in trade, as ferrymen or as 
fishermen. (In many places any one of these classes forms 
quite a large population ; for example, fishermen at Tarentum 
and Byzantium, crews of triremes at Athens, merchant sea- 
men at Aegina and Chios, ferrymen at Tenedos.) To the 
classes already mentioned may be added day-labourers, and 
those who, owing to their needy circumstances, have no 
leisure, or those who are not free of birth on both sides ; and 
there may be other classes as well. The notables again may 22 
be divided according to their wealth, birth, virtue, education, 
and similar differences. 

Of forms of democracy first comes that which is said to 
be based strictly on equality. In such a democracy the law 
1 Cp. iii. c. 6. 



if 6 Extreme Democracy 

IV. 4 says that it is just for nobody to be poor, and for nobody to 
be rich l ; and that neither should be masters, but both equal. 

23 For if liberty and equality, as is thought by some, are chiefly 
to be found in democracy, they will be best attained when all 
persons alike share in the government to the utmost. And 
since the people are the majority, and the opinion of the 
majority is decisive, such a government must necessarily be 

24 a democracy. Here then is one sort of democracy. There 
is another in which the magistrates are elected according to 
a certain property qualification, but a low one ; he who has 
the required amount of property has a share in the govern- 

1292 a ment, but he who loses his property loses his rights. Another 
kind is that in which all the citizens who are under no dis- 
qualification share in the government, but still the law is 

25 supreme. In another, everybody, if he be only a citizen, is 
admitted to the government, but the law is supreme as before. 
A fifth form of democracy, in other respects the same, is that 
in which, not the law, but the multitude, have the supreme 

26 power, and supersede the law by their decrees. This is 
a state of affairs brought about by the demagogues. For in 
democracies which are subject to the law the best citizens 
hold the first place, and there are no demagogues ; but where 
the laws are not supreme, there demagogues spring up. For 
the people becomes a monarch, and is many in one ; and the 
many have the power in their hands, not as individuals, but 

27 collectively. Homer says that, ' it is not good to have a rule 

1 Or, reading dpx^iv with Victorius, * that the poor should no more 
govern than the rich.' The emendation is not absolutely necessary, 
though supported by vi. 2. § 9, Xaov yap rd fxrjOtv fxaKXov apxav tovs 
airopovs tj tovs tviTopovs /u?;5e xvplovs ehai piuvovs dAAa nduras Z£ taov 
holt dptOfioy. 



Extreme Democracy 15-7 

of many l *, but whether he means this corporate rule, or the IV. 4 
rule of many individuals, is uncertain. And the people, who 
is now a monarch, and no longer under the control of law, 
seeks to exercise monarchical sway, and grows into a despot ; 
the flatterer is held in honour ; this sort of democracy being 
relatively to other democracies what tyranny is to other forms 
of monarchy. The spirit of both is the same, and they alike 28 
exercise a despotic rule over the better citizens. The decrees 
of the demos correspond to the edicts of the tyrant ; and the 
demagogue is to the one what the flatterer is to the other. 
Both have great power — the flatterer with the tyrant, the 
demagogue with democracies of the kind which we are 
describing. The demagogues make the decrees of the people 39 
override the laws, and refer all things to the popular assembly. 
And therefore they grow great, because the people have all 
things in their hands, and they hold in their hands the votes 
of the people, who are too ready to listen to them. Further, 30 
those who have any complaint to bring against the magis- 
trates say, ( let the people be judges ' ; the people are too 
happy to accept the invitation ; and so the authority of every 
office is undermined. Such a democracy is fairly open to the 
objection that it is not a constitution at all ; for where the 
laws have no authority, there is no constitution. The law 31 
ought to be supreme over all, and the magistracies and the 
government should judge only of particulars. So that if 
democracy be a real form of government, the sort of constitu- 
tion in which all things are regulated by decrees is clearly not 
a democracy in the true sense of the word, for decrees relate 
only to particulars 2 . 

1 II. ii. 204. a Cp. N. Eth. v. 10. § 7. 



iy8 Varieties of Oligarchy 

IV. 5 These then are the different kinds of democracies. Of 
oligarchies, too, there are different kinds — one where the 
property qualification for office is so high that the poor, 
although they form the majority, have no share in the govern- 
ment, yet he who acquires a qualification may obtain a share. 

1292 b Another sort is when there is a qualification for office, but 
a high one, and the vacancies in the governing body are filled 
by co-optation. If the election is made out of all the qualified 
persons, a constitution of this kind inclines to an aristocracy, 

2 if out of a privileged class, to an oligarchy. Another sort of 
oligarchy is when the son succeeds the father. There is 
a fourth form, likewise hereditary, in which the magistrates 
are supreme and not the law. Among oligarchies this is 
what tyranny is among monarchies, and the last-mentioned 
form of democracy among democracies ; and in fact this 
sort of oligarchy receives the name of a dynasty (or rule of 
powerful families). 

3 These are the different sorts of oligarchies and democra- 
cies. It should however be remembered that in many states 1 
the constitution which is established by law, although not 
democratic, owing to the character and habits of the people, 
may be administered democratically, and conversely in other 
states the established constitution may incline to democracy, 

4 but may be administered in an oligarchical spirit. This most 
often happens after a revolution : for governments do not 
change at once ; at first the dominant party are content with 
encroaching a little upon their opponents. The laws which 
existed previously continue in force, but the authors of the 
revolution have the power in their hands. 

From what has been already said we may safely infer that 
1 Cp. v. i. § 8. 



Stages of Democracy i y 9 

there are so many different kinds of democracies and of IV. 6 
oligarchies. For it is evident that either all the classes whom 
we mentioned must share in the government, or some only and 
not others. When the class of husbandmen and of those 2 
who possess moderate fortunes have the supreme power, the 
government is administered according to law. For the citi- 
zens being compelled to live by their labour have no leisure ; 
and so they set up the authority of the law, and attend 
assemblies only when necessary. Since they all obtain a 3 
share in the government when they have acquired the quali- 
fication which is fixed by the law, nobody is excluded — the 
absolute exclusion of any class would be a step towards 
oligarchy. But leisure cannot be provided for them unless 
there are revenues to support them. This is one sort of 
democracy, and these are the causes which give birth to it. 
Another kind is based on the mode of election, 1 which 
naturally comes next in order 1 ; in this, every one to whose 
birth there is no objection is eligible, and may share in the 
government if he can find leisure. And in such a democracy 4 
the supreme power is vested in the laws, because the state has 
no means of paying the citizens. A third kind is when all 
freemen have a right to share in the government, but do not 
actually share, for the reason which has been already given ; 
so that in this form again the law must rule. A fourth kind 5 
of democracy is that which comes latest in the history of 1293 a 
states. In our own day, when cities have far outgrown their 
original size, and their revenues have increased, all the citizens 
have a place in the government, through the great prepon- 
derance of their numbers; and they all, including the poor 
who receive pay, and therefore have leisure to exercise their 
1 Or, ' which is proper lo it.' 



1 60 Stages of Oligarchy 



IV. 6 rights, share in the administration. Indeed, when they are 

6 paid, the common people have the most leisure, for they are 
not hindered by the care of their property, which often fetters 
the rich, who are thereby prevented from taking part in the 
assembly or in the courts, and so the state is governed by the 

7 poor, who are a majority, and not by the laws. So many 
kinds of democracies there are, and they grow out of these 
necessary causes. 

Of oligarchies, one form is that in which the majority of 
the citizens have some property, but not very much ; and this 
is the first form, which allows to any one who obtains the 

8 required amount the right of sharing in the government. The 
sharers in the government being a numerous body, it follows 
that the law must govern, and not individuals. For in pro- 
portion as they are further removed from a monarchical form 
of government, and in respect of property have neither so 
much as to be able to live without attending to business, nor so 
little as to need state support, they must admit the rule of law 

9 and not claim to rule themselves. But if the men of property 
in the state are fewer than in the former case, and own more 
property, there arises a second form of oligarchy. For the 
stronger they are, the more power they claim, and having this 
object in view, they themselves select those of the other 
classes who are to be admitted to the government ; but, not 
being as yet strong enough to rule without the law, they make 

10 the law represent their wishes. When this power is inten- 
sified by a further diminution of their numbers and increase 
of their property, there arises a third and further stage of 
oligarchy, in which the governing class keep the offices in 
their own hands, and the law ordains that the son shall 

11 succeed the father. When, again, the rulers have great 



Aristocracy s the Pure and the Mixed 161 

wealth and numerous friends, this sort of dynastia or family IV. 6 
despotism approaches a monarchy ; individuals rule and not 
the law. This is the fourth sort of oligarchy, and is analogous 
to the last sort of democracy. 

There are still two forms besides democracy and oligarchy ; 7 
one of them is universally recognized and included among the 
four principal forms of government, which are said to be 
(i) monarchy, (2) oligarchy, (3) democracy, and (4) the so- 
called aristocracy or government of the best. But there is also 
a fifth, which retains the generic name of polity or constitu- 
tional government ; this is not common, and therefore has not 
been noticed by writers who attempt to enumerate the dif- 
ferent kinds of government ; like Plato in his books about the 1293 b 
state, they recognize four only. The term ' aristocracy ' 2 
is rightly applied to the form of government which is de- 
scribed in the first part of our treatise : for that only can 
be rightly called aristocracy [the government of the best] 
which is a government formed of the best men absolutely, 
and not merely of men who are good when tried by any given 
standard. In the perfect state the good man is absolutely the 
same as the good citizen ; whereas in other states the good 
citizen is only good relatively to his own form of govern- 
ment. But there are some states differing from oligarchies 3 
and also differing from the so-called polity or constitu- 
tional government ; these are termed aristocracies, and in 
them magistrates are certainly chosen, both according to their 
wealth and according to their merit. Such a form of govern- 
ment is not the same with the two just now mentioned, and 
is termed an aristocracy. For indeed in states which do not 4 
make virtue the aim of the community, men of merit and 
reputation for virtue may be found. And so where a govern- 

DAVIS M 



i6i Mixed Constitutions 

IV. 7 merit has regard to wealth, virtue, and numbers, as at Car- 
thage \ that is aristocracy ; and also where it has regard only 
to two out of the three, as at Lacedaemon, to virtue and 
numbers, and the two principles of democracy and virtue 
5 temper each other. There are these two forms of aristocracy 
in addition to the first and perfect state, and there is a third 
form, viz. the polities which incline towards oligarchy. 
8 I have yet to speak of the so-called polity and of tyranny. 
I put them in this order, not because a polity or constitutional 
government is to be regarded as a perversion any more than the 
above-mentioned aristocracies. The truth is, that they all 
fall short of the most perfect form of government, and so 
they are reckoned among perversions, and other forms {sc. 
the really perverted forms) are perversions of these, as I 

2 said before 2 . Last of all I will speak of tyranny, which 
I place last in the series because I am enquiring into the 
constitutions of states, and this is the very reverse of 
a constitution. 

Having explained why I have adopted this order, I will 
proceed to consider constitutional government ; of which the 
nature will be clearer now that oligarchy and democracy 

3 have been defined. For polity or constitutional government 
may be described generally as a fusion of oligarchy and 
democracy ; but the term is usually applied to those forms 
of government which incline towards democracy, and the 
term aristocracy to those which incline towards oligarchy, 
because birth and education are commonly the accompani- 

4 ments of wealth. Moreover, the rich already possess the 
external advantages the want of which is a temptation to 
crime, and hence they are called noblemen and gentlemen, 

1 Cp. ii, ii. §§ 5-10. * Cp. iii. 7. 



Mixed Constitutions 163 

And inasmuch as aristocracy seeks to give predominance to IV. 8 
the best of the citizens, people say also of oligarchies 
that they are composed of noblemen and gentlemen. Now 1294 a 
it appears to be an impossible thing that the state which 5 
is governed by the best citizens should be ill-governed \ and 
equally impossible that the state which is ill-governed should 
be governed by the best. But we must remember that good 
laws, if they are not obeyed, do not constitute good govern- 
ment. For there are two parts of good government ; one 6 
is the actual obedience of citizens to the laws, the other 
part is the goodness of the laws which they obey ; they 
may obey bad laws as well as good. And there may be 
a further subdivision; they may obey either the best laws 
which are attainable to them, or the best absolutely. 

The distribution of offices according to merit is a special 7 
characteristic of aristocracy, for the principle of an aristocracy 
is virtue, as wealth is of an oligarchy, and freedom of a 
democracy. In all of them there of course exists the right 
of the majority, and whatever seems good to the majority of 
those who share in the government has authority. Generally, 8 
however, a state of this kind is called a constitutional govern- 
ment [not an aristocracy], for the fusion goes no further 
than the attempt to unite the freedom of the poor and the 
wealth of the rich, who commonly take the place of the 
noble. And as there are three grounds on which men claim 9 
an equal share in the government — freedom, wealth, and virtue 
(for the fourth or good birth is the result of the two last, 
being only ancient wealth and virtue) — it is clear that the 
admixture of the two elements, that is to say, of the rich 
and poor, is to be called a polity or constitutional government ; 

1 Omitting a\\& -novqpoKparovixivqv. 
M 2 



i#4 Aristocracy and Polity 

IV. 8 and the union of the three is to be called aristocracy or 
the government of the best, and more than any other form of 
government, except the true and ideal, has a right to this 
name. 
10 Thus far I have described the different forms of states 
which exist besides monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy, 
and what they are, and in what aristocracies differ from 
one another, and polities from aristocracies — that the two 
latter are not very unlike is obvious. 
9 Next we have to consider how by the side of oligarchy 
and democracy the so-called polity or constitutional govern- 
ment springs up, and how it should be organized. The 
nature of it will be at once understood from a comparison of 
oligarchy and democracy ; we must ascertain their different 
characteristics, and taking a portion from each, put the two 

2 together, like the parts of an indenture. Now there are three 
modes in which fusions of government may be effected. The 
nature of the fusion will be made intelligible by an example of 
the manner in which different governments legislate, say con- 
cerning the administration of justice. In oligarchies they 
impose a fine on the rich if they do not serve as judges, and 
to the poor they give no pay ; but in democracies they give 

3 pay to the poor and do not fine the rich. Now (i) the union 
of these two modes l is a common or middle term between 

1294 b them, and is therefore characteristic of a constitutional 
government, for it is a combination of both. This is one 
mode of uniting the two elements. Or (2) a mean may be 
taken between the enactments of the two : thus democracies 
require no property qualification, or only a small one, from 
members of the assembly, oligarchies a high one; here 
1 C P . c. 13. § 6. 



Polity 



i6f 



neither of these is the common term, but a mean between them. IV. 9 
(3) There is a third mode, in which something is borrowed 4 
from the oligarchical and something from the democratical 
principle. For example, the appointment of magistrates by- 
lot is democratical, and the election of them oligarchical; 
democratical again when there is no property qualification, 
oligarchical when there is. In the aristocratical or constitu- 5 
tional state, one element will be taken from each — from oli- 
garchy the mode of electing to offices, from democracy the 
disregard of qualification. Such are the various modes of 6 
combination. 

There is a true union of oligarchy and democracy when the 
same state may be termed either a democracy or an oligarchy ; 
those who use both names evidently feel that the fusion 
is complete. Such a fusion there is also in the mean ; for 
both extremes appear in it. The Lacedaemonian constitution, 7 
for example, is often described as a democracy, because it has 
many democratical features. In the first place the youth 
receive a democratical education. For the sons of the poor 
are brought up with the sons of the rich, who are educated 
in such a manner as to make it possible for the sons of the 
poor to be educated like them. A similar equality prevails 8 
in the following period of life, and when the citizens are 
grown up to manhood the same rule is observed; there is 
no distinction between the rich and poor. In like manner 
they all have the same food at their public tables, and 
the rich wear only such clothing as any poor man can 
afford. Again, the people elect to one of the two greatest 9 
offices of states, and in the other they share x ; for they elect 
the Senators and share in the Ephoralty. By others the 
1 Cp. ii. 9. § 21. 



1 66 Tyranny 

IV, 9 Spartan constitution is said to be an oligarchy, because it 
has many oligarchical elements. That all offices are filled 
by election and none by lot, is one of these oligarchical 
characteristics ; that the power of inflicting death or banish- 
ment rests with a few persons is another ; and there are 
io others. In a well attempered polity there should appear to 
be both elements and yet neither ; also the government should 
rely on itself, and not on foreign aid, nor on the good will of 
a majority of foreign states — they might be equally well- 
disposed when there is a vicious form of government — but on 
the general willingness of all classes in the state to maintain 
the constitution. 

Enough of the manner in which a constitutional government, 
and in which the so-called aristocracies ought to be framed. 
10 Of the nature of tyranny I have still to speak, in order 
° a that it may have its place in our enquiry, since even tyranny is 
reckoned by us to be a form of government, although there is 
not much to be said about it. I have already in the former 
part of this treatise * discussed royalty or kingship according 
to the most usual meaning of the term, and considered 
whether it is or is not advantageous to states, and what kind 
of royalty should be established, and whence, and how it 
arises. 

2 When speaking of royalty we also spoke of two forms 
of tyranny, which are both according to law, and therefore 
easily pass into royalty. Among Barbarians there are elected 
monarchs who exercise a despotic power ; despotic rulers 
were also elected in ancient Hellas, called Aesymnetes or 

3 dictators. These monarchies, when compared with one 
another, exhibit certain differences. And they are, as I 

1 iii. 14-17. 



'Polity 



167 



said before, royal, in so far as the monarch rules accord- IV. 10 
ing to law and over willing subjects ; but they are tyrannical 
in so far as he is despotic and rules according to his own 
fancy. There is also a third kind of tyranny, which is the 
most typical form, and is the counterpart of the perfect 
monarchy. This tyranny is just that arbitrary power of an 4 
individual which is responsible to no one, and governs all 
alike, whether equals or betters, with a view to its own 
advantage, not to that of its subjects, and therefore against 
their will. No freeman, if he can escape from it, will endure 
such a government. 

The kinds of tyranny are such and so many, and for the 
reasons which I have given. 

We have now to enquire what is the best constitution 11 
for most states, and the best life for most men, neither 
assuming a standard of virtue which is above ordinary persons, 
nor an education which is exceptionally favoured by nature 
and circumstances, nor yet an ideal state which is an aspiration 
only, but having regard to the life in which the majority 
are able to share, and to the form of government which states 
in general can attain. As to those aristocracies, as they are a 
called, of which we were just now speaking, they either 
lie beyond the possibilities of the greater number of states, 
or they approximate to the so-called constitutional govern- 
ment, and therefore need no separate discussion. And in 
fact the conclusion at which we arrive respecting all these 
forms rests upon the same grounds. For if it has been truly 3 
said in the Ethics * that the happy life is the life according 
to unimpeded virtue, and that virtue is a mean, then the 
life which is in a mean, and in a mean attainable by every 
1 N. Eth. vii. 13. § 2. 



1 68 The ~Rule of the Middle Class 

IV. 11 one, must be the best. And the same criteria of virtue 
1295 b and vice apply both to cities and to constitutions ; for the 
constitution is in a figure the life of the city 1 . 

4 Now in all states there are three elements ; one class is 
very rich, another very poor, and a third in a mean. It 
is admitted that moderation and the mean are best, and there- 
fore it will clearly be best to possess the gifts of fortune 
in moderation ; for in that condition of life men are most 

5 ready to listen to reason. But he who greatly excels in 
beauty, strength, birth or wealth, or on the other hand who 
is very poor, or very weak, or very much disgraced, finds it 
difficult to follow reason 2 . Of these two the one sort grow 
into violent and great criminals, the others into rogues and 
petty rascals. And two sorts of offences correspond to them 8 , 
the one committed from violence, the other from roguery. 
The petty rogues are disinclined to hold office, whether 
military or civil, and their aversion to these two duties is 
as great an injury to the state as their tendency to crime. 

6 Again, those who have too much of the goods of fortune, 
strength, wealth, friends, and the like, are neither willing 
nor able to submit to authority. The evil begins at home : 
for when they are boys, by reason of the luxury in which 
they are brought up 4 , they never learn, even at school, the 
habit of obedience. On the other hand, the very poor, who 

7 are in the opposite extreme, are too degraded. So that the 
one class cannot obey, and can only rule despotically ; the 
other knows not how to command and must be ruled like 
slaves. Thus arises a city, not of freemen, but of masters 
and slaves, the one despising, the other envying ; and nothing 

1 Cp. iii. 3. §§ 7, 8. 2 Cp. PI. Rep. iv. 421 c, d ff. 

3 Laws, viii 831 e. 4 Cp. v. 9. § 13. 



The l^ule of the Middle Class 169 

can be more fatal to friendship and good fellowship in states IV. 11 
than this : for good fellowship tends to friendship ; when men 
are at enmity with one another, they would rather not even 
share the same path. But a city ought to be composed, as far 8 
as possible, of equals and similars ; and these are generally the 
middle classes. Wherefore the city which is composed 
of middle-class citizens is necessarily best governed; they 
are, as we say, the natural elements of a state. And this is 
the class of citizens which is most secure in a state, for they 
do not, like the poor, covet their neighbours' goods ; nor do 9 
others covet theirs, as the poor covet the goods of the rich ; 
and as they neither plot against others, nor are themselves 
plotted against, they pass through life safely. Wisely then 
did Phocylides pray — 

' Many things are best in the mean ; I desire to be of 
a middle condition in my city.' 

Thus it is manifest that the best political community is 10 
formed by citizens of the middle class, and that those states 
are likely to be well-administered, in which the middle class 
is large, and larger if possible than both the other classes, 
or at any rate than either singly ; for the addition of the 
middle class turns the scale, and prevents either of the 
extremes from being dominant. Great then is the good n 
fortune of a state in which the citizens have a moderate and 
sufficient property ; for where some possess much, and the 1296 a 
others nothing, there may arise an extreme democracy, or 
a pure oligarchy; or a tyranny may grow out of either 
extreme — either out of the most rampant democracy, or out 
of an oligarchy ; but it is not so likely to arise out of a middle 
and nearly equal condition. I will explain the reason of this 12 



17 o The Middle Class is rarely Supreme 

IV. 11 hereafter, when I speak of the revolutions of states 1 . The 
mean condition of states is clearly best, for no other is free 
from faction ; and where the middle class is large, there 

13 are least likely to be factions and dissensions. For a similar 
reason large states are less liable to faction than small ones, 
because in them the middle class is large ; whereas in small 
states it is easy to divide all the citizens into two classes who 
are either rich or poor, and to leave nothing in the middle. 

M And democracies are safer s and more permanent than 
oligarchies, because they have a middle class which is more 
numerous and has a greater share in the government ; for 
when there is no middle class, and the poor greatly exceed 
in number, troubles arise, and the state soon comes to an 

15 end. A proof of the superiority of the middle class 
is that the best legislators have been of a middle condi- 
tion ; for example, Solon, as his own verses testify ; and 
Lycurgus, for he was not a king ; and Charondas, and almost 
all legislators. 

16 These considerations will help us to understand why most 
governments are either democratical or oligarchical. The 
reason is that the middle class is seldom numerous in them, 
and whichever party, whether the rich or the common people, 
transgresses the mean and predominates, draws the govern- 
ment to itself, and thus arises either oligarchy or democracy. 

17 There is another reason — the poor and the rich quarrel with 
one another, and whichever side gets the better, instead of 
establishing a just or popular government, regards political 
supremacy as the prize of victory, and the one party sets up 

T g a democracy and the other an oligarchy. Both the parties 
which had the supremacy in Hellas looked only to the 
1 Cp. Bk. v. a Cp. v. 1. § 15; 7. § 6. 



The Goodwill of the Stronger 171 

interest of their own form of government, and established in IV. 11 
states, the one, democracies, and the other, oligarchies ; they 
thought of their own advantage, of the public not at all. For 19 
these reasons the middle form of government has rarely, if 
ever, existed, and among a very few only. One man alone of 
all who ever ruled in Hellas was induced to give this middle 
constitution to states. But it has now become a habit among 1296 b 
the citizens of states, not even to care about equality ; all men 
are seeking for dominion, or, if conquered, are willing to 
submit. 

What then is the best form of government, and what makes ao 
it the best, is evident ; and of other states, since we say that 
there are many kinds of democracy and many of oligarchy, it 
is not difficult to see which has the first and which the second 
or any other place in the order of excellence, now that 
we have determined which is the best. For that which 21 
is nearest to the best must of necessity be better, and 
that which is furthest from it worse, if we are judging 
absolutely and not relatively to given conditions : I say 
' relatively to given conditions,' since a particular government 
may be preferable for some, but another form may be better 
for others. 

We have now to consider what and what kind of govern- 12 
ment is suitable to what and what kind of men. I may begin 
by assuming, as a general principle common to all govern- 
ments, that the portion of the state which desires permanence 
ought to be stronger than that which desires the reverse. 
Now every city is composed of quality and quantity. By 
quality I mean freedom, wealth, education, good birth, and by 
quantity, superiority of numbers. Quality may exist in one of a 
the classes which make up the state, and quantity in the 



172 The Goodwill of the Stronger 

IV. 12 other. For example, the meanly-born may be more in 
number than the well-born, or the poor than the rich, yet 
they may not so much exceed in quantity as they fall short in 

3 quality ; and therefore there must be a comparison of quantity 
and quality. Where the number of the poor is more than 
proportioned to the wealth of the rich, there will naturally be 
a democracy, varying in form with the sort of people who 
compose it in each case. If, for example, the husbandmen 
exceed in number, the first form of democracy will then 
arise ; if the artisans and labouring class, the last ; and so with 
the intermediate forms. But where the rich and the notables 
exceed in quality more than they fall short in quantity, there 
oligarchy arises, similarly assuming various forms according 
to the kind of superiority possessed by the oligarchs. 

4 The legislator should always include the middle class in 
his government; if he makes his laws oligarchical, to the 
middle class let him look ; if he makes them democratical, 
he should equally by his laws try x to attach this class to 
the state 1 . There only can the government ever be stable 

1297 a where the middle class exceeds one or both of the others, and 

5 in that case there will be no fear that the rich will unite with 
the poor against the rulers. For neither of them will ever be 
willing to serve the other, and if they look for some form of 
government more suitable to both, they will find none better 
than this, for the rich and the poor will never consent to rule 
in turn, because they mistrust one another. The arbiter is 
always the one trusted, and he who is in the middle is an 

6 arbiter. The more perfect the admixture of the political 
elements, the more lasting will be the state. Many even of 

1 Or, if npoaayeaOcu can govern tois vu/xois, ' to win this class over 
to his laws. 1 



The Policy of Oligarchies 173 

those who desire to form aristocratical governments make IV. 12 
a mistake, not only in giving too much power to the rich, but 
in attempting to overreach the people. There comes a time 
when out of a false good there arises a true evil, since the 
encroachments of the rich are more destructive to the state 
than those of the people. 

The devices by which oligarchies deceive the people are 13 
five in number; they relate to (i) the assembly; (2) the 
magistracies; (3) the courts of law; (4) the use of arms; 
(5) gymnastic exercises. (1) The assemblies are thrown 
open to all, but either the rich only are fined for non- 
attendance, or a much larger fine is inflicted upon them. 

(2) As to the magistracies, those who are qualified by 2 
property cannot decline office upon oath, but the poor may. 

(3) In the law-courts the rich, and the rich only, are fined 
if they do not serve, the poor are let off with impunity, or, 
as in the laws of Charondas, a large fine is inflicted on the 
rich, and a smaller one on the poor. In some states all 3 
citizens who have registered themselves are allowed to attend 
the assembly and to try causes ; but if after registration they 
do not attend in the assembly or at the courts, heavy fines are 
imposed upon them. The intention is that through fear 
of the fines they may avoid registering themselves, and then 
they cannot sit in the law-courts or in the assembly. 

(4) Concerning the possession of arms, and (5) gymnastic 4 
exercises, they legislate in a similar spirit. For the poor are 
not obliged to have arms, but the rich are fined for not having 
them ; and in like manner no penalty is inflicted on the poor 
for non-attendance at the gymnasium, and consequently, 
having nothing to fear, they do not attend, whereas the rich 
are liable to a fine, and therefore they take care to attend. 



174 Military Basis of the Constitution 

IV. 13 These are the devices of oligarchical legislators, and 

5 in democracies they have counter devices. They pay the poor 
for attending the assemblies and the law-courts, and they 

6 inflict no penalty on the rich for non-attendance. It is 
obvious that he who would duly mix the two principles should 
combine the practice of both, and provide that the poor 
should be paid to attend, and the rich fined if they do not 
attend, for then all will take part ; if there is no such combina- 

1297 b tion, power will be in the hands of one party only. The 

7 government should be confined to those who carry arms. As 
to the property qualification, no absolute rule can be laid 
down, but we must see what is the highest qualification 
sufficiently comprehensive to secure that the number of those 
who have the rights of citizens exceeds the number of those 

8 excluded. Even if they have no share in office, the poor, 
provided only that they are not outraged or deprived of their 
property, will be quiet enough. 

But to secure gentle treatment for the poor is not an easy 

9 thing, since a ruling class is not always humane. And in time 
of war the poor are apt to hesitate unless they are fed ; when 
fed, they are willing enough to fight. In some states the 
government is vested, not only in those who are actually 
serving, but also in those who have served ; among the 
Malians, for example, the governing body consisted of the 
latter, while the magistrates were chosen from those actually 

io on service. And the earliest government which existed among 
the Hellenes, after the overthrow of the kingly power, grew 
up out of the warrior class, and was originally taken from the 
knights (for strength and superiority in war at that time 
depended on cavalry 1 ) ; indeed, without discipline, infantry 
1 Cp. iv. 3. § 3; vi. 7. § 1. 



The Distribution of Political Power 17? 

are useless, and in ancient times there was no military know- IV. 13 
ledge or tactics, and therefore the strength of armies lay 
in their cavalry. But when cities increased and the heavy 
armed grew in strength, more had a share in the government ; 
and this is the reason why the states, which we call con- n 
stitutional governments, have been hitherto called democracies. 
Ancient constitutions, as might be expected, were oligarchical 
and royal ; their population being small they had no consider- 
able middle class ; the people were weak in numbers and 
organization, and were therefore more contented to be 
governed. 

I have explained why there are various forms of govern- 12 
ment, and why there are more than is generally supposed; 
for democracy, as well as other constitutions, has more than 
one form : also what their differences are, and whence they 
arise, and what is the best form of government, speaking 
generally, and to whom the various forms of government 
are best suited ; all this has now been explained. 

Having thus gained an appropriate basis of discussion we 14 
will proceed to speak of the points which follow next in 
order. We will consider the subject not only in general but 
with reference to particular states. All states have three 
elements, and the good law-giver has to regard what is 
expedient for each state. When they are well-ordered, the 
state is well-ordered, and as they differ from one another, 
constitutions differ. What is the element first (1) which 2 
deliberates about public affairs ; secondly (2) which is con- 1298 * 
cerned with the magistrates and determines what they should 
be, over whom they should exercise authority, and what 
should be the mode of electing them; and thirdly (3) which 3 
has judicial power ? 



176 Forms of the Deliberative Power 

IV\ 14 The deliberative element has authority in matters of war 
and peace, in making and unmaking alliances ; it passes laws, 
inflicts death, exile, confiscation, audits the accounts of 
magistrates. All these powers must be assigned either to all 
the citizens or to some of them, for example, to one or more 
magistracies ; or different causes to different magistracies, or 

4 some of them to all, and others of them only to some. That 
all things should be decided by all is characteristic of 
democracy ; this is the sort of equality which the people 
desire. But there are various ways in which all may share 
in the government ; they may deliberate, not all in one body, 
but by turns, as in the constitution of Telecles the Milesian. 
There are other states in which the boards of magistrates 
meet and deliberate, but come into office by turns, and are 
elected out of the tribes and the very smallest divisions of 
the state, until every one has obtained office in his turn. 
The citizens, on the other hand, are assembled only for 
the purposes of legislation, and to consult about the con- 

5 stitution, and to hear the edicts of the magistrates. In 
another variety of democracy the citizens form one assembly, 
but meet only to elect magistrates, to pass laws, to advise 
about war and peace, and to make scrutinies. Other matters 
are referred severally to special magistrates, who are elected 

6 by vote or by lot out of all the citizens. Or again, the 
citizens meet about election to offices and about scrutinies, and 
deliberate concerning war or alliances, while other matters are 
administered by the magistrates, who, as far as is possible, are 
elected by vote 1 . I am speaking of those magistracies in 

7 which special knowledge is required. A fourth form of 
democracy is when all the citizens meet to deliberate about 

1 Cp. vi. 2. § 5. 



In Democracies and Oligarchies 177 

everything, and the magistrates decide nothing, but only make IV. 14 
the preliminary enquiries ; and that is the way in which the 
last and worst form of democracy, corresponding, as we 
maintain, to the close family oligarchy and to tyranny, is 
at present administered. All these modes are democratical. 

On the other hand, that some should deliberate about all is 
oligarchical. This again is a mode which, like the demo- 8 
cratical, has many forms. When the deliberative class, being 
elected out of those who have a moderate qualification, are 
numerous and they respect and obey the law without alter- 
ing it, and any one who has the required qualification shares 
in the government, then, just because of this moderation, the 
oligarchy inclines towards polity. But when only selected in- 1298 b 
dividuals and not the whole people share in the deliberations 
of the state, then, although, as in the former case, they observe 
the law, the government is a pure oligarchy. Or, again, 9 
when those who have the power of deliberation are self- 
elected, and son succeeds father, and they and not the laws 
are supreme — the government is of necessity oligarchical. 
Where, again, particular persons have authority in particular 10 
matters — for example, when the whole people decide about 
peace and war and hold scrutinies, but the magistrates regulate 
everything else, and they are elected either by vote or by lot — 
there 1 the form of government is an aristocracy or polity l . 
And if some questions are decided by magistrates elected 
by vote, and others by magistrates elected by lot, either 
absolutely or out of select candidates, or elected both by 
vote and by lot — these practices are partly characteristic of an 

1 Reading with several of the MSS. api<TTOtcpaTta rj no\iTeia t and 
omitting fxiv. Or, with Bekker's text, apiOTOfcpaTia iikv Jj -noXiTtio, 
'the government is an aristocracy/ 
tavis N 



178 In Democracies and Oligarchies 

IV. 14 aristocratical government, and partly of a pure constitutional 
government. 

1 1 These are the various forms of the deliberative body \ they 
correspond to the various forms of government. And the 
government of each state is administered according to one or 

1 2 other of the principles which have been laid down. Now it 
is for the interest of democracy, according to the most 
prevalent notion of it (I am speaking of that extreme form of 
democracy, in which the people are supreme even over the 
laws), with a view to better deliberation to adopt the custom 
of oligarchies respecting courts of law. For in oligarchies the 
rich who are wanted to be judges are compelled to attend 
under pain of a fine, whereas in democracies the poor are paid 
to attend. And this practice of oligarchies should be 
adopted by democracies in their public assemblies, for they 
will advise better if they all deliberate together — the people 

13 with the notables and the notables with the people. It is also 
a good plan that those who deliberate should be elected 
by vote or by lot in equal numbers out of the different 
classes ; and that if the people greatly exceed in number 
those who have political training, pay should not be given to 
all, but only to as many as would balance the number of the 
notables, or that the number in excess should be eliminated 

14 by lot. But in oligarchies either certain persons should be 
chosen out of the mass, or a class of officers should be 
appointed such as exist in some states, who are termed 
probuli and guardians of the law; and the citizens should 
occupy themselves exclusively with matters on which these 
have previously deliberated ; for so the people will have 
a share in the deliberations of the state, but will not be able 

15 to disturb the principles of the constitution. Again, in 



The Executive 179 

oligarchies either the people ought to accept the measures IV. 14 

of the government, or not to pass anything contrary to them ; 

or, if all are allowed to share in counsel, the decision should 

rest with the magistrates. The opposite of what is done in 

constitutional governments should be the rule in oligarchies; 

the veto of the majority should be final, their assent not final, 

but the proposal should be referred back to the magistrates. 

Whereas in constitutional governments they take the contrary 16 

course ; the few have the negative not the affirmative power ; 

the affirmation of everything rests with the multitude. 1 299 a 

These, then, are our conclusions respecting the deliberative, 
that is, the supreme element in states. 

Next we will proceed to consider the distribution of 15 
offices ; this, too, being a part of politics concerning which 
many questions arise : — What shall their number be ? Over 
what shall they preside, and what shall be their duration ? 
Sometimes they last for six months, sometimes for less; 
sometimes they are annual, whilst in other cases offices are 
held for still longer periods. Shall they be for life or for 
a long term of years; or, if for a short term only, shall 
the same persons hold them over and over again, or once 
only? Also about the appointment to them — from whom 
are they to be chosen, by whom, and how ? We should a 
first be in a position to say what are the possible varieties of 
them, and then we may proceed to determine which are 
suited to different forms of government. But what are to be 
included under the term ' offices * ? That is a question not 
quite so easily answered. For a political community requires 
many officers ; and not every one who is chosen by vote or 
by lot is to be regarded as a ruler. In the first place there 
are the priests, who must be distinguished from political 

N 2 



180 What Constitutes an Office? 

IV. 15 officers ; masters of choruses and heralds, even ambassadors, 

3 are elected by vote [but still they are not political officers]. 
Some duties of superintendence again are political, extending 
either to all the citizens in a single sphere of action, like 
the office of the general who superintends them when they 
are in the field, or to a section of them only, like the 
inspectorships of women or of youth. Other offices are 
concerned with household management, like that of the corn 
measurers who exist in many states and are elected officers. 
There are also menial offices which the rich have executed by 

4 their slaves. Speaking generally, they are to be called offices 
to which the duties are assigned of deliberating about certain 
measures and of judging and commanding, especially the last; 
for to command is the especial duty of a magistrate. But the. 
question is not of any importance in practice ; no one has ever 
brought into court the meaning of the word, although such 
problems have a speculative interest. 

5 What kinds of offices, and how many, are necessary to the 
existence of a state, and which, if not necessary, yet conduce 
to its well-being, are much more important considerations, 

6 affecting all states, but more especially small ones. For in 
great states it is possible, and indeed necessary, that every 
office should have a special function; where the citizens are 
numerous, many may hold office. And so it happens that 
vacancies occur in some offices only after long intervals, or 
the office is held once only ; and certainly every work is 

1299 b better done which receives of the sole 1 , and not the divided, 

7 attention of the worker. But in small states it is necessary 
to combine many offices in a few hands £ , since the small 
number of citizens does not admit of many holding office : — 

1 Cp. ii, a. § 6, a Cp. vi. S. 



What Constitutes an Office \ 



181 



for who will there be to succeed them ? And yet small IV. 15 
states at times require the same offices and laws as large ones ; 
the difference is that the one want them often, the others only 
after long intervals. Hence there is no reason why the care 8 
of many offices should not be imposed on the same person, 
for they will not interfere with each other. When the 
population is small, offices should be like the spits which also 
serve to hold a lamp 1 . We must first ascertain how many 
magistrates are necessary in every state, and also how many 
are not exactly necessary, but are nevertheless useful, and 
then there will be no difficulty in judging what offices can be 
combined in one. We should also know when local tribunals 9 
are to have jurisdiction over many different matters, and when 
authority should be centralized: for example, should one 
person keep order in the market and another in some other 
place, or should the same person be responsible everywhere ? 
Again, should offices be divided according to the subjects 
with which they deal, or according to the persons with whom 
they deal : I mean to say, should one person see to good 
order in general, or one look after the boys, another after the 
women, and so on ? Further, under different constitutions, IO 
should the magistrates be the same or different ? For 

example, in democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, 
should there be the same magistrates, although they are 

ilected, not out of equal or similar classes of citizens, but 
differently under different constitutions — in aristocracies, for 

ixample, they are chosen from the educated, in oligarchies 
from the wealthy, and in democracies from the free — or are 
-.here different offices proper 'to different constitutions 2 , and 

1 Cp. Note on i. a. § 3. a See note. 



i 82 The Executive under 

IV. 15 may the same be suitable to some, but unsuitable to others ? 
For in some states it may be convenient that the same office 
should have a more extensive, in other states a narrower 
ii sphere. Special offices are peculiar to certain forms of 
government: — for example, [to oligarchies] that of probuli, 
which is not a democratic office, although a bule or council is. 
There must be some body of men whose duty is to prepare 
measures for the people in order that they may not be diverted 
from their business ; when these are few in number, the state 
inclines to an oligarchy : or rather the probuli must always be 

12 few, and are therefore an oligarchical element. But when 
both institutions exist in a state, the probuli are a check 
on the council ; for the counsellor is a democratic element, 
but the probuli are oligarchical Even the power of the 
council disappears when democracy has taken that extreme 

1300 a form, in which the people themselves are always meeting and 

1 3 deliberating about everything. This is the case when the 
members of the assembly are wealthy or receive pay; for 
they have nothing to do and are always holding assemblies 
and deciding everything for themselves. A magistracy which 
controls the boys or the women, or any similar office, is 
suited to an aristocracy rather than to a democracy ; for how 
can the magistrates prevent the wives of the poor from going 
out of doors ? Neither is it an oligarchical office ; for the 
wives of the oligarchs are too fine to be controlled. 

14 Enough of these matters. I will now enquire into the 
appointment of offices. There are three questions to be 
answered, and the combinations of answers give all possible 
differences : first, who appoints ? secondly, from whom ? and 

15 thirdly, how? Each of these three may further differ in 
three ways: (1) All the citizens, or only some, appoint; 



Different Constitutions 183 

(2) Either the magistrates are chosen out of all or out of IV. 15 
some who are distinguished either by a property qualification, 
or by birth, or merit, or for some special reason, as at 
Megara only those were eligible who had returned from exile 
and fought together against the democracy; (3) They may 
be appointed either by vote or by lot. Again, these several 16 
modes may be combined ; I mean that some officers may be 
elected by some, others by all, and some again out of some, 
and others out of all, and some by vote and others by 
lot. Each of these differences admits of four variations. 17 
(1) Either all may elect out of all by vote, or all out of 
all by lot ; and either out of all collectively or by sections, as, 
for example, by tribes, and wards, and phratries, until all the 
citizens have been gone through ; or the citizens may be in 
all cases eligible indiscriminately, and in some cases they may 
be elected by vote, and in some by lot. Again, (2) if only 18 
some appoint, they may appoint out of all by vote, or out 
of all by lot ; or out of some by vote, out of some by lot, and 
some offices may be appointed in one way and some in 
another ; I mean if they are appointed by all they may be 
appointed partly by vote and partly by lot 1 . Thus there will 
be twelve forms of appointment without including the two 
combinations in the mode of election. Of these varieties two 19 
are democratic forms, namely, when the choice is made by all 
the people out of all by vote or by lot, or by both, that is to 
say, some by lot and some by vote. The cases in which they 
do not all appoint at one time, but some appoint out of all or 
out of some by vote or by lot or by both (I mean some by 
lot and some by vote), or some out of all and others out 

1 i. e. partly out of all and partly out of some, and partly by vote and 
partly by lot (see infra c. 16. § 6). 



184 The Executive 

IV. 15 of some both by lot and vote, are characteristic of a polity or 

20 constitutional government. That some should be appointed 
out of all by vote or by lot or by both, is oligarchical, and still 
more oligarchical when some are elected from all and some 
from some. That some should be elected out of all and 
some out of some, or again some by vote and others by 

1300 b lot, is characteristic of a constitutional government, which 

21 inclines to an aristocracy. That some should be chosen out 
of some, and some taken by lot out of some, is oligarchical 
1 though not equally oligarchical l ; oligarchical, too, is the 
appointment of some out of some in both ways, and of some 
out of all. But that all should elect by vote out of some is 
aristocratical. 

22 These are the different ways of constituting magistrates, 
and in this manner officers correspond to different forms 
of government : — which are proper to which, or how they 
ought to be established, will be evident when we determine 
the nature of their powers 2 . By powers I mean such power 
as a magistrate exercises over the revenue or in defence of 
the country ; for there are various kinds of power : the power 
of the general, for example, is not the same with that which 
regulates contracts in the market. 

16 Of the three parts of government, the judicial remains 
to be considered, and this we shall divide on the same 
principle. There are three points on which the varieties 
of law-courts depend — the persons from whom they are 
appointed, the matters with which they are concerned, and the 
manner of their appointment. I mean, (1) are the judges 
taken from all, or from some only ? (2) how many kinds of 

1 These words are bracketed by Bekker in both editions. 

2 Omitting tcai with some MSS. and the old translator. 



Different Modes of appointing Judges 1 8 y 

law-courts are there ? (3) are the judges chosen by vote or IV. 16 
by lot ? 

First, let me determine how many kinds of law-courts 2 
there are. They are eight in number : One is the court of 
audits or scrutinies ; a second takes cognizance of [ordinary] 
offences against the state ; a third is concerned with treason 
against the government ; the fourth determines disputes re- 
specting penalties, whether raised by magistrates or by private 
persons ; the fifth decides the more important civil cases ; 
the sixth tries cases of homicide, which are of various kinds, 3 
(a) premeditated, (b) unpremeditated, (c) cases in which the 
guilt is confessed but the justice is disputed ; and there may 
be a fourth court (d) in which murderers who have fled from 
justice are tried after their return ; such as the Court of 
Phreatto is said to be at Athens. But cases of this sort 
rarely happen at all even in large cities. The different kinds 
of homicide may be tried either by the same or by different 
courts. (7) There are courts for strangers : — of these there 4 
are two subdivisions, (a) for the settlement of their disputes 
with one another, (b) for the settlement of disputes between 
them and the citizens. And besides all these there must be 
(8) courts for small suits about sums of a drachma up to five 
drachmas, or a little more, which have to be determined, but 
they do not require many judges. 

Nothing more need be said of these small suits, nor of the 5 
courts for homicide and for strangers : — I would rather speak 
of political cases, which, when mismanaged, create division and 
disturbances in states. 

Now if all the citizens judge, in all the different cases 
which I have distinguished, they may be appointed by vote 
or by lot, or sometimes by lot and sometimes by vote. Or 



i 8 6 Different Modes of Appointing Judges 

IV. 16 when a certain class of causes are tried, the judges who de- 
cide them may be appointed, some by vote, and some by lot. 
1301 a These then are the four modes of appointing judges from the 

6 whole people, and there will be likewise four modes, if they 
are elected from a part only ; for they may be appointed from 
some by vote and judge in all causes; or they may be 
appointed from some by lot and judge in all causes ; or they 
may be elected in some cases by vote, and in some cases taken 
by lot, or some courts, even when judging the same causes, 
may be composed of members some appointed by vote and 
some by lot. These then are the ways in which the aforesaid 
judges may be appointed. 

7 Once more, the modes of appointment may be combined, 
I mean, that some may be chosen out of the whole people, 
others out of some, some out of both ; for example, the 
same tribunal may be composed of some who were elected 
out of all, and of others who were elected out of some, either 
by vote or by lot or by both. 

8 In how many forms law-courts can be established has now 
been considered. The first form, viz. that in which the 
judges are taken from all the citizens, and in which all 
causes are tried, is democratical ; the second, which is com- 
posed of a few only who try all causes, oligarchical ; the 
third, in which some courts are taken from all classes, and 
some from certain classes only, aristocratical and constitu- 
tional. 



BOOK V 

The design which we proposed to ourselves is now nearly V. 1 
completed \ Next in order follow the causes of revolution 
in states, how many, and of what nature they are ; what 
elements work ruin in particular states, and out of what, and 
into what they mostly change ; also what are the elements of 
preservation in states generally, or in a particular state, and 
by what means each state may be best preserved : these 
questions remain to be considered. 

In the first place we must assume as our starting-point 2 
that in the many forms of government which have sprung up 
there has always been an acknowledgement of justice and 2 
proportionate equality, although mankind fail in attaining 
them, as indeed I have already explained 3 . Democracy, 3 
for example, arises out of the notion that those who are 
equal in any respect are equal in all respects ; because men 
are equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal. Oligarchy 
is based on the notion that those who are unequal in one 
respect are in all respects unequal ; being unequal, that is, in 
property, they suppose themselves to be unequal absolutely. 
The democrats think that as they are equal they ought to be 4 

1 Cp. iv. c. 2. 

3 Reading icai with the MSS. and Bekker's 1st ed. 

3 Cp. iii. 9. §§ 1-4. 



1 8 8 'Revolutions : their Causes 

V. 1 equal in all things ; while the oligarchs, under the idea that 
they are unequal, claim too much, which is one form of 

5 inequality. All these forms of government have a kind of 
justice, but, tried by an absolute standard, they are faulty; 
and, therefore, both parties, whenever their share in the 
government does not accord with their preconceived ideas, 

6 stir up revolution. Those who excel in virtue have the best 
1301 b Hght of all to rebel (for they alone can with reason be deemed 

absolutely unequal) 1 , but then they are of all men the least 

7 inclined to do so 2 . There is also a superiority which is 
claimed by men of rank ; for they are thought noble because 
they spring from wealthy and virtuous ancestors 3 . Here 

8 then, so to speak, are opened the very springs and fountains 
of revolution ; and hence arise two sorts of changes in govern- 
ments ; the one affecting the constitution, when men seek to 
change from an existing form into some other, for example, 
from democracy into oligarchy, and from oligarchy into demo- 
cracy, or from either of them into constitutional government or 
aristocracy, and conversely ; the other not affecting the con- 
stitution, when, without disturbing the form of government, 
whether oligarchy, or monarchy, or any other, they try to get 

9 the administration into their own hands 4 . Further, there is 
a question of degree ; an oligarchy, for example, may become 
more or less oligarchical, and a democracy more or less demo- 
cratical ; and in like manner the characteristics of the other 
forms of government may be more or less strictly maintained. 

io Or, the revolution may be directed against a portion of the 
constitution only, e. g. the establishment or overthrow of 
a particular office : as at Sparta it is said that Lysander 

1 Cp. iii. 13. § 25. 2 Cp. c. 4. § 12. 

3 Cp. iv. 8. § 9. * Cp. iv. 5, § 3. 



The Desire of Equality 189 

attempted to overthrow the monarchy, and king Pausanias 1 V. 1 
the ephoralty. At Epidamnus, too, the change was partial. 
For instead of phylarchs or heads of tribes, a council was 
appointed; but to this day the magistrates are the only 11 
members of the ruling class who are compelled to go to the 
Heliaea when an election takes place, and the office of the 
single archon 2 [survives, which] is another oligarchical feature. 
Everywhere inequality is a cause of revolution, but an in- 
equality in which there is no proportion, for instance, a per- 
petual monarchy among equals ; and always it is the desire of 
equality which rises in rebellion. 

Now equality is of two kinds, numerical and proportional ; 12 
by the first I mean sameness or equality in number or size ; 
by the second, equality of ratios. For example, the excess of 
three over two is equal to the excess of two over one ; 
whereas four exceeds two in the same ratio in which two 
exceeds one, for two is the same part of four that one is of 
two, namely, the half. As I was saying before 3 , men agree 13 
about justice in the abstract, that it is treating others according 
to their deserts, but there is a difference of opinion about the 
application of the principle ; some think that if they are equal 
in any respect they are equal absolutely, others that if they are 
unequal in any respect they are unequal in all. Hence there 14 
are two principal forms of government, democracy and oli- 
garchy ; for good birth and virtue are rare, but wealth and 1302 a 
numbers are more common. In what city shall we find 
a hundred persons of good birth and of virtue ? whereas the 
poor everywhere abound. That a state should be ordered, 
simply and wholly, according to either kind of equality, is not 

1 Cp. vii. 14. § 20. a Cp. iii. 16. § I. 

3 Cp. § 2 ; iii, 9. §§ 1-4. 



190 The Great Source of Revolution 

V. 1 a good thing ; the proof is the fact that such forms of govern- 

15 ment never last. They are originally based on a mistake, and, 
as they begin badly, cannot fail to end badly. The inference 
is that both kinds of equality should be employed ; numerical 
in some cases, and proportionate in others. 

Still democracy appears to be safer and less liable to revo- 

16 lution than oligarchy \ For in oligarchies 2 there is the double 
danger of the oligarchs falling out among themselves and also 
with the people ; but in democracies 3 there is only the danger 
of a quarrel with the oligarchs. No dissension worth men- 
tioning arises among the people themselves. And we may 
further remark that a government which is composed of the 
middle class more nearly approximates to democracy than to 
oligarchy 4 , and is the safest of the imperfect forms of 
government. 

2 In considering how dissensions and political revolutions 
arise, we must first of all ascertain the beginnings and causes 
of them which affect constitutions generally. They may be 
said to be three in number ; and we have now to give an out- 
line of each. We want to know (1) what is the feeling ? 
and (2) what are the motives of those who make them ? 

2 (3) whence arise political disturbances and quarrels ? The 
universal and chief cause of this revolutionary feeling has been 
already mentioned ; viz. the desire of equality, when men think 
that they are equal to others who have more than themselves; 
or, again, the desire of inequality and superiority, when con- 
ceiving themselves to be superior they think that they have 

3 not more but the same or less than their inferiors ; pretensions 
\ which may and may not be just. Inferiors revolt in order 

1 Cp. iv. 1 1. § 14. 2 Cp. c 6. 

3 Cp. c. 5. i Omitting fj before tujv d\iycuv. 



'Revolutions 191 

that they may be equal, and equals that they may be superior, v/2 
Such is the state of mind which creates revolutions. The 
motives for making them are the desire of gain and honour, 
or the fear of dishonour and loss ; the authors of them want 
to divert punishment or dishonour from themselves or their 
friends. The causes and reasons of these motives and dis- 4 
positions which are excited in men, about the things which 
I have mentioned, viewed in one way, may be regarded as 
seven, and in another as more than seven. Two of them 5 
have been already noticed ! ; but they act in a different 
manner, for men are excited against one another by the love 
of gain and honour — not, as in the case which I have just 
supposed, in order to obtain them for themselves, but at seeing 1302 b 
others, justly or unjustly, engrossing them. Other causes are 6 
insolence, fear, love of superiority, contempt, disproportionate 
increase in some part of the state ; causes of another sort are 
election intrigues, carelessness, neglect about trifles, dissimi- 
larity of elements. 

What share insolence and avarice have in creating revolu- 3 
tions, and how they work, is plain enough. When the 
magistrates are insolent and grasping they conspire against 
one another and also against the constitution from which they 
derive their power, making their gains either at the expense of 
individuals or of the public. It is evident, again, what an 2 
influence honour exerts and how it is a cause of revolution. Men 
who are themselves dishonoured and who see others obtaining 
honours rise in rebellion ; the honour or dishonour when un- 
deserved is unjust, and just when awarded according to 
merit. Again, superiority is a cause of revolution when one 3 
or more persons have a power which is too much for the 
1 Supra §§ 2, 3. 



192 Causes of Revolutions 

V. 3 state and the power of the government ; this is a condition of 
affairs out of which there arises a monarchy, or a family 
oligarchy. And, therefore, in some places, as at Athens 
and Argos, they have recourse to ostracism 1 . But how 
much better to provide from the first that there should be 
no such pre-eminent individuals instead of letting them come 
into existence and then finding a remedy. 

4 Another cause of revolution is fear. Either men have 
committed wrong, and are afraid of punishment, or they are 
expecting to suffer wrong and are desirous of anticipating 
their enemy 2 . Thus at Rhodes the notables conspired 
against the people through fear of the suits that were brought 

5 against them. Contempt is also a cause of insurrection and 
revolution ; for example, in oligarchies — when those who 
have no share in the state are the majority, they revolt, 
because they think that they are the stronger. Or, again, in 
democracies, the rich despise the disorder and anarchy of the 
state ; at Thebes, for example, where, after the battle of 
Oenophyta, the bad administration of the democracy led to 
its ruin. At Megara the fall of the democracy was due 
to a defeat occasioned by disorder and anarchy. And at 
Syracuse the democracy was overthrown before the tyranny 
of Gelo arose ; at Rhodes before the insurrection. 

6 Political revolutions also spring from a disproportionate 
increase in any part of the state. For as a body is made 
up of many members, and every member ought to grow 
in proportion 3 , that symmetry may be preserved, but loses 
its nature if the foot be four cubits long and the rest of the 

1303 a body two spans ; and, should the abnormal increase be one of 

1 Cp. iii. 13. § 15. 2 Cp. c. 5, § 2. 

3 Cp. iii, 13. § 21. 



Occasions of 'Revolutions 193 

quality as well as of quantity, may even take the form of V. 3 
another animal : even so a state has many parts, of which 
some one may often grow imperceptibly ; for example, the 
number of poor in democracies and in constitutional states. 
And this disproportion may sometimes happen by an accident, 7 
as at Tarentum, from a defeat in which many of the notables 
were slain in a battle with the Iapygians just after the 
Persian War, the constitutional government in consequence 
becoming a democracy ; or, as was the case at Argos, where 
after the Josses inflicted in * the Battle of the Seventh Day ' 
by Cleomenes the Lacedaemonian, the Argives were com- 
pelled to admit to citizenship some of their perioe'ci : and at 
Athens, when, after frequent defeats of their infantry in the 
times of the Peloponnesian War, the notables were reduced 
in number, because the soldiers had to be taken from the 
roll of citizens. Revolutions arise from this cause in 8 
democracies as well as in other forms of government, but not 
to so great an extent. When the rich * grow numerous or 
properties increase, the form of government changes into an 
oligarchy or a government of families. Forms of government 9 
also change — sometimes even without revolution, owing to 
election contests, as at Heraea (where, instead of electing 
their magistrates, they took them by lot, because the electors 
were in the habit of choosing their own partisans) ; or owing 
to carelessness, when disloyal persons are allowed to find 
their way into the highest offices, as at Oreum, where, upon 
the accession of Heracleodorus to office, the oligarchy was 
overthrown, and changed by him into a constitutional and 
democratical government. 

1 Reading tvwSpav. 



194 Occasions of Revolutions 

V. 3 Again, the revolution may be accomplished by small 

10 degrees ; I mean that a great change may sometimes slip 
into the constitution through neglect of a small matter ; at 
Ambracia, for instance, the qualification for office, small 
at first, was eventually reduced to nothing. For the 
Ambraciots thought that a small qualification was much the 
same as none at all. 

11 Another cause of revolution is difference of races which do 
not at once acquire a common spirit ; for a state is not the 
growth of a day, neither is it a multitude brought together 
by accident. Hence the reception of strangers in colonies, 
either at the time of their foundation or afterwards, has 
generally produced revolution ; for example, the Achaeans 
who joined the Troezenians in the foundation of Sybaris, 
being the more numerous, afterwards expelled them ; hence 

12 the curse fell upon Sybaris. At Thurii the Sybarites 
quarrelled with their fellow-colonists ; thinking that the land 
belonged to them, they wanted too much of it and were 
driven out. At Byzantium the new colonists were detected 
in a conspiracy, and were expelled by force of arms ; the 
people of Antissa, who had received the Chian exiles, fought 
with them, and drove them out ; and the Zancleans, after 
having received the Samians, were driven by them out of 

13 their own city. The citizens of Apollonia on the Euxine, 
after the introduction of a fresh body of colonists, had a 
revolution ; the Syracusans, after the expulsion of their 

1303 b tyrants, having admitted strangers and mercenaries to the 
rights of citizenship, quarrelled and came to blows ; the 
people of Amphipolis, having received Chalcidian colonists, 
were nearly all expelled by them. 

14 Now, in oligarchies the masses make revolution under the 



Occasions of 'Revolutions 195- 

idea that they are unjustly treated, because, as I said before, V. 3 
they are equals, and have not an equal share, and in 
democracies the notables revolt, because they are not equals, 
and yet have only an equal share. 

Again, the situation of cities is a cause of revolution when 15 
the country is not naturally adapted to preserve the unity 
of the state. For example, the Chytrians at Clazomenae did 
not agree with the people of the island; and the people of 
Colophon quarrelled with the Notians; at Athens, too, the 
inhabitants of the Piraeus are more democratic than those who 
live in the city. For just as in war, the impediment of 16 
a ditch, though ever so small, may break a regiment, so every 
cause of difference, however slight, makes a breach in a 
city. The greatest opposition is confessedly that of virtue 
and vice ; next comes that of wealth and poverty ; and 
there are other antagonistic elements, greater or less, of which 
one is this difference of place. 

In revolutions the occasions may be trifling, but great 4 
interests are at stake. Trifles are most important when 
they concern the rulers, as was the case of old at Syracuse ; 
for the Syracusan constitution was once changed by a love- 
quarrel of two young men, who were in the government. 
The story is that while one of them was away from home 2 
his beloved was gained over by his companion, and he to 
revenge himself seduced the other's wife. They then drew 
all the members of the ruling class into their quarrel and 
made a revolution. We learn from this story that we should 3 
be on our guard against the beginnings of such evils, and 
should put an end to the quarrels of chiefs and mighty men. 
The mistake lies in the beginning — as the proverb says, 
' Well begun is half done ' — so an error at the beginning, 

O 2 



i $6 Occasions of Revolutions, 

V. 4 though quite small, has the proportion of a half to the whole 

4 matter. In general, when the notables quarrel, the whole city 
is involved, as happened in Hestiaea after the Persian War. 
The occasion was the division of an inheritance ; one of 
two brothers refused to give an account of their father's 
property and the treasure which he had found : so the poorer 
of the two quarrelled with him and enlisted in his cause 
the popular party, the other, who was very rich, the wealthy 
classes. 

5 At Delphi, again, a quarrel about a marriage was the 
1304 a beginning of all the troubles which followed. In this case the 

bridegroom, fancying some occurrence to be of evil omen, 
came to the bride, and went away without taking her. 
Whereupon her relations, thinking that they were insulted 
by him, put some of the sacred treasure [among his offerings] 
while he was sacrificing, and then slew him, pretending that 

6 he had been robbing the temple. At Mitylene, too, a dis- 
pute about heiresses was the beginning of many misfortunes, 
and led to the war with the Athenians in which Paches took 
their city. A wealthy citizen, named Timophanes, left two 
daughters; Doxander, another citizen, wanted to obtain them 
for his sons, but he was rejected in his suit, whereupon 
he stirred up a revolution, and instigated the Athenians (of 

7 whom he was proxenus) to interfere. A similar quarrel about 
an heiress arose at Phocis between Mnaseas the father of 
Mnason, and Euthycrates the father of Onomarchus ; this 
was the beginning of the Sacred War. A marriage-quarrel 
was also the cause of a change in the government of 
Epidamnus. A certain man bethrothed his daughter secretly 
to a person whose father, having been made a magistrate, 
fined the father of the girl, and the latter, stung by the insult, 



and the Manner of Effecting Them 197 

conspired with the unenfranchised classes to overthrow the V. 4 
state. 

Governments also change into oligarchy or into democracy 8 
or into a constitutional government because the magistrates, or 
some other section of the state, increase in power or renown. 
Thus at Athens the reputation gained by the court of 
the Areopagus, in the Persian War, seemed to tighten the 
reins of government. On the other hand, the victory of 
Salamis *, which was gained by the common people who 
served in the fleet, and won for the Athenians the empire of 
the sea, strengthened the democracy. At Argos, the notables, 9 
having distinguished themselves against the Lacedaemonians 
in the battle of Mantinea, attempted to put down the demo- 
cracy. At Syracuse, the people having been the chief 
authors of the victory in the war with the Athenians, changed 
the constitutional government into democracy. At Chalcis, 
the people, uniting with the notables, killed Phoxus the 
tyrant, and then seized the government. At Ambracia 2 , the 
people, in like manner, having joined with the conspirators in 
expelling the tyrant Periander, transferred the government to 
themselves. And generally, it should be remembered that 10 
those who have secured power to the state, whether private 
citizens, or magistrates, or tribes, or any other part or 
section of the state, are apt to cause revolutions. For either 
envy of their greatness draws others into rebellion, or they 
themselves, in their pride of superiority, are unwilling to 
remain on a level with others. 

Revolutions break out when opposite parties, e.g. the rich ri 
and the poor, are equally balanced, and there is little or 1304 b 

1 Cp. ii. 12. § 5 ; viii. 6. § II. 

2 Cp. supra c. 3. § 10, and infra c. 10. §16. 



i 9 8 Occasions of Revolutions 

. 4 nothing between them ; for, if either party were manifestly 

12 superior, the other would not risk an attack upon them. And, 
for this reason, those who are eminent in virtue do not stir up 
insurrections, being always a minority. Such are the beginnings 
and causes of the disturbances and revolutions to which every 
form of government is liable. 

Revolutions are effected in two ways, by force and by 
fraud. Force may be applied either at the time of making the 

13 revolution or afterwards. Fraud, again, is of two kinds ; for 
(1) sometimes the citizens are deceived into a change of 
government, and afterwards they are held in subjection against 
their will. This was what happened in the case of the Four 
Hundred, who deceived the people by telling them that the 
king would provide money for the war against the Lace- 
daemonians, and when the deception was over, still endeavoured 
to retain the government. (2) In other cases the people are 
persuaded at first, and afterwards, by a repetition of the 
persuasion, their goodwill and allegiance are retained. The 
revolutions which affect constitutions generally spring from 
the above-mentioned causes 1 . 

5 And now, taking each constitution separately, we must see 
what follows from the principles already laid down. 

Revolutions in democracies are generally caused by the in- 
temperance of demagogues, who either in their private capacity 
lay information against rich men until they compel them 
to combine (for a common danger unites even the bitterest 
enemies), or coming forward in public they stir up the people 
against them. The truth of this remark is proved by a 

2 variety of examples. At Cos the democracy was overthrown 
because wicked demagogues arose, and the notables combined. 

1 Cp. hurra c. 2, § 1. 



Revolutions in Democracies 199 

At Rhodes the demagogues not only provided pay for the V. 5 
multitude, but prevented them from making good to the 
trierarchs the sums which had been expended by them ; 
and they, in consequence of the suits which were brought 
against them, were compelled to combine and put down the 
democracy 1 . The democracy at Heraclea was overthrown 3 
shortly after the foundation of the colony by the injustice of 
the demagogues, which drove out the notables, who came 
back in a body and put an end to the democracy. Much in 4 
the same manner the democracy at Megara 2 was overturned ; 
there the demagogues drove out many of the notables in 
order that they might be able to confiscate their property. At 
length the exiles, becoming numerous, returned, and engaging 
and defeating the people, established an oligarchy. The same 1305 a 
thing happened with the democracy of Cyme which was over- 
thrown by Thrasymachus. And we may observe that in most 5 
states the changes have been of this character. For sometimes 
the demagogues, in order to curry favour with the people, 
wrong the notables and so force them to combine ; — either 
they make a division of their property, or diminish their 
incomes by the imposition of public services, and sometimes 
they bring accusations against the rich that they may have 
their wealth to confiscate 8 . 

Of old, the demagogue was also a general, and then demo- 6 
cracies changed into tyrannies. Most of the ancient tyrants 
were originally demagogues 4 . They are not so now, but 7 
they were then ; and the reason is that they were generals 
and not orators, for oratory had not yet come into fashion. 
Whereas in our day, when the art of rhetoric has made such 

1 Cp. supra c. 3. § 4. 2 Cp. c. 3. § 5, and iv. 15. § 15. 

a Cp. infra c. 8. § 20. * Cp. c. 10. § 4; Plato, Rep. viii. 565 d. 



200 The Demagogue and the Tyrant 

V. 5 progress, the orators lead the people, but their ignorance of 
military matters prevents them from usurping power ; at any 

8 rate instances to the contrary are few and slight. Formerly 
tyrannies were more common than they are now, because 
great power was often placed in the hands of individuals ; 
thus a tyranny arose at Miletus out of the office of the Pry- 
tanis, who had supreme authority in many important matters 1 , 
Moreover, in those days, when cities were not large, the 
people dwelt in the fields, busy at their work ; and their chiefs, 

9 if they possessed any military talent, seized the opportunity, 
and winning the confidence of the masses by professing their 
hatred of the wealthy, they succeeded in obtaining the tyranny. 
Thus at Athens Peisistratus led a faction against the men of 
the plain 2 , and Theagenes at Megara slaughtered the cattle 
of the wealthy, which he found by the river side where they 

io had put them to graze. Dionysius, again, was thought worthy 
of the tyranny because he denounced Daphnaeus and the rich ; 
his enmity to the notables won for him the confidence of the 
people. Changes also take place from the ancient to the 
latest form of democracy ; for where there is a popular elec- 
tion of the magistrates and no property qualification, the 
aspirants for office get hold of the people, and contrive at 

ii last even to set them above the laws. A more or less com- 
plete cure for this state of things is for the separate tribes, 
and not the whole people, to elect the magistrates. 

These are the principal causes of revolutions in demo- 
cracies. 

6 There are two patent causes of revolutions in oligarchies 
[one coming from without, the other from within the govern- 
ment] : (i) First, when the oligarchs oppress the peoj^e, 
1 Cp. infra c. io. § 5. - See Herod, i. 59. 



Revolutions in Oligarchies 



201 



for then anybody is good enough to be their champion, V. 6 
especially if he be himself a member of the oligarchy, as 1305 b 
Lygdamis at Naxos, who afterwards came to be tyrant. But 2 
revolutions which commence outside the governing class may 
be further subdivided. Sometimes, when the government is 
very exclusive, the revolution is brought about by persons of 
the wealthy class who are excluded, as happened at Massalia 
and Istros and Heraclea, and other cities. Those who had 3 
no share in the government created a disturbance, until first 
the elder brothers, and then the younger, were admitted ; for 
in some places father and son, in others elder and younger 
brothers, do not hold office together. At Massalia the oli- 
garchy became more like a constitutional government, but at 
Istros ended in a democracy, and at Heraclea was enlarged 
to 600. At Cnidos, again, the oligarchy underwent a con- 4 
siderable change. For the notables fell out among themselves, 
because only a few shared in the government ; there existed 
among them the rule already mentioned, that father and son 
could not hold office together, and, if there were several 
brothers, only the eldest was admitted. The people took 
advantage of the quarrel, and choosing one of the notables to 
be their leader, attacked and conquered the oligarchs, who 
were divided, and division is always a source of weakness. 
The city of Erythrae, too, in old times was ruled, and ruled 5 
well, by the Basilidae, but the people took offence at the 
narrowness of the oligarchy and changed the government. 

(2) Of internal causes of revolutions in oligarchies one is 
the personal rivalry of the oligarchs, which leads them to 
play the demagogue. Now, the oligarchical demagogue is of 6 
two sorts : either (1) he practises upon the oligarchs them- 
selves (for, although the oligarchy are quite a small number, 



202 Their Causes External and Internal 

V. 6 there may be a demagogue among them, as at Athens the 
party of Charicles predominated among the Thirty, that of 
Phrynichus in the Four Hundred) ; or (2) the oligarchs may 
play the demagogue with the people. This was the case at 
Larissa, where the guardians of the citizens endeavoured to 
gain over the people because they were elected by them ; and 
such is the fate of all oligarchies in which the magistrates are 
elected, as at Abydos, not by the class to which they belong, 
but by the heavy-armed or by the people, although they may 
be required to have a high qualification, or to be members of 

7 a political club ; or, again, where the law-courts are inde- 
pendent of the government, the oligarchs flatter the people in 
order to obtain a decision in their own favour, and so they 
change the constitution ; this happened at Heraclea in Pontus. 
Again, oligarchies change whenever any attempt is made to 
narrow them ; for then those who desire equal rights are com- 

8 pelled to call in the people. Changes in the oligarchy also 
occur when the oligarchs waste their private property by 
extravagant living ; for then they want to innovate, and 

1306 a either try to make themselves tyrants, or install some one else 
in the tyranny, as Hipparinus did Dionysius at Syracuse, and 
as at Amphipolis x a man named Cleotimus introduced Chal- 
cidian colonists, and when they arrived, stirred them up 
g against the rich. For a like reason in Aegina the person 
who carried on the negotiation with Chares endeavoured to 
revolutionize the state. Sometimes a party among the oli- 
garchs try to create a political change ; sometimes they rob 
the treasury, and then, either the other oligarchs quarrel with 
the thieves, as happened at Apollonia in Pontus, or they with 
the other oligarchs. But an oligarchy which is at unity 
1 Cp. c. 3. § 13. 



Oligarchy, Dangers in Peace and War 203 

with itself is not easily destroyed from within ; of this we V. 6 
may see an example at Pharsalus, for there, although the 10 
rulers are few in number, they govern a large city, because 
they have a good understanding among themselves. 

Oligarchies, again, are overthrown when another oligarchy 
is created within the original one, that is to say, when the n 
whole governing body is small and yet they do not all share 
in the highest offices. Thus at Elis the governing body was 
a small senate ; and very few ever found their way into it, 
because, although in number ninety, the senators were elected 
for life and out of certain families in a manner similar to the 
Lacedaemonian elders. Oligarchy is liable to revolutions 12 
alike in war and in peace ; in war because, not being able to 
trust the people, the oligarchs are compelled to hire mer- 
cenaries, and the general who is in command of them often 
ends in becoming a tyrant, as Timophanes did at Corinth ; or 
if there are more generals than one they make themselves into 
a company of tyrants *. Sometimes the oligarchs, fearing 
this danger, give the people a share in the government because 
their services are necessary to them. And in time of peace, 13 
from mutual distrust, the two parties hand over the defence 
of the state to the army and to an arbiter between the two 
factions who often ends the master of both. This happened 
at Larissa when Simosand the Aleuadae had the government, 
and at Abydos in the days of Iphiades and the political clubs. 
Revolutions also arise out of marriages or lawsuits which lead 14 
to the overthrow of one party among the oligarchs by another. 
Of quarrels about marriages I have already mentioned 2 some 
instances ; another occurred at Eretria, where Diagoras over- 
turned the oligarchy of the knights because he had been 
1 dwaonia. 2 Cp. c. 4. §§ 5-7. 



204 'Revolutions in Oligarchies 

V. 6 wronged about a marriage. A revolution at Heraclea, and 

J 5 another at Thebes, both arose out of decisions of law-courts 

upon a charge of adultery ; in both cases the punishment was 

just, but executed in the spirit of party, at Heraclea upon 

1806 b Eurytion, and at Thebes upon Archias ; for their enemies 
were jealous of them and so had them pilloried in the 

1 6 agora. Many oligarchies have been destroyed by some 
members of the ruling class taking offence at their excessive 
despotism ; for example, the oligarchy at Cnidus and at 
Chios. 

Changes of constitutional governments, and also of oli- 
garchies which limit the office of counsellor, judge, or other 
magistrate to persons having a certain money qualification, 

17 often occur by accident. The qualification may have been 
originally fixed according to the circumstances of the time, in 
such a manner as to include in an oligarchy a few only, or 
in a constitutional government the middle class. But after 
a time of prosperity, whether arising from peace or some 
other good fortune, the same property becomes many times 
as large, and then everybody participates in every office ; this 
happens sometimes gradually and insensibly, and sometimes 

18 quickly. These are the causes of changes and revolutions in 
oligarchies. 

We must remark generally, both of democracies and oli- 
garchies, that they sometimes change, not into the opposite 
forms of government, but only into another variety of the 
same class ; I mean to say, from those forms of democracy 
and oligarchy which are regulated by law into those which are 
arbitrary, and conversely. 
7 In aristocracies revolutions are stirred up when a few only 
share in the honours of the state ; a cause which has been 



Revolutions in Oligarchies 20 j 

already shown to affect oligarchies ; for an aristocracy is V. 7 
a sort of oligarchy, and, like an oligarchy, is the government 
of a few, although the few are the virtuous and not the 
wealthy ; hence the two are often confounded. And revo- 2 
lutions will be most likely to happen, and must happen, when 
the majority of the people are high-spirited, and have a notion 
that they are as good as their rulers. Thus at Lacedaemon 
the so-called Partheniae, who were the [illegitimate] sons of 
the Spartan peers, attempted a revolution, and, being detected, 
were sent away to colonize Tarentum. Again, revolutions 
occur when great men who are at least of equal merit are 
dishonoured by those higher in office, as Lysander was by 3 
the kings of Sparta : or, when a brave man is excluded from 
the honours of the state, like Cinadon, who conspired against 
the Spartans under Agesilaus ; or, again, when some are very 
poor and others very rich, a state of society which is most 
often the result of war, as at Lacedaemon in the days of the 
Messenian War ; this is proved from the poem of Tyrtaeus, 4 
entitled ' Good Order' ; for he speaks of certain citizens who 1307a 
were ruined by the war and wanted to have a redistribution of 
the land. Again, revolutions arise when an individual who 
is great, and might be greater, wants to rule alone, as at Lace- 
daemon, Pausanias, who was general in the Persian War, or 
like Hanno at Carthage. 

Constitutional governments and aristocracies are commonly 5 
overthrown owing to some deviation from justice in the con- 
stitution itself; the cause of the downfall is, in the former, 
the ill-mingling of the two elements democracy and oligarchy ; 
in the latter, of the three elements, democracy, oligarchy, and 
virtue, but especially democracy and oligarchy. For to com- 
bine these is the endeavour of constitutional governments ; 



io6 Revolutions in Aristocracies^ etc. 

V. 7 and most of the so-called aristocracies have a like aim 1 , but 

6 differ from polities by the addition of virtue ; hence some of 
them are more and some less permanent. Those which 
incline more to oligarchy are called aristocracies, and those 
which incline to democracy constitutional governments. And 
therefore the latter are the safer of the two ; for the greater 
the number, the greater the strength, and when men are equal 

7 they are contented. But the rich, if the government gives 
them power, are apt to be insolent and avaricious ; and, in 
general, whichever way the constitution inclines, in that direc- 
tion it changes as either party gains strength, a constitutional 
government becoming a democracy, an aristocracy, an oli- 

8 garchy. But the process may be reversed, and aristocracy 
may change into democracy. This happens when the poor, 
under the idea that they are being wronged, force the consti- 
tution to take an opposite form. In like manner constitutional 
governments change into oligarchies. The only stable prin- 
ciple of government is equality according to proportion, and 
for every man to enjoy his own. 

9 What I have just mentioned actually happened at Thurii 2 , 
where the qualification for office, though at first high, was 
reduced, and the magistrates increased in number. The 
notables had previously acquired the whole of the land 
contrary to law ; for the government tended to oligarchy, and 
they were able to encroach. But the people, who had been 
trained by war, soon got the better of the guards kept by the 
oligarchs, until those who had too much gave up their land. 

io Again, since all aristocratical governments incline to oli- 
garchy, the notables are apt to be grasping ; thus at Lacedae- 
mon, where property has passed into few hands 3 , the notables 
1 Cp. iv. c. 7. 3 Cp. c 3. § 12. 3 Cp. ii. 9. § 14. 



Involutions in Mixed Governments 207 

can do too much as they like, and are allowed to marry whom v. 7 
they please. The city of Locri was ruined by a marriage 
connexion with Dionysius, but such a thing could never have 
happened in a democracy, or in a well-balanced aristocracy. 

I have already remarked that in all states revolutions are ir 
occasioned by trifles \ In aristocracies, above all, they are of 1307 t> 
a gradual and imperceptible nature. The citizens begin by 
giving up some part of the constitution, and so with greater 
ease the government change something else which is a little 
more important, until they have undermined the whole fabric 
of the state. At Thurii there was a law that generals should 12 
only be re-elected after an interval of five years, and some 
high-spirited young men who were popular with the soldiers 
of the guard, despising the magistrates and thinking that they 
would easily gain their purpose, wanted to abolish this law and 
allow their generals to hold perpetual commands ; for they 
well knew that the people would be glad enough to elect them. 
Whereupon the magistrates who had charge of these matters, 13 
and who are called councillors, at first determined to resist, 
but they afterwards consented, thinking that, if only this one 
law was changed, no further inroad would be made on the 
constitution. But other changes soon followed which they in 
vain attempted to oppose ; and the state passed into the hands 
of the revolutionists who established a dynastic oligarchy. 

All constitutions are overthrown either from within or from 14 
without; the latter, when there is some government close at 
hand having an opposite interest, or at a distance, but powerful. 
This was exemplified in the old times of the Athenian and 
the Lacedaemonian supremacies ; the Athenians everywhere 

1 c 4. § 1. 



20 8 The Preservation of States 

V. 7 put down the oligarchies, and the Lacedaemonians the 
democracies *. 

I have now explained what are the chief causes of revolu- 
tions and dissensions in states. 
8 We have next to consider what means there are of pre- 
serving states in general, and also in particular cases. In the 
first place it is evident that if we know the causes which 
destroy states, we shall also know the causes which preserve 
them ; for opposites produce opposites, and destruction is the 
opposite of preservation 2 . 

2 In all well -attempered governments there is nothing which 
should be more jealously maintained than the spirit of 
obedience to law, more especially in small matters ; for 
transgression creeps in unperceived and at last ruins the state, 
just as the constant recurrence of small expenses in time eats 

3 up a fortune. The change does not take place all at once, 
and therefore is not observed ; the mind is deceived, as in the 
fallacy which says that ' if each part is little, then the whole 
is little.' And this is true in one way, but not in another, for 
the whole and the all are not little, although they are made up 
of littles. 

4 In the first place, then, men should guard against the 
beginning of change, and in the second place they should not 

1308 a rely upon the political devices of which I have already 
spoken 3 , invented only to deceive the people, for they are 

5 proved by experience to be useless. Further we note that 
oligarchies as well as aristocracies may last, not from any 
inherent stability in such forms of government, but because the 
rulers are on good terms both with the unenfranchised and 

1 Cp. iv. ii. § 18. 2 Cp. Nic. Eih. v. l. § 4. 

3 Cp. iv. 13. § 1. 



How to avoid Revolution 209 

with the governing classes, not maltreating any who are V. 8 
excluded from the government, but introducing into it the 
leading spirits among them l . They should never wrong the 
ambitious in a matter of honour, or the common people in 
a matter of money ; and they should treat one another and 
their fellow-citizens in a spirit of equality. The equality 6 
which the friends of democracy seek to establish for the 
multitude is not only just but likewise expedient among equals. 
Hence, if the governing class are numerous, many democratic 
institutions are useful ; for example, the restriction of the 
tenure of offices to six months, that all those who are of 
equal rank may share in them. Indeed, equals or peers when 
they are numerous become a kind of democracy, and therefore 
demagogues are very likely to arise among them, as I have 
already remarked 2 . The short tenure of office prevents oli- 7 
garchies and aristocracies from falling into the hands of 
families ; it is not easy for a person to do any great harm 
when his tenure of office is short, whereas long possession 
begets tyranny in oligarchies and democracies. For the 
aspirants to tyranny are either the principal men of the state, 
who in democracies are demagogues and in oligarchies 
members of ruling houses, or those who hold great offices, 
and have a long tenure of them 3 . 

States are preserved when their destroyers are at a distance, 8 
and sometimes also because they are near, for the fear of them 
makes the government keep in hand the state. Wherefore the 
ruler who has a care of the state should invent terrors, and 
bring distant dangers near, in order that the citizens may be on 
their guard, and, like sentinels in a night-watch, never relax 
their attention. He should endeavour too by help of the laws 9 
1 vi. 7. § 4. » Supra c. 6. § 6. 8 Cp. c. 5. § 6. 

•AVIS P 



21 o Hon? to avoid Revolution in 

V. 8 to control the contentions and quarrels of the notables, and to 
prevent those who have not hitherto taken part in them from 
being drawn in. No ordinary man can discern the beginning 
of evil \ but only the true statesman. 

10 As to the change produced in oligarchies and constitutional 
governments 2 by the alteration of the qualification, when this 
arises, not out of any variation in the census but only out of 
the increase of money, it is well to compare the general 
valuation of property with that of past years, annually in those 
cities in which the census is taken annually, and in larger 

1308 b cities every third or fifth year. If the whole is many times 
greater or many times less than when the rates were fixed at 
the previous census, there should be power given by law to 
raise or lower the qualification as the amount is greater or less. 

11 Where in the absence of any such provision the standard is 
raised, a constitutional government passes into an oligarchy, 
and an oligarchy is narrowed to a rule of families ; where 
the standard is lowered, constitutional government becomes 
democracy, and oligarchy either constitutional government or 
democracy. 

12 It is a principle common to democracy, oligarchy 3 , and 
every other form of government not to allow the dispropor- 
tionate increase of any citizen, but to give moderate honour for 
a long time rather than great honour for a short time. For 
men are easily spoilt ; not every one can bear prosperity. But 
if this rule is not observed, at any rate the honours which are 
given all at once should be taken away by degrees and not all 
at once. Especially should the laws provide against any one 

1 Cp. c. 4. §§ 1-3. a Cp. c. 3. § 8; c. 6. §§ 16-18. 

:i Or, adding teal fxovapx'i^t f monarchy/ with many MSS. and 
Bekker's first edition. 



Oligarchy and Democracy 



21 I 



having too much power, whether derived from friends or V. 8 
money ; if he has, he and his followers should be sent out of 
the country 1 . And since innovations creep in through the 13 
private life of individuals, there ought to be a magistracy which 
will have an eye to those whose life is not in harmony with 
the government, whether oligarchy or democracy or any other. 
And for a like reason an increase of prosperity in any part of 
the state should be carefully watched. The proper remedy 14 
for this evil is always to give the management of affairs and 
offices of state to opposite elements ; such opposites are the 
virtuous and the many, or the rich and the poor. Another 
way is to combine the poor and the rich in one body, or to 
increase the middle class : thus an end will be put to the 
revolutions which arise from inequality. 

But above all every state should be so administered and so 15 
regulated by law that its magistrates cannot possibly make 
money 2 . In oligarchies special precautions should be used 
against this evil. For the people do not take any great 16 
offence at being kept out of the government — indeed they are 
rather pleased than otherwise at having leisure for their private 
business — but what irritates them is to think that their rulers 
are stealing the public money ; then they are doubly annoyed ; 
for they lose both honour and profit. If office brought no 17 
profit, then and then only could democracy and aristocracy be 
combined ; for both notables and people might have their 1309 a 
wishes gratified. All would be able to hold office, which is 
the aim of democracy, and the notables would be magistrates, 
which is the aim of aristocracy. And this result may be 18 
accomplished when there is no possibility of making money 

1 Cp. c. 3. § 3; iii. 13. § 15. 3 Cp. c. 12. § 14. 

P 2 



212 



Oligarchy and Democracy V re served 



V. 8 out of the offices ; for the poor will not want to have them 
when there is nothing to be gained from them — they would 
rather be attending to their own concerns ; and the rich, who 
do not want money from the public treasury, will be able to 
take them ; and so the poor will keep to their work and grow 
rich, and the notables will not be governed by the lower class. 

19 In order to avoid peculation of the public money, the transfer 
of the revenue should be made at a general assembly of the 
citizens, and duplicates of the accounts deposited with the 
different brotherhoods, companies, and tribes. And honours 
should be given by law to magistrates who have the reputation 

20 of being incorruptible. In democracies the rich should be 
spared; not only should their property not be divided, but 
their incomes also, which in some states are taken from them 
imperceptibly, should be protected. It is a good thing to 
prevent the wealthy citizens, even if they are willing, from 
undertaking expensive and useless public services, such as the 
giving of choruses, torch-races, and the like. In an oligarchy, 
on the other hand, great care should be taken of the poor, and 
lucrative offices should go to them ; if any of the wealthy 
classes insult them, the offender should be punished more 
severely 1 than one of their own class for a like offence 1 . 
Provision should be made that estates pass by inheritance and 
not by gift, and no person should have more than one inheri- 
tance ; for in this way properties will be equalized, and more 

2i of the poor rise to competency. It is also expedient both in 
a democracy and in an oligarchy to assign to those who have 
less share in the government (for example, to the rich in 
a democracy and to the poor in an oligarchy) an equality or 
preference in all but the principal offices of state. The latter 
1 Or, ' than if he had wronged one of his own class. 5 



by Loyalty and 'Moderation 213 

should be entrusted chiefly or only to members of the govern- V. 8 
ing class. 

There are three qualifications required in those who have 
to fill the highest offices — (1) first of all, loyalty to the 9 
established constitution ; (2) the greatest administrative 
capacity ; (3) virtue and justice of the kind proper to each 
form of government ; for, if what is just is not the same in all 
governments, the quality of justice must also differ. There 
may be a doubt however, when all these qualities do not meet a 
in the same person, how the selection is to be made ; suppose, 
for example, a good general is a bad man and not a friend to 1309 b 
the constitution, and another man is loyal and just, which 
should we choose? In making the election ought we not 
to consider two points ? what qualities are common, and what 
are rare. Thus in the choice of a general, we should regard 
his skill rather than his virtue ; for few have military skill, 3 
but many have virtue. In keeping watch or in any office of 
stewardship, on the other hand, the opposite rule should be 
observed; for more virtue than ordinary is required in the 
holder of such an office, but the necessary knowledge is of 
a sort which all men possess. 

It may, however, be asked what a man wants with virtue if 4 
he have political ability and is loyal, since these two qualities 
alone will make him do what is for the public interest. But 
may not men have both of them and yet be deficient in self- 
control ? If, knowing and loving their own interests, they do 
not always attend to them, may they not be equally negligent 
of the interests of the public ? 

Speaking generally, we may say that whatever legal enact- 5 
ments are held to be for the interest of states, all these preserve 
states. And the great preserving principle is the one which 



214 Preservatives of 

V. 9 has been repeatedly mentioned ] — to have a care that the loyal 

6 citizens should outnumber the disloyal. Neither should we 
forget the mean, which at the present day is lost sight of in 
perverted forms of government : for many practices which 
appear to be democratical are the ruin of democracies, and 
many which appear to be oligarchical are the ruin of oligarchies. 

7 Those who think that all virtue is to be found in their own 
party principles push matters to extremes ; they do not con- 
sider that disproportion destroys a state. A nose which varies 
from the ideal of straightness to a hook or snub may still be 
of good shape and agreeable to the eye ; but if the excess be 
very great, all symmetry is lost, and the nose at last ceases to 
be a nose at all on account of some excess in one direction or 
defect in the other ; and this is true of every other part of the 

8 human body. The same law of proportion equally holds in 
states. Oligarchy or democracy, although a departure from 
the most perfect form, may yet be a good enough government, 
but if any one attempts to push the principles of either to an 
extreme, he will begin by spoiling the government and end by 

9 having none at all. Wherefore the legislator and the states- 
man ought to know what democratical measures save and 
what destroy a democracy, and what oligarchical measures save 
or destroy an oligarchy. For neither the one nor the other 
can exist or continue to exist unless both rich and poor are 
included in it. If equality of property is introduced, the state 

1310 a must of necessity take another form ; for when by laws carried 
to excess one or other element in the state is ruined, the con- 
stitution is ruined, 
io There is an error common both to oligarchies and to 
democracies: — in the latter the demagogues, when the multi- 
1 Cp. 5v. 12. § i ; vi. 6. § 2. 



Oligarchy and Democracy 215* 

:ude are above the law, are always cutting the city in two by V. 9 
quarrels with the rich, whereas they should always profess to 
be maintaining their cause ; just as in oligarchies, the oligarchs 
should profess to maintain the cause of the people, and should 
take oaths the opposite of those which they now take. For 1 1 
there are cities in which they swear — 4 1 will be an enemy to 
the people, and will devise all the harm against them which 
I can ; ' but they ought to exhibit and to entertain the very 
opposite feeling ; in the form of their oath there should be an 
express declaration — ' I will do no wrong to the people.' 

But of all the things which I have mentioned, that which 
most contributes to the permanence of constitutions is the 
adaptation of education to the form of government l , and yet 
in our own day this principle is universally neglected. The 12 
best laws, though sanctioned by every citizen of the state, 
will be of no avail unless the young are trained by habit and 
education in the spirit of the constitution, if the laws are 
democratical, democratically, or oligarchically if the laws are 
oligarchical. For there may be a want of self-discipline in 
states as well as in individuals. Now, to have been educated 13 
in the spirit of the constitution is not to perform the actions in 
which oligarchs or democrats delight, but those by which the 
existence of an oligarchy or of a democracy is made possible. 
Whereas among ourselves the sons of the ruling class in an 
oligarchy live in luxury 2 , but the sons of the poor are hardened 
by exercise and toil, and hence they are both more inclined 
and better able to make a revolution 3 . And in democracies 14 
of the more extreme type there has arisen a false idea of 
freedom which is contradictory to the true interests of the 

1 Cp. i. 13. § 15. a Cp. iv. 11. § 6. 

3 Cp. PI. Rep. viii. 556 d. 



2 1 6 Origin of Tyranny 

V. 9 state. For two principles are characteristic of democracy, the 
15 government of the majority and freedom. Men think that 
what is just is equal ; and that equality is the supremacy of 
the popular will ; and that freedom and equality mean the 
doing what a man likes. In such democracies every one lives 
as he pleases, or in the words of Euripides, * according to his 
fancy.' But this is all wrong ; men should not think it 
slavery to live according to the rule of the constitution ; for it 
is their salvation. 

I have now discussed generally the causes of the revolution 

and destruction of states, and the means of their preservation 

and continuance. 

10 I have still to speak of monarchy, and the causes of its 

destruction and preservation. What I have said already 

1310 b respecting other forms of government applies almost equally 

2 to royal and to tyrannical rule. For royal rule is of the 
nature of an aristocracy, and a tyranny is a compound of 
oligarchy and democracy in their most extreme forms ; it is 
therefore most injurious to its subjects, being made up of two 
evil forms of government, and having the perversions and 

3 errors of both. These two forms of monarchy differ in their 
very origin. The appointment of a king is the resource of 
the better classes against the people, and he is elected by 
them out of their own number, because either he himself or 
his family excel in virtue and virtuous actions ; whereas a 
tyrant is chosen from the people to be their protector against 
the notables, and in order to prevent them from being injured. 

4 History shows that almost all tyrants have been demagogues 
who gained the favour of the people by their accusation of the 

5 notables 1 . At any rate this was the manner in which the 

1 Cp. c. 5. § 6 ; Plato, Rep. =,65 d. 



Origin of Tyranny 217 

tyrannies arose in the days when cities had increased in power. V. 10 
Others which were older originated in the ambition of kings 
wanting to overstep the limits of their hereditary power and 
become despots. Others again grew out of the class which 
were chosen to be chief magistrates ; for in ancient times the 
people who elected them gave the magistrates, whether civil or 
religious, a long tenure. Others arose out of the custom 
which oligarchies had of making some individual supreme over 
the highest offices. In any of these 1 ways an ambitious man 6 
had no difficulty, if he desired, in creating a tyranny, since he 
had the power in his hands already, either as king or as one of 
the officers of state 2 . Thus Pheidon at Argos and several 
others were originally kings, and ended by becoming tyrants ; 
Phalaris, on the other hand, and the Ionian tyrants, acquired 
the tyranny by holding great offices. Whereas Panaetius at 
Leontini, Cypselus at Corinth, Peisistratus at Athens, Diony- 
sius at Syracuse, and several others who afterwards became 
tyrants, were at first demagogues. 

And so, as I was saying, royalty ranks with aristocracy, for 7 
it is based upon merit, whether of the individual or of his 
family, or on benefits conferred 3 , or on these claims with 
power added to them. For all who have obtained this honour 8 
have benefited, or had in their power to benefit, states and 
nations ; some, like Codrus, have prevented the state from 
being enslaved in war; others, like Cyrus, have given their 
country freedom, or have settled or gained a territory, like the 
Lacedaemonian, Macedonian, and Molossian kings 4 . The 9 
idea of a king is to be a protector of the rich against unjust 1311 a 

1 Retaining tovtois* which is omitted in Bekker's second edition, 
apparently by mistake. 

2 Cp. c. 5. § 8. 3 Cp. iii. 14. § 12. 4 Cp. c. 11. § 2. 



21 



8 Tyranny, Oligarchy, Democracy 



V. 10 treatment, of the people against insult and oppression. Whereas 
a tyrant, as has often been repeated, has no regard to any 
public interest, but only to his private ends ; his aim is plea- 
io sure, the aim of a king, honour. Wherefore also in their 
desires they differ ; the tyrant is desirous of riches, the king, 
of what brings honour. And the guards of a king are citizens, 
but of a tyrant mercenaries '. 
ti That tyranny has all the vices both of democracy and 
oligarchy is evident. As of oligarchy so of tyranny, the end 
is wealth ; (for by wealth only can the tyrant maintain either 
his guard or his luxury). Both mistrust the people, and 
therefore deprive them of their arms. Both agree too in 
injuring the people and driving them out of the city and 

12 dispersing them. From democracy tyrants have borrowed the 
art of making war upon the notables and destroying them 
secretly or openly, or of exiling them because they are rivals 
and stand in the way of their power ; and also because plots 
against them are contrived by men of this class, who either 

13 want to rule or escape subjection. Hence Periander advised 
Thrasybulus 2 to cut off the tops of the tallest ears of corn, 
meaning that he must always put out of the way the citizens 
who overtop the rest. And so, as I have already intimated, 
the beginnings of change are the same in monarchies as in 
other forms of government ; subjects attack their sovereigns 
out of fear or contempt, or because they have been unjustly 
treated by them. And of injustice, the most common form 
is insult, another is confiscation of property. 

x 4 The ends sought by conspiracies against monarchies, 
whether tyrannies or royalties, are the same as the ends 
sought by conspiracies against other forms of government. 
1 Cp. iii. 14. § 7. 2 Cp. iii. 13. § 16. 



The Overthrow of Monarchies 219 

Monarchs have great wealth and honour which are objects of V. 10 
desire to all mankind. The attacks are made sometimes 
against their lives, sometimes against the office ; where the 
sense of insult is the motive, against their lives. Any sort of 15 
insult (and there are many) may stir up anger, and when men 
are angry, they commonly act out of revenge, and not from 
ambition. For example, the attempt made upon the Peisis- 
tratidae arose out of the public dishonour offered to the sister 
of Harmodius and the insult to himself. He attacked the 
tyrant for his sister's sake, and Aristogeiton joined in the 
attack for the sake of Harmodius. A conspiracy was also 16 
formed against Periander, the tyrant of Ambracia, because, 
when drinking with a favourite youth, he asked him whether 1311 b 
by this time he was not with child by him. Philip, too, was 
attacked by Pausanias because he permitted him to be insulted 
by Attalus and his friends, and Amyntas the little, by Derdas, 
because he boasted of having enjoyed his youth. Evagoras of 
Cyprus, again, was slain by the eunuch to revenge an insult ; 
for his wife had been carried off by Evagoras' son. Many 17 
conspiracies have originated in shameful attempts made by 
sovereigns on the persons of their subjects. Such was the 
attack of Crataeus upon Archelaus ; he had always hated the 
connexion with him, and so, when Archelaus, having promised 
him one of his two daughters in marriage, did not give him 
either of them, but broke his word and married the elder to 
the king of Elymaea, when he was hard pressed in a war 
against Sirrhas and Arrhibaeus, and the younger to his own 
son Amyntas, under the idea that he would then be less likely 
to quarrel with the son of Cleopatra — Crataeus made this 
slight a pretext for attacking Archelaus, though even a less 
reason would have sufficed, for the real cause of the estrange- 



220 The Overthrow of Monarchies 

V. 10 merit was the disgust which he felt at his connexion with the 

1 8 king. And from a like motive Hellanocrates of Larissa con- 
spired with him ; for when Archelaus, who was his lover, did 
not fulfil his promise of restoring him to his country, he 
thought that the connexion between them had originated, not 
in affection, but in the wantonness of power. Parrhon, too, 
and Heracleides of Aenos, slew Cotys in order to avenge 
their father, and Adamas revolted from Cotys in revenge for 
the wanton outrage which he had committed in mutilating him 
when a child. 

19 1 Many, too, irritated at blows inflicted on the person which 
they deemed an insult, have either killed or attempted to kill 
officers of state and royal princes by whom they have been 
injured l . Thus, at Mitylene, Megacles and his friends 
attacked and slew the Penthalidae, as they were going about 
and striking people with clubs. At a later date Smerdis, who 
had been beaten and torn away from his wife by Penthilus, 

20 slew him. In the conspiracy against Archelaus, Decamnichus 
stimulated the fury of the assassins and led the attack ; he was 
enraged because Archelaus had delivered him to Euripides to 
be scourged ; for the poet had been irritated at some remark 
made by Decamnichus on the foulness of his breath. Many 
other examples might be cited of murders and conspiracies 
which have arisen from similar causes. 

21^ Fear is another motive which has caused conspiracies as 
well in monarchies as in more popular forms of government. 
Thus Artapanes conspired against Xerxes and slew him, 
fearing that he would be accused of hanging Darius against 
his orders — he being under the impression that Xerxes would 

1 Or : ' Many persons too, even of those connected with the govern- 
ment or the royal family,' taking rwv irepi, etc. with the subject. 



caused by Insult, Fear, Contempt 221 

forget what he had said in the middle of a meal, and that the V. 10 
offence would be forgiven. 

Another motive is contempt, as in the case of Sardanapulus, 22 - ' 
whom some one saw carding wool with his women, if the 
story-tellers say truly ; and the tale may be true, if not of him, 
of some one else \ Dion attacked the younger Dionysius 23 
because he despised him, and saw that he was equally despised 
by his own subjects, and that he was always drunk. Even 
the friends of a tyrant will sometimes attack him out of con- 
tempt ; for the confidence which he reposes in them breeds 
contempt, and they think that they will not be found out. 
The expectation of success is likewise a sort of contempt ; 24 
the assailants are ready to strike, and think nothing of the 
danger, because they seem to have the power in their hands. 
Thus generals of armies attack monarchs ; as, for example, 
Cyrus attacked Astyages, despising the effeminacy of his life, 
and believing that his power was worn out. Thus, again, 
Seuthes the Thracian conspired against Amadocus, whose 
general he was. 

And sometimes men are actuated by more than one motive, 25 
like Mithridates, who conspired against Ariobarzanes, partly 
out of contempt and partly from the love of gain. 

Bold natures, placed by their sovereigns in a high military 
position, are most likely to make the attempt in the expecta- 
tion of success ; for courage is emboldened by power, and the 
union of the two inspires them with the hope of an easy 
victory. 

Attempts of which the motive is ambition arise from other 
causes. There are men who will not risk their lives in the 26 
hope of gains and rewards however great, but who nevertheless 
1 Cp. i. 11. § 8. 



222 



Overthrow of Monarchies 



V. 10 regard the killing of a tyrant simply as an extraordinary action 
which will make them famous and honourable in the world; 

2 7 they wish to acquire, not a kingdom, but a name. It is rare, 
however, to find such men ; he who would kill a tyrant must 

28 be prepared to lose his life if he fail. He must have the 
resolution of Dion, who, when he made war upon Dionysius, 
took with him very few troops, saying, i that whatever measure 
of success he might attain would be enough for him, even if 
he were to die the moment he landed ; such a death would be 
welcome to him.' But this is a temper to which few can 
attain. 

29 Once more, tyrannies, like all other governments, are 
1312 b destroyed from without by some opposite and more powerful 

form of government. That such a government will have the 
will to attack them is clear \ for the two are opposed in 

30 principle ; and all men, if they can, do what they will. 
Democracy is also antagonistic to tyranny, on the principle of 
Hesiod, 'Potter hates Potter,' because they are nearly akin, 
for the extreme form of democracy is tyranny ; and royalty 
and aristocracy are both alike opposed to tyranny, because 
they are constitutions of a different type. And therefore the 
Lacedaemonians put down most of the tyrannies, and so 
did the Syracusans during the time when they were well 
governed. 

31 Again, tyrannies are destroyed from within, when the 
reigning family are divided among themselves, as that of 
Gelo was, and more recently that of Dionysius ; in the case of 
Gelo because Thrasybulus, the brother of Hiero, flattered the 
son of Gelo and led him into excesses in order that he might 
rule in his name. Whereupon the family conspired to get rid 
of Thrasybulus and save the tyranny ; but the party who con- 



Especially of Tyramiies 223 

spired * with them seized the opportunity and drove them all V. 10 
out. In the case of Dionysius, Dion, his own relative, 32 
attacked and expelled him with the assistance of the people ; 
he afterwards perished himself. 

There are two chief motives which induce men to attack 
tyrannies — hatred and contempt. Hatred of tyrants is 
inevitable, and contempt is also a frequent cause of their 
destruction. Thus we see that most of those who have 33 
acquired, have retained their power, but those who have 
inherited 2 , have lost it, almost at once ; for living in luxurious 
ease, they have become contemptible, and offer many oppor- 
tunities to their assailants. Anger, too, must be included 
under hatred, and produces the same effects. It is oftentimes 34 
even more ready to strike — the angry are more impetuous in 
making an attack, for they do not listen to reason. And men 
are very apt to give way to their passions when they are 
insulted. To this cause is to be attributed the fall of the 
Peiststratidae and of many others. Hatred is more reasonable, 35 
but anger is accompanied by pain, which is an impediment to 
reason, whereas hatred is painless 8 . 

In a word, all the causes which I have mentioned as 
destroying the last and most unmixed form of oligarchy, and 
the extreme form of democracy, may be assumed to affect 
tyranny ; indeed the extreme forms of both are only tyrannies 
distributed among several persons. Kingly rule is little 36 
affected by external causes, and is, therefore, lasting ; it is 
generally destroyed from within. And there are two ways 
in which the destruction may come about; (1) when the 1313 a 

1 Omitting tear inserted by Bekker in 2nd ed. 
3 Cp. Plato, Laws, iii. 695. 
3 Cp. Rhetoric, ii. 4. § 31. 



224 Overthrow of Monarchies 

V. 10 members of the royal family quarrel among themselves, and 
(2) when the kings attempt to administer the state too much 

37 after the fashion of a tyranny, and to extend their authority 
contrary to the law. There are now no royalties ; monarchies, 
where they exist, are * tyrannies. For the rule of a king is 
over voluntary subjects, and he is supreme in all important 
matters ; but in our own day men are more upon an equality, 
and no one is so immeasurably superior to others as to repre- 
sent adequately the greatness and dignity of the office. Hence 
mankind will not, if they can help, endure it, and any one who 
obtains power by force or fraud is at once thought to be 

38 a tyrant. In hereditary monarchies a further cause of destruc- 
tion is the fact that kings often fall into contempt, and, 
although possessing not tyrannical but only royal power, are 
apt to outrage others. Their overthrow is then readily 
effected ; for there is an end to the king when his subjects 
do not want to have him, but the tyrant lasts, whether they 
like him or not. 

The destruction of monarchies is to be attributed to these 
and the like causes. 
11 And they are preserved, to speak generally, by the opposite 
causes; or, if we consider them separately, (1) royalty is 
preserved by the limitation of its powers. The more re- 
stricted the functions of kings, the longer their power will last 
unimpaired ; for then they are more moderate and not so 
despotic in their ways; and they are less envied by their 
2 subjects. This is the reason why the kingly office has lasted 
so long among the Molossians. And for a similar reason it 
has continued among the Lacedaemonians, because there it 
was always divided between two, and afterwards further 
1 Omitting nai with Bekker's 2nd ed. 



Preservation of Monarchies zz$ 

limited by Theopompus in various respects, more particularly V". 11 
by the establishment of the Ephoralty. He diminished the 
power of the kings, but established on a more lasting basis 
the kingly office, which was thus made in a certain sense not 
less, but greater. There is a story that when his wife once 3 
asked him whether he was not ashamed to leave to his sons 
a royal power which was less than he had inherited from his 
father, he replied, ' No indeed, for the power which I leave 
to them will be more lasting.' 

As to (2) tyrannies, they are preserved in two most 4 
opposite ways. One of them is the old traditional method in 
which most tyrants administer their government. Of such 
arts Periander of Corinth is said to have been the great 
master, and many similar devices may be gathered from the 
Persians in the administration of their government. There 5 
are also the ancient prescriptions for the preservation of 
a tyranny, in so far as this is possible ; viz. that the tyrant 
should lop off those who are too high ; he must put to death 
men of spirit : he must not allow common meals, clubs, 
education, and the like ; he must be upon his guard against 1313 b 
anything which is likely to inspire either courage or confidence 
among his subjects ; he must prohibit literary assemblies or 
other meetings for discussion, and he must take every means 
to prevent people from knowing one another (for acquaintance 
begets mutual confidence). Further, he must compel the 6 
inhabitants to appear in public and live 1 at his gates 1 ; then 
he will know what they are doing ; if they are always kept 
under, they will learn to be humble. In short, he should 
practise these and the like Persian and barbaric arts which all 
have the same object. A tyrant should also endeavour to 7 

1 Or, ' at their doors.' 
pavis Q 



2 26 The Devices of Tyranny 

V. 11 know what each of his subjects says or does, and should 
employ spies, like the < female detectives ' at Syracuse, and 
the eavesdroppers whom Hiero was in the habit of sending to 
any place of resort or meeting ; for the fear of informers 
prevents people from speaking their minds, and if they do, 

8 they are more easily found out. Another art of the tyrant is 
to sow quarrels among the citizens ; friends should be 
embroiled with friends, the people with the notables, and the 
rich with one another. Also he should impoverish his 
subjects ; he thus provides money for the support of his 
guards \ and the people, having to keep hard at work, are 

9 prevented from conspiring. The Pyramids of Egypt afford 
an example of this policy ; also the offerings of the family of 
Cypselus, and the building of the temple of Olympian Zeus 
by the Peisistratidae, and the great Polycratean monuments at 
Samos ; all these works were alike intended to occupy the 

io people and keep them poor. Another practice of tyrants is 
to multiply taxes, after the manner of Dionysius at Syracuse, 
who contrived that within five years his subjects should bring 
into the treasury their whole property. The tyrant is also 
fond of making war in order that his subjects may have some- 
thing to do and be always in want of a leader. And whereas 
the power of a king is preserved by his friends, the character- 
istic of a tyrant is to distrust his friends, because he knows 
that all men want to overthrow him, and they above all have 
the power 2 . 

1 Reading 77 t* with Bekker's 2nd ed. 

3 This, which is probably the meaning of the passage, cannot be 
elicited from the text as it stands. The addition is required of some 
such phrase as clvtov Ka$e\e?v, which is not wholly without manuscript 
authority. 



The Ways of Tyranny and of Tyrants 227 

Again, the evil practices of the last and worst forms of V. 11 
democracy are all found in tyrannies. Such are the power ir 
given to women in their families in the hope that they will 
inform against their husbands, and the licence which is allowed 
to slaves in order that they may betray their masters ; for 
slaves and women do not conspire against tyrants ; and they 
are of course friendly to tyrannies and also to democracies, 
since under them they have a good time. For the people too 
would fain be a monarch, and therefore by them, as well as by 12 
the tyrant, the flatterer is held in honour ; in democracies he 
is the demagogue ; and the tyrant also has his humble com- 
panions who flatter him. 131*1 a 

Hence tyrants are always fond of bad men, because they 
love to be flattered, but no man who has the spirit of a free- 
man in him will demean himself by flattery ; good men love 
others, but they do not flatter anybody. Moreover the bad 13 
are useful for bad purposes ; ' nail knocks out nail,' as the 
proverb says. It is characteristic of a tyrant to dislike every 
one who has dignity or independence ; he wants to be alone in 
his glory, but any one who claims a like dignity or asserts his 
independence encroaches upon his prerogative, and is hated by 
him as an enemy to his power. Another mark of a tyrant is 14 
that he likes foreigners better than citizens, and lives with 
them and invites them to his table ; for the one are enemies, 
but the others enter into no rivalry with him. 

Such are the notes of the tyrant and the arts by which he 
preserves his power ; there is no wickedness too great for him. 
All that we have said may be summed up under three heads, 
which answer to the three aims of the tyrant. These are, 15 
(1) the humiliation of his subjects; he knows that a mean- 
spirited man will not conspire against anybody: (2) the crea- 
Q 2 



22 



8 Preservation of Tyranny 



V. 11 tion of mistrust among them ; for a tyrant is not overthrown 
until men begin to have confidence in one another ; and this 
is the reason why tyrants are at war with the good ; they are 
under the idea that their power is endangered by them, not 
only because they will not be ruled despotically, but also 
because they are loyal to one another, and to other men, and 
do not inform against one another or against other men : 

16 (3) the tyrant desires that his subjects shall be incapable of 
action, for no one attempts what is impossible, and they will 
not attempt to overthrow a tyranny, if they are powerless. 
Under these three heads the whole policy of a tyrant may be 
summed up, and to one or other of them all his ideas may be 
referred: (1) he sows distrust among his subjects; (2) he 
takes away their power ; (3) he humbles them. 

17 This then is one of the two methods by which tyrannies 
are preserved ; and there is another which proceeds upon 

iS a different principle of action. The nature of this latter 
method may be gathered from a comparison of the causes 
which destroy kingdoms, for as one mode of destroying 
kingly power is to make the office of king more tyrannical, so 
the salvation of a tyranny is to make it more like the rule of 
a king. But of one thing the tyrant must be careful ; he 
must keep power enough to rule over his subjects, whether 
they like him or not, for if he once gives this up he gives up 

19 his tyranny. But though power must be retained as the 
foundation, in all else the tyrant should act or appear to act in 
1314 b the character of a king. In the first place he should pretend 
a care of the public revenues, and not waste money in making 
presents of a sort at which the common people get excited 
when they see their miserable earnings taken from them and 
lavished on courtesans and strangers and artists. He should 



The Beneficent Despot 229 

give an account of what he receives and of what he spends V. 11 
(a practice which has been adopted by some tyrants) ; for 
then he will seem to be the manager of a household rather 
than a tyrant ; nor need he fear that, while he is the lord of 20 
the city, he will ever be in want of money. Such a policy is 
much more advantageous for the tyrant when he goes from 
home, than to leave behind him a hoard, for then the garrison 
who remain in the city will be less likely to attack his power ; 
and a tyrant, when he is absent from home, has more reason 
to fear the guardians of his treasure than the citizens, for the 
one accompany him, but the others remain behind. In the 21 
second place, he should appear to collect taxes and to require 
public services only for state purposes ; and that he may form 
a fund in case of war, he ought to make himself the guardian 
and treasurer of them, as if they belonged, not to him, but to 
the public. He should appear, not harsh, but dignified, and 
when men meet him they should look upon him with reverence, 
and not with fear. Yet it is hard for him to be respected if 22 
he inspires no respect, and therefore whatever virtues he may 
neglect, at least he should maintain the character of a states- 
man, and produce the impression that he is one. Neither he 
nor any of his associates should ever be guilty of the least 
offence against modesty towards the young of either sex who 
are his subjects, and the women of his family should observe 23 
a like self-control towards other women ; the insolence of 
women has ruined many tyrannies. In the indulgence of 
pleasures he should be the opposite of our modern tyrants, 
who not only begin at dawn and pass whole days in sensuality, 
but want other men to see them, that they may admire their 
happy and blessed lot. In these things a tyrant should be 24 
especially moderate, or at any rate should not parade his vices 



230 Preservation of Tyranny 

V. 11 to the world ; for a drunken and drowsy tyrant is soon 
despised and attacked ; not so he who is temperate and wide 
awake. His conduct should be the very reverse of nearly 
everything which has been said before about tyrants. He 
ought to adorn and improve his city, as though he were not 

25 a tyrant, but the guardian of the state. Also he should 
1315 a appear to be particularly earnest in the service of the Gods ; 

for if men think that a ruler is religious and has a reverence 
for the Gods, they are less afraid of suffering injustice at his 
hands, and they are less disposed to conspire against him, 
because they believe him to have the very Gods fighting on 

26 his side. At the same time his religion must not be thought 
foolish. And he should honour men of merit, and make 
them think that they would not be held in more honour by 
the citizens if they had a free government. The honour he 
should distribute himself, but the punishment should be in- 

27 flicted by officers and courts of law. It is a precaution which 
is taken by all monarchs not to make one person great ; but if 
one, then two or more should be raised, that they may look 
sharply after one another. If after all some one has to be 
made great, he should not be a man of bold spirit ; for such 
dispositions are ever most inclined to strike. And if any one 
is to be deprived of his power, let it be diminished gradually, 

28 not taken from him all at once 1 . The tyrant should abstain 
from all outrage; in particular from personal violence and 
from wanton conduct towards the young. He should be 
especially careful of his behaviour to men who are lovers of 
honour ; for as the lovers of money are offended when their 
property is touched, so are the lovers of honour and the 

29 virtuous when their honour is affected. Therefore a tyrant 

1 Cp. c. 8. § 13. 



The Beneficent Despot 231 

ought either not to use force at all, or he should be thought V. 11 
only to employ fatherly correction, and not to trample upon 
others ; and his acquaintance with youth should be supposed 
to arise from affection, and not from the insolence of power, 
and in general he should compensate the appearance of dis- 
honour by the increase of honour. 

Of those who attempt assassination they are the most 30 
dangerous, and require to be most carefully watched who do 
not care to survive, if they effect their purpose. Therefore 31 
special precaution should be taken about any who think that 
either they or their relatives have been insulted; for when 
men are led away by passion to assault others they are regard- 
less of themselves. As Heracleitus says, ' It is difficult to 
fight against anger ; for a man will buy revenge with life V 

And whereas states consist of two classes, of poor men 32 
and of rich, the tyrant should lead both to imagine that they 
are preserved and prevented from harming one another by his 
rule, and whichever of the two is stronger he should attach 
to his government; for, having this advantage, he has no 
need either to emancipate slaves or to disarm the citizens; 
either party added to the force which he already has, will 
make him stronger than his assailants. 

But enough of these details ; — what should be the general 33 
policy of the tyrant is obvious. He ought to show himself to 
his subjects in the light, not of a tyrant, but of the master of 
a household and of a king. He should not appropriate what 1315 b 
is theirs, but should be their guardian ; he should be moderate, 
not extravagant in his way of life ; he should be the com- 
panion of the notables, and the hero of the multitude. For 34 
then his rule will of necessity be nobler and happier, because 
1 Fragm. 69 (ed. Mullach). 



232 Short Duration of Tyrannies 

, 11 he will rule over better men * whose spirits are not crushed, 
over men to whom he himself is not an object of hatred, and 
of whom he is not afraid. His power too will be more 
lasting. Let his disposition be virtuous, or at least half 
virtuous ; and if he must be wicked, let him be half wicked 
only. 
12 Yet no forms of government are so short-lived as oligarchy 
and tyranny. The tyranny which lasted longest was that of 
Orthagoras and his sons at Sicyon ; this continued for a hun- 
dred years. The reason was that they treated their subjects 
with moderation, and to a great extent observed the laws ; 
and in various ways gained the favour of the people by the 
care which they took of them. Cleisthenes, in particular, 

2 was respected for his military ability. If report may be 
believed, he crowned the judge who decided against him in 
the games ; and, as some say, the sitting statue in the Agora 
of Sicyon is the likeness of this person. A similar story is 
told of Peisistratus, who is said on one occasion to have 
allowed himself to be summoned and tried before the Areo- 
pagus. 

3 Next in duration to the tyranny of Orthagoras was that of 
the Cypselidae at Corinth, which lasted seventy-three years 
and six months : Cypselus reigned thirty years, Periander 
forty-four, and Psammetichus the son of Gordius three. 

4 Their continuance was due to similar causes : Cypselus was 
a popular man, who during the whole time of his rule never 
had a body-guard ; and Periander, although he was a tyrant, 

5 was a great soldier. Third in duration was the rule of the 
Peisistratidae at Athens, but it was interrupted ; for Peisis- 
tratus was twice driven out, so that during three-and-thirty 

1 C P . i. 5. § 2. 



Criticism of Plato 233 

years he reigned only seventeen ; and his sons reigned V. 12 
eighteen — altogether thirty-five years. Of other tyrannies, 
that of Hiero and Gelo at Syracuse was the most lasting. 
Even this, however, was short, not more than eighteen years 6 
in all ; for Gelo continued tyrant for seven years, and died in 
the eighth ; Hiero reigned for ten years, and Thrasybulus 
was driven out in the eleventh month. In fact, tyrannies 
generally have been of quite short duration. 

I have now gone through all the causes by which consti- 7 
tutional governments and monarchies are either destroyed or 1316 a 
preserved. 

In the Republic of Plato \ Socrates treats of revolutions, 
but not well, for he mentions no cause of change which 
peculiarly affects the first or perfect state. He only says 8 
that nothing is abiding, but that all things change in a certain 
cycle ; and that the origin of the change is a base of numbers 
which are in the ratio of four to three, and this when com- 
bined with a figure of five gives two harmonies — (he means 
when the number of this figure becomes solid) ; he conceives 
that nature will then produce bad men who will not submit 
to education ; in which latter particular he may very likely 
be not far wrong, for there may well be some men who 
cannot be educated and made virtuous. But why is such 9 
a cause of change peculiar to his ideal state, and not rather 
common to all states, nay to everything which comes into 
being at all ? 2 Or how is the state specially changed by 
the agency of time, which, as he declares, makes all things 
change ? And things which did not begin together, change 
together 2 , for example, if something has come into being the 

1 Rep. viii, 546. 

2 Placing a note of interrogation after fJitTa&aWeiv. Or : ( And 



234 Criticism of Plato 

V. 12 day before the completion of the cycle, it will change with it. 
Further, why should the perfect state change into the Spartan ? 

10 for governments more often take an opposite form than 
one akin to them. The same remark is applicable to the 
other changes ; he says that the Spartan constitution changes 
into an oligarchy, and this into a democracy, and this again 

n into a tyranny. And yet the contrary happens quite as often ; 
for a democracy is even more likely to change into an oligarchy 
than into a monarchy. Further, he never says whether 
tyranny is, or is not, liable to revolutions, and if it is, what 
is the cause of them, or into what form it changes. And 
the reason is, that he could not very well have told : for there 
is no rule ; according to him it should revert to the first and 

12 best, and then there would be a complete cycle. But in point 
of fact a tyranny often changes into a tyranny, as that at 
Sicyon changed from the tyranny of Myron into that of 
Cleisthenes ; into oligarchy, as the tyranny of Antileon did at 
Chalcis ; into democracy, as that of Gelo did at Syracuse ; 
into aristocracy, as at Carthage, and the tyranny of Charilaus 

13 at Lacedaemon. Often an oligarchy changes into a tyranny, 
like most of the ancient oligarchies in Sicily; for example, 
the oligarchy at Leontini changed into the tyranny of Panae- 
tius ; that at Gela into the tyranny of Cleander ; that at 
Rhegium into the tyranny of Anaxilaus ; the same thing has 

14 happened in many other states. And it is absurd to suppose 
that the state changes into oligarchy merely because [as Plato 

in the period of time which, as he says, makes all things change, things 
which did not begin together change together.' 

Bekker in his 2nd edition has altered the reading of the MSS. Ita re 
rov xpovov to 5ta ye rbv XP° V0V * The rendering of the text agrees 
with either reading ; that of the note with the reading of the MSS. only. 



Criticism of Plato 23 f 

says *] the ruling class are lovers and makers of money, V. 12 
and not because the very rich think it unfair that the very poor 1-316 b 
should have an equal share in the government with themselves. 
Moreover, in many oligarchies there are laws against making 
money in trade. But at Carthage, which is a democracy, 
there is no such prohibition ; and yet to this day the Cartha- 
ginians have never had a revolution. It is absurd too for him 15 
to say that an oligarchy is two cities, one of the rich, and the 
other of the poor 2 . Is not this just as much the case in the 
Spartan constitution, or in any other in which either all do 
not possess equal property, or in which all are not equally 
good men ? Nobody need be any poorer than he was before, 16 
and yet the oligarchy may change all the same into a demo- 
cracy, if the poor form the majority ; and a democracy may 
change into an oligarchy, if the wealthy class are stronger 
than the people, and the one are energetic, the other in- 
different. Once more, although the causes of revolutions are 17 
very numerous, he mentions only one 3 , which is, that the 
citizens become poor through dissipation and debt, as though 
he thought that all, or the majority of them, were originally 
rich. This is not true : though it is true that when any 
of the leaders lose their property they are ripe for revolution ; 
but, when anybody else, it is no great matter. And an 18 
oligarchy does not more often pass into a democracy than into 
any other form of government. Again, if men are deprived 
of the honours of state, and are wronged, and insulted, they 
make revolutions, and change forms of government, even 
although they have not wasted their substance because they 



1 Rep. viii. 550 e. 3 Rep. viii. 551 d. 

3 Rep. viii. 555 d. 



2 36 Criticism of Plato 

V. 12 might do what they liked — of which extravagance he declares 
excessive freedom to be the cause \ 

Finally, although there are many forms of oligarchies and 
democracies, Socrates speaks of their revolutions as though 
there were only one form of either of them. 

1 Rep. viii. 564. 



BOOK VI 

We have now considered the varieties of the deliberative VI. 1 
or supreme power in states, and the various arrangements of 
law-courts and state offices, and which of them are adapted 
to different forms of government *. We have also spoken of 
the destruction and preservation of states, how and from what 
causes they arise 2 . 

Of democracy and all other forms of government there are 2 
many kinds ; and it will be well to assign to them severally 
the modes of organization which are proper and advantageous 
to each, adding what remains to be said about them. More- 3 
over, we ought to consider the various combinations of these 
modes themselves 3 ; for such combinations make constitutions 
overlap one another, so that aristocracies have an oligarchical 
character, and constitutional governments incline to demo- 
cracies 4 . 

When I speak of the combinations which remain to be 4 
considered, and thus far have not been considered by us, 
I mean such as these : — when the deliberative part of the 
government and the election of officers is constituted oligar- 
chically, and the law-courts aristocratically, or when the 
courts and the deliberative part of the state are oligarchical, 
and the election to offices aristocratical, or when in any other 
way there is a want of harmony in the composition of a state. 

I have shown already what forms of democracy are suited 5 

1 Bk. iv. 14-16. 2 Bk. v. 

3 Cp. Bk. iv. 7-9. * Cp. iv. 8. § 3. 



238 The Elements of Democracy 

VI. 1 to particular cities, and what of oligarchy to particular peoples, 
and to whom each of the other forms of government is suited. 

6 Further, we must not only show which of these governments 
is the best for each state, but also briefly proceed to con- 
sider 1 how these and other forms of government are to 
be established. 

First of all let us speak of democracy, which will also 
bring to light the opposite form of government commonly 

7 called oligarchy. For the purposes of this enquiry we need 
to ascertain all the elements and characteristics of democracy, 
since from the combinations of these the varieties of demo- 

8 cratic government arise. There are several of these differing 
from each other, and the difference is due to two causes. 
One (1) has been already mentioned 2 — differences of popu- 
lation ; for the popular element may consist of husbandmen, 
or of mechanics, or of labourers, and if the first of these 
be added to the second, or the third to the two others, 
not only does the democracy become better or worse, but its 

9 very nature is changed. A second cause (2) remains to 
be mentioned : the various properties and characteristics of 
democracy, when variously combined, make a difference. 
For one democracy will have less and another will have more, 
and another will have all of these characteristics. There 
is an advantage in knowing them all, whether a man wishes 
to establish some new form of democracy, or only to remodel 

10 an existing one 5 . Founders of states try to bring together 
all the elements which accord with the ideas of the several 
constitutions ; but this is a mistake of theirs, as I have already 
remarked 4 when speaking of the destruction and preservation 

1 Cp. iv. 2. § 5. 2 Cp. iv. 4. § 2i, 

3 Cp. iv. 1. § 7. 4 v. 9. § 7. 



The Nature of Democracy 239 

of states. We will now set forth the requirements, ethical VI. 1 
character, and aims of such states. 

The basis of a democratic state is liberty ; which, according 2 
to the common opinion of men, can only be enjoyed in such 1317 b 
a state — this they affirm to be the great end of every demo- 
cracy \ One principle of liberty is for all to rule and be 2 
ruled in turn, and indeed democratic justice is the application 
of numerical not proportionate equality ; whence it follows 
that the majority must be supreme, and that whatever the 
majority approve must be the end and the just. Every citizen, 
it is said, must have equality, and therefore in a democracy 
the poor have more power than the rich, because there are 
more of them, and the will of the majority is supreme. This, 3 
then, is one note of liberty which all democrats affirm to 
be the principle of their state. Another is that a man should 
live as he likes 2 . This, they say, is the privilege of a freeman ; 
and, on the other hand, not to live as a man likes is the mark 
of a slave. This is the second characteristic of democracy, 4 
whence has arisen the claim of men to be ruled by none, 
if possible, or, if this is impossible, to rule and be ruled 
in turns ; and so it coincides with the freedom based upon 
equality [which was the first characteristic], 

3 Such being our foundation and such the nature of de- 5 
mocracy, its characteristics are as follows 3 : — the election 
of officers by all out of all ; and that all should rule over 
each, and each in his turn over all ; that the appointment 
to all offices, or to all but those which require experience and 

1 Cp. Plato Rep. viii. 557 foil. 2 Cp. v. 9. § 15. 

3 Or (taking dpxr} in the sense of ' beginning '), * Such being our 
foundation, and such being the principle from which we start, the 
characteristics of democracy are as follows/ 



240 The Characteristics of Democracy 

VI. 2 skill *, should be made by lot ; that no property qualification 
should be required for offices, or only a very low one ; that 
no one should hold the same office twice, or not often, except 
in the case of military offices ; that the tenure of all offices, 
or of as many as possible, should be brief; that all men 
should sit in judgment, or that judges selected out of all should 
judge in all matters, or in most, or in the greatest and most 
important — such as the scrutiny of accounts, the constitution, 
and private contracts ; that the assembly should be supreme 
over all causes, or at any rate over the most important, and 

6 the magistrates over none or only over a very few 2 . Of all 
institutions, a council is the most democratic 3 when there is 
not the means of paying all the citizens, but when they are 
paid even this is robbed of its power ; for the people then 
draw all cases to themselves, as I said in the previous dis- 

7 cussion 4 . The next characteristic of democracy is payment 
for services; assembly, law-courts, magistrates, everybody 
receives pay, when it is to be had ; or when it is not to 
be had for all, then it is given to the law-courts and to the 
stated assemblies, to the council and to the magistrates, or at 
least to any of them who are compelled to have their meals 
together. And whereas oligarchy is characterized by birth, 
wealth, and education, the notes of democracy appear to be 

S the opposite of these — low birth, poverty, mean employment. 
Another note is that no magistracy is perpetual, but if any 
1318 a such have survived some ancient change in the constitution it 
should be stripped of its power, and the holders should be 
elected by lot and no longer by vote. These are points 
common to all democracies ; but democracy and demos in 

1 Cp. iv. 14. § 6. 2 See note. 

3 Cp. iv. 15. § 11. 4 Cp. iv. 6. § 5. 



Democratical Justice 241 

their truest form are based upon the recognized principle of VI. 2 
democratic justice, that all should count equally ; for equality 
implies that the rich should have no more share in the govern- 
ment than the poor *, and should not be the only rulers, but 
that all should rule equally according to their numbers 2 . And 
in this way men think that they will secure equality and 
freedom in their state. 

Next comes the question, How is this equality to be ob- 3 
tained ? Is the qualification to be so distributed that five 
hundred rich shall be equal to a thousand poor ? and shall we 
give the thousand a power equal to that of the five hundred ? 
or, if this is not to be the mode, ought we, still retaining the 
same ratio, to take equal numbers from each and give them 
the control of the elections s and of the courts ? — Which, a 
according to the democratical notion, is the juster form of the 
constitution — this or one based on numbers only ? Demo- 
crats say that justice is that to which the majority agree, 
oligarchs that to which the wealthier class ; in their opinion 
the decision should be given according to the amount of 
property. In both principles there is some inequality and 3 
injustice. For if justice is the will of the few, any one 
person who has more wealth than all the rest of his class put 
together, ought, upon the oligarchical principle, to have the 
sole power — but this would be tyranny ; or if justice is the 
will of the majority, as I was before saying 4 , they will 
unjustly confiscate the property of the wealthy minority. To 4 

1 Transposing duupovs and eviropovs, with Bekker's 2nd ed. 

2 Cp. iv. 4. § 22. 

3 Reading with Bekker's 2nd ed. alpiatav from conjecture for 
bcatpeacwv, which is the reading of the MSS. See note. 

4 Cp. iii. 10. § r. 

DAVIS R 



242 Democratical Justice 

VI. 3 find a principle of equality in which they both agree we must 
enquire into their respective ideas of justice. 

Now they agree in saying that whatever is decided by the 
majority of the citizens is to be deemed law. Granted : — but 
not without some reserve ; since there are two classes out of 
which a state is composed, — the poor and the rich, — that 
is to be deemed law on which both or the greater part 
of both agree ; and if they disagree, that which is approved 
by the majority, that is by those who have the higher qualifi- 

5 cation. For example, suppose that there are ten rich and 
twenty poor, and some measure is approved by six of the rich 
and is disapproved by fifteen of the poor, and the remaining 
four of the rich join with the party of the poor, and the 
remaining live of the poor with that of the rich ; in such 
a case the will of those whose qualifications, when both sides 

6 are added up, are the greatest, should prevail. If they turn 
out to be equal, there is no greater difficulty than at present, 
when, if the assembly or the courts are divided, recourse 

1318 b is had to the lot, or to some similar expedient. But, although 
it may be difficult in theory to know what is just and equal, 
the practical difficulty of inducing those to forbear who can, 
if they like, encroach, is far greater, for the weaker are 
always asking for equality and justice, but the stronger l care 
for none of these things 1 , 
4 Of the four kinds of democracy, as was said in the previous 
discussion 2 , the best is that which comes first in order ; it is 
also the oldest of them all. T am speaking of them according 
to the natural classification of their inhabitants. For the best 
material of democracy is an agricultural population 3 ; there is 

1 Or, f care nothing for the weaker.' 3 Cp. iv. 4. § 22. 

s Cp. iv. 6. § 2. 



The best Kind of Democracy 243 

no difficulty in forming a democracy where the mass of the VI, 4 
people live by agriculture or tending of cattle. Being poor, 2 
they have no leisure, and therefore do not often attend the 
assembly, and not having the necessaries of life they are always 
at work, and do not covet the property of others. Indeed, 
they find their employment pleasanter than the cares of govern- 
ment or office where no great gains can be made out of them, 
for the many are more desirous of gain than of honour 1 . 
A proof is that even the ancient tyrannies were patiently endured 3 
by them, as they still endure oligarchies, if they are allowed 
to work and are not deprived of their property ; for some of 
them grow quickly rich and the others are well enough off. 
Moreover they have the power of electing the magistrates 4 
and calling them to account 2 ; their ambition, if they have 
any, is thus satisfied ; and in some democracies, although they 
do not all share in the appointment of offices, except through 
representatives elected in turn out of the whole people, as at 
Mantinea, yet, if they have the power of deliberating, the 
many are contented. Even this form of government may be 5 
regarded as a democracy, and was such at Mantinea. Hence 
it is both expedient and customary in such a democracy that 
all should elect to offices, and conduct scrutinies, and sit in 
the law-courts, but that the great offices should be filled up by 
election and from persons having a qualification ; the greater 
requiring a greater qualification, or, if there be no offices for 
which a qualification is required, then those who are marked 
out by special ability should be appointed. Under such a 6 
form of government the citizens are sure to be governed well 
(for the offices will always be held by the best persons; the 
people are willing enough to elect them and are not jealous of 
1 iv. 13. § 8. 2 Cp. ii. 12. $ 5. 

R 2 



244 The Agricultural Democracy 

VI. 4 the good). The good and the notables will then be satisfied, 
for they will not be governed by men who are their inferiors, 
and the persons elected will rule justly, because others will call 

7 them to account. Every man should be responsible to others, 
nor should any one be allowed to do just as he pleases ; for 
where absolute freedom is allowed there is nothing to restrain 

1319 a the evil which is inherent in every man. But the principle of 
responsibility secures that which is the greatest good in states ; 
the right persons rule and are prevented from doing wrong, 

8 and the people have their due. It is evident that this is the 
best kind of democracy, and why? because the people are drawn 
from a certain class. The ancient laws of many states which 
aimed at making the people husbandmen were excellent. They 
provided either that no one should possess more than a certain 
quantity of land, or that, if he did, the land should not be 
within a certain distance from the town or the acropolis. 

9 Formerly in many states there was a law forbidding any one 
to sell his original allotment of land *. There is a similar law 
attributed to Oxylus, which is to the effect that there should 
be a certain portion of every man's property on which he could 

io not borrow money. A useful corrective to the evil of which 
I am speaking would be the law of the Aphytaeans, who, 
although they are numerous, and do not possess much land, are 
all of them husbandmen. For their properties are reckoned in 
the census, not entire, but only in such small portions 2 that 
even the poor may have more than the amount required *. 

ii Next best to an agricultural, and in many respects similar, 
are a pastoral people, who live by their flocks ; they are the 

» Cp. ii. ?. § 7. 

a Or, * that the qualification of the poor may exceed that of the 
rich.' 



The inferior Kjnds of Democracy 24 j 

best trained of any for war, robust in body and able to camp VI. 4 
out. The people of whom other democracies consist are far 12 
inferior to them, for their life is inferior ; there is no room for 
moral excellence in any of their employments, whether they 
be mechanics or traders or labourers. Besides, people of this 13 
class can readily come to the assembly, because they are con- 
tinually moving about in the city and in the agora ; whereas 
husbandmen are scattered over the country and do not meet, 
or equally feel the want of assembling together. Where the 14 
territory extends to a distance from the city, there is no 
difficulty in making an excellent democracy or constitutional 
government, for the people are compelled to settle in the 
country ; and even if there is a town population the assembly 
ought not to meet when the country people cannot come. We 15 
have thus explained how the first and best form of democracy 
should be constituted ; it is clear that the other or inferior 
sorts will deviate in a regular order, and the population which 1319 b 
is excluded will at each stage be of a lower kind. 

The last form of democracy, that in which all share alike, is 
one which cannot be borne by all states, and will not last long 
unless well regulated by laws and customs. The more general 
causes which tend to destroy this or other kinds of government 
have now been pretty fully considered *. In order to constitute 16 
such a democracy and strengthen the people, the leaders have 
been in the habit of including as many as they can, and making 
citizens not only of those who are legitimate, but even of the 
illegitimate, and of those who have only one parent a citizen, 
whether father or mother 2 ; for nothing of this sort comes 
amiss to such a democracy. This is the way in which dema- 17 
gogues proceed ; whereas the right thing would be to make 
1 C P . v. 5. 3 C P . iii. 5. § 7. 



246 The Construction and 

VI. 4 no more additions when the number of the commonalty exceeds 
that of the notables or of the middle class, — beyond this not 
to go. When in excess of this point the state becomes dis- 
orderly, and the notables grow excited and impatient of the 
democracy, as in the insurrection at Cyrene ; for no notice is 
taken of a little evil, but when it increases it strikes the eye. 
iS Measures like those which Cleisthenes 1 passed when he wanted 
to increase the power of the democracy at Athens, or such 
as were taken by the founders of popular government at Cyrene, 

19 are useful in the extreme form of democracy. Fresh tribes 
and brotherhoods should be established ; the private rites of 
families should be restricted and converted into public ones ; 
in short, every contrivance should be adopted which will mingle 
the citizens with one another and get rid of old connexions. 

20 Again, the measures which are taken by tyrants appear all of 
them to be democratic ; such, for instance, as the licence per- 
mitted to slaves (which may be to a certain extent advantageous) 
and also that of women and children, and the allowing every- 
body to live as he likes 2 . Such a government will have many 
supporters, for most persons would rather live in a disorderly 
than in a sober manner. 

5 The mere establishment of a democracy is not the only or 
principal business of the legislator, or of those who wish to 
create such a state, for any state, however badly constituted, 
may last one, two, or three days ; a far greater difficulty is the 

2 preservation of it. The legislator should therefore endeavour to 
have a firm foundation according to the principles already laid 
down concerning the preservation and destruction of states 3 ; 
he should guard against the destructive elements, and should 

1 C P . iii. 2. §3; v. 3. § 5. 2 C P . v. 11. § 11. 

3 Cp. Bk. v. 



Preservation of Democracy 247 

make laws, whether written or unwritten, which will contain VI. 5 
all the preservatives of states. He must not think the truly 1320 a 
democratical or oligarchical measure to be that which will give 
the greatest amount of democracy or oligarchy, but that which 
will make them last longest *. The demagogues of our own 3 
day often get property confiscated 2 in the law-courts in order 
to please the people. But those who have the welfare of the 
state at heart should counteract them, and make a law that the 
property of the condemned which goes into the treasury should 
not be public but sacred. Thus offenders will be as much 
afraid, for they will be punished all the same, and the people, 
having nothing to gain, will not be so ready to condemn the 
accused. Care should also be taken that state trials are as 4 
few as possible, and heavy penalties should be inflicted on 
those who bring groundless accusations ; for it is the practice 
to indict, not members of the popular party, but the notables, 
although the citizens ought to be all equally attached to the 
state, or at any rate should not regard their rulers as enemies. 

Now, since in the last and worst form of democracy the 5 
citizens are very numerous, and can hardly be made to assemble 
unless they are paid, and to pay them when there are no 
revenues presses hardly upon the notables (for the money 
must be obtained by a property-tax and confiscations and cor- 
rupt practices of the courts, things which have before now 
overthrown many democracies) ; where, I say, there are no 
revenues, the government should hold few assemblies, and the 
law-courts should consist of many persons, but sit for a few 
days only. This system has two advantages : first, the rich 6 
do not fear the expense, even although they are unpaid them- 
selves when the poor are paid ; and secondly, causes are better 
1 Cp.v. u. §§2 )3 . 2 C P . v. 5. §5. 



248 A Patriotic Nobility 

VI. 5 tried, for wealthy persons, although they do not like to be 
long absent from their own affairs, do not mind going for a few 

7 days to the law-courts. Where there are revenues the dema- 
gogues should not be allowed after their manner to distribute 
the surplus ; the poor are always receiving and always wanting 
more and more, for such help is like water poured into a leaky 
cask. Yet the true friend of the people should see that they 
be not too poor, for extreme poverty lowers the character of 

8 the democracy ; measures also should be taken which will 
give them lasting prosperity ; and as this is equally the interest 
of all classes, the proceeds of the public revenues should be 
accumulated and distributed among them, if possible, in such 
quantities as may enable them to purchase a little farm, or, at any 

1320 b rate, make a beginning in trade and husbandry. And if this 

9 benevolence cannot be extended to all, money should be dis- 
tributed in turn according to tribes or other divisions, and in 
the meantime the rich should pay the fee for the attendance of 
the poor at the necessary assemblies ; and should in return be 
excused from useless public services. By administering the 
state in this spirit the Carthaginians retain the affections of the 
people ; their policy is from time to time to send some of 

10 them into their dependent towns, where they grow rich \ It 
is also worthy of a generous and sensible nobility to divide the 
poor amongst them, and give them the means of going to work. 
The example of the people of Tarentum is also well deserving 
of imitation, for, by sharing the use of their own property with 

1 1 the poor, they gain their good will 2 . Moreover, they divide 
all their offices into two classes, one-half of them being elected 
by vote, the other by lot ; the latter, that the people may 
participate in them, and the former, that the state may be better 

1 Cp. ii. 11. § 15. 2 Cp. ii. 5. § S. 



The various Kinds of Oligarchies 249 

administered. A like result may be gained by dividing the VI. 5 
same offices \ so as to have two classes of magistrates, one 
chosen by vote, the other by lot. 

Enough has been said of the manner in which democracies 6 
ought to be constituted. 

From these considerations there will be no difficulty in see- 
ing what should be the constitution of oligarchies. We must 
put together in our minds each form of oligarchy by reasoning 
from its opposite, calculating the structure of each in relation 
to that of the opposite democracy. 

The first and best attempered of oligarchies is akin to a con- 2 
stitutional government. In this there ought to be two standards 
of qualification ; the one high, the other low — the lower 
qualifying for the humbler yet indispensable offices and the 
higher for the superior ones. He who acquires the prescribed 
qualification should have the rights of citizenship. The nature 
of those admitted should be such as will make the entire 3 
governing body stronger than those who are excluded, and the 
new citizen should be always taken out of the better class of the 
people. The principle, narrowed a little, gives another form 
of oligarchy ; until at length we reach the most cliquish and 
tyrannical of them all, answering to the extreme democracy, 
which, being the worst, requires vigilance in proportion to its 4 
badness. For as healthy bodies and ships well provided with 
sailors may undergo many mishaps and survive them, whereas 
sickly constitutions and rotten ill-manned ships are ruined by 
the very least mistake, so do the worst forms of government 1321 a 
require the greatest care. The populousness of democracies 5 
generally preserves them (for number is to democracy in the 
place of justice based on proportion) ; whereas the preservation 
1 Reading tt/s avTTjs apx^s with Bekker's 2nd ed. 



2yo How to Organise an Oligarchy 

VI. 6 of an oligarchy clearly depends on an opposite principle, viz. 
good order. 
7 As there are four chief divisions of the common people — 
husbandmen, mechanics, retail traders, labourers ; so also 
there are four kinds of military forces — the cavalry, the heavy 
infantry, the light-armed troops, the navy \ When the 
country is adapted for cavalry, then a strong oligarchy is likely 
to be established. For the security of the inhabitants depends 
upon a force of this sort, and only rich men can afford to keep 
horses. The second form of oligarchy prevails when there 
are heavy infantry 2 ; for this service is better suited to the rich 

2 than to the poor. But the light-armed and the naval element 
are wholly democratic ; and nowadays, when they are so 
numerous, if the two parties quarrel, the oligarchy are often 
worsted by them in the struggle. A remedy for this state of 
things may be found in the practice of generals who combine 
a proper contingent of light-armed troops with cavalry and 

3 heavy-armed. And this is the way in which the poor get the 
better of the rich in civil contests ; being lightly armed, they 
fight with advantage against cavalry and heavy infantry. An 
oligarchy which raises such a force out of the lower classes 
raises a power against itself. And therefore, since the ages 
of the citizens vary and some are older and some younger, the 
fathers should have their own sons, while they are still young, 
taught the agile movements of light-armed troops ; and some, 
when they grow up, should be selected out of the youth, and 

4 become light-armed warriors in reality. The oligarchy should 
also yield a share in the government to the people, either, as I 
said before, to those who have a property qualification 3 , or, as 

1 Cp. iv. 3. §§ 2 , 3. 2 Reading oirXtT-qv with Bekker's 1st ed. 

3 Cp. c. 6. § 2. 



The Necessary Offices of State 2yi 

in the case of Thebes ', to those who have abstained for a VI. 7 
certain number of years from mean employments, or, as at 
Massalia, to men of merit who are selected for their worthi- 
ness, whether [previously] citizens or not. The magistracies 5 
of the highest rank, which ought to be in the hands of the 
governing body, should have expensive duties attached to them, 
and then the people will not desire them and will take no 
offence at the privileges of their rulers when they see that 
they pay a heavy fine for their dignity. It is fitting also that 6 
the magistrates on entering office should offer magnificent 
sacrifices or erect some public edifice, and then the people who 
participate in the entertainments, and like to see the city 
decorated with votive offerings and buildings, will not desire 
an alteration in the government, and the notables will have 
memorials of their munificence. This, however, is anything 7 
but the fashion of our modern oligarchs, who are as covetous 
of gain as they are of honour ; oligarchies like theirs may be 
well described as petty democracies. Enough of the manner 1321 b 
in which democracies and oligarchies should be organized. 

Next in order follows the right distribution of offices, their 8 
number, their nature, their duties, of which indeed we have 
already spoken 2 . No state can exist not having the necessary 
offices, and no state can be well administered not having the 
offices which tend to preserve harmony and good order. In 2 
small states, as we have already remarked 3 , there need not be 
many of them, but in larger there must be a larger number, 
and we should carefully consider which offices may properly 
be united and which separated. 

First among necessary offices is that which has the care of 3 

1 Cp. iii. 5. § 7. 2 Cp. iv. 15. 

3 Cp. iv. 15. §§ 5-7. 



z?2 Offices — the Criminal Executive 

VI. 8 the market ; a magistrate should be appointed to inspect con- 
tracts and to maintain order. For in every state there must 
inevitably be buyers and sellers who will supply one another's 
wants ; this is the readiest way to make a state self-sufficing 
and so fulfil the purpose for which men come together into one 

4 state 1 . A second office of a similar kind undertakes the super- 
vision and embellishment of public and private buildings, the 
maintaining and repairing of houses and roads, the prevention 
of disputes about boundaries and other concerns of a like nature. 

5 This is commonly called the office of City-warden, and has 
various departments, which, in more populous towns, are shared 
among different persons, one, for example, taking charge of the 

6 walls, another of the fountains, a third of harbours. There 
is another equally necessary office, and of a similar kind, having 
to do with the same matters without the walls and in the 
country : — the magistrates who hold this office are called 
Wardens of the country, or Inspectors of the woods. Besides 
these three there is a fourth office of receivers of taxes, who 
have under their charge the revenue which they distribute 
among the various departments ; these are called Receivers or 

7 Treasurers. Another officer registers all private contracts, and 
decisions of the courts, all public indictments, and also all 
preliminary proceedings. This office again is sometimes sub- 
divided, in which case one officer is appointed over all the rest. 
These officers are called Recorders or Sacred Recorders, 
Presidents, and the like. 

8 Next to these conies an office of which the duties are the 
most necessary and also the most difficult, viz. that to which 
is committed the execution of punishments, or the exaction of 

1 Cp. i. 2. § 3 ; Nic. Eth. v. 6. § 4; PI. Rep. ii. 369. 



Offices Military and Civil 2^3 

fines from those who are posted up according to the registers ; VI. 8 
and also the custody of prisoners. The difficulty of this office 1322 a 
arises out of the odium which is attached to it ; no one will 
undertake it unless great profits are to be made, and any one who 
does is loth to execute the law. Still the office is necessary ; 
for judicial decisions are useless if they take no effect ; and if 
society cannot exist without them, neither can it exist with- 
out the execution of them. It is an office which, being so 10 
unpopular, should not be entrusted to one person, but divided 
among several taken from different courts. In like manner 
an effort should be made to distribute among different persons 
the writing up of those who are registered as public debtors. 
Some sentences should be executed by officers who have other 
functions ; penalties for new offences should be exacted by new 
offices ; and as regards those which are not new, when one 
court has given judgment, another should exact the penalty ; for 
example, the wardens of the city should exact the fines imposed 
by the wardens of the agora, and others again should exact the 
fines imposed by them. For penalties are more likely to be u 
exacted when less odium attaches to the exaction of them ; 
but a double odium is incurred when the judges who have 
passed also execute the sentence, and if they are always the 
executioners, they will be the enemies of all. 

In many places one magistracy has the custody of the 
prisoners, while another executes the sentence, as, for example, 
4 the Eleven ' at Athens. It is well to separate off the jailor- 12 
ship, and try by some device to render the 'office less unpopular. 
For it is quite as necessary as that of the executioner ; but 
good men do all they can to avoid it, and worthless persons 
cannot safely be trusted with it ; for they themselves require a 
guard, and are not fit to guard others. There ought not there- 13 



2^4 Offices Military and Civil 

VI. 8 fore to be a single or permanent officer set apart for this duty ; 
but it should be entrusted to the young, wherever they are 
organized into a band or guard, and different magistrates acting 
in turn should take charge of it. 

These are the indispensable officers, and should be ranked 
first : — next in order follow others, equally necessary, but of 

14 higher rank, and requiring great experience and fidelity. Such 
are the offices to which are committed the guard of the city, 
and other military functions. Not only in time of war but of 
peace their duty will be to defend the walls and gates, and to 
muster and marshal the citizens. In some states there are 
many such offices ; in others there are a few only, while small 

1 5 states are content with one ; these officers are called generals 
1322 b or commanders. Again, if a state has cavalry or light-armed 

troops or archers or a naval force, it will sometimes happen 
that each of these departments has separate officers, who are 
called admirals, or generals of cavalry or of infantry. And 
there are subordinate officers called naval and military captains, 
and captains of horse ; having others under them : — all these 

16 are included in the department of war. Thus much of military 
command. 

But since many, not to say all, of these offices handle the 
public money, there must of necessity be another office which 
examines and audits them, and has no other functions. Such 
officers are called by various names — Scrutineers, Auditors, 

1 7 Accountants, Controllers. Besides all these offices there is 
another which is supreme over them, and to this, which in a 
democracy presides over the assembly, is often entrusted both 
the introduction and the ratification of measures. For that 
power which convenes the people must of necessity be the 
head of the state. In some places they are called 'probuli,' 



Offices of Religion — Summary 257 

because they hold previous deliberations, but in a democracy VI. 8 
more commonly 'councillors 1 .' These are the chief political 18 
offices. 

Another set of officers is concerned with the maintenance 
of religion ; priests and guardians see to the preservation and 
repair of the temples of the gods and to other matters of religion. 
One office of this sort may be enough in small places, but in 19 
larger ones there are a great many besides the priesthood ; for 
example, superintendents of sacrifices, guardians of shrines, 
treasurers of the sacred revenues. Nearly connected with these 20 
there are also the officers appointed for the performance of the 
public sacrifices, except any which the law assigns to the 
priests ; such officers derive their dignity from the public hearth 
of the city. They are sometimes called archons, sometimes 
kings 2 , and sometimes prytanes. 

These, then, are the necessary offices, which may be summed 21 
up as follows : offices concerned with matters of religion, with 
war, with the revenue and expenditure, with the market, with 
the city, with the harbours, with the country ; also with the 
courts of law, with the records of contracts, with execution of 
sentences, with custody of prisoners, with audits and scrutinies 
and accounts of magistrates ; lastly, there are those which pre- 
side over the public deliberations of the state. There are like- 22 
wise magistracies characteristic of states which are peaceful 
and prosperous, and at the same time have a regard to good 
order : such as the offices of guardians of women, guardians of 
the laws, guardians of children, and directors of gymnastics ; 
also superintendents of gymnastic and Dionysiac contests, and 1323 ?. 
of other similar spectacles. Some of these are clearly not 23 
democratic offices ; for example, the guardianships of women 
1 Cp.iv. 15. § 11. 2 Cp. iii. 14. § 14. 



2?6 Summary 

VI. 8 and children 1 — the poor, not having any slaves, must employ 
both their women and children as servants. 
24 Once more : there are three forms of the highest elective 
offices in states — guardians of the law, probuli, councillors, — 
of these, the guardians of the law are an aristocratical, the 
probuli an oligarchical, the council a democratical institution. 
Enough of the different kinds of offices. 

1 Cp. iv. 15. § 13. 



BOOK VII 

He who would duly enquire about the best form of a state VII. 1 
ought first to determine which is the most eligible life ; while 
this remains uncertain the best form of the state must also be 
uncertain ; for, in the natural order of things, those may be 
expected to lead the best life who are governed in the best 
manner of which their circumstances admit. We ought there- 2 
fore to ascertain, first of all, which is the most generally eligible 
life, and then whether the same life is or is not best for the state 
and for individuals. 

Assuming that enough has been already said in exoteric 
discourses concerning the best life, we will now only repeat 
the statements contained in them. Certainly no one will dispute 3 
the propriety of that partition of goods which separates them 
into three classes 1 , viz. external goods, goods of the body, 
and goods of the soul, or deny that the happy man must have 
all three. For no one would maintain that he is happy who 4 
has not in him a particle of courage or temperance or justice 
or prudence, who is afraid of every insect which flutters past 
him, and will commit any crime, however great, in order to 
gratify his lust of meat or drink, who will sacrifice his dearest 
friend for the sake of half a farthing, and is as feeble and false 
in mind as a child or a madman. These propositions are 5 
universally acknowledged as soon as they are uttered 2 , but men 

1 Cp. N. Eth. i. 8. § 2. 

2 Omitting wairfp, which is bracketed by Bekker in his second 
edition. 



2^8 Goods of Fortune f and Goods of the Soul 

VII. 1 differ about the quantity which is desirable or the relative 
superiority of this or that good. Some think that a very 
moderate amount of virtue is enough, but set no limit to their 
desires of wealth, property, power, reputation, and the like. 

6 To whom we reply by an appeal to facts, which easily prove 
that mankind do not acquire or preserve virtue by the help of 

1323 b external goods, but external goods by the help of virtue, and 
that happiness, whether consisting in pleasure or virtue, or 
both, is more often found with those who are most highly 
cultivated in their mind and in their character, and have only 
a moderate share of external goods, than among those who 
possess external goods to a useless extent but are deficient in 
higher qualities ; and this is not only matter of experience, but, 
if reflected upon, will easily appear to be in accordance with 

7 reason. For, whereas external goods have a limit, like any 
other instrument l , and all things useful are of such a nature 
that where there is too much of them they must either do harm, 
or at any rate be of no use, to their possessors, every good of 
the soul, the greater it is, is also of greater use, if the epithet 

8 ' useful ' as well as ' noble ' is appropriate to such subjects. No 
proof is required to show that the best state of one thing 
in relation to another is proportioned to the degree of excel- 
lence by which the natures corresponding to those states are 
separated from each other : so that, if the soul is more noble 
than our possessions or our bodies, both absolutely and in 
relation to us, it must be admitted that the best state of either 

9 has a similar ratio to the other. Again, it is for the sake of 
the soul that goods external and goods of the body are eligible 
at all, and all wise men ought to choose them for the sake of 
the soul, and not the soul for the sake of them. 

1 C P . i. 8. § 15. 



Virtue the Source of Happiness 25-9 

Let us acknowledge then that each one has just so much of VII. 1 
happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous and IO 
wise action. God is a witness to us of this truth 1 ; for he 
is happy and blessed, not by reason of any external good, but 
in himself and by reason of his own nature. And herein of 
necessity lies the difference between good fortune and happiness; 
for external goods come of themselves, and chance is the author 
of them, but no one is just or temperate by or through chance 2 . 
In like manner, and by a similar train of argument, the happy u 
state may be shown to be that which is [morally] best and 
which acts rightly ; and rightly it cannot act without doing 
right actions, and neither individual nor state can do right actions 
without virtue and wisdom. Thus the courage, justice, and 12 
wisdom of a state have the same form and nature as the 
qualities which give the individual who possesses them the 
name of just, wise, or temperate. 

Thus much may suffice by way of preface: for I could not 13 
avoid touching upon these questions, neither could I go through 
all the arguments affecting them ; these must be reserved for 
another discussion. 

Let us assume then that the best life, both for individuals and 
states, is the life of virtue, having external goods enough for 
the performance of good actions. If there are any who con- -^24 a 
trovert our assertion, we will in this treatise pass them over, 
and consider their objections hereafter. 

There remains to be discussed the question, Whether the 2 
happiness of the individual is the same as that of the state, or 
different ? Here again there can be no doubt — no one denies 
that they are the same. For those who hold that the well-being 2 

1 Cp. c. 3. § 10; N. Eth.x. 8. § 7 ; Met. xii. 7. 

3 Ethics i. 9. § 6. 

S 2 



260 Is Contemplation best^ or Action? 

VII. 2 of the individual consists in his wealth, also think that riches 
make the happiness of the whole state, and those who value 
most highly the life of a tyrant deem that city the happiest 
which rules over the greatest number ; while they who approve 
an individual for his virtue say that the more virtuous a city 

3 is, the happier it is. Two points here present themselves 
for consideration : first (i), which is the more eligible life, 
that of a citizen who is a member of a state, or that of an 
alien who has no political ties; and again (2), which is the 
best form of constitution or the best condition of a state, either 
on the supposition that political privileges are given to all, or 

4 that they are given to a majority only ? Since the good of the 
state and not of the individual is the proper subject of political 
thought and speculation, and we are engaged in a political dis- 
cussion, while the first of these two points has a secondary 
interest for us, the latter will be the main subject of our 
enquiry. 

5 Now it is evident that the form of government is best in 
which every man, whoever he is, can act for the best and live 
happily. But even those who agree in thinking that the life 
of virtue is the most eligible raise a question, whether the life 
of business and politics is or is not more eligible than one 
which is wholly independent of external goods, I mean than 
a contemplative life, which by some is maintained to be the 

6 only one worthy of a philosopher. For these two lives — the 
life of the philosopher and the life of the statesman — appear 
to have been preferred by those who have been most keen in 
the pursuit of virtue, both in our own and in other ages. 
Which is the better is a question of no small moment ; for 
the wise man, like the wise state, will necessarily regulate his 

7 life according to the best end. There are some who think 



The Policy of War and Oppression 261 

that while a despotic rule over others is the greatest injustice, VII. 2 
to exercise a constitutional rule over them, even though not 
unjust, is a great impediment to a man's individual well-being. 
Others take an opposite view ; they maintain that the true life 
of man is the practical and political, and that every virtue admits 
of being practised, quite as much by statesmen and rulers as 
by private individuals. Others, again, are of opinion that g 
arbitrary and tyrannical rule alone consists with happiness ; 
indeed, l in some states the entire aim of the laws 1 is to give 
men despotic power over their neighbours. And, therefore, 9 
although in most cities the laws may be said generally to be in 
a chaotic state, still, if they aim at anything, they aim at the 
maintenance of power : thus in Lacedaemon and Crete the 
system of education and the greater part of the laws are framed 
with a view to war 2 . And in all nations which are able to 10 
gratify their ambition military power is held in esteem, for ex- 
ample among the Scythians and Persians and Thracians and 
Celts. In some nations there are even laws tending to stimulate 
the warlike virtues, as at Carthage, where we are told that men 
obtain the honour of wearing as many armlets as they have served 
campaigns. There was once a law in Macedonia that he who 11 ' 
had not killed an enemy should wear a halter, and among the 
Scythians no one who had not slain his man was allowed to 
drink out of the cup which was handed round at a certain feast. 
Among the Iberians, a warlike nation, the number of enemies 
whom a man has slain is indicated by the number of spits which 
are fixed in the earth round his tomb ; and there are numerous 12 

1 Or, inserting tcax before vofxwv (apparently the reading of the old 
lranslator), ( in some cases the entire aim both of the constitution and the 
laws.' 

3 Cp. Plato, Laws, i. 633 ff 



2(52 War not the Supreme End 

VII. 2 practices among other nations of a like kind, some of them 
established by law and others by custom. Yet to a reflecting 
mind it must appear very strange that the statesman should be 
always considering how he can dominate and tyrannize over 
Mothers, whether they will or not. How can that which 
is not even lawful be the business of the statesman or the 
legislator ? Unlawful it certainly is to rule without regard to 
justice, for there may be might where there is no right. 
The other arts and sciences offer no parallel ; a physician 
is not expected to persuade or coerce his patients, nor a pilot 

14 the passengers in his ship. Yet many appear to think that 
a despotic government is a true political form, and what men 
affirm to be unjust and inexpedient in their own case they are 
not ashamed of practising towards others ; they demand 
justice for themselves, but where other men are concerned 

15 they care nothing about it. Such behaviour is irrational; 
unless the one party is born to command, and the other born 
to serve, in which ease men have a right to command, not 
indeed all their fellows, but only those who are intended 
to be subjects ; just as we ought not to hunt mankind, 
whether for food or sacrifice, but only the animals which are 
intended for food or sacrifice, that is to say, such wild 

16 animals as are eatable. And surely there may be a city 
1325 a happy in isolation, which we will assume to be well-governed 

(for it is quite possible that a city thus isolated might be well- 
administered and have good laws) ; but such a city would 
not be constituted with any view to war or the conquest of 

17 enemies — all that sort of thing must be excluded. Hence 
we see very plainly that warlike pursuits, although generally 
to be deemed honourable, are not the supreme end of all 
things, but only means. And the good lawgiver should 



The False and True Idea of a Jailer 263 

enquire how states and races of men and communities VII. 2 

may participate in a good life, and in the happiness which is 

attainable by them. His enactments will not be always the 18 

same ; and where there are neighbours 1 he will have to deal 

with them according to their characters, and to see what 

duties are to be performed towards each. The end at which 

the best form of government should aim may be properly 

made a matter of future consideration 2 . 

Let us now address those who, while they agree that the 3 

life of virtue is the most eligible, differ about the manner 

of practising it. For some renounce political power, and 

think that the life of the freeman is different from the life of 

the statesman and the best of all ; but others think the life 

of the statesman best. The argument of the latter is that 

he who does nothing cannot do well, and that virtuous 

activity is identical with happiness. To both we say : ' you 

are partly right and partly wrong.' The first class are right 

in affirming that the life of the freeman is better than the 

life of the despot ; for there is nothing grand or noble a 

in having the use of a slave, in so far as he is a slave; 

or in issuing commands about necessary things. But it is 

an error to suppose that every sort of rule is despotic like 

that of a master over slaves, for there is as great a difference 

between the rule over freemen and the rule over slaves as 

there is between slavery by nature and freedom by nature, 

about which I have said enough at the commencement of 

this treatise 3 . And it is equally a mistake to place inac- 3 

tivity above action, for happiness is activity, and the actions of 

the just and wise are the realization of much that is noble. 

1 Cp. ii. 6. § 7; 7. § 14. a Cp. c. 14. 

3 C P . i.e. 5,6,7. 



254 The False and 'True Idea of a l^uler 

VII. 3 But perhaps some one, accepting these premisses, may still 
maintain that supreme power is the best of all things, because 
the possessors of it are able to perform the greatest number 

4 of noble actions. If so, the man who is able to rule, 
instead of giving up anything to his neighbour, ought rather to 
take away his power ; and the father should make no account 
of his son, nor the son of his father, nor friend of friend ; 
they should not bestow a thought on one another in com- 
parison with this higher object, for the best is the most 
eligible and i doing well ' is the best. There might be some 

1325 b truth in such a view if we assume that robbers and plunderers 

5 attain the chief good. But this can never be ; and hence we 
infer the view to be false. For the actions of a ruler cannot 
really be honourable, unless he is as much superior to other 
men as a husband is to a wife, or a father to his children, 
or a master to his slaves. And therefore he who violates 
the law can never recover by any success, however great, 
what he has already lost in departing from virtue. For 
equals share alike in the honourable and the just, as is just 

6 and equal. But that the unequal should be given to equals, 
and the unlike to those who are like, is contrary to nature, 
and nothing which is contrary to nature is good. If, there- 
fore, there is any one Y superior in virtue and in the power of 
performing the best actions, him we ought to follow and 

7 obey, but he must have the capacity for action as well as 
virtue. 

If we are right in our view, and happiness is assumed to 

be virtuous activity, the active life will be the best, both for 

S the city collectively, and for individuals. Not that a life 

of action must necessarily have relations to others, as some 

1 Cp.iii. 13. §25, and 17. §7. 



The Conditions of the Perfect State z6j 

persons think, nor are those ideas only to be regarded VII. 3 
as practical which are pursued for the sake of practical results, 
but much more the thoughts and contemplations which are 
independent and complete in themselves; since virtuous 
activity, and therefore action, is an end, and even in the case 
of external actions the directing mind is most truly said 
to act. Neither, again, is it necessary that states which are 9 
cut off from others and choose to live alone should be inactive ; 
for there may be activity also in the parts; there are many 
ways in which the members of a state act upon one another. 
The same thing is equally true of every individual. If this 10 
were otherwise, God and the universe, who have no external 
actions over and above their own energies 1 , would be far enough 
from perfection. Hence it is evident that the same life is 
best for each individual, and for states, and for mankind 
collectively. 

Thus far by way of introduction. In what has preceded 4 
I have discussed other forms of government ; in what 
remains, the first point to be considered is what should be the 
conditions of the ideal or perfect state ; for the perfect state 2 
cannot exist without a due supply of the means of life. And 
therefore we must presuppose many purely imaginary condi- 
tions 2 , but nothing impossible. There will be a certain 
number of citizens, a country in which to place them, and the 
like. As the weaver or shipbuilder or any other artisan 3 
must have the material proper for his work (and in proportion 1326 a 
as this is better prepared, so will the result of his art be 
nobler), so the statesman or legislator must also have the 
materials suited to him. 

First among the materials required by the statesman is 4 
1 Cp. c. 1. § 10. 2 Cp. ii. 6. § 7. 



z66 The Number of the Citizens 

VII. 4 population : he will consider what should be the number and 
character of the citizens, and then what should be the size 
and character of the country. Most persons think that a 
state in order to be happy ought to be large ; but even if they 
are right, they have no idea what is a large and what a small 

5 state. For they judge of the size of the city by the number 
of the inhabitants ; whereas they ought to regard, not their 
number, but their power. A city too, like an individual, has 
a work to do ; and that city which is best adapted to the 
fulfilment of its work is to be deemed greatest, in the 
same sense of the word great in which Hippocrates might be 
called greater, not as a man, but as a physician, than some one 

6 else who was taller. And even if we reckon greatness by 
numbers, we ought not to include everybody, for there must 
always be in cities a multitude of slaves and sojourners and 
foreigners ; but we should include those only who are members 
of the state, and who form an essential part of it. The number 
of the latter is a proof of the greatness of a city ; but a city 
which produces numerous artisans and comparatively few 
soldiers cannot be great, for a great city is not to be confounded 

7 with a populous one. Moreover, experience shows that a very 
populous city can rarely, if ever, be well governed ; since all 
cities which have a reputation for good government have a 
limit of population. We may argue on grounds of reason, and 

S the same result will follow. For law is order, and good law 
is good order ; but a very great multitude cannot be orderly : 
to introduce order into the unlimited is the work of a divine 
power — of such a power as holds together the universe. Beauty 

9 is realized in number and magnitude 1 , and the state which com- 
bines magnitude with good order must necessarily be the most 
1 Cp. Poet. 7. § 4. 



The Number of the Citizens 267 

beautiful. To the size of states there is a limit, as there is to VII. 4 
other things, plants, animals, implements ; for none of these 10 
retain their natural power when they are too large or too small, 
but they either wholly lose their nature, or are spoiled. For 
example \ a ship which is only a span long will not be a ship 
at all, nor a ship a quarter of a mile long ; yet there may be 
a ship of a certain size, either too large or too small, which 
will still be a ship, but bad for sailing. In like manner a state -^26 b 
when composed of too few is not as a state ought to be, self- 
sufficing ; when of too many, though self-sufficing in all mere 
necessaries, it is a nation and not a state, being almost incap- 
able of constitutional government. For who can be the general 
of such a vast multitude, or who the herald, unless he have the 
voice of a Stentor ? 

A state then only begins to exist when it has attained 
a population sufficient for a good life in the political com- 
munity : it may indeed somewhat exceed this number. But, 1 2 
as I was saying, there must be a limit. What should be 
the limit will be easily ascertained by experience. For both 
governors and governed have duties to perform ; the special 
functions of a governor are to command and to judge. But 13 
if the citizens of a state are to judge and to distribute offices 
according to merit, then they must know each other's 
characters; where they do not possess this knowledge, 
both the election to offices and the decision of lawsuits 
will go wrong. When the population is very large they 
are manifestly settled at haphazard, which clearly ought 
not to be. Besides, in an overpopulous state foreigners and 14 
metics will readily acquire the rights of citizens, for who will 
find them out ? Clearly, then, the best limit of the population 
1 C P . v. 9. § 7. 



268 The Situation of the City 

VII. 4 of a state is the largest number which suffices for the pur- 
poses of life, and can be taken in at a single view. Enough 
concerning the size of a city. 

5 Much the same principle will apply to the territory of the 
state : every one would agree in praising the state which 
is most entirely self-sufficing ; and that must be the state 
which is all-producing, for to have all things and to want 
nothing is sufficiency. In size and extent it should be such 
as may enable the inhabitants to live temperately and liberally 

2 in the enjoyment of leisure *. Whether we are right or 
wrong in laying down this limit we will enquire more precisely 
hereafter 2 , when we have occasion to consider what is the 
right use of property and wealth : a matter which is much 
disputed, because men are inclined to rush into one of two 
extremes, some into meanness, others into luxury. 

3 It is not difficult to determine the general character of 
the territory which is required ; there are, however, some 
points on which military authorities should be heard ; they 
tell us that it should be difficult of access to the enemy, and 

1327 a easy of egress to the inhabitants. Further, we require that 
the land as well as the inhabitants of whom we were just now 
speaking should be taken in at a single view, for a country 
which is easily seen can be easily protected. As to the 
position of the city, if we could have what we wish, it should 

4 be well situated in regard both to sea or land. This then 
is one principle, that it should be a convenient centre for the 
protection of the whole country : the other is, that it should 
be suitable for receiving the fruits of the soil, and also for the 
bringing in of timber and any other products. 

6 Whether a communication with the sea is beneficial to 

1 Cp. ii. 6. § 9. 3 Cp. c. S-10 infra (?). 



Proximity of the Sea^ Good or Evil? 269 

a well-ordered state or not is a question which has often been VII. 6 
asked. It is argued that the introduction of strangers brought 
up under other Jaws, and the increase of population, will be 
adverse to good order (for a maritime people will always have 
a crowd of merchants coming and going), and that intercourse 
by sea is inimical to good government 1 . Apart from these 2 
considerations, it would be undoubtedly better, both with 
a view to safety and to the provision of necessaries, that the 
city and territory should be connected with the sea ; the 3 
defenders of a country, if they are to maintain themselves 
against an enemy, should be easily relieved both by land and 
by sea ; and even if they are not able to attack by sea and 
land at once, they will have less difficulty in doing mischief 
to their assailants on one element, if they themselves can use 
both. Moreover, it is necessary that they should import from 4 
abroad what is not found in their own country, and that they 
should export what they have in excess ; for a city ought to 
be a market, not indeed for others, but for herself. 

Those who make themselves a market for the world only 
do so for the sake of revenue, and if a state ought not to 
desire profit of this kind it ought not to have such an 
emporium. Nowadays we often see in countries and cities 5 
dockyards and harbours very conveniently placed outside the 
city, but not too far off; and they are kept in dependence by 
walls and similar fortifications. Cities thus situated mani- 
festly reap the benefit of intercourse with their ports ; and 
any harm which is likely to accrue may be easily guarded 
against by the laws, which will pronounce and determine who 
may hold communication with one another, and who may not. 

There can be no doubt that the possession of a moderate 6 
1 Cp. Plalo, Laws, iv. 704 ff. 



270 The Character of the Citizens 

VII. 6 naval force is advantageous to a city ; the citizens require 

1327 b such a force for their own needs, and they should also 

be formidable to their neighbours in certain cases \ or, 

if necessary, able to assist them by sea as well as by land. 

7 The proper number or magnitude of this naval force is 
relative to the character of the state ; for if her function 
is to take a leading part in politics 2 , her naval power should 
be commensurate with the scale of her enterprises. The 
population of the state need not be much increased, since 

8 there is no necessity that the sailors should be citizens : the 
marines who have the control and command will be freemen, 
and belong also to the infantry ; and wherever there is 
a dense population of Perioeci and husbandmen, there will 
always be sailors more than enough. Of this we see 
instances at the present day. The city of Heraclea, for 
example, although small in comparison with many others, can 

9 man a considerable fleet. Such are our conclusions respect- 
ing the territory of the state, its harbour, its towns, its 
relations to the sea, and its maritime power. 

7 Having spoken of the number of the citizens, we will 
proceed to speak of what should be their character. This is 
a subject which can be easily understood by any one who 
casts his eye on the more celebrated states of Hellas, 
and generally on the distribution of races in the habitable 

2 world. Those who live in a cold climate and in [northern] 
Europe are full of spirit, but wanting in intelligence and 
skill ; and therefore they keep their freedom, but have 
no political organization, and are incapable of ruling over 
others. Whereas the natives of Asia are intelligent and 

1 Cp. ii. 6. § 7. 

2 Reading ttoXitihov with ihe MSS. and Bekker's first edilion. 



The Character of the Citizens 271 

inventive, but they are wanting in spirit, and therefore they are VII. 7 
always in a state of subjection and slavery. But the Hellenic 3 
race, which is situated between them, is likewise intermediate 
in character, being high-spirited and also intelligent *. Hence 
it continues free, and is the best governed of any nation, and, 
if it could be formed into one state, would be able to rule the 
world. There are also similar differences in the different tribes 4 
of Hellas ; for some of them are of a one-sided nature, and 
are intelligent or courageous only, while in others there is a 
happy combination of both qualities. And clearly those whom 
the legislator will most easily lead to virtue may be expected 
to be both intelligent and courageous. Some [like Plato 2 ] 5 
say that the guardians should be friendly towards those 
whom they know, fierce towards those whom they do not 
know. Now, passion is the quality of the soul which begets 1328 a 
friendship and inspires affection ; notably the spirit within us 
is more stirred against our friends and acquaintances than 
against those who are unknown to us, when we think that we 
are despised by them ; for which reason Archilochus, com- 6 
plaining of his friends, very naturally addresses his soul in these 
words, 

' For weit thou not plagued on account of friends 3 ? ' 
The power of command and the love of freedom are in all 
men based upon this quality, for passion is commanding and 
invincible. Nor is it right to say that the guardians should be 7 
fierce towards those whom they do not know, for we ought 
not to be out of temper with any one ; and a lofty spirit is not 

1 Cp. Plato, Rep. iv. 435 e, 436 a. a Rep. ii. 375. 

5 Or : ' For suTely thou art not plagued on account of thy friends ? ' 
The line is probably corrupt. Better to read with Bergk, <rv yotp 5^ naph 
<pi\ojv airayxfo, i for thou indeed wert plagued by friends.' 



272 The Passionate Nature 

VII. 7 fierce by nature, but only when excited against evil-doers. 
And this, as I was saying before, is a feeling which men 
show most strongly towards their friends if they think they 

8 have received a wrong at their hands : as indeed is reason- 
able ; for, besides the actual injury, they seem to be de- 
prived of a benefit by those who owe them one. Hence the 
saying, 

* Cruel is the strife of brethren l ; ' 
and again, 

* They who love in excess also hate in excess V 

9 Thus we have nearly determined the number and character 
of the citizens of our state, and also the size and nature of 
their territory. I say ' nearly/ for we ought not to require 
the same minuteness in theory as in fact 3 . 

8 As in other natural compounds the conditions of a compo- 
site whole are not necessarily organic parts of it, so in a state 
or in any other combination forming a unity not everything 

2 is a part, which is a necessary condition 3 . The members of 
an association have necessarily some one thing the same 
and common to all, in which they share equally or unequally ; 

3 for example, food or land or any other thing. But where 
there are two things of which one is a means and the other 
an end, they have nothing in common except that the one 
receives what the other produces. Such, for example, is the 
relation in which workmen and tools stand to their work ; 
the house and the builder have nothing in common, but 

4 the art of the builder is for the sake of the house. And 
so states require property, but property, even though living 
beings are included in it 4 , is no part of a state ; for a state is 

1 Eurip. Frag. 51 Dindorf. 2 Cp. 12. § 9, infra. 

3 Cp. iii. 5. § 2. 4 Cp. i. 4. § 2. 



The Necessary Conditions of a State 273 

not a community of living beings only, but a community VII. 8 
of equals, aiming at the best life possible. Now, whereas 5 
happiness is the highest good, being a realization and perfect 
practice of virtue, which some attain, while others have little 
or none of it, the various qualities of men are clearly the 
reason why there are various kinds of states and many forms 
of government ; for different men seek after happiness in 
different ways and by different means, and so make for 1328 b 
themselves different modes of life and forms of government. 
We must see also how many things are indispensable to 6 
the existence of a state, for what we call the parts of a state 
will be found among them. Let us then enumerate the 
functions of a state, and we shall easily elicit what we want : 

First, there must be food ; secondly, arts, for life requires 7 
many instruments ; thirdly, there must be arms, for the 
members of a community have need of them in order to 
maintain authority both against disobedient subjects and 
against external assailants ; fourthly, there must be a certain 
amount of revenue, both for internal needs and for the 
purposes of war ; fifthly, or rather first, there must be a care 
of religion, which is commonly called worship ; sixthly, and 
most necessary of all, there must be a power of deciding what 
is for the public interest, and what is just in men's dealings 
with one another. 

These are the things which every state may be said to 8 
need. For a state is not a mere aggregate of persons, but 
a union of them sufficing for the purposes of life x ; and 
if any of these things be wanting, it is simply impossible 
that the community can be self-sufficing. A state then 9 

1 Cp. supra, c. 5. § I. 

DAVIS X 



274 The Necessary Conditions of a State 

VII. 8 should be framed with a view to the fulfilment of these 
functions. There must be husbandmen to procure food, and 
artisans, and a warlike and a wealthy class, and priests, and 
judges to decide what is just a and expedient. 
9 Having determined these points, we have in the next place 
to consider whether all ought to share in every sort of occupa- 
tion. Shall every man be at once husbandman, artisan, coun- 
cillor, judge, or shall we suppose the several occupations just 
mentioned assigned to different persons ? or, thirdly, shall some 
employments be assigned to individuals and others common to 
all ? The question, however, does not occur in every state ; 

2 as we were saying, all may be shared by all, or not all by all, 
but only some by some 2 ; and hence arise the differences of 
states, for in democracies all share in all, in oligarchies the 

3 opposite practice prevails. Now, since we are here speaking 
of the best form of government, and that under which the state 
will be most happy (and happiness, as has been already said, 
cannot exist without virtue 3 ), it clearly follows that in the 
state which is best governed the citizens who are absolutely 
and not merely relatively just men must not lead the life of 
mechanics or tradesmen, for such a life is ignoble and inimical 

4 to virtue 4 . Neither must they be husbandmen, since leisure is 
1329 a necessary both for the development of virtue and the perform- 
ance of political duties. 

Again, there is in a state a class of warriors, and another 
of councillors, who advise about the expedient and determine 
matters of law, and these seem in an especial manner parts of 
a state. Now, should these two classes be distinguished, or 

5 are both functions to be assigned to the same persons ? Here 

1 Reading St/catW with Bekker in his second edition. 
2 Cp. iv. 4 and 14. 3 Cp. c. 8. § 5. * Cp. Plato, Laws, xi. 919. 



The Governing Classes 2jy 

again there is no difficulty in seeing that both functions will in VII. 9 
one way belong to the same, in another, to different persons. 
To different persons in so far as their employments are suited 
to different ages of life, for the one requires wisdom, and the 
other strength. But on the other hand, since it is an im- 
possible thing that those who are able to use or to resist force 
should be willing to remain always in subjection, from this 
point of view the persons are the same ; for those who carry 
arms can always determine the fate of the constitution. It 6 
remains therefore that both functions of government should be 
entrusted to the same persons, not, however, at the same time, 
but in the order prescribed by nature, who has given to young 
men strength and to older men wisdom. Such a distribution 
of duties will be expedient and also just, for it is in accordance 
with desert. Besides, the ruling class should be the owners of 7 
property, for they are citizens, and the citizens of a state should 
be in good circumstances ; whereas mechanics or any other 
class whose art excludes the art of virtue have no share in the 
state. This follows from our first principle, for happiness can- 
not exist without virtue, and a city is not to be termed happy 
in regard to a portion of the citizens, but in regard to them all \ 
And clearly property should be in their hands, since the hus- 8 
bandmen will of necessity be slaves or barbarians or Perioeci 2 . 
Of the classes enumerated there remain only the priests, and 
the manner in which their office is to be regulated is obvious. 
No husbandman or mechanic should be appointed to it ; for 9 
the Gods should receive honour from the citizens only. Now 
since the body of the citizens is divided into two classes, the 
warriors and the councillors ; and it is beseeming that the 
worship of the Gods should be duly performed, and also a 

1 Cp. ii. 5. §§ 27, 28 2 Cp. infra, c. 10. §§ 13, 14. 

T 2 



2 7 6 Warriors — Councillors — Priests 

VII. 9 rest provided in their service for those who from age have 

given up active life — to the old men of these two classes should 

be assigned the duties of the priesthood. 

io We have shown what are the necessary conditions, and 

what the parts of a state : husbandmen, craftsmen, and labourers 

of all kinds are necessary to the existence of states, but the 

parts of the state are the warriors and councillors. And these 

are distinguished severally from one another, the distinction 

being in some cases permanent, in others not. 

10 It is no new or recent discovery of political philosophers 

1329 b that the state ought to be divided into classes, and that the 

warriors should be separated from the husbandmen. The 

system has continued in Egypt and in Crete to this day, and 

was established, as tradition says, by a law of Sesostris in 

2 Egypt and of Minos in Crete. The institution of common 
tables also appears to be of ancient date, being in Crete as 

3 old as the reign of Minos, and in Italy far older. The Italian 
historians say that there was a certain Italus king of Oenotria, 
from whom the Oenotrians were called Italians, and who gave 
the name of Italy to the promontory of Europe lying between 
the Scylletic and Lametic Gulfs, which are distant from one 

4 another only half a day's journey. They say that this Italus 
converted the Oenotrians from shepherds into husbandmen, and 
besides other laws which he gave them, was the founder of 
their common meals ; even in our day some who are derived 
from him retain this institution and certain other laws of his. 

5 On the side of Italy towards Tyrrhenia dwelt the Opici, who 
are now, as of old, called Ausones ; and on the side towards 
Iapygia and the Ionian Gulf, in the district called Syrtis \ the 

1 Retaining the reading of the MSS., which Bekker in his second 
edition has altered into ^.ipiris, a conjecture of Goettling's. 



Ancient Egypt, Crete, Italy 277 

Chones, who are likewise of Oenotrian race. From this part VII. 10 
of the world originally came the institution of common tables ; 
the separation into castes [which was much older] from Egypt, 
for the reign of Sesostris is of far greater antiquity than that 
of Minos. It is true indeed that these and many other things 7 
have been invented several times over * in the course of ages, 
or rather times without number ; for necessity may be supposed 
to have taught men the inventions which were absolutely re- 
quired, and when these were provided, it was natural that other 
things which would adorn and enrich life should grow up by 
degrees. And we may infer that in political institutions the 
same rule holds. Egypt 2 witnesses to the antiquity of all 8 
things, for the Egyptians appear to be of all people the most 
ancient ; and they have laws and a regular constitution [existing 
from time immemorial]. We should therefore make the best 
use of what has been already discovered s , and try to supply 
defects. 

I have already remarked that the land ought to belong to 9 
those who possess arms and have a share in the government *, 
and that the husbandmen ought to be a class distinct from them ; 
and I have determined what should be the extent and nature 
of the territory. Let me proceed to discuss the distribution 
of the land, and the character of the agricultural class ; for 
I do not think that property ought to be common, as some 

1 Cp. Plato, Laws, iii. 676 ; Aristotle, Metaph. xi. 8. 1074 b. 10; and 
Pol. ii. 5. § 16 (note). 

2 Cp. Metaph. i. 1. § 16; Meteor, i. 14. 352 b. 19; Plato, Timaeus, 
22 b; Laws, ii. 656, 657. 

3 Reading, with Bekker in his second edition, evprjfjievois : which may 
have been altered into elprjficvots from a confusion of efprjTCu irporepov 
in § 9 infra. 

* Cp. supra, c. 9. §§ 5-7. 



278 Private Landholders — Common Meals 

VII. 10 maintain 1 , but only that by friendly consent there should be 
1330 a a common use of it ; and that no citizen should be in want of 
subsistence. 

As to common meals, there is a general agreement that a well- 
ro ordered city should have them ; and we will hereafter explain 
what are our own reasons for taking this view. They ought, 
however, to be open to all the citizens 2 . And yet it is not 
easy for the poor to contribute the requisite sum out of their 
private means, and to provide also for their household. The 
expense of religious worship should likewise be a public charge. 

11 The land must therefore be divided into two parts, one public 
and the other private, and each part should be subdivided, 
half of the public land being appropriated to the service of 
the Gods, and the other half used to defray the cost of the 
common meals ; while of the private land, half should be 
near the border, and the other near the city, so that each 
citizen having two lots they may all of them have land in both 
places ; there is justice and fairness in such a division s , and it 
tends to inspire unanimity among the people in their border 

12 wars. Where there is not this arrangement, some of them are 
too ready to come to blows with their neighbours, while others 
are so cautious that they quite lose the sense of honour. 
Wherefore there is a law in some places which forbids those 
who dwell near the border to take part in public deliberations 
about wars with neighbours, on the ground that their interests 

13 will pervert their judgment. For the reasons already mentioned, 
then, the land should be divided in the manner described. 

1 Cp. ii. 5. 2 C P . ii. 9. § 31. 

'•' Cp. Plato, Laws, v. 745, where the same proposal is found. Aristotle, 
in Rook ii. 6. § 15, condemns the division of lots which he here 
adopts. 



The Land and its Cultivators 279 

The very best thing of all would be that the husbandmen should VII. 10 
be slaves, not all of the same race 1 and not spirited, for if 
they have no spirit they will be better suited for their work, 
and there will be no danger of their making a revolution. The 
next best thing would be that they should be Perioeci of foreign 
race 2 , and of a like inferior nature ; some of them should be 14 
the slaves of individuals, and employed on the private estates 
of men of property, the remainder should be the property of 
the state and employed on the common land s . I will hereafter 
explain what is the proper treatment of slaves, and why it is 
expedient that liberty should be always held out to them as 
the reward of their services. 

We have already said that the city should be open to the 11 
land and v to the sea 4 , and to the whole country as far 
as possible. In respect of the place itself our wish would 
be to find a situation for it, fortunate in four things. The 
first, health — this is a necessity : cities which lie towards the 2 
east, and are blown upon by winds coming from the east, 
are the healthiest ; next in healthfulness are those which are 
sheltered from the north wind, for they have a milder winter. 
The site of the city should likewise be convenient both 1330 b 
for political administration and for war. With a view to the 3 
latter it should afford easy egress to the citizens, and 
at the same time be inaccessible and difficult of capture to 
enemies 5 . There should be a natural abundance of springs 
and fountains in the town or, if there is a deficiency of them, 
great reservoirs may be established for the collection of 
rain-water, such as will not fail when the inhabitants are cut 

1 Cp. Plato, Laws, vi. 777. 3 Cp. c. 9. § 8. 

3 Cp. ii. 7. § 23. 4 Cp. c. 5. § 3 . 

5 Repetition of c. 5. § 3. 



28 o The City: Sanitary Conditions 

VII. 11 off from the country by war. Special care should be taken 

4 of the health of the inhabitants, which will depend chiefly on 
the healthiness of the locality and of the quarter to which they 
are exposed, and secondly, on the use of pure water ; this 
latter point is by no means a secondary consideration. For 
the elements which we use most and oftenest for the support 
of the body contribute most to health, and among these 

5 are water and air. Wherefore, in all wise states, if there is 
a want of pure water, and the supply is not all equally good, 
the drinking water ought to be separated from that which is 
used for other purposes. 

As to strongholds, what is suitable to different forms of 
government varies : thus an acropolis is suited to an oligarchy 
or a monarchy, but a plain to a democracy ; neither to an 

6 aristocracy, but rather a number of strong places. The 
arrangement of private houses is considered to be more 
agreeable and generally more convenient if the streets are 
regularly laid out after the modern fashion which Hippo- 
damus 1 introduced ; but for security in war the antiquated 
mode of building, which made it difficult for strangers to get 
out of a town and for assailants to find their way in, is 

7 preferable. A city should therefore adopt both plans of 
building : it is possible to arrange the houses irregularly, 
as husbandmen plant their vines in what are called ' clumps.' 
The whole town should not be laid out in straight lines, but 
only certain quarters and regions ; thus security and beauty 
will be combined. 

8 As to walls, those who say 2 that cities making any 
pretension to military virtue should not have them, are quite 
out of date in their notions ; and they may see the cities 

1 Cp. ii. 8. § i. Cp. Plato, Laws, vi. 778, 779. 



Military 'Requirements , 281 

which prided themselves on this fancy confuted by facts. VII. 11 
True, there is little courage shown in seeking for safety 9 
behind a rampart when an enemy is similar in character 
and not much superior in number ; but the superiority of the 
besiegers may be and often is beyond the power of men to 
resist, and too much for the valour of a few ; and if they 
are to be saved and to escape defeat and outrage, the strongest 1331 a 
wall will be the best defence of the warrior, more especially 
now that catapults and siege engines have been brought 
to such perfection. To have no walls would be as foolish 10 
as to choose a site for a town in an exposed country, and to 
level the heights; or as if an individual were to leave his 
house unwalled, lest the inmates should become cowards. 
Nor must we forget that those who have their cities surrounded 11 
by walls may either take advantage of them or not, but cities 
which are unwalled have no choice. 

If our conclusions are just, not only should cities have 
walls, but care should be taken to make them ornamental, 
as well as useful for warlike purposes, and adapted to resist 
modern inventions. For as the assailants of a city do 12 
all they can to gain an advantage, so the defenders should 
make use of any means of defence which have been already 
discovered, and should devise and invent others, for when 
men are well prepared no enemy even thinks of attacking 
them. 

As the walls are to be divided by guardhouses and towers 12 
built at suitable intervals, and the body of citizens must 
be distributed at common tables, the idea will naturally 
occur that we should establish some of the common tables 
in the guardhouses. The arrangement might be as follows ; 2 
the principal common tables of the magistrates will occupy 



282 Public Buildings 



^ 



VII. 12 a suitable place, and there also will be the buildings appro- 
priated to religious worship except in the case of those rites 
which the law or the Pythian oracle has restricted to a 

3 special locality 1 . The site should be a spot seen far and 
wide, which gives due elevation to virtue and towers over the 
neighbourhood. Near this spot should be established an 
agora, such as that which the Thessalians call the ' freemen's 

4 agora ' ; from this all trade should be excluded, and no 
mechanic, husbandman, or any such person allowed to enter, 
unless he be summoned by the magistrates. It would be 
a charming use of the place, if the gymnastic exercises of 

5 the elder men were performed there. For 2 in this noble 
practice different ages should be separated 2 , and some of 
the magistrates should stay with the boys, while the grown- 
up men remain with the magistrates [i.e. in the freeman's 
agora] ; for the presence of the magistrates is the best mode 

33 J? of inspiring true modesty and ingenuous fear. There should 
also be a traders' agora, distinct and apart from the other, in 
a situation which is convenient for the reception of goods 
both by sea and land. 

But in speaking of the magistrates we must not forget 
another section of the citizens, viz. the priests, for whom 
public tables should likewise be provided in their proper 
7 place near the temples. The magistrates who deal with 
contracts, indictments, summonses, and the like, and those 
who have the care of the agora and of the city respectively, 
ought to be established near the agora and in some public 
place of meeting ; the neighbourhood of the traders' agora 
will be a suitable spot; the upper agora we devote to 

1 Cp. Plato, Laws, v. 73S ; vi. 759, 778; viii. 848. 

- Or 'this institution should be divided according to ages.' 



The End of the State and the Means 283 

the life of leisure, the other is intended for the necessities of VII. 12 
trade. 

The same order should prevail * in the country, for there 8 
too the magistrates, called by some ' Inspectors of Forests,' 
and by others 'Wardens of the Country/ must have guard- 
houses and common tables while they are on duty ; temples 
should also be scattered throughout the country, dedicated, 
some to Gods, and some to heroes. 

But it would be a waste of time for us to linger over 9 
details like these. The difficulty is not in imagining but in 
carrying them out. We may talk about them as much as we 
like, but the execution of them will depend upon fortune. 
Wherefore let us say no more about these matters for the present. 

Returning to the constitution itself, let us seek to 13 
determine out of what, and what sort of, elements the state 
which is to be happy and well-governed should be composed. 
There are two things in which all well-being consists ; one of 2 
them is the choice of a right end and aim of action, and 
the other the discovery of the actions which are means 
towards it ; for the means and the end may agree or disagree. 
Sometimes the right end is set before men, but in practice they 
fail to attain it ; in other cases they are successful in all the 
means, but they propose to themselves a bad end, and some- 
times they fail in both. Take, for example, the art of medicine ; 
physicians do not always understand the nature of health, and 
also the means which they use may not effect the desired end. 
In all arts and sciences both the end and the means should be 
equally within our control. 

The happiness and well-being which all men manifestly 3 
desire, some have the power of attaining, but to others, from 
1 Reading vt v(p.TJaOat with Bekker's first edition. 



284 The Good Life Requires External Goods 

VII. 13 some accident or defect of nature, the attainment of them is 

1332 a not granted ; for a good life requires a supply of external 

goods, in a less degree when men are in a good state, in 

4 a greater degree when they are in a lower state. Others 
again, who possess the condition of happiness, go utterly 
wrong from the first in the pursuit of it. But since our 
object is to discover the best form of government, that, 
namely, under which a city will be best governed, and since 
the city is best governed which has the greatest opportunity 
of obtaining happiness, it is evident that we must clearly 
ascertain the nature of happiness. 

5 We have said in the Ethics *, if the arguments there adduced 
are of any value, that happiness is the realization and perfect 
exercise of virtue, and this not conditional, but absolute. 

6 And I used the term ' conditional ' to express that which is 
indispensable, and ' absolute ' to express that which is good 
in itself. Take the case of just actions ; just punishments 
and chastisements do indeed spring from a good principle, but 
they are good only because we cannot do without them — 
it would be better that neither individuals nor states should 
need anything of the sort — but actions which aim at honour 

7 and advantage are absolutely the best. The conditional 
action is only the choice 2 of a lesser evil ; whereas these are 
the foundation and creation of good. A good man may 
make the best even of poverty and disease, and the other ills 
of life ; but he can only attain happiness under the opposite 
conditions 3 . As we have already said in the Ethics 4 , 

1 Cp. N. Elh. i. 7. § 15 ; x. 6. § 2 ; and cp. c. 8. § 5, supra. 

2 Retaining lhe MSS. reading cttpeais with Bekker's first edition. 

3 N. Eth. i. ro. § 12-14. 

4 N. Eih. iii. 4. §§ 4, 5 ; E. E. vii. 15. § 4 ; M. M. ii. 9. § 3- 



The Good Life Requires External Goods 28y 

the good man is he to whom, because he is virtuous, the VII. 13 
absolute good is his good. It is also plain that his use 8 
of other goods must be virtuous and in the absolute sense 
good. This makes men fancy that external goods are the 
cause of happiness, yet we might as well say that a brilliant 
performance on the lyre was to be attributed to the instru- 
ment and not to the skill of the performer. 

It follows then from what has been said that some things 
the legislator must find ready to his hand in a state, others 
he must provide. And therefore we can only say : May 9 
our state be constituted in such a manner as to be blessed 
with the goods of which fortune disposes (for we acknow- 
ledge her power) : whereas virtue and goodness in the 
state are not a matter of chance but the result of knowledge 
and purpose. A city can be virtuous only when the citizens 
who have a share in the government are virtuous, and in 
our state all the citizens share in the government; let us then 
enquire how a man becomes virtuous. For even if we could io 
suppose all the citizens to be virtuous, and not each of them, 
yet the latter would be better, for in the virtue of each the 
virtue of all is involved. 

There are three things which make men good and virtuous: 
these are nature, habit, reason 1 . In the first place, every one n 
must be born a man and not some other animal ; in the 
second place, he must have a certain character, both of 
body and soul. But some qualities there is no use in having 
at birth, for they are altered by habit, and there are some 1332 b 
gifts of nature which may be turned by habit to good or 
bad. Most animals lead a life of nature, although in lesser 12 
Darticulars some are influenced by habit as well. Man 
1 Cp. N. Eth. x. 9. § 6. 



28 6 How Men become Good 

VII. 13 has reason, in addition, and man only *. Wherefore nature, 
habit, reason must be in harmony with one another [for they 
do not always agree] ; men do many things against habit and 
13 nature, if reason persuades them that they ought. We have 
already determined what natures are likely to be most easily 
moulded by the hands of the legislator 2 . All else is the work 
of education ; we learn some things by habit and some by 
instruction. 
14 Since every political society is composed of rulers and 
subjects, let us consider whether the relations of one to 
the other should interchange or be permanent 3 . For the 
education of the citizens will necessarily vary with the answer 

2 given to this question. Now, if some men excelled others 
in the same degree in which gods and heroes are supposed to 
excel mankind in general, having in the first place a great 
advantage even in their bodies, and secondly in their minds, 
so that the superiority of the governors 4 over their subjects 
was patent and undisputed 4 , it would clearly be better that 
once for all the one class should rule and the others serve 5 . 

3 But since this is unattainable, and kings have no marked 
superiority over their subjects, such as Scylax affirms to be 
found among the Indians, it is obviously necessary on many 
grounds that all the citizens alike should take their turn of 
governing and being governed. Equality consists in the same 
treatment of similar persons, and no government can stand 

4 which is not founded upon justice. For [if the government 
be unjust] every one in the country unites with the governed 

1 Cp. i. 2. § 10. a Cp. supra, c. 7. § 4. 3 Cp. iii. 6. § 9. 

* Or, taking rots apxofxivois with <pavipav^ ' was undisputed and patent 
to their subjects.' 

* Cp. i. 5. §8; iii. 13. § 13. 



Same Persons Rulers and Subjects 287 

in the desire to have a revolution, and it is an impossibility that VII. 14 
the members of the government can be so numerous as to be 
stronger than all their enemies put together. Yet that governors 
should excel their subjects is undeniable. How all this is to 
be effected, and in what way they will respectively share in 
the government, the legislator has to consider. The subject 
has been already mentioned 1 . Nature herself has given the 5 
principle of choice when she made a difference between old 
and young (though they are really the same in kind), of whom 
she fitted the one to govern and the others to be governed. 
No one takes offence at being governed when he is young, 
nor does he think himself better than his governors, espe- 
cially if he will enjoy the same privilege when he reaches the 
required age. 

We conclude that from one point of view governors 6 
and governed are identical, and from another different. And 
therefore their education must be the same and also different. 1333 a 
For he who would learn to command well must, as men say, 
first of all learn to obey 2 . As I observed in the first 
part of this treatise, there is one rule which is for the sake 
of the rulers and another rule which is for the sake of the 
ruled 3 ; the former is a despotic, the latter a free government. 7 
Some commands differ not in the thing commanded, but 
in the intention with which they are imposed. Wherefore, 
many apparently menial offices are an honour to the free 
youth by whom they are performed ; for actions do not differ 
as honourable or dishonourable in themselves so much as in the 
end and intention of them. But since we say 4 that the virtue 8 
of the citizen and ruler is the same as that of the good man, 

1 Cp. c. 9. § 5. 2 Cp. iii. 4. § 14. 

8 Cp. iii. 6. § 6. * Cp. iii. 42nd 5. § 10. 



288 Who must Learn 'Rule by Obedience 

VII. 14 and that the same person must first be a subject and then 
a ruler, the legislator has to see that they become good men, 
and by what means this may be accomplished, and what is 
the end of the perfect life. 
9 Now the soul of man is divided into two parts, one of 
which has reason in itself, and the other, not having reason 
in itself, is able to obey reason 1 . And we call a man 
good because he has the virtues of these two parts. In 
which of them the end is more likely to be found is no 

io matter of doubt to those who adopt our division; for in 
the world both of nature and of art the inferior always exists 
for the sake of the better or superior, and the better or 
superior is that which has reason. The reason too, in 
our ordinary way of speaking, is divided into two parts, for 

i i there is a practical and a speculative reason 2 , and there must 
be a corresponding division of actions ; the actions of the 
naturally better principle are to be preferred by those who 
have it in their power to attain to both or to all, for that 
is always to every one the most eligible which is the highest 

la attainable by him. The whole of life is further divided 
into two parts, business and leisure s , war and peace, and all 
actions into those which are necessary and useful, and those 

13 which are honourable. And the preference given to one 
or the other class of actions must necessarily be like the 
preference given to one or other part of the soul and its 
actions over the other ; there must be war for the sake 
of peace, business for the sake of leisure, things useful 
and necessary for the sake of things honourable. All these 

1 Cp. N. Eth. i. 13. §§ 1 8, 19. 
3 Cp. N. Eth. vi. 1. § 5; 11. § 4. 
3 N. Eth. x. 7. § 6. 



The Spartan Ideal Criticised 289 

points the statesman should keep in view when he frames his VII. 14 
laws ; he should consider the parts of the soul and their 
functions, and above all the better and the end ; he should 14 
also remember the diversities of human lives and actions. 
For men must engage in business and go to war, but leisure 1333 b 
and peace are better; they must do what is necessary and 
useful, but what is honourable is better. In such principles 
children and persons of every age which requires education 
should be trained. Whereas even the Hellenes of the 15 
present day, who are reputed to be best governed, and the 
legislators who gave them their constitutions, do not appear 
to have framed their governments with a regard to the best 
end, or to have given them laws and education with a view to 
all the virtues, but in a vulgar spirit have fallen back on those 
which promised to be more useful and profitable. Many 16 
modern writers have taken a similar view : they commend the 
Lacedaemonian constitution, and praise the legislator for 
making conquest and war his sole aim *, a doctrine which 
may be refuted by argument and has long ago been refuted by 
facts. For most men desire empire in the hope of accumu- 17 
lating the goods of fortune ; and on this ground Thibron and 
all those who have written about the Lacedaemonian consti- 
tution have praised their legislator, because the Lacedae- 
monians, by a training in hardships, gained great power. 
But surely they are not a happy people now that their empire 18 
has passed away, nor was their legislator right. How 
ridiculous is the result, if, while they are continuing in the 
observances of his laws and no one interferes with them 
they have lost the better part of life. These writers further 1 9 

1 Plato, Laws, i. 628, 638. 

DAVIS U 



290 Spartan or Military Ideal 

VII. 14 err about the sort of government which the legislator should 
approve, for the government of freemen is noble, and implies 
more virtue than despotic government \ Neither is a city to 
be deemed happy or a legislator to be praised because he 
trains his citizens to conquer and obtain dominion over their 

20 neighbours, for there is great evil in this. On a similar 
principle any citizen who could, would obviously try to obtain 
the power in his own state — the crime which the Lacedae- 
monians accused king Pausanias of attempting 2 , although 
he had so great honour already. No such principle and 
no law having this object is either statesmanlike or useful or 

21 right. For the same things are best both for individuals and 
for states, and these are the things which the legislator ought 
to implant in the minds of his citizens. Neither should men 
study war with a view to the enslavement of those who 
do not deserve to be enslaved ; but first of all they should 
provide against their own enslavement, and in the second 

1334 a place obtain empire for the good of the governed, and not for 
the sake of exercising a general despotism, and in the third 
place they should seek to be masters only over those 

22 who deserve to be slaves. Facts, as well as arguments, prove 
that the legislator should direct all his military and other 
measures to the provision of leisure and the establishment of 
peace. For most of these military states are safe only while 
they are at war s , but fall when they have acquired their 
empire ; like unused iron they lose their edge in time of peace. 
And for this the legislator is to blame, he never having 
taught them how to lead the life of peace. 

15 Since the end of individuals and of states is the same> the 

1 C P . i. 5. § 2. 2 Cp. v. i.§ 10; 7. §4. 

3 Cp. ii. 9. § 34. 



Spartan or Military Ideal 291 

end of the best man and of the best state must also be VII. 15 
the same ; it is therefore evident that there ought to exist in 
both of them the virtues of leisure ; for peace, as has been 
often repeated, is the end of war, and leisure of toil. But 2 
leisure and cultivation may be promoted, not only by those 
virtues which are practised in leisure, but also by some 
of those which are useful to business *. For many neces- 
saries of life have to be supplied before we can have leisure. 
Therefore a city must be temperate and brave, and able 
to endure : for truly, as the proverb says, i There is no 
leisure for slaves,' and those who cannot face danger like men 
are the slaves of any invader. Courage and endurance 3 
are required for business and intellectual virtue for leisure, 
temperance and justice for both, more especially in times 
of peace and leisure, for war compels men to be just and 
temperate, whereas the enjoyment of good fortune and 
the leisure which comes with peace tends to make them 
insolent. Those, then, who seem to be the best off and to be 4 
in the possession of every good, have special need of justice 
and temperance — for example, those (if such there be, as the 
poets say) who dwell in the Islands of the Blest ; they above 
all will need philosophy and temperance and justice, and all 
the more the more leisure they have, living in the midst 
of abundance. There is no difficulty in seeing why the state 5 
that would be happy and good ought to have these virtues. 
If it be disgraceful in men not to be able to use the goods of 
life, it is peculiarly disgraceful not to be able to use them in 
time of peace — to show excellent qualities in action and war, 
and when they have peace and leisure to be no better than slaves. 

1 i. e. ' not only by some of the speculative but also by some of the 
practical virtues.' 

U 2 



292 Need of a Higher Ideal of Life 

VII. 15 Wherefore we should not practise virtue after the manner of 

6 the Lacedaemonians 1 . For they, while agreeing wich other 
1334 b men in their conception of the highest goods, differ from the 

rest of mankind in thinking that they are to be obtained by the 
practice of a single virtue. And since these goods and the 
enjoyment of them are clearly greater than the enjoyment 
derived from the virtues of which they are the end, we must 
now consider how and by what means they are to be 
attained. 

7 We have already determined that nature and habit and reason 
are required 2 , and what should be the character of the citizens 
has also been defined by us. But we have still to consider 
whether the training of early life is to be that of reason or 
habit, for these two must accord, and when in accord they 
will then form the best of harmonies. Reason may make 
mistakes and fail in attaining the highest ideal of life, 3 and 

8 there may be a like evil influence of habit s . Thus much is 
clear in the first place, that, as in all other things, generation 
starts from a beginning, and that the ends of some beginnings 
are related to another end. Now. in men reason and mind are 
the end towards which nature strives, so that the generation 
and moral discipline of the citizens ought to be ordered with 

9 a view to them. In the second place, as the soul and body 
are two, we see also that there are two parts of the soul, the 
rational and the irrational 4 , and two corresponding states — 
reason and appetite. And as the body is prior in order of 
generation to the soul, so the irrational is prior to the rational. 

1 Cp. ii. 9. § 34. 2 Cp. 13 § 12. 

8 Or, * and yet a man may be trained by habit as if the reason had not 
so erred.* 

4 Cp. N. Eth. i. 13. § 9 ff. 



Nature and Habit Prior to Treason 293 

The proof is that anger and will and desire are implanted in VII. 15 
children from their very birth, but reason and understanding 
are developed as they grow older. Wherefore, the care of the 
body ought to precede that of the soul, and the training of the 
appetitive part should follow : none the less our care of it must 
be for the sake of the reason, and our care of the body for the 
sake of the soul \ 

Since the legislator should begin by considering how the 16 
frames of the children whom he is rearing may be as good as 
possible, his first care will be about marriage — at what age 
should his citizens marry, and who are fit to marry ? In 2 
legislating on this subject he ought to consider the persons and 
their relative ages, that there may be no disproportion in them, 
and that they may not differ in their bodily powers, as will be 
the case if the man is still able to beget children while the 
woman is unable to bear them, or the woman able to bear while 
the man is unable to beget, for from these causes arise quarrels 
and differences between married persons. Secondly, he must 
consider the time at which the children will succeed to their 
parents ; there ought not to be too great an interval of age, for 3 
then the parents will be too old to derive any pleasure from 
their affection, or to be of any use to them. Nor ought they 1335 a 
to be too nearly of an age ; to youthful marriages there are many 
objections — the children will be wanting in respect to their 
parents, who will seem to be their contemporaries, and disputes 
will arise in the management of the household. Thirdly, and 4 
Jiis is the point from which we digressed, the legislator must 
-nould to his will the frames of newly-born children. Almost 
ill these objects may be secured by attention to one point. 
Since the time of generation is commonly limited within the 5 
1 Cp. Plato, Rep. iii. 410. 



294 The Physical Foundation 

VII. 16 age of seventy years in the case of a man, and of fifty in the 
case of a woman, the commencement of the union should con- 

6 form to these periods. The union of male and female when 
too young is bad for the procreation of children ; in all other 
animals the offspring of the young are small and ill-developed, 
and generally of the female sex, and therefore also in man, as 
is proved by the fact that in those cities in which men and 
women are accustomed to marry young, the people are small 

7 and weak ; in childbirth also younger women suffer more, 
and more of them die ; some persons say that this was the 
meaning of the response once given to the Troezenians — 
[' Shear not the young field '] — the oracle really meant that 
many died because they married too young ; it had nothing to 

8 do with the ingathering of the harvest. It also conduces to 
temperance not to marry too soon ; for women who marry 
early are apt to be wanton ; and in men too the bodily frame 
is stunted if they marry while they are growing (for there is 

9 a time when the growth of the body ceases). Women should 
many when they are about eighteen years of age, and men at 
seven-and-thirty * ; then they are in the prime of life, and the 

io decline in the powers of both will coincide. Further, the 
children, if their birth takes place at the time that may 
reasonably be expected, will succeed in their prime, when the 
fathers are already in the decline of life, and have nearly 
reached their term of three-score years and ten. 

Thus much of the age proper for marriage : the season of 
the year should also be considered ; according to our present 
custom, people generally limit marriage to the season of winter, 

ii and they are right. The precepts of physicians and natural 
philosophers about generation should also be studied by the 
1 Omitting 77 fxiKpCv, 



Regulations Concerning Marriage 29 j 

parents themselves ; the physicians give good advice about VII. 16 

the right age of the body, and the natural philosophers about 

the winds ; of which they prefer the north to the south. 1335 b 

What constitution in the parent is most advantageous to 12 
the offspring is a subject which we will hereafter consider 
when we speak of the education of children, and we will only 
make a few general remarks at present. The temperament of 
an athlete is not suited to the life of a citizen, or to health, or 
to the procreation of children, anymore than the valetudinarian 
or exhausted constitution, but one which is in a mean between 
them. A man's constitution should be inured to labour, but 13 
not to labour which is excessive or of one sort only, such as 
is practised by athletes ; he should be capable of all the actions 
of a freeman. These remarks apply equally to both parents. 

Women who are with child should be careful of themselves ; 14 
they should take exercise and have a nourishing diet. The 
first of these prescriptions the legislator will easily carry into 
effect by requiring that they shall take a walk daily to some 
temple, where they can worship the gods who preside over 
birth 1 . Their minds, however, unlike their bodies, they 
ought to keep unexercised, for the offspring derive their natures 
from their mothers as plants do from the earth. 

As to the exposure and rearing of children, let there be a 15 
law that no deformed child shall live, but where there are too 
many (for in our state population has a limit), when couples 
have children in excess, and the state of feeling is averse to the 
exposure of offspring, let abortion be procured before sense 
and life have begun ; what may or may not be lawfully done in 
these cases depends on the question of life and sensation. 

And now, having determined at what ages men and women 16 
1 Cp. Plato, Laws, vii. 7S9. 



29 6 Regulations Concerning 'Marriage 

VII. 16 are to begin their union, let us also determine how long they 
shall continue to beget and bear offspring for the state 1 ; men 
who are too old, like men who are too young, produce children 
who are defective in body and mind ; the children of very old 

17 men are weakly. The limit, then, should be the age which is the 
prime of their intelligence, and this in most persons, according to 
the notion of some poets who measure life by periods of seven 
years, is about fifty 2 ; at four or five years later, they should 
cease from having families ; and from that time forward only 
cohabit with one another for the sake of health, or for some 
similar reason. 

!8 As to adultery, let it be held disgraceful for any man 

or woman to be unfaithful when they are married, and called 

1336 a husband and wife. If during the time of bearing children 

anything of the sort occur, let the guilty person be punished 

with a loss of privileges in proportion to the offence 3 . 

17 After the children have been born, the manner of rearing 
them may be supposed to have a great effect on their bodily 
strength. It would appear from the example of animals, and 
of those nations who desire to create the military habit, that 
the food which has most milk in it is best suited to human be- 
ings ; but the less wine the better, if they would escape disease. 

2 Also all the motions to which children can be subjected at their 
early age are very useful. But in order to preserve their tender 
limbs from distortion, some nations have had recourse to 
mechanical appliances which straighten their bodies. To 
accustom children to the cold from their earliest years is also 
an excellent practice, which greatly conduces to health, and 

3 hardens them for military service. Hence many barbarians 

1 A« to vpytiv. a Cp. Solon, Fragm. 25 Bergk. 

s Cp. Laws, vjii. S41. 



Education of Infants 297 

have a custom of plunging their children at birth into a cold VII. 17 

stream ; others, like the Celts, clothe them in a light wrapper 

only. For human nature should be early habituated to endure 

all which by habit it can be made to endure ; but the process 

must be gradual. And children, from their natural warmth, 

may be easily trained to bear cold. Such care should attend 

them in the first stage of life. 

The next period lasts to the age of five ; during this .no 4 
demand should be made upon the child for study or labour, lest 
its growth be impeded ; and there should be sufficient motion to 
prevent the limbs from being inactive. This can be secured, 
among other ways, by amusement, but the amusement should not 
be vulgar or tiring or riotous. The Directors of Education, as 5 
they are termed, should be careful what tales or stories the 
children hear 1 , for the sports of children are designed to prepare 
the way for the business of later life, and should be for the most 
part imitations of the occupations which they will hereafter pur- 
sue in earnest 2 . Those are wrong who [like Plato] in the Laws 6 
attempt to check the loud crying and screaming of children, 
for these contribute towards their growth, and, in a manner, 
exercise their bodies 3 . Straining the voice has an effect 
similar to that produced by the retention of the breath in 
violent exertions. Besides other duties, the Directors of 7 
Education should have an eye to their bringing up, and should 
take care that they are left as little as possible with slaves. 
For until they are seven years old they must live at home ; \zZ6b 
and therefore, even at this early age, all that is mean and low 
should be banished from their sight and hearing. Indeed, 8 
there is nothing which the legislator should be more careful to 

1 Plato, Rep. ii. 377 ff. 2 Plato, Laws, i. 643; vii. 799. 

a Plato, Laws, vii. 792. 



298 Maxima Debetur Pueris J^everentia 

VII. 17 drive away than indecency of speech ; for the light utterance 
of shameful words is akin to shameful actions. The young 
especially should never be allowed to repeat or hear anything of 
9 the sort. A freeman who is found saying or doing what is 
forbidden, if he be too young as yet to have the privilege of 
a place at the public table, should be disgraced and beaten, and 
an elder person degraded as his slavish conduct deserves. And 
since we do not allow improper language, clearly we should 

10 also banish pictures or tales which are indecent. Let the 
rulers take care that there be no image or picture representing 
unseemly actions, except in the temples of those Gods at 
whose festivals the law permits even ribaldry, and whom the 
law also permits to be worshipped by persons of mature age 
on behalf of themselves, their children, and their wives. But 

11 the legislator should not allow youth to be hearers of satirical 
Iambic verses or spectators of comedy until they are of an age 
to sit at the public tables and to drink strong wine ; by that 
time education will have armed them against the evil influences 
of such representations. 

12 We have made these remarks in a cursory manner — they 
are enough for the present occasion ; but hereafter 1 we will 
return to the subject and after a fuller discussion determine 
whether such liberty should or should not be granted, and in 

13 what way granted, if at all. Theodorus, the tragic actor, was 
quite right in saying that he would not allow any other actor, 
not even if he were quite second-rate, to enter before himself, 
because the spectators grew fond of the voices which they first 
heard. And the same principle of association applies universally 
to things as well as persons, for we always like best whatever 

14 comes first. And therefore youth should be kept strangers 10 

1 Unfulfilled promise ^?), but cp. viii. 5. § 21. 



The Impressions of Early Tears 299 

all that is bad, and especially to things which suggest vice or VII. 17 
hate. When the five years have passed away, during the two 
following years they must look on at the pursuits which they 
are hereafter to learn. There are two periods of life into 15 
which education has to be divided — from seven to the age of 
puberty, and onwards to the age of one-and-twenty. [The 1337 a 
poets] who divide ages by sevens a are not always right 2 : we 
should rather adhere to the divisions actually made by nature ; 
for the deficiencies of nature are what art and education seek 
to fill up. 

Let us then first enquire if any regulations are to be laid 16 
down about children, and secondly, whether the care of them 
should be the concern of the state or of private individuals — 
which latter is in our own day the common custom — and in the 
third place, what these regulations should be. 

1 Cp, supra, c. 16. § 17. 

3 Reading ov tfaAws, with the MSS. and Bekker's first edition : 
or, reading ov tcaKtvs, a conjecture of Muretus, which Bekker has adopted 
in his second edition, ' are in the main right ; but we should also observe, 
etc/ 



BOOK VIII 

VIII. 1 No one will doubt that the legislator should direct his 
attention above all to the education of youth, or that the 

2 neglect of education does harm to states. The citizen should 
be moulded to suit the form of government under which 
he lives \ For each government has a peculiar character 
which originally formed and which continues to preserve 
it. The character of democracy creates democracy, and the 
character of oligarchy creates oligarchy ; and always the 
better the character, the better the government. 

Now for the exercise of any faculty or art a previous 
training and habituation are required; clearly therefore 

3 for the practice of virtue. And since the whole city has 
one end, it is manifest that education should be one and the 
same for all, and that it should be public, and not private — 
not as at present, when every one looks after his own 
children separately, and gives them separate instruction of the 
sort which he thinks best ; the training in things which are of 

4 common interest should be the same for all. Neither must 
we suppose that any one of the citizens belongs to himself, for 
they all belong to the state, and are each of them a part 
of the state, and the care of each part is inseparable from the 
care of the whole. In this particular the Lacedaemonians 
are to be praised, for they take the greatest pains about their 
children, and make education the business of the state 2 . 

2 That education should be regulated by law and should 
be an affair of state is not to be denied, but what should 
1 Cp. v. 9. §§ 11-16. 2 Cp. N. Eth. x. 9. § 13. 



What is a Liberal Education? 301 

be the character of this public education, and how young VIII. 2 
persons should be educated, are questions which remain to be 
considered. For mankind are by no means agreed about the 
things to be taught, whether we look to virtue or the best life. 
Neither is it clear whether education is more concerned 
with intellectual or with moral virtue. The existing prac- a 
tice is perplexing ; no one knows on what principle we 
should proceed — should the useful in life, or should virtue, 
or should the higher knowledge, be the aim of our training ; 
all three opinions have been entertained. Again, about the 1337 b 
means there is no agreement ; for different persons, start- 
ing with different ideas about the nature of virtue, naturally 
disagree about the practice of it. There can be no doubt 3 
thaj children should be taught those useful things which 
are really necessary, but not all things ; for occupations 
are divided into liberal and illiberal ; and to young children 
should be imparted only such kinds of knowledge as will 
be useful to them without vulgarizing them. And any 4 
occupation, art, or science, which makes the body or soul or 
mind of the freeman less fit for the practice or exercise 
of virtue, is vulgar ; wherefore we call those arts vulgar 5 
which tend to deform the body, and likewise all paid employ- 
ments, for they absorb and degrade the mind. There are 
also some liberal arts quite proper for a freeman to acquire, 
but only in a certain degree, and if he attend to them 
too closely, in order to attain perfection in them, the same 
evil effects will follow. The object also which a man 6 
sets before him makes a great difference ; if he does or 
learns anything for his own sake l or for the sake of his 
friends, or with a view to excellence, the action will not 
1 Cp. iii. 4. § 13. 



302 What is a Liberal Education? 

VIII. 2 appear illiberal ; but if done for the sake of others, the very 
same action will be thought menial and servile. The 
received subjects of instruction, as I have already remarked \ 
are partly of a liberal and partly of an illiberal character. 
3 The customary branches of education are in number four ; 
they are — (i) reading and writing, (2) gymnastic exercises, 
(3) music, to which is sometimes added (4) drawing. Of 
these, reading and writing and drawing are regarded as useful 
for the purposes of life in a variety of ways, and gymnastic 
exercises are thought to infuse courage. Concerning music 

2 a doubt may be raised — in our own day most men cultivate it 
for the sake of pleasure, but originally it was included in 
education, because nature herself, as has been often said, 
requires that we should be able not only to work well, but to 
use leisure well ; for, as I must repeat once and again 2 , the 

3 first principle of all action is leisure. Both are required, but 
leisure is better than occupation ; and therefore the question 
must be asked in good earnest, what ought we to do when at 
leisure ? Clearly we ought not to be amusing ourselves, 
for then amusement would be the end of life. But if this is 

4 inconceivable, and yet amid serious occupations amusement 
is needed more than at other times (for he who is hard 
at work has need of relaxation, and amusement gives 
relaxation, whereas occupation is always accompanied with 
exertion and effort), at suitable times we should introduce 
amusements, and they should be our medicines, for the 
emotion which they create in the soul is a relaxation, and 

1338 a from the pleasure we obtain rest. Leisure of itself gives 
pleasure and happiness and enjoyment of life, which are 

5 experienced, not by the busy man, but by those who have 

1 § 3 supra. 2 As in vii. 15. §§ 1, 2, and N. Eth. x. 6. 



The '"Use of Music 303 

leisure. For he who is occupied has in view some end which VIII. 3 
he has not attained ; but happiness is an end which all men 
deem to be accompanied with pleasure and not with pain. 
This pleasure, however, is regarded differently by different 
persons, and varies according to the habit of individuals ; the 
pleasure of the best man is the best, and springs from 
the noblest sources. It is clear, then, that there are branches 6 
of learning and education which we must study with a view 
to the enjoyment of leisure, and these are to be valued 
for their own sake ; whereas those kinds of knowledge which 
are useful in business are to be deemed necessary, and exist 
for the sake of other things. And therefore our fathers 7 
admitted music into education, not on the ground either of its 
necessity or utility, for it is not necessary, nor indeed useful 
in the same manner as reading and writing, which are useful 
in money-making, in the management of a household, in the 
acquisition of knowledge and in political life, nor like drawing, 
useful for a more correct judgment of the works of artists, 
nor again like gymnastic, which gives health and strength ; 
for neither of these is to be gained from music. There 
remains, then, the use of music for intellectual enjoyment in 
leisure ; which appears to have been the reason of its introduc- 
tion, this being one of the ways in which it is thought that 
a freeman should pass his leisure; as Homer says — 

'How good is it to invite men to the pleasant feast 1 ,' 
and afterwards he speaks of others whom he describes as 
inviting 

k The bard who would delight them all V 

1 Or, ' to invite Thalia to the feast/ an interpretation of the passage 
possibly intended by Aristotle, though of course not the original 
meaning. 2 Od. xvii. 385. 



304 Educational Studies 

VIII. 3 And in another place Odysseus says there is no better way of 
passing life than when 

' Men's hearts are merry and the banqueters in the hall, 
sitting in order, hear the voice of the minstrel V 
to It is evident, then, that there is a sort of education in 
which parents should train their sons, not as being useful or 
necessary, but because it is liberal or noble. Whether this is 
of one kind only, or of more than one, and if so, what they 
are, and how they are to be imparted, must hereafter be 

11 determined. Thus much we are now in a position to say that 
the ancients witness to us ; for their opinion may be gathered 
from the fact that music is one of the received and traditional 
branches of education. Further, it is clear that children 
should be instructed in some useful things — for example, in 
reading and writing — not only for their usefulness, but also 
because many other sorts of knowledge are acquired through 

12 them. With a like view they may be taught drawing, not 
to prevent their making mistakes in their own purchases, or 
in order that they may not be imposed upon in the buying 

1338 b or selling of articles, but rather because it makes them 
judges of the beauty of the human form. To be always 
seeking after the useful does not become free and exalted 

13 souls 2 . Now it is clear that in education habit must go 
before reason, and the body before the mind ; and therefore 
boys should be handed over to the trainer, who creates in 
them the proper habit of body, and to the wrestling-master, 
who teaches them their exercises. 

4 Of those stateswhich in ourowndayseem to take the greatest 
care of children, some aim at producing in them an athletic 
habit, but they only injure their forms and stunt their growth. 
1 Od. ix. 7. 2 Cp. Plato, Rep. vii. 525 ff. 



Pbyncal Education 30^ 

Although the Lacedaemonians have not fallen into this VIII. 4 

mistake, yet they brutalize their children by laborious exercises 

which they think will make them courageous. But in truth, 2 

as we have often repeated, education should not be exclusively 

directed to this or to any other single end. And even if we 

suppose the Lacedaemonians. to be right in their end, they do 

not attain it. For among barbarians and among animals 

courage is found associated, not with the greatest ferocity, but 

with a gentle and lion-like temper. There are many races 3 

who are ready enough to kill and eat men, such as the 

Achaeans and Heniochi, who both live about the Black Sea * ; 

and there are other inland tribes, as bad or worse, who all live 

by plunder, but have no courage. It is notorious that the 4 

Lacedaemonians, while they were themselves assiduous 

in their laborious drill, were superior to others, but now they 

are beaten both in war and gymnastic exercises. For their 

ancient superiority did not depend on their mode of training 

their youth, but only on the circumstance that they trained 

them at a time when others did not. Hence we may 5 

infer that what is noble, not what is brutal, should have the 

first place ; no wolf or other wild animal will face a really 

noble danger ; such dangers are for the brave man 9 . And 6 

parents who devote their children to gymnastics while 

they neglect their necessary education, in reality vulgarize 

them ; for they make them useful to the state in one quality 

only, and even in this the argument proves them to be inferior 

to others. We should judge the Lacedaemonians not from 7 

what they have been, but from what they are ; for now they 

have rivals who compete with their education ; formerly they 

had none. 

Cp. N. Eth. vii. 5. § 2. 3 Cp. N. Eth. iii. 6. § 8. 



306 Gymnastic 

VIII. 4 It is an admitted principle that gymnastic exercises should 
be employed in education, and that for children they should 
be of a lighter kind, avoiding severe regimen or painful toil, 

8 lest the growth of the body be impaired. The evil of 
excessive training in early years is strikingly proved by 

1339 a the example of the Olympic victors; for not more than two 
or three of them have gained a prize both as boys and as men ; 
their early training and severe gymnastic exercises exhausted 

9 their constitutions. When boyhood is over, three years 
should be spent in other studies ; the period of life which 
follows may then be devoted to hard exercise and strict 
regimen. Men ought not to labour at the same time with 
their minds and with their bodies 1 ; for the two kinds of 
labour are opposed to one another — the labour of the body 
impedes the mind, and the labour of the mind the body. 

5 Concerning music there are some questions which we have 
already raised ; these we may now resume and carry further ; 
and our remarks will serve as a prelude to this or any other 

2 discussion of the subject. It is not easy to determine the 
nature of music, or why any one should have a knowledge of 
it. Shall we say, for the sake of amusement and relaxation, 
like sleep or drinking, which are not good in themselves, but 
are pleasant, and at the same time c make care to cease/ 

3 as Euripides 2 says ? And therefore men rank them with 
music, and make use of all three — sleep 3 , drinking, music — 
to which some add dancing. Or shall we argue that music 
conduces to virtue, on the ground that it can form our minds 
and habituate us to true pleasures as our bodies are made by 

1 Cp. Plato, Rep. vii. 537 B. 2 Bacchae, 380. 

3 Reading (with Bekker's 2nd ed.) vttvw, a correction which seems 
necessary, and is suggested by vnvov teal /xtOrjs above. 



Music 307 

gymnastic to be of a certain character ? Or shall we say that VIII. 5 
it contributes to the enjoyment of leisure and mental cultiva- * 
tion, which is a third alternative ? Now obviously youth are 
not to be instructed with a view to their amusement, for learn- 
ing is no pleasure, but is accompanied with pain. Neither is 
intellectual enjoyment suitable to boys of that age, for it is 
the end, and that which is imperfect cannot attain the perfect 
or end. But perhaps it may be said that boys learn music for 5 
the sake of the amusement which they will have when they 
are grown up. If so, why should they learn themselves, and 
not, like the Persian and Median kings, enjoy the pleasure 
and instruction which is derived from hearing others ? (for 6 
surely skilled persons who have made music the business 
and profession of their lives will be better performers than 
those' who practise only to learn). If they must learn music, 
on the same principle they should learn cookery, which 
is absurd. And even granting that music may form the 7 
character, the objection still holds : why should we learn 
ourselves? Why cannot we attain true pleasure and form 1339b 
a correct judgment from hearing others, like the Lacedae- 
monians ? — for they, without learning music, nevertheless can 
correctly judge, as they say, of good and bad melodies. Or 8 
again, if music should be used to promote cheerfulness 
and refined intellectual enjoyment, the objection still remains — 
why should we learn ourselves instead of enjoying the 

I performances of others ? We may illustrate what we are 
saying by our conception of the Gods ; for in the poets Zeus 
does not himself sing or play on the lyre. Nay, we call 
professional performers vulgar ; no freeman would play or 
sing unless he were intoxicated or in jest. But these matters 9 
may be left for the present. 

x 2 



308 The Pleasure of Music 

VIII. 5 The first question is whether music is or is not to be a part 
of education. Of the three things mentioned in our discus- 
sion, which is it ? — Education or amusement or intellectual 
enjoyment, for it may be reckoned under all three, and seems 

10 to share in the nature of all of them. Amusement is for the 
sake of relaxation, and relaxation is of necessity sweet, for 
it is the remedy of pain caused by toil, and intellectual 
enjoyment is universally acknowledged to contain an element 
not only of the noble but of the pleasant, for happiness 

ii is made up of both. All men agree that music is one of 
the pleasantest things, whether with or without song ; as 
Musaeus says, 

' Song is to mortals of all things the sweetest.' 
Hence and with good reason it is introduced into social 
gatherings and entertainments, because it makes the hearts of 
men glad : so that on this ground alone we may assume that 

la the young ought to be trained in it. For innocent pleasures 
are not only in harmony with the perfect end of life, but they 
also provide relaxation. And whereas men rarely attain the 
end, but often rest by the way and amuse themselves, not only 
with a view to some good, but also for the pleasure's sake, it 
may be well for them at times to find a refreshment in music. 

13 It sometimes happens that men make amusement the end, 
for the end probably contains some element of pleasure, 
though not any ordinary or lower pleasure ; but they mistake 
the lower for the higher, and in seeking for the one find the 
other, since every pleasure has a likeness to the end of 
action 1 . For the end is not eligible, nor do the pleasures 
which we have described exist, for the sake of any future 
good but of the past, that is to say, they are the alleviation of 
1 Cp. N.Eth. vii. 13. §6. 



Music and Morals 309 

past toils and pains. And we may infer this to be the VIII. 5 

reason why men seek happiness from common pleasures. 14 

But music is pursued, not only as an alleviation of past 

toil, but also as providing recreation. And who can say 15 

whether, having this use, it may not also have a nobler one I 

In addition to this common pleasure, felt and shared in by all 1340 a 

(for the pleasure given by music is natural, and therefore 

adapted to all ages and characters), may it not have also 

some influence over the character and the soul ? It must 16 

have such an influence if characters are affected by it. And 

that they are so affected is proved by the power which 

the songs of Olympus and of many others exercise ; for 

beyond question they inspire enthusiasm, and enthusiasm 

is an emotion of the ethical part of the soul. Besides, when 17 

men hear imitations, even unaccompanied by melody or 

rhythm, their feelings move in sympathy. Since, then, music 

is a pleasure, and virtue consists in rejoicing and loving and 

hating aright, there is clearly nothing which we are so much 

concerned to acquire and to cultivate as the power of forming 

right judgments, and of taking delight in good dispositions 

and noble actions 1 . Rhythm and melody supply imitations 18 

of anger and gentleness, and also of courage and temperance 

and of virtues and vices in general, which hardly fall short of 

the actual affections, as we know from our own experience, 

for in listening to such strains our souls undergo a change. 

The habit of feeling pleasure or pain at mere representations 19 

is not far removed from the same feeling about realities 2 ; for 

example, if any one delights in the sight of a statue for 

its beauty only, it necessarily follows that the sight of 

1 Cp. Plato, Rep. iii. 401, 402; Laws, ii. 658, 659. 
% Cp. Plato, Rep. iii. 395. 



310 The Harmonies 

VIII. 5 the original will be pleasant to him. No other sense, such 
20 as taste or touch, has any resemblance to moral qualities ; 
in sight only there is a little, for figures are to some extent of 
a moral character, and [so far] all participate in the feeling 
about them. Again, figures and colours are not imitations, 
2i but signs of moral habits, and these signs occur only when the 
body is under the influence of emotions. The connexion of 
them with morals is slight, but in so far as there is any, 
young men should be taught to look, not at the works 
of Pauson, but at those of Polygnotus \ or any other painter 
or statuary who expresses moral ideas. On the other hand, 

22 even in mere melodies 2 there is an imitation of character, for 
the musical modes differ essentially from one another, 
and those who hear them are differently affected by each. 

1340 b Some of them make men sad and grave, like the so-called 
Mixolydian, others enfeeble the mind, like the relaxed 
harmonies, others, again, produce a moderate and settled 
temper, which appears to be the peculiar effect of the Dorian ; 

23 the Phrygian inspires enthusiasm. The whole subject 
has been well treated by philosophical writers on this branch 
of education, and they confirm their arguments by facts. 
The same principles apply to rhythms 3 : some have a 
character of rest, others of motion, and of these latter again, 

24 some have a more vulgar, others a nobler movement. Enough 
has been said to show that music has a power of forming the 
character, and should therefore be introduced into the education 

25 of the young. The study is suited to the stage of youth, for 
young persons will not, if they can help, endure anything which 
is not sweetened by pleasure, and music has a natural sweet- 

1 Cp. Poet. 2. § 2; 6. § 15. 2 Cp. Plato, Rep. iii. 398, 399. 

3 Rep. iii. 399 e, 400. 



The Harmonies 311 

ness. There seems to be in us a sort of affinity to harmonies VIII. 5 
and rhythms, which makes some philosophers say that the soul 
is a harmony, others, that she possesses harmony. 

And now we have to determine the question which 6 
has been already raised l , whether children should be 
themselves taught to sing and play or not. Clearly there is 
a considerable difference made in the character by the actual 
practice of the art. It is difficult, if not impossible, for 
those who do not perform to be good judges of the perform- 
ance of others 2 . Besides, children should have something 2 
to do, and the rattle of Archytas, which people give to their 
children in order to amuse them and prevent them from 
breaking anything in the house, was a capital invention, 
for a young thing cannot be quiet. The rattle is a toy suited 
to the infant mind, and [musical] education is a rattle or toy 
for children of a larger growth. We conclude then that they 3 
should be taught music in such a way as to become not only 
critics but performers. 

The question what is or is not suitable for different ages 

may be easily answered ; nor is there any difficulty in 

meeting the objection of those who say that the study of 

music is vulgar. We reply (1) in the first place, that they 4 

who are to be judges must also be performers, and that they 

should begin to practise early, although when they are older 

they may be spared the execution ; they must have learned 

to appreciate what is good and to delight in it, thanks to 

the knowledge which they acquired in their youth. As to 5 

(2) the vulgarizing effect which music is supposed to exercise, 

this is a question [of degree], which we shall have no 

difficulty in determining, when we have considered to what 

* 
1 <*. 5- §§ 5-8. a Cp. supra, c. 5. § 7. 



12 



The Gentleman 'Musician 



VIII. 6 extent freemen who are being trained to political virtue 

should pursue the art, what melodies and what rhythms they 

1341a should be allowed to use, and what instruments should be 

employed in teaching them to play, for even the instrument 

6 makes a difference. The answer to the objection turns upon 
these distinctions ; for it is quite possible that certain methods 
of teaching and learning music do really have a degrading 
effect. It is evident then that the learning of music ought 
not to impede the business of riper years, or to degrade the 
body or render it unfit for civil or military duties, whether for 
the early practice or for the later study of them. 

7 The right measure will be attained if students of music stop 
short of the arts which are practised in professional contests, 
and do not seek to acquire those fantastic marvels of execution 
which are now the fashion in such contests, and from these 

8 have passed into education. Let the young pursue their 
studies until they are able to feel delight in noble melodies and 
rhythms, and not merely in that common part of music in which 
every slave or child and even some animals find pleasure. 

From these principles we may also infer what instruments 

9 should be used. The flute, or any other instrument which 

equires great skill, as for example the harp, ought not to be 
admitted into education, but only such as will make intelligent 
students of music or of the other parts of education. 
Besides, the flute is not an instrument which has a good moral 
effect ; it is too exciting. The proper time for using it is 
when the performance aims not at instruction, but at the relief 
io of the passions 1 . And there is a further objection; the 
impediment which the flute presents to the use of the voice 
detracts from its educational value. The ancients therefore 
1 C P . c 7. § 3. 



Musical Instruments 313 

were right in forbidding the flute to youths and freemen, VIII. 6 
although they had once allowed it. For when their wealth gave n 
them greater leisure, and they had loftier notions of excellence, 
being also elated with their success, both before and after the 
Persian War, with more zeal than discernment they pursued 
every kind of knowledge, and so they introduced the flute into 
education. At Lacedaemon there was a Choragus who led 12 
the Chorus with a flute, and at Athens the instrument became 
so popular that most freemen could play upon it. The 
popularity is shown by the tablet which Thrasippus dedicated 
when he furnished the Chorus to Ecphantides. Later expe- 
rience enabled men to judge what was or what was not really 
conducive to virtue, and they rejected both the flute and several 13 
other old-fashioned instruments, such as the Lydian harp, the 
many-stringed lyre, the 'heptagon,' 'triangle,' ' sambuca/ and 1341b 
the like — which are intended only to give pleasure to the 
hearer, and require extraordinary skill of hand 1 . There is 
a meaning also in the myth of the ancients, which tells how 
Athene invented the flute and then threw it away. It was 14 
not a bad idea of theirs, that the Goddess disliked the 
instrument because it made the face ugly ; but with still more 
reason may we say that she rejected it because the acquirement 
of flute-playing contributes nothing to the mind, since to 
Athene we ascribe knowledge and art. 

Accordingly we reject the professional instruments and also 15 
the professional mode of education in music — and by pro- 
fessional we mean that which is adopted in contests, for in this 
the performer practises the art, not for the sake of his own 
improvement, but in order to give pleasure, and that of a vulgar 
sort, to his hearers. For this reason the execution of such 
1 Cp. Plato, Rep. iii. 399 d. 



314 The Professional 'Musician 

VIII. 6 music is not the part of a freeman but of a paid performer, and 
16 the result is that the performers are vulgarized, for the end at 
which they aim is bad 1 . The vulgarity of the spectator tends 
to lower the character of the music and therefore of the per- 
formers ; they look to him — he makes them what they are, and 
fashions even their bodies by the movements which he expects 
them to exhibit. 
7 We have also to consider rhythms and harmonies. Shall we 
use them all in education or make a distinction ? and shall the 
distinction be that which is made by those who are engaged in 
education, or shall it be some other ? For we see that music 
is produced by melody and rhythm, and we ought to know 
what influence these have respectively on education, and 
whether we should prefer excellence in melody or excellence in 

2 rhythm. But as the subject has been very well treated by 
many musicians of the present day, and also by philosophers 
who have had considerable experience of musical education, to 
these we would refer the more exact student of the subject ; we 
shall only speak of it now after the manner of the legislator, 
having regard to general principles. 

3 We accept the division of melodies proposed by certain 

philosophers into ethical melodies, melodies of action, and 

passionate or inspiring melodies, each having, as they say, a 

mode or harmony corresponding to it. But we maintain 

further that music should be studied, not for the sake of one, 

but of many benefits, that is to say, with a view to (1) 

education, (2) purgation (the word ' purgation ' we use at present 

without explanation, but when hereafter we speak of poetry 2 , we 

will treat the subject with more precision) ; music may also 

1 Cp. Plato, Laws, iii. 700. 
2 Cp. Poet. c. 6. though the promise is really unfulfilled. 



The Power of Music 3 i j* 

serve (3) for intellectual enjoyment, for relaxation and for VIII. 7 
recreation after exertion. It is clear, therefore, that all the 1342 a 
harmonies must be employed by us, but not all of them in the 
same manner. In education ethical melodies are to be preferred, 
but we may listen to the melodies of action and passion when 
they are performed by others. For feelings such as pity and 4 
fear, or, again, enthusiasm, exist very strongly in some souls, 
and have more or less influence over all. Some persons fall 
into a religious frenzy, whom we see disenthralled by the use of 
mystic melodies, which bring healing and purgation to the soul. 
Those who are influenced by pity or fear and every emotional 5 
nature have a like experience, others in their degree are stirred 
by something which specially affects them, and all are in a 
manner purged and their souls lightened and delighted. The 
melodies of purgation likewise give an innocent pleasure to 
mankind. Such are the harmonies and the melodies in which 6 
.those who perform music at the theatre should be invited to 
compete. But since the spectators are of two kinds — the 
one free and educated, and the other a vulgar crowd composed 
of mechanics, labourers and the like — there ought to be 7 
contests and exhibitions instituted for the relaxation of the 
second class also. And the melodies will correspond to their 
minds ; for as their minds are perverted from the natural state, 
so there are exaggerated and corrupted harmonies which are 
in like manner a perversion. A man receives pleasure from 
what is natural to him, and therefore professional musicians 
may be allowed to practise this lower sort of music before an 
audience of a lower type. But, for the purpose of education, 8 
as I have already said, those modes and melodies should be 
employed which are ethical, such as the Dorian ; though we 
may include any others which are approved by philosophers 



3 1 6 The Dorian, Phrygian, 

VIII. 7 who have had a musical education. The Socrates of the 

9 Republic 1 is wrong in retaining only the Phrygian mode along 

1342 b with the Dorian, and the more so because he rejects the flute ; 

for the Phrygian is to the modes what the flute is to musical 

instruments — both of them are exciting and emotional. 

io Poetry proves this, for Bacchic frenzy and all similar emotions 
are most suitably expressed by the flute, and are better set to 
the Phrygian than to any other harmony. The dithyramb, for 

ii example, is acknowledged to be Phrygian, a fact of which the 
connoisseurs of music offer many proofs, saying, among other 
things, that Philoxenus, having attempted to compose his 
Tales 2 as a dithyramb in the Dorian mode, found it impossible, 

i2 and fell back into the more appropriate Phrygian. All men 
agree that the Dorian music is the gravest and manliest. And 
whereas we say that the extremes should be avoided and the 
mean followed, and whereas the Dorian is a mean between the 
other harmonies [the Phrygian and the Lydian 3 ], it is evident 
that our youth should be taught the Dorian music. 

r3 Two principles have to be kept in view — what is possible, 
what is becoming : at these every man ought to aim. But 
even these are relative to age ; the old, who have lost their 
powers, cannot very well sing the severe melodies, and nature 
herself seems to suggest that their songs should be of the 

14 more relaxed kind. Wherefore the musicians likewise blame 
Socrates, and with justice, for rejecting the relaxed harmonies 
in education under the idea that they are intoxicating ; not in the 
ordinary sense of intoxication (for wine rather tends to excite 
men), but because they have no strength in them. And so 

1 Plato, Rep. iii. 399. 

3 Retaining the MS. reading txvQovs. Cp. Poet. c. 2. § 7. 

3 Cp. c. 5. § 22. 



and Lydian Modes 317 

with a view to a time of life when men begin to grow old, VIII. 
they ought to practise the gentler harmonies and melodies as 
well as the others. And if there be any harmony, such as the 15 
Lydian above all others appears to be, which is suited to 
children of tender age, and possesses the elements both of order 
and of education, clearly [we ought to use it, for] education 
should be based upon three principles — the mean, the possible, 
the becoming, these three. 



INDEX 



Abydos, v. 6, §§ 6, 13. 

Account, power of calling magis- 
trates to, in Sparta exercised by 
the Ephors, ii. 9, § 26 ; given 
by Solon to the people, ib. 1 2 , 
§ 5; iii. 11, § 8 ; and justly 
claimed by them, iii. 1 1 ; when 
exercised by all, a mark of 
democracy, iv. 14, §§ 4-6 ; vi.2, 

§ 5 5 4> § 5- 
Achaea [in Peloponnerus], v. 3, 

§n. 
Achaea [Pthiotis], ii. 9, § 3. 
Achaeans, the (in Colchis), viii. 4, 

§3. 

Achilles, iii. 5, § 9. 

Acquisition, the art of, (i) the 
natural, i. 9, § 1 2 ; 1 1 , §§ 1 , 2 ; 
includes war [in certain cases] 
and hunting, i. 7, § 5 ; 8, § 1 2 ; 
vii. 14, § 21 ; a part of house- 
hold management, i. 4, § 1 ; 

8, §§ 13-15; 9> §§ J -8; I0 > 

§§1-4; 11, § 2; has a limit, 
ib.8, §14; 9, §§13-18: {ii) that 
which is contrary to nature, in- 
cluding (a) exchange which 
goes beyond the need of life, 
i. 9, §§2-5; 10, §4; 11, § 3; 
(/>) usury, ib. 10, §4; 11, §3; 
(c) trade, ib. 9, §4; 10, §4; 
11, § 3 ; (d) service for hire, ib. 
11, § 3 : (iii) the intermediate 
kind, ib. § 4. 

Adamas, v. 10, § 18. 

Admiral, office of (at Sparta), 

"• 9, § 33- 

Aegina, iv. 4, § 21 ; v. 6, § 9. 
Aenos, in Thrace, v. 10, § 18. 



Aesymnetes, the, or dictators of 
ancient Hellas, iii. 14, §§ 8-10, 
14; iv. 10, § 2 ; always received 
a guard, iii. 15, § 16. 

Agamemnon, iii. 5, §9; 14, § 4; 
16, § 10. 

Agesilaus, King of Sparta, v. 7, 

§3. 

Agriculture, the employment fol- 
lowed by the greater part of 
mankind, i. 8, § 7; works upon, 
ib. II, §7; ancient legislation 
to encourage, vi. 4, §§ 8-10. 

Alcaeus, iii. 14, § 10. 

Alcyone, mother of Diodes the 
Corinthian, ii. 12, § 8. 

Aleuadae, the, at Larissa, v. 6, 

Aliens, resident, how distin- 
guished from citizens, iii. 1, § 4; t 
obliged to have a patron, ib. ; 
enrolled by Clcisthenes in the 
tribes, ib. 2, §3; admitted to 
citizenship at Syracuse, v. 3, 

§13. 

Alliance, an, how different from 
a state, ii. 2, § 3; iii. 9, §§ 6-8. 

Almsgiving, demoralizing effects 
of, vi. 5, § 7- 

Alternation in office, character- 
istic of constitutional govern- 
ments, i. 1, § 2 ; 12, §2; ii. 2, 
§§4-7; iii. 4, §§ 10, 14-17; 6, 
§§9, 10; 16, §§2, 3; 17, §4; 
vi. 2, §§2,5; vii. 14, §§1-5. 

Amadocus (? king of the Odry- 
sians), v. 10, § 24. 

Amasis, king of Egypt, i. 1 2, § 2. 

Ambition, a cause of crime, ii. 7, 



320 



Index 



§§ 10-14, 18 ; 9, § 28 ; encour- 
aged by the Spartan law-giver, 
ib. 9, § 28; a motive of revolu- 
tions, ii. 7, §§ 10, 18; v. 7, §4; 
10, §5- 

Ambracia, v. 3, § ic; 4, §9; 10, 
§16. 

Amphipolis, v. 3, § 13; 6, §8. 

Amyntas the Little (? father of 
Philip), v. 10, § 16. 

Anaxilaus, tyranny of, at Rhe- 
gium, v. 12, § 13. 

Andria, ancient name of the 
common meals at Sparta, ii. 10, 

Androdamas, of Rhegium, ii. 12, 

Andros, ii. 9, § 20. 

Animals, the, intention of Nature 
in denying speech to, i. 2,§§ 10- 
12; under the dominion of man, 
ib. 5, § 7 ; tame better than wild, 
ib. ; only differ from slaves in 
not being able to apprehend 
reason, ib. § 9 ; their various 
modes of life, ib. 8, §§ 4-6 ; 
supply their offspring with food 
in different ways, ib. § ro; cre- 
ated for the sake of man. ib. 
§§9-12; produce offspring re- 
sembling their parents, ii. 3, § 9 ; 
cannot form a state, iii. 9, § 6 ; 
lead a life of nature, not of 
reason, vii. 13, § 12 ; the parts 
of animals an illustration of the 
parts of the state, iv. 4, §§ 7-9 ; 
the offspring of young animals 
often small and ill-developed, 
vii. 16, § 6. 

Antileon, tyrant at Chalcis, v. 12, 
§12. 

Antimenides, brother of Alcaeus, 
iii. 14, §9. 

Antissa, in Lesbos, v. 3, § 12. 

Antisthenes, iii. 13, § 14. 

Aphytaeans, the (in Pallene), 
vi. 4, § 10. 



Apollodorus of Lemnos, i. 1 1, § 7. 
Apollonia (on the Adriatic), iv. 4, 

§5. 

Apollonia (on the Euxine), v. 3, 
§ 13; ib. 6, §9. 

Appeal, a court of, allowed by 
Hippodamus, ii. 8, § 4. 

Appetitive principle, the, of the 
soul, i. 5, §6; iii.4, §6; i6,§5; 
vii. 15, §§9, 10. 

Arbitrator, the judge should not 
be made into an, ii. 8, § 13; the 
middle class the arbitrators of 
the state, iv. 12, § 5. 

Arcadia, ii. 2, § 3; ib. 9, §§ 3, 11. 

Archelaus, king of Macedonia, 
v. 10, §§ 17-20. 

Archias of Thebes, v. 6, § 15. 

Archilochus, quoted, vii. 7, § 6. 

Archons, the duties of, vi. 8, § 20; 
the single Archon at Epidam- 
nus, iii. 16, § 1 ; v. 1, § 12. 

Archytas, of Tarentum, viii. 6, 
§2. 

Areopagus, the, at Athens {see 
Council of Areopagus). 

Argo, the, iii. 13, § 16. 

Argos, use of ostracism at, v. 3, 
§ 3 ; the political changes after 
' Hebdome,' ib. 3, § 7 ; the oli- 
garchical revolution after the 
battle of Mantinea, ib. 4, § 9 ; 
the tyranny of Pheidon, ib. 10, 
§ 6 ; enmity of the Argives to 
the Lacedaemonians, ii. 9, §§3, 
11. 

Ariobarzanes, v. 10, § 25. 

Aristocracy, characterized by 
election for merit, ii. 1 1, §§9, 
11 ; iv. 8, § 7; v. 7, § 1; dis- 
tinguished from the perfect state, 
as being a government of men 
who are only good relatively to 
the constitution, iv. 7, § 2 {but 
cp. iii. 4, § 5) ; so called because 
the best rule or the best interests 
of the state are consulted, iii. 7, 



Index 



321 



§ 3; not a perversion, iv. 8, § 1 ; 
analogous to oligarchy (1) be- 
cause the few rule, v. 7, § 1 ; 
(2) because birth and education 
commonly accompany wealth, 
iv. 8, § 3; — to royalty as a 
government of the best, ib. 10, 
§ 2 ; preferable to royalty, be- 
cause the good are more than 
one, iii. 15, § 10; hoV distin- 
guished from oligarchy and 
constitutional government, iv. 7 ; 
8; 14, §10; v. 7, §§5-9(cp.ii. 
11 > §§ 5—10^) ; usually degener- 
ates into oligarchy, iii. 7, § 5 ; 
15, §11; iv. 2, §2; v. 7, §7; 
8, § 7 ; — causes of revolutions in 
aristocracies, v. 7 ; the means of 
their preservation, ib. 8, §§ 5-7 ; 
aristocracy less stable than con- 
stitutional government, ib. 7, 
§ 6 ; liable to danger because 
the rich have too much power, 
ib. 1 a, §6; might be combined 
with democracy if the magi< 
strates were unpaid and office 
open to all, ib. 8, § 17 (cp. vi. 4, 
§ 6) ; — magistracies peculiar to 
aristocracy, iv. 15, § 10; vi. 8, 
§§22, 24; aristocratical modes 
of appointing magistrates and 
judges, iv. 15, §§20, 21; 16, §8; 
practice of trying all suits by the 
same magistrates, aristocratical, 
ii. 11, § 8; iii. i, § 10; — the 
people naturally suited to an 
aristocracy, iii. 17, §§ 3-7. 

Aristogeiton, conspiracy of Har- 
modius and, v. 10, § 15. 

Aristophanes, ii. 4, § 6. 

Arrhibaeus, king of the Lyn- 
cestians, v. 10, § 17. 

Art, works of, wherein different 
from realities, iii. 11, § 4. 

Artapanes, v. 10, § 21. 

Artisan, the employments of the, 
devoid of moral excellence, i. 1 3, 



§§13,14; iii. 5, §5; vi.4, §12; 
vii. 9, §§ 3, 7 ; artisans some- 
times public slaves, ii. 7, § 22 ; 
only admitted to office in de- 
mocracies, iii. 4, § 12; often 
acquire wealth, ib. 5, § 6 ; the 
question whether they are citi- 
zens, ib. 5 ; necessary to the 
existence of the state, iv. 4, §§9, 
21 ; not a part of the state, vii. 
4, § 6 ; should be debarred from 
the 'Freemen's Agora,' ib. 12, 

Arts, the, require instruments, 
both living and lifeless, 1.4; 
some arts subservient to others, 
ib. 8, § 2 ; 10, §§ 1-4; the arts 
have a limit in their means 
though not in their end, ib. 8, 
§ 14 ; 9, § 13 ; both the means 
and the end ought to be within 
our control, vii. 13, § 2 ; amount 
of knowledge which a freeman 
is permitted in the arts, i. 11, 
§ 1; viii. 2, § 5; degrees of ex- 
cellence in them, i. 1 1, § 6; viii. 
2 > §§5>6; changes in, advan- 
tageous, ii. 8, § 18 ; iii. 15, § 4 ; 
the analogy of, not to be ex- 
tended to the laws, ii. 8, § 24 ; 
iii. 15, §4; exist for the benefit 
of those under them, iii. 6, §§ 7- 
9; by whom should the artist 
be judged? ib. 11, §§ 10-14 (cp. 
viii. 6, §§ 1-4) ; the arts aim at 
some good, iii. 12, § 1; justice 
of the different claims to political 
superiority illustrated from the 
arts, ib. 12, §§4-8; law of pro- 
portion in the arts, ib. 13, § 21 ; 
the problems of the arts, an 
illustration of the problems 01 
politics, iv. 1, §§ 1-4 ; the arts 
have to supply the deficiencies 
of Nature, vii. 17, § 15. 

Asia, ii. 10, § 3 ; iv. 3* § 3 ; the 
Asiatics better fitted for slavery 



322 



Index 



than the Hellenes, Hi. 14, § 6 ; 
vii. 7, § 2 ; cannibal tribes in 
Asia, viii. 4, § 3. 

Assembly, the, payment of, evil 
effects of the practice, ii. 7, § 1 9 ; 
i y - 6, § 5 ; vi. 2, § 6 ; how they 
may be counteracted, vi. 5, § 5; 
— power monopolized by, in ex- 
treme democracies, iv. 6, § 5 ; 
14, §7; v.5, §10; 6, §17; 9, 
§ 14; vi. 2, §5; 4, §15 (cp. ii. 
12, §4; v. 11, §§ 11, 12); meet- 
ings should be infrequent, vi. 5, 
§ 5 (cp.iv. 14, §§ 4, 5); charac- 
ter of, in the different kinds of 
democracies, iv. 14, §§ 4-7 ; vi. 
2 > §§ 5-7; in oligarchies, iv. 14, 
§§ S-11 (cp. iii. 1, § 10) ; pro- 
vision in case of equal voting in 
assemblies, vi. 3, § 6 : — at Car- 
thage, ii. 11, §§ 5-6; in Crete, 
ib. 10, § 7 ; 11, §6; at Sparta, 
ib. 11, §6. 

Astyages, v. 10, § 24. 

Atarneus (in Mysia), ii. 7, § 17. 

Athene, viii. 6, § 13. 

Athens; payment of the dicas- 
teries commenced by Pericles, 
ii. 12, §4 (cp. iv. 6, § 5; vi. 2, 
§ 6) ; evil effects of the practice, 
li. 7, § 19; plan introduced by 
Diophantus for the regulation 
of the public slaves, ib. § 23; 
maintenance at the public ex- 
pense of the children of citizens 
who had fallen in battle, ib. 8, 
§ 6 ; the Solonian constitution, 
ib. 7, §6; 12, §§ 1-6; iii. ii, 
§ 8 ; the Areopagus {see Council 
of Areopagus) ; the Court of 
Phreatto, iv. 16, § 3 ; effect of 
the Persian war upon Athens, 
ii. 12, § 5 ; v. 4, § 8; viii. 6, § 11 ; 
introduction of flute-playing at 
Athens after the Persian war, viii. 
6, § 1 1 ; the legislation of Draco, 
ii. 12, §13; the expulsion of the 



tyrants, iii. 2, §3; v. 12, §5; 
the use of ostracism, v. 3, § 3 
(cp. iii. 13, § 15); number of 
sailors in the population, iv. 4, 
§ 21 ; new citizens introduced by 
Cleisthenes, iii. 2, § 3; the tribes 
redivided by him, vi. 4, § 17 ; 
treatment of the subject cities by 
Athens, iii. 13, § 19 ; democrati- 
cal governments forced upon the 
allies by the Athenians, iv. 1 1, 
§ 18 ; v. 7, § 14 ; great losses of 
the nobilityin the Peloponnesian 
War, v. 3, § 7 ; difference of sen- 
timent between the Athenians 
and the citizens of the Piraeus, 
ib. § 15; origin of the war \ 
tween Athens and Mitylene. 
4, § 6 ; defeat of the Athe: 
expedition to Sicily, ib. 
government of the Four 
dred, ib. § 13; 6, § 6; 
Thirty, ib. 6, § 6 ; rise 
sistratus to the tyranny, i. 
10, § 6 ; his trial befc 
Areopagus, ib. 12, § 2 ; 
spiracy of Harmodius anc 
togeiton, ib. 1 o, § 1 5 ; magis 
of the Eleven, vi. 8, §11. 

Athlete, the temperament of an, 
not suited to the life of the 
citizen, vii. 16, § 12; viii. 4. 

Athletics : see Gymnastic Exer- 
cises. 

Attalus, v. 10, § 16. 

Ausones, the, or Opici, vii. 10, 
§5. 

Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, 

». 7, § 17. 
Avarice, encouraged at Sparta, 
ii. 9, §§ 13,28,37; at Carthage, 
ib. 11, §11; a frequent cause of 
crime, ib. 7, § 19; 9, § 28; of 
revolution, v. 2, §5; 3, §1. 

Babylonia, ii. 6, §6; Babylon, iii. 
3, §5; Babylonians, ib. 13, § 19. 



Index 



3*3 



Bacchiadae.the, at Corinth, ii. 12, 
§8. 

Barbarians, the, do not distin- 
guish the female and the slave, 
i* 2 ? §4> generally under kingly 
rule, ib. § 6 (cp. iii. 14, § 6) ; 
regarded by the Hellenes as 
natural slaves, i. 6, § 6 ; their 
nobility not recognized by the 
Hellenes, ib. § 7; prevalence of 
barter among them, ib. 8, § 5. 

Barter : see Exchange. 

Basilidae, the, v. 6, § 5. 

Bequest, freedom of, at Sparta, 
ii. 9, § 14; should be forbidden 
by law, v. 8, § 20. 

''^irth, illegitimate, not a dis- 
malification for citizenship in 
: ktreme democracies, iii. 5, § 7 ; 
* 4, §16. 

t,theIslandsofthe,vii.i5,§4. 
, the, ruled according to 
re by the soul, i. 5, §§4-7; 
^ody of the freeman not 
^ays distinguished by nature 
n that of the slave, ib. § 10; 
'J beauty of the body more 
j|)vious than that of the soul, 
ib. § 11 ; the interest of, identi- 
cal with that of the soul, ib. 6, 
§ 10; the goods of, for the sake 
of the soul, vii. 1, §§ 8, 9; prior 
to the soul, ib. 15, § 10; must 
not be educated at the same 
time as the mind, viii. 3, § 13 ; 

4, §9- 
Body, habit of, to be required in 
the citizen, vii. 16, § 12; viii. 3, 

§13. 
Byzantium, iv. 4, § 2 1 ; v. 3, §1 2. 

Camicus, ii. 10, § 4. 

Carthage, the constitution of, 
analogous to those of Lacedae- 
mon and Crete, ii. 11, §§ 1, 5 ; 
an aristocracy with oligarchical 
and democratical features, ib. 



§§5-10; iv.7, §4; v.i 2, §14; 
never had a revolution, ii. 11, 
§§ 2, 15; v. 12, § 14; never 
under a tyranny, ii. 11, § 2 {but 
cp.v. 12, § 12) ; the kingspartly 
chosen for ability, ii. 11, §§4-9; 
influence of wealth, ib. §§9-13; 
plurality of offices, ib. § 13 ; 
the magistrates judges in crim- 
inal cases, ib. § 7 ; iii. 1, §§ 10, 
11 ; honours paid to military 
merit, vii. 2, § 10; the con- 
spiracy of Hanno, v. 7, § 4 ; 
custom of sending out the 
poorer citizens to the colonies, 
ii. 11, § 15; vi. 5, §9; treaties 
between the Carthaginians and 
the Tyrrhenians, iii. 9, § 6. 

Catana, ii. 12, § 6. 

Cavalry, importance of, in the 
ancient oligarchies, iv. 3, § 3 ; 
13, § 10; vi. 7, § 1 (cp. the 
government of * the knights ' in 
Eietria, v. 6, § 14). 

Celts, the, ii. 9, § 7; vii. 2, § 10; 
17, §3. 

Chalcidian cities, the (in Italy 
and Sicily), ii. 12, § 6 ; — (of 
Thrace), ib. § 14. 

Chalcis, in Euboea, iv. 3, § 3 ; 
v.4, §9; ib. 12, § 12. 

Chares, the Athenian general, 
v. 6, § 9. 

— of Paros, a writer on Agri- 
culture, i. ii, § 7. 

Charicles, leader of a party 
among the Thirty at Athens, 
v. 6, § 6. 

Charilaus, king of Sparta, ii. 10, 
§ 2; v. 12, § 12. 

Charondas, used the word opo- 
aiirvoi for the members of a 
family, i. 2, §5; legislated for 
Catana and the other Chalcidian 
cities in Italy and Sicily, ii. 12, 
§ 6 ; said to have been the 
disciple of Zaleucus, ib. § 7 ; 



324 



Index 



the first to make laws against 
perjury, ib. § n; famous for the 
accuracy of his legislation, ib. ; 
belonged to the middle class, 
iv. 1 1, § 15 ; compelled the rich 
to attend the law-courts, ib. 13, 

§3. 

Child, the, relation of, and the 
parent, i. 2, § 2 ; 3, § 1 ; the 
virtue of, ib. 13, §§ 3-12; ruled 
like a king by the elder or 
parent, ib. 2, §6; 7, § 1 ; 12, 
§ 3; has the deliberative faculty, 
but immature, ib. 13, § 7 (cp. vii. 

15, § IO )- 
Children, ought to be educated 
with regard to the constitution, 
i. 13, §15; v*9> §§"- I 5; viii. 
1 ; recognized in certain coun- 
tries by their resemblance to 
their parents, ii. 3, § 9 ; the 
children of citizens who died in 
battle reared at the public ex- 
pense, ib. 8, § 6; children, in 
what sense citizens, iii. 1, § 5 ; 
5, § 2 ; education of the chil- 
dren of kings, ib. 4, § 8 ; bad 
education of the children of the 
rich, iv. 11, §§4-8; v. 9, §§ 11- 
15; licence permitted to chil- 
dren in democracies and tyran- 
nies, vi. 4, § 20 ; exposure of 
deformed children, vii. 16, § 15; 
way in which children should be 
reared, ib. 17; they should not 
see or hear anything indecent, 
ib. §§ 7-1 1 ; viii. 5, §§ 19-21; 
what their education should 
include, viii. 2 ; 3 ; why they 
ought to learn music and draw- 
ing, ib. 3, § 2 foil. ; degree to 
which they should carry musical 
proficiency, ib. 6, §§ 1-8 ; must 
not carry gymnastic exercise too 
far, ib. 4 ; must not labour with 
body and mind at once, ib. § 9; 
restlessness of young children, 



ib. 6, § 2 ; their toys } ib. ; their 

crying not to be checked, vii. 

i7 ? §6. 
Children, Plato's community of, 

see Women and Children. 
Children, Guardians of, iv. 15, 

§§9, 13; vi. 8, §22. 
Chios, iii. 13, § 19 ; iv. 4, § 21 ; 

v. 3, §12 ; 6, § 16. 
Chones, the, in southern Italy, 

vii. 10, §5. 
Chytrum, a part of Clazomenae, 

v. 3, § 15- 

Cinadon, v. 7, § 3. 

Citizen, the, must both rule and 
obey, i. 1, § 2 ; 12, § 2; ii. 2, 
§§4-7; 11, § 14; iii. 4, §§ 10- 
16; 5, § 1 ; 6, §§9-"J I3> 
§ 12; 16, §§ 2, 3; 17, § 4; 
vi. 2, § 5; vii. 9, §§4-8; 14, 
§§ 1-8 ; must have leisure, ii. 9, 
§ 2 ; 11, §§ 10, 12; vii. 9, §§ 4, 
7 ; 1 2, § 7 ; belongs to the state, 
viii. 1, §4; — necessity of defining 
the word, iii. 1, § 2 foil. ; children 
and old men, in what sense 
citizens, ib. § 5 ; 5, §2; resi- 
dence and legal rights, inade- 
quate definitions, ib. 1, §§ 4, 5; 
not enough that the parents 
were citizens, ib. 3, §§ 1-3 ; the 
citizen must share in the ad- 
ministration of the state, ib. 1, 
§§5-12; 2, §§3-5; 5; 13, § 12; 
differs under each form of gov- 
ernment, ib. 1, §9; 5, § 5; 13, 
§12; iv. 7, § 2 ; the question 
about citizens admitted after a 
revolution, iii. 2, §§ 3-5 ; — the 
virtue of the good citizen : is it 
identical with that of the good 
man? ib. 4; 5, § 10; 18; vii. 
14, § 8, the virtue of the citizen 
in the perfect state, iii. 4, § 5 ; 
1 3> § T 2 J — n °t all citizens who 
are necessary to the state, ib. 5, 
§2; vii. 9, § 10; the artisans 



Index 



3*f 



not to be citizens, iii. 5 ; vii. 9, 
§3; nor the sailors, vii. 6, §§ 7, 
8 ; is the life of the citizen the 
best ? ib. 2 ; 3 ; the character 
necessary in the citizens, ib. 7 ; 
their habit of body, ib. 16, § 12; 
viii. 3, §13; 4. 
Citizenship, rights of, conferred 
on strangers in early times at 
Sparta, ii. 9, § 1 7 ; lost at Sparta, 
by failure to contribute to the 
common meals, ib. § 32 ; 10, 
§ 7 ; given to persons of ille- 
gitimate birth in extreme de- 
mocracies, iii. 5, § 7; vi. 4, § 16; 
exclusion from, sometimes con- 
cealed, iii. 5, §9; easily pre- 
tended in a large state, vii. 4, 

§14- 
City, the : see State. 
Clazomenae, v. 3, § 15. 
Cleander, tyrant of Gela, v. 12, 

§ 13. 

Cleisthenes, tyrant of Sicyon, v. 

12, §§1, 12. 
— , the Athenian, iii. 2, § 3 ; vi. 4, 

§ 18. 
Cleomenes (king of Sparta), v. 3, 

§7. 
Cleopatra (the widow of Perdic- 

cas), v. 10, § 17. 
Cleotimus, leader of a revolution 

at Amphipolis, v. 6, § 8. 
Clubs; at Carthage, ii. 11, §3; 

at Abydos, v. 6, §§ 6, 13; hated 

by tyrants, ii. 11, § 5. 
Cnidus, v. 6, §§ 4, 16. 
Codrus, king of Athens, v. 10, § 8. 
Colonies, of Carthage, ii. 1 1 , § 1 5 ; 

y i« 5, § 9 ; oligarchies formed in 

colonies by the first settlers, iv. 

4, § 5 ; dissensions in, a cause of 

revolutions, v. 3, §§ n-14. 
Colophon, of, iv. 4, § 5 ; v. 3, 

Commerce, divisions of, i. 1 1 , § 3 ; 
its advantages and disadvan- 



tages, vii. 6 ; — commercial trea- 
ties, iii. 9, § 6. 
Common meals, hostility of the 
tyrant to, v. 1 1 , § 5 ; first estab- 
lished in Italy, vii. 10, §§ 1-8; 
how they should be arranged, 
ib. §§ 10-12 ; the young not 
allowed to share in them, ib. 17, 
§ 1 1 ; — of the magistrates, vi. 2, 
§ 7 ; vii. 12, § 1 ; of the priests, 
vii. 12, §6; — (at Carthage), ii. 

11, §35— (in Crete), ib. 5, §15; 
the original ot the Spartan, ib. 
io, § 5 ; maintained at the public 
cost, ib. §§ 7-10;— (at Sparta), 
make property to some degree 
common, ib. 5, § 15; badly regu- 
lated, ib. 9, §§31, 32; 10, § 7; 
anciently called ' andria,' ib. 10, 

§5. 

Community of women and chil- 
dren, the, proposed by Plato, 
ii. I, § 3; arguments against, ii. 
3; 4;— of property, ib. 5; vii. 
io, §9. 

Confederacy, difference between 
a, and a state, ii, 2, § 3; iii. 9, 
§§ 6-8. 

Constitution, regard must be had 
to the, in education, i. 13, § 15; 
v. 9, §§ n-15; viii. I; the best 
constitntion supposed by some 
to be a combination of all exist- 
ing forms, ii. 6, § 17 (cp. iv. I, 
§6; 7, §4J 9> §7); the per- 
manence of a constitution only 
secured by the consent of all 
classes, ii. 9, §22; iv. 9, §10; 

12, §6; v. 8, §5; 9, §§5-10; 
vi. 6, § 2; 7, § 4; older constitu- 
tions more simple than later, 
ii. 10, §1; contentment with a 
constitution not always a proof 
of its excellence, ib. 10, §12 
{but vp. c. ii, §§2, 15); in each 
constitution the citizen differ- 
ent, iii. 1, §9; 5, §5; 13, §12; 



3 2< * 



Index 



iv. 7, § 2 ; relation of the con- 
stitution and the state, iii. 1, 
§ i;3,§9;6,§i; 7, § 2 ; iv. 1, 
§ I0 J 3. § 5 ; definition of the 
word, iii. 1, § 1 ; 6, § 1 ; iv. 1, 
§ I0 ; 3) §55 tne constitution 
the life of the state, iv. 11, § 3; 
the people naturally suited to 
each constitution, iii. 17; the 
constitution sometimes nomin- 
ally unchanged after a revolu- 
tion, iv. 5, §§3, 4 (cp.v. 1, §8); 
the encroachments of the rich 
often more dangerous to the 
constitution than those of the 
poor, iv. 12, § 6; life according 
to the constitution no slavery, 

v. 9> § 15;. vii - 3> §§ J -3- 
Corinth, iii. 9, §9; tyranny of 
Timophanes, v. 6, § 12; tyranny 
of the Cypselids, ib. 10, § 6; 11, 
§ 9 ; its duration, ib. 1 2, § § 3,4; 
family of the Bacchiadae, ii. 1 2, 

§8- 

Cos, v. 5, § 2. 

Cosmi, the (in Crete), to the 
Ephors, ii. 10, §§ 6-14. 

Cotys, king of the Odrysians in 
Thrace, v. 10, § 18. 

Council of Areopagus, the, ii. 1 2, 
§§ 2, 4; v. 4, § 8; 12, § 2. 

Councillors and warriors, the two 
highest classes in the state, iv. 4, 
§§ 10-17; vii. 4? §§ 4-7; 8, §7; 
9> §§4-J°- 

Crataeus, one of the assassins of 
Archelaus, v. 10, § 17. 

Crete, favourable position of, ii. 
10, §§3,12, 16; visit of Lycurgus 
to,ib. § 2 ; — the Cretan constitu- 
tion the original of the Lace- 
daemonian, ib. §§ 1-3; analo- 
gous to the Carthaginian, ib. 1 1, 
§ 1 ; the attention of the legis- 
lator directed solely to war, vii. 
2, § 9 ; — the common tables in- 
troduced into Crete by Minos, 



ib. 10, §§2,6; called by the 
Cretans, avfipta, ii. 10, § 5 ; ob- 
ject of the institution, ii.5, § 15; 
better managed in Ciete than at 
Lacedaemon, ib. 9, §§30-33; 
io j §§ 7-9; — frequency of sedi- 
tion in Crete, ib. 10, §§ 14, 15 ; 
— slaves in Crete forbidden 
gymnastic exercises and the use 
of arms, ib. 5, § 19; thePerioeci 
in Crete well managed, ib. 9, § 3; 
J o? §§ J 5> T 6 ; governed by the 
laws of Minos, ib. 10, § 3 ; ana- 
logy of the Cretan Perioeci with 
the Helots, ib. § 5 ; — existence 
of caste in Crete, vii. 10, § 1, 

Custom, power of, ii. 8, § 24; 
iv. 5> §3; vii. 13, §§ n-13; a 
sort of justice, i. 6, § 5. 

Cyclopes, the, i. 2, § 7. 

Cyme, in Aeolis, v. 5, § 4. 

Cypselids, the, v. 11, § 9; ib. 12, 

§§3,4- 
Cypselus of Corinth, v. 10, § 6 ; 

12, § 3- 
Cyrene, vi. 4, §§ 17, 18. 
Cyrus, king of Persia, v. io, 

§§8, 24. 

Daedalus, i. 4, § 3. 

Dancing, viii. 5, § 3. 

Daphnaeus, of Syracuse, v. 5, 
§ 10. 

Darius, son of Xerxes, v. io, 
§21. 

Decamnichus, v. 10, § 20. 

Deliberation, the right to share 
in, essential to the citizen, iii. 1 ; 
§§6-12; 2, § 5; 13, § 12 (cp. 
vii. 8, § 7). 

Delphi, v. 4, § 5 ; the Delphian 
knife, i. 2, § 3. 

Demagogues, the authors and 
flatterers of the extreme demo- 
cracy, ii. 12, §§ 4-6; iv. 4, 
§§25-31; v.9, § 10; 11, §§ 11, 
12; vi. 4, §§ 15-17; confiscate 



Index 



327 



the property of the rich, v. 5, 
§ 5; vi. 5, §3; often bring 
about revolutions, v. 3, § 4; 5, 
§§1-5; in ancient times became 
tyrants, ib. 5, §§ 6-10; 10, §§4, 
6: — in oligarchies, ib. 6, § 5. 

Demhvrgi, magistrates at Larissa, 
iii. 2, § 2. 

Democracy, the government of 
the many in their own interests, 
iii. 7, § 5; 8, §2; iv. 11, § 17; 
akin to tyranny, iv. 4, § 27; v. 
10, §§ ii, 30, 35; 11, §12; the 
only possible government in 
large states, iii. 15, § 13; iv. 6, 
§5; 13, §10 (cp. vi. 5, §5); 
the perversion of constitutional 
government, iii. 7, §5; iv. 2, 
§§ 1, 2; Plato wrong in calling 
democracy the worst of good 
constitutions, but the best of 
bad ones, iv. 2, § 3; insuffici- 
ency of the common definitions 
of democracy, iii. 8; iv. 4, §§ 1- 
6; more forms of democracy 
than one, iv. 1, § 8 ; 4, §§ 20- 
22; 11, §20; 12, §3; 13, §12; 
vi. 1, § 2; the forms enumerated, 
iv. 4, §§ 22-31; 6, §§1-7; 12, 
§3; Mi §§ J -7; vi * 45 growth 
of the last and worst form, ii, 
12, §4; iii. 4, § 12; 6,§§9-n; 
iv. 6, §5; v. 5, §§6-11; 6, 
§§6-8; 9, § 10; vi. 2, §§5-9; 
4i §§ 15-20 (cp. v. 10, § 12; ii f 
§11) ; — democracy more stable 
than oligarchy, iv. 11, § 14; v. 
1, §15; 7» §6 (cp.v. 3, §8); 
causes of revolution in democra- 
cies : anarchy, v. 3, § 5 ; vi. 4, 
§ 17 ; demagogic practices, v. 

3, §4; 5; 9, § 10 ; vi -5, §5; 

disproportionate increase, v. 3, 
§§ 6-8 ; dissatisfaction of the 
notables, ib. § 14Ccp.i1. 7, §§ 10, 
18); long tenure or greatness 
of office, v. 5, §8; 8, § 7; the 



means of their preservation, iv. 
12, §4; 13, §§5-8; 14, §13 ; 
v. 8; vi. 4, §17; 5; democracy 
(especially the extreme form) 
apt to pass into tyranny, iv. 11, 
§ u J v. 5, §§6-10; 8, §7; 

10, §30; Plato censured for 
supposing that the change is 
necessarily to tyranny, v. 12, 
§ 10; — Athens the champion of 
democracy in Hellas, iv. 11, 
§ 18 ; v. 7, § 14; the democratic 
principle represented at Sparta 
by the Ephoralty, ii. 6, § 17 ; 
9, §21; 10, §10; iv. 9, § 9 ; — 
characteristics of democracy : 
liberty and equality for all, iii. 
8, §7; iv. 4. §§22, 23; 8, §7; 
v. 1, §3; 8, §6; 9, §§14, 15; 
vi. 2, §§ 1-4, 9; 4, §20; the 
use of the lot, ii. 1 1, § 7 ; 12, 
§ 3; iv. 9, §4; 15, § 19; vi. 
2 j §§ 5 ? 8; employment of a 
large number of magistrates, ii. 

11, § 14 ; short tenure of office, 
v. 8, §6; vi. 2, §§5, 8; pay- 
ment of the citizens, ii. 7, § 19; 

12, §4; iv. 6, §5; 9, §2; vi. 
2 i §§6, 7; 5 1 §5 ; carelessness 
in the admission of artisans and 
persons of illegitimate birth to 
citizenship, iii. 4, § 12 ; 5, §§7, 
8; vi. 4, §16; licence allowed 
to women and children, v. 11, 
§ 11 ; vi. 4, § 20; — ostracism 
originally a democratic institu- 
tion, iii. 13, § 15; v. 3, § 3; 
democratical tricks to keep the 
power in the hands of the 
people, iv. 13, §5 ; suggestions 
for the improvement of demo- 
cracy, ib. 14, §12; vi. 5, §§5- 
1 1 ; the magistrates peculiar to 
democracy, iv. 15, § 11 ; vi. 8, 
§§ 17, 24; democratical modes 
of appointing magistrates and 
judges, iv. 15, § 19; 16, §8;— 



328 



Index 



character and powers of the 
assembly, ib. 14, §§ 1-7 ;— the 
best material of a democracy, 
ib. 6, § 2 ; vi. 4, § 1 ; the 
position suitable to a democracy, 
vii. 11, §5; democracy always 
supported by the sailors and 
light armed, vi. 7, §§ i, 2. 

Derdas (? King of Elymaea), v. 
10, § 16. 

Devices, political, of oligarchies 
and democracies, iv. 13, §§ 1- 
8 ; their inutility, v. 8, §4. 

Diagoras, an Eretrian, v. 6, § 14. 

Dicaea, 'the Pharsalian mare/ 

». 3> § 9- 
Dicasteries, the Athenian, ii. 12, 

§4- 
Dictators : see Aesymnetes. 
Diodes, ii. 12, §§ 8-11. 
Dion, v. 10, §§ 23, 28, 31, 32. 
Dionysius the Elder, i. n, §§ 11, 

12; iii. 15, § 16; v. 5, §§8, 

10; 7, § 10; io,§6; 11, § 10. 
Dionysius the Younger, v. 10, 

§§23, 28, 31, 32. 
Diophantus, ii. 7, § 23. 
Directors of Education, vii. 17, 

§§5, 7 ; of Gymnastics, vi. 8, 

§ 22. 
Dorian Harmony, the : see 

Harmony. 
Dowries, ii. 7, §3; 9, § 15. 
Doxander, v. 4, § 6. 
Draco, ii. 12, § 13. 
Drawing, a branch of education, 

viii. 3, §§ r, 12. 
Dynasty, or Family Oligarchy : 

see Oligarchy. 

Ecphantides (the ancient comic 
poet), viii. 6, § 12. 

Education, may be directed to 
a wrong end, ii. 7, §§ 8, 9; 
must have regard to the 
constitution, i. 13, § 15; v. 9, 
§ 1 1 j viii. 1 j the great means 



of uniting the state, ii. 5, §§ iS— 
21 ; special, for the ruler, iii. 4, 
§ 8 (cp. vii. 14, § 6) ; confers a 
claim to pre-eminence in the 
state, iii. 13, § 1 (cp. c. 9, §§ 14, 
15; 12, §§S, 9; iv. 8, §§2-5); 
excellence of the Spartan 
education, iv. 9, § 7 ; viii. 1, 
§4 {but cp. viii. 4, §§ 1-7) ; 
bad education of the rich, iv. 
1 1, § 6 ; v. 9, § 13 ; hostility of 
the tyrant to education, v. n, 
§ 5 ; education necessary to 
supplement habit, vii. 13, § 13; 
17, § 15 ; the special business 
of the legislator, viii. 1, § 1 ; 
wrong notions of education 
prevalent in Hellas, vii, 14, § 15 ; 
viii. 1, § 3 ; 4, § 6 ; the periods 
of education, vii. 17; viii. 4, 
§§ 7-9 ; necessity of a common 
system of education, viii. 1, § 3 
(cp. ii. 7, § 8; and iv. 9, § 7 ; 
should education have an ethical 
01 a practical aim ? viii. 2 ; 3 ; 
5; should it include music? ib. 
3 ; 5 ; 6 ; what instruments 
and harmonies are to be used ? 
ib. 6, §§8-16; 7; education 
not to be directed to a single 
end, ib. 4, § 2 ; the proper 
place of gymnastics in education, 
ib. 3, § 13 ; 4 ; the education of 
mind and body not to be carried 
on together, ib. 4, § 9 ; writers 
upon musical education, ib. 5, 
§ 23; 7, §§ 2, 3, 8, 11, 14; 
musical education a kind of 
rattle to older children, ib. 6, 
§ 2 ; the three principles of edu- 
cation, ib. 7, § 15 : — Directors 
of Education, vii. 17, §§ 5, 7. 

Egypt, iii. 15, § 4; v. 11, §9; 
vii. 10, §§ 1-6, 8. 

Eleven, the, at Athens, vi. 8, § 1 1. 

Elis, v. 6, § 1 1. 

Elymaea, v. 10, § 17. 



Index 



329 



Empire, unnecessary to the hap- 
piness of states, vii. 2)3; 14, 
§§ 12-22. 

End, the, the completed nature 
of each thing, i. 2, § 8 ; has no 
limit in the arts, ib. 8, § 14 ; 9, 
§ 13 ; may agree or disagree 
with the means, vii. 13, § 2 ; 
contains an element of pleasure, 
viii. 5, § 13. 

Ephialtes, ii. 12, §4. 

Ephors, the, a democratic element 
at Sparta, ii. 6, § 17 ; 9, §§ 20- 
22; 10, § 10; iv. 9, §9; their 
corruption and licence, ii. 9, 
§§ 19-24 ; 10, § 12 ; greatness 
of their power, ib. 9, § 20 ; v. 
Ii, §2; the mode of their 
election childish, ii. 9, § 23 ; 
have the right of calling the 
magistrates to account, ib. § 26; 
try suits respecting contracts, 
iii. 1, §10 (cp. ii. 9, §23; 11, 
§ 7) ; established by Theopom- 
pus as a check on the royal 
power, v. 11, §§ 1-3; corre- 
spond to the Cosmi in Crete, ii. 
10, §§ 6, 10, 12; to the magis- 
tracy of 104 at Carthage, ib. 

ii, §3- 

Epidamnus, ii. 7, § 23 ; iii. 16, 
§1; v. 1, §§ 10, 11; 4, §7. 

Epimenides, of Crete, i. 2, §5. 

Equality, how related to justice, 
iii. 9; 12; 13, §§ 11, 12; v. 1, 
§ 2 ; 9, §14; vii. 3, §5; 14, 
§§ 1-6 ; (the true kind) no 
longer desired in Hellenic 
states, iv. 11, §§4-10, 19; v, 
9> §§ 5— IO ; equality and liberty 
the aim of democracy, iii. 8, 
§ 7; iv. 4, §22; 8, §7; v. 1, 
§35 8, §6; 9,§i4; vi. 2, §§1- 
4, 9; the desire of equality a 
cause of sedition, v. 1, §§ 3-8 ; 
2> §§2, 3; 3, §2; when 
attained creates contentment, 



ib. 7, § 6 ; equality either 
numerical or proportional, iii. 
8 ; iv. 12, §§ 1-4; v. 1, §§ 12- 
16; vi. 3 ; states must not be 
based on one kind alone, v. 1, 
§ 14 ; denied to the weak by the 
strong, vi. 3, § 6. 

Equality of property, proposed 
by Phaleas, ii. 7 ; 12, § 12. 

Eretria, iv. 3, § 3 ; v. 6, § 14. 

Erythrae, v. 6, § 5. 

Ethiopia, iv. 4, §4. 

Eubulus (tyrant of Atarneus), ii. 

Euripides, v. 10, § 20 ; quoted, 

i. 2, §4; iii. 4, §8; v. 9, §15; 

vii. 7, § 8 ; viii. 5, § 2. 
Europe, vii. 7, § 2. 
Euryphon, ii. 8, § 1. 
Eurytion, v. 6, § 15. 
Euthycrates, aPhocian,v. 4, § 7. 
Evagoras, tyrant of Salamis in 

Cyprus, v. 10, § 16. 
Evil, i. 2, § 12. 
Exchange, (1) according to 

nature (barter of necessaries), 

i. 9, §§2-7; 10, §§3, 4; (2) 

contrary to nature (retail trade), 

i. 9, §§1-4,9-12; io, §4; 11, 

§3. 
Executive element, the, in the 

state, iv. 14, § 2 ; 15 ; vi. 8. 
Experience, value of, ii. 5, § 16 ; 

vii. 10, § 8. 
Exposure of deformed children, 

justifiable, vii. 16, § 15. 
Extremes, danger of, iv. 11, 

§§16-19; 12, §§4-6; vi. 5, 

§§ 1-4. 

Faction, frequency of, in Crete, 
ii. 10, §§ 14-16 ; evil effects of, 
in Hellas, iv. 11, §§ 16-18; a 
cause of revolution in oligar- 
chies, v. 6, § 9 ; less common 
in democracies, iv. 11, § 14; v. 
1, §§ >5> 16; 7, §6. 



330 



Index 



Family, the, the village a colony 
of, i. 2, § 6 ; (cp. c. 9, § 5) ; 
composed of three relations 
which are sanctioned by nature, 
ib. 2, § 2 foil. ; 3, §§1-3; 12; 
*3> § I 5 j governed by the elder 
or parent who is their king, ib. 
2 , § 6 ; 7, § 1 ; 12, §3; different 
kinds of rule within the family, 
ib. 12 ; the family apart of the 
state, ib. 13, § 15; ii. 9, § 5 ; 
the state more self- sufficient 
than the family, ii. 2, § 8. 

Family oligarchy : see Oligarchy. 

Family quarrels, a cause of 
revolutions, v. 4, §§ 5-7 ; 6, 
§14; 10, § 3. 

Father and child, relation of, i. 
2, §§ 1-5; 3, §§ 1-3; 12. 

Female, the, by nature different 
from the slave except among 
barbarians, i. 2, §§3,4; subject 
by nature to the male, ib. 5, 
§ 7 ; 12, § 1 ; 13, §7; tendency 
of the female to produce off- 
spring like the parents, ii. 3, 
§ 9 :— the union of male and 
female formed in obedience to 
a natural instinct, i. 2, § 2 ; the 
relation of male and female 
part of the household, ib. 3, § 2 ; 
12, § 1. [See Woman.] 

Finance, importance of, to the 
statesman, i. 11, §13; the 
finances of Sparta badly man- 
aged, ii. 9, § 36 ; suggestions 
for the regulation of state 
finances, v. 8, §§ 15-19; vi. 5. 

Four Hundred, government of 
the, at Athens, v. 4, § 13 ; 6, § 6. 

Freedom, supposed by Hellenes 
not to exist among barbarians, 
i. 2, § 4 ; 6, § 6 ; is a reason 
why men claim authority in a 
state, iii. 9, § 14; 12, § 8; 13, 
§§2-5. [See Liberty.] 

Freeman, the, in his relation to 



the slave, i. 3, §§ 2-4 ; 3, § 4; 
5 ; 6 ; not always outwardly 
distinguished by nature from 
him, ib. 5, § 10 ; rule over 
freemen more noble than rule 
over slaves, ib. § 2 ; vii. 3, § 2 ; 
14, §19; will never willingly 
submit to the tyrant, iv. 10, 
§4; v. 11, §12; has a natural 
right to rule, ii. 2, § 6 ; iii. 16, 
§§2, 3 ; must not be ashamed 
to obey his lawful superiors, v. 
9, §§ 11-14; vii. 3, §2; 14, 
§§ 1-5 (cp. iv. 11, §6); may 
have a certain knowledge of the 
arts, viiL 2, §§ 5, 6 ; may be al- 
lowed to share in the pleasures 
of music, ib. 5, § 7. 
Friendship, weakened by com- 
munism, ii. 4, §§ 5-9 ; the 
motive of society, ib. § 6 ; iii. 

9, § J 3 5 iv - ll > §7 (cp- vi. 5, 
§§7-11); implies equality, iii. 
16, § 13 ; friendship among the 
citizens hated by the tyrant, v. 
11, § 5 ; friendship at Sparta, 
ii. 5, § 7- 

Gela, v. 12, § 13. 

Gelo, tyrant of Syracuse, v. 3, 
§5 ; 10, §31; 12, §§5,6. 

General, the, learns command by 
obedience, iii. 4, § 14 ; generals 
often became demagogues in an- 
cient times, v. 5, §§6-10; have 
often attacked their masters, ib. 

10, § 24 ; wise generals com- 
bine light-armed troops with 
cavalry and heavy infantry, vi. 
7, § 2. 

Generalship, a rare quality, v. 

9, § 3- 
Gerusia : see Council of Elders. 
God, happy by reason of his own 

nature, vii. 1, §10; 3, §10; 

alone able to hold together the 

universe, ib. 4, § 8. 



Index 



33 1 



Gods, the, supposed to be under 
a king because mankind origin- 
ally were, i. 2, § 7 ; 12, § 3; 
their statues more beautiful than 
ordinaryhumanforms,ib.5,§ 10. 

Good, absolute and relative, vii. 
13, §§5-8. 

Good, the, the aim of the state, 
i. 1, §1 ; ii. 2, §7. 

Good and evil, the sense of, cha- 
racteristic of man, i. 2, §12; 
made the test of freedom and 
slavery, ib. 6, § 8. 

Goods, the three kinds of, vii. 1, 
§§ 2-5 ; external goods not to 
be preferred to virtue, ii. 9, 
§35; vii. 1, §§5-9; 15, §6; 
not the cause of happiness, vii. 
i, § 10; 13, §8. 

Gordius, father of Psammetichus, 
tyrant of Corinth, v. 12, § 3. 

Gorgias of Leontini, i. 13, § 10 ; 
iii. 2, § 2. 

Government, the Constitutional, 
called in ancient times demo- 
cracy, iv. 13, § 1 1 ; its rarity, ib. 
7, § 1 (cp. c. 11, § 16) ; one of 
the true forms of government, 
iii. 7, § 3 (cp. iv. 8, § 1) ; how 
distinguished from aristocracy, 
oligarchy, and democracy, iv. 7 ; 
8; 14, §§8-10; v. 7, §§5-7: 
vi. 1, §3 (cp. ii. 11, §§5-9)J 
composed of the heavy-armed 
soldiers, ii. 6, § 16 ; iii. 7, § 4; 
17, §4; iv. 13, §10; the people 
to whom it is adapted, iii. 17, 
§ 4 ; suited to a large country 
population, vi. 4, § 14; cha- 
racterized by the alternation of 
rulers and ruled, i. 1, § 2 ; 12, 
§ 2; ii. 2, §§4-7; 11, §14; iii. 
4, §§10, 14; 6, §9; 16, §2; 
17, §4; vii. 14, §§ 1-5 (cp. i. 
7, § *)> by tne combination of 
the vote and the lot in the election 
of the magistrates, iv. 15, §§19- 



22; gives the affirmative power 
to the many, ib. 14, § 16; the 
mode in which it arises, ib. 9 ; 
causes of revolution to which it 
is subject, v. 3, §§6-8; 6, 
§§ 16-18 ; 7, §§ 5-9; means of 
its preservation, ib. 8, §§ 10, 
1 1 ; more stable than aristocracy, 
ib. 7, §6. 

Government, forms of, how to 
be criticized, ii. 9, § 1 ; iv. 1 ; 
the legislator must know all, 
iv. 1, §§5-8; differ according 
to the character of the supreme 
authority, iii. 6, § 1 ; 13, §5; 
iv. 8, §§ 2-4; 14, § 1 ; are 
based on partial justice only, 
iii. 9, §§ 1-4, 15; 17, §6; v. 
1, §2; vi. 3, §§1-4; are all 
perversions of the perfect state, 
iv. 8, §1 ; may be divided into 
true forms or perversions, iii. I, 
§§8-10; 6, § 11 ; 7; 18; iv. 
2 j §§1-3; 8, § 1 ; their suc- 
cessive changes in ancient times, 
iii. 15, §§ 11-13; iv. 13, §§ 9- 
1 2 ; Plato's theory of change 
wrong, v. 1 2, §§5-1 8 ; influence 
of increased population upon 
forms of government, iii. 15, 
§§ 11-13; iv. 6, §5; vi.5,§5; 
the worst forms the most pre- 
carious, vi. 6, §4; common 
error that forms of government 
can be reduced to two — oli- 
garchy and democracy, iv. 3, 
§§6-8 ; sense in which this is 
true, ib. 4, § 19 ; v. 1 , § 14 (cp. 
vi. 1, § 6) ; the people adapted 
to each form of government, iii. 
1 7 ; the magistrates suited to 
each, iv. 15, §§ 11-13 ; vi. 8, 
§§17, 24 ; the judicial arrange- 
ments, ii. 11, § 7 ; iii. 1, §§ 10, 
] 1 ; iv. 16, § 8 ; the military 
force, vi. 7, §§ 1, 2. 

Government, writers on, often un- 



33* 



Index 



practical, iv. i, § 5 ; have ex- 
tolled the Lacedaemonian con- 
stitution, ib. §6; vii. 14, §§ 16, 17. 

Guardians, the, in Plato's 
Republic : see Plato. 

Gymnastic, like other arts, has 
undergone improvement, ii. 8, 
§18; includes various kinds 
of training, iv. 1, §§ 1, 2. 

Gymnastic exercises, forbidden 
to slaves in Crete, ii. 5, § 19; 
discouraged in oligarchies 
among the poor, iv. 13, § 4 ; 
one of the recognized branches 
of education, viii. 3, § 1 ; carried 
to excess at Lacedaemon, ib. 4, 
§§ 1-7 ; suggestions for their 
arrangement, vii. 12, §§ 1-6 ; 
should be of a lighter kind for 
children, viii. 4, § 7 : — Directors 
of, vi. 8, § 22. 

Habit, the strength of law derived 
from, ii. 8, § 24 ; one element 
of virtue, vii. 13, §§ 11-13 ; 15. 
§ 7 ; must go before reason in 
education, viii. 3, § 13. 

Hanno, v. 7, § 4. 

Happiness, independent of exter- 
nal goods, vii. 1, § 10 ; 13, §8; 
the happiness of the whole de- 
pendent on the happiness of the 
parts, i. 6, § 10 ; ii. 5, § 27; 
vii. 9, § 7 J happiness propor- 
tioned to virtue, vii. I, § 10; 8, 

§5'! 9> §§3, 7; 13, §5 5 the 
perfect happiness of the divine 
nature, ib. 1, § 10 ; 3, § 10; the 
happiness of men and states the 
same, ib. 2 ; 3 ; the happiness 
of states not dependent on em- 
pire over others, ib. 2,§§ 14-18; 
or on size, ib. 4, §§4-11 ; happi- 
ness implies virtuous activity, 
ib. 3, §§ 1-3 ; is the worthy 
employment of leisure, viii. 3, 
§§3-6; 5. §§9~ I 5- 



Harbours, should be separated 
from the city, vii. 6, §§ 1-6. 

Harmodius, v. 10, § 15. 

Harmonies, the, iv. 3, § 7 ; viii. 
5, §§16-25; 7- 

Harmony, the soul said to be, or 
to possess, viii. 5, § 25. 

Harmony, the Dorian, iii. 3, § 8 ; 
1V - 3? § 7 j produces a moderate 
and settled temper, viii. 5, § 22 ; 
7? §§8-13: — the Lydian ; re- 
jected by Plato in the Republic, 
ib. 7, §§ 9, 14; suitable to 
children, ib. § 15 :— the Mixo- 
Lydian ; has a sad and grave 
effect, ib. 5, § 22 : — the Phry- 
gian, iii. 3, §8; iv. 3, §7; 
inspires enthusiasm , viii. 5 , § 2 2 j 
7, § 9 ; should not have been 
retained by Plato, ib. 7, §§9-13. 

Hebdome, v. 3, § 7. 

Heliaea, court of, at Epidamnus, 
v. i, § 11. 

Hellanocrates of Larissa, v. 10, 
§ 18. 

Hellas, influence of the climate 
of, on the national character, 
vii. 7, §§1-4; natural superi- 
ority of Hellenes to Barbarians, 
i. 2, § 4; 6, § 6; iii. 14, § 6; 
vii. 7, § 3 ; differences of the 
various Hellenic tribes, vii. 7, 
§ 4 : — barbarous laws among 
the ancient Hellenes, ii. 8, § 20; 
the Hellenes formerly under 
royal rule, i. 2, §6; iii. 15, §11. 
iv. 13, § 10 ; changes in govern- 
ment caused by the increase of 
population, iii. 15, §§ 1 1-13; iv. 
<5 } §55 13, §§ 10-12; vi. 5, 
§ 5 ; rise of the heavy-armed 
in importance, iv. 13, §10; 
effects of the Persian war upon 
Hellas, ii. 12, § 5 ; v. 4, § 8 ; 
viii. 6, § n ; growth of the 
Athenian empire in Hellas, iii. 
1 3, § J 9 J division of Hellas be- 



Index 



333 



tween Athens and Lacedaemon, 
iv. it, § 18; v. 7, § 14: — 
smallness of the middle class 
in later Hellas, iv. 11, §§ 7, 16- 
19; lack of great men, v. 10, 
§ 37 ; effects of the cultivation 
of rhetoric, ib. 5, §7; wrong 
notions of education, iv. 1 1, § 6 ; 
vii. 14, §15; viii. 1, §3; 2, 
§ 2 : — rage for flute playing in 
Hellas after the Persian War, 
viii. 6, § 12. 

Helots, ii. 5, § 22 ; 9, § 2 ; 10, 
§§4> !6. 

Heniochi, the, in Pontus, viii. 

4, §3- 
Hephaestus, i. 4, § 3. 
Heraclea, in Pontus, v. 5, § 3 ; 

6, §§2, 3, 7, 15; vii. 6, §8. 
Heracleides of Aenos,v. 10, § 18, 
Heracleitus, v. 11, § 31. 
Heracleodorus, v. 3, § 9. 
Heracles, iii. 13, § 16. 
Heraea (in Arcadia), v. 3, § 9. 
Hesiod, quoted, i. 2, §5 ; v.io,§3o. 
Hestiaea (the later Oreus) in Eu- 

boea, v. 3, § 9 ; 4, § 4. 
Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse, v. 10, 

§31; 11, § 7; 12, §§5, 6. 
Hipparinus, v. 6, § 8. 
Hippocrates, vii. 4, § 5. 
Hippodamus, of Miletus, ii. 8, 

§ 1 ; vr. 11, §6. 
Homer, calls Zeus ' the father of 

Gods and men/ i. 12, §2; — 

quoted, 

II. ii. 204 ; iv. 4, § 27 ; 
ib. 372 ; iii. 16, § 10; 
v. 39 I "3; ib. 14, §5J 
ix. 63; i. 2, § 9; 

ib. 319; "■ 7) § I0 ; 
ib. 648; iii. 5, §9; 
x. 224 ; ib. 16, § 10 ; 
xviii. 376 ; i. 4. § 3 ; 
Odyss. ix. 7 ; viii. 3, § 9 ; 
ib. 14; i. 2, §7; 
xvii. 385 ; viii. 3, § 9 ; 



— a passage is also cited, viii. 

3, § 8, which does not occur in 
our Homer. 

Honour, inequality in, a cause of 
revolutions, ii. 7, §§ 10-13, J 8- 
20; v. 2, § 2; 3, §§ 2, 14; 4, 
§§8-10; 12, §18; the remedy 
for this, v. 8, § 12; 11, §§ 26, 
27 ; the citizen must share in 
the honours of the state, iii. 5, 
§9 (cp.c. 10, §§4, 5); honour 
less desired by men than wealth, 
iv. i3,§8; v.8, §16; vi. 4, §3 
(cp. vi. 7, § 7). 

Household management, the art 
of, distinguished from the rule 
of a master, i. 1, § 2 ; 3, § 4 ; 
7, § 1; iii. 6, §§6, 7; divided 
into three parts, i. 3, §§1-3; 
12, § 1 ; how related to money- 
making, ib. 3, §3; 8, §§ 1, 2; 
9, §§ 1, 12-18; 10, §§ 1-4; 
includes the natural art of ac- 
quisition, ib. 4, § 1 ; 8, §§13- 

15; 9>§§ I ~ s l 1 o,§§ l -4; ", 

§§1-3; has a limit, ib. 9, 
§§14, 18; is more concerned 
with virtue than with wealth, 
ib. 13, § 1 ; the parts of men 
and women in, different, iii. 4, 
§17; exists for the benefit of 
those under it, ib. 6, §§6, 7. 

Husband and wife, relation of. 
[See ' Male ' and • Female.'] 

Husbandmen, are sometimes 
hunters, i. 8, § 8 ; would be 
better suited for Plato's com- 
munism than the guardians, ii. 

4, § 4 ; make the best form of 
democracy, iv. 6, § 2 ; 12, § 3 ; 
vi. 4, §§ 1, 8-10 ; furnish good 
sailors, vii. 6, § 8 ; should not be 
citizens, ib. 9, § 8 ; 10, §§13, 
14 ; nor admitted to office, ib. 
9, § 9 ; should be excluded from 
the , Freemen'sAgora,'ib.i2,§3. 

Husbandry, a part of the natural 



334 



Index 



art of money-making, i. 8, § 3 ; 
10, §3; ii, § 2. 

Iapygia, v. 3, § 7 ; vii. 10, § 5. 

Iberians, the, vii. 2, § 11. 

India, vii. 14, § 3. 

Inheritance, sale ofan, forbidden, 
ii- 7, § 6 ; (at Sparta\ ib. 9, 
§ 14 (cp. v. 8, § 20) ; the divi- 
sion of an, may be a cause of 
revolution, v. 4, § 4. 

Instruments, best when made for 
one use, i. 2, § 3; may be either 
living or lifeless, ib. 4, § 2 ; are 
used either in production or in 
action, ib, §§4-6; are never 
unlimited in the arts, ib. 8, 
§§14, 15 ; the slave a living 
instrument, ib. 4, §§2,6. 

Ionia, v. 10, § 6. 

Ionian Gulf, the, vii. 10, § 5. 

Iphiades, a party leader at 
Abydos, v. 6, § 14. 

Istros, v. 6, § 2. 

Italus, king of Oenotria, vii. 10, 

§3- 
Italy, >ii. 10, §§ 2-6. 

Jason, tyrant ofPherae, iii. 4, § 9. 

Judges, not allowed to commu- 
nicate with each other, ii. 8, 
§13; should not hold office for 
life, ib. 9, § 25 ; necessary, even 
in the first beginnings of the 
state, iv. 4, §§ 13, 14; the 
various modes of appointing 
them, ib. 16, §§ 5-7 ; provision 
for an equal division of opinion 
among judges, vi. 3, § 6 ; those 
who inflict penalties to be 
different from those who see to 
their execution, ib. 8, §§8-11. 

Justice, the sense of, peculiar to 
man, i. 2, § 12 ; the bond of 
men in states, ib. § 16 ; iii. 12, 
§9; 13. §31 (cp. iv. 4, §13); 
sometimes defined as benevo- 



force ? iii. 1 - 



■ 14-16; 



guarded by the citizens, ib. 14, 
§ 7 ; v. 10, § 10. 

King, the true, or natural supe- 
rior of the citizens, iii. 13, 
§§ 13, 24, 25; 17, §§5-8; vii. 
3, § 6 ; unknown in later Hellas, 
v. 10, § 37. [See Royalty.] 

King, a, the Gods why supposed 
to be under, i. 2, § 7 ; 12, § 3. 

Kings, the, of Crete (in ancient 
times), ii. 10, § 6 ; of Carthage, 
ib. 11, §§ 3-6, 9, 10 ; of Mace- 
donia, v. 10, § 8; oftheMolos- 
sians, ib. ; 11, § 2 ; of Persia, 
viii. 5, §5; of Sparta [see Lace- 
daemon] : — Kings, the ancient, 



lence, i. 6, § 4 ; different m men 
and women, ib. 13, §§ 3, 9 ; in 
the ruler and the subject, ib. 
§§2-8; iii. 4, §§ 16-18; con- 
sists in equality, iii. 9, § 1 ; 12, 
§1; 13, § 12 ; vii. 14, § 3 ; 
cannot be the destruction of the 
state, iii. 10, § 2 ; cannot be 
united with the love of conquest, 
vii. 2, §§7-18; selfishness of 
the ordinary notions of justice, 
vi. 3, §6; vii. 2, § 14; all claims 
to rule based upon partial and 
relative justice only, iii. 9, 
§§ 1-6, 15 ; v. 1, §§ 2-6 ; 9, 
§1; vi. 2, § 2; 3, §§ 1-4. 

King, the, not the same with the 
statesman, i. 1, § 2 ; ought to 
be chosen for merit (as at 
Carthage), ii. 9, § 29 ; 11, § 4 ; 
receives a special education, iii. 
4, § 8 ; may be justified in put- 
ting down his rivals, ib. 13, 
§ 22 ; v. 11, § 27 ; is the 
champion of the better classes 
against the people, v. 10, § 3 ; 
often supreme in religious 
matters, iii. 14, § 13 ; vi. 8, 
§ 20 ; should he have a military 



Index 



m 



sometimes became tyrants, v. 

Knights, the, at Athens, ii. 12, 
§ 6 ; at Eretria, v. 6, § 14. 

Lacedaemon ; frequent wars of 
the Lacedaemonians with their 
neighbours, ii. 9, §§ 3, 11 ; their 
difficulties with the Helots, 
ib. §§ 2-4 (cp. ib. 5, § 22) ; the 
Messenian Wars, ib. § 1 1 ; v. 
7> §§3> 4> tn e conspiracy of 
the Partheniae, v. 7, § 2 ; — of 
Pausanias, ib. 1, § 10; 7, §4; 
vii. 14, § 20; — ofCinadon,v. 7, 
§ 3 ; — of Lysander, ib. 1, § 10; 
7, § 2 ; the putting down of the 
tyrants, ib. 10, § 30; the subject 
cities governed in the oligar- 
chical interest by the Lacedae- 
monians, iv. 11, § 18; v. 7, 
§14; — friendship among the 
Lacedaemonians, ii. 5, §7; 
agriculture forbidden to them, 
ib. §17; simplicity of life among 
them, ib. 6, § 17 ; iv. 9, §§ 6-9; 
excellence of the Lacedae- 
monian education, iv. 9, § 7 ; 
viii. 1, §4 {but cp. vii. 2, §9; 
viii. 4, § 1) ; music not com- 
prised in it, viii. 5, § 7 ; Lace- 
daemonian training only ad- 
vantageous while other nations 
did not train, ib. 4, §§ 4-7 ; 
rage for flute-playing at Lace- 
daemon after the Persian War, 
ib. 6, § 12 ; error of the Lace- 
daemonians in thinking the ob- 
jects of their desire preferable to 
the virtue which gained them, ii. 
9, §35(cP- vii. 1, §5); spirit of 
distrust in the Lacedaemonian 
government, ii. 9, § 30 ; bad 
management of the revenue, ib. 
§ 36 ; frequency of corruption, 
ib. §§19, 26; 10, §12; accu- 
mulation of property, ib. 9, 



§§I3, Mi v - 7f§§3»i<\(cp.v. 
I2> § *5) '} number of heiresses, 
ii- 9j § 15 ; decrease in popu- 
lation, ib. §§ 14-19; encourage- 
ment of large families, ib. § 14; 
expulsion of strangers, ib. 10, 
§15; strangers admitted to 
citizenship in ancient times, ib. 
9, § 17 ; licence of the Lacedae- 
monian women, ib. §§ 5-13 : — 
the Lacedaemonian constitution 
a combination of various forms 
of government, ib. 6, §§ 16, 17; 
9, § 2 2 ; — an aristocracy with an 
element of democracy, iv. 7, § 4 
(cp. ii. 9, § 20 ; 10, § 10) ;— re- 
garded by some as a democracy, 
by others as an oligarchy, iv. 9, 
§§ 6-10; — often considered the 
next best to the ideal state, ii. 
6, § 16 ; iv. 1, § 6 ; — its resem- 
blance to the Cretan, ii. 10, 
§ § 4-7 ; — to the Carthaginian, 
ib. 1 1, §§ 3—5 ; the arrangement 
ofthelaw-courtsatLacedaemon, 
an aristocratical feature, ib. § 7 ; 
Hi. 1, §§ 10, 11; the attention 
of the legislator directed solely 
to war, ii. 9, §§34, 35 5 vii * 
2, § 9; 14, §§ 16-22 ; viii. 4, 
§§1-7 : — imperfections of the 
Lacedaemonian monarchy, ii. 9, 
§§ 2 9, 30; 11, §§ 3, 4J limited 
powers of the kings, iii. 14, § 3; 
v. 1 1 , § 2 ; their office an heredi- 
tary generalship, ii. 9, § 33 ; iii. 
!4>§§4»5i i 4i x 5>§§ 1,2; 16, 
§ 1 : origin of their power, 
v. 10, §8; reason of its long 
continuance, ib. 11, §2: — the 
Gerusia criticized, ii. 9, §§ 25- 
29; 11, §§4, 11 ; v. 6, § Hi- 
faults and merits of the Epho- 
ralty, ii. 6, §17; 9, §§19-24, 
26; 10, §§ 10, 12 ; 11, § 3; 
established by Theopompus as 
a check on the royal power, v. 



33* 



Index 



IJ j §§2, 3; — the office of ad- 
miral, ii. 9, § 33 : — the com- 
mon tables, why instituted, ib. 
5> § r 5I 6, § 17; 9, §§3^32; 
iv. 9, § 8 ; not so well managed 
as in Crete, ii. 9, §32; 10, 
§§7,8. 

Lamet.ic Gulf, the, vii. 10, § 3. 

Land, the, should be divided into 
two portions, vii. 10, § 11 {but 
cp. ii. 6, § 15) : Hippodamus's 
division of, ii. 8, §§3, 12; — 
should it be cultivated by the 
owners? ib. 5, §§3, 18, 19; 8, 
§§8-13; vii. 9, §§1-4; 10, 
§§ 1 3, 14 ; at Sparta, had fallen 
into the hands of a few, ii. 9, 

§§i4> J 5. 

Landowners, small, to be encour- 
aged, vi. 4, §§ 8-10. 

Larissa, iii. 2, § 2 ; v. 6, §§ 6, 13. 

Law, the, of Oxylus, vi. 4, § 9: — 
Laws, the, of Androdamas, ii. 
12, §14; of Charondas, ib. 
§§ 6-8, 11 ; iv. 13, §2 ; of 
Draco, ii. i 2, § 1 3 ; of Lycurgus 
{see Sparta); of Minos, ii. 10, 
§ 3 ; vii. 10, § 1 ; of Phaleas, ii. 
7 ; 12, § 12 ; of Philolaus, ib. 
12, §§8-10; of Pittacus, ib. 
§13; of Plato {see Plato) ; of 
Solon, ii. 7, § 6 ; 12, §§ 1-6; iii. 
11, §8; of Zaleucus, ii. 12, §6. 

Law, the, derives its force from 
habit, ii. 8, § 24 ; 'a surety of 
justice* (Lycophron), iii. 9, § 8 ; 
may have a party character, ib. 
10, §5; 11, §20; only exists 
for equals, ib. 13, §§13, 14; 
16, §§ 2, 3; must be supported 
by force in the ruler, ib. 15, 
§§ 14, 15; is a mean, ib. 16, 
§ 8 ; is order, vii. 4, § 8 ; is 
without passion, iii. 15, § 5 ; 
the rule of, the rule of God, ib. 
16, §5 (cp. i. 2, §§15, 16);— 
should the law or the monarch 



rule ? iii. 15, §§ 1-10; 16 ;— 
should the law ever be changed ? 
ii. 8, §§ 16-25 v c P- iii- J 5> §§ 6, 
7 ; 16, § 5) : — Laws, the, cannot 
provide for circumstances, ii. 8. 
§ 22; iii. 11, § 19; 15, §§4-8 ; 
16, §§4-13; shonld be supreme, 
and the magistrates only their 
interpreters, iii. ii, §19; 16, 
§§5, 10-12 ; iv. 4, §31 ; are 
relative to the constitution, but 
distinct from it, iii. n, §20; 
iv. I, §§9, 10 ; must be obeyed 
and must be good, iv. 4, § 30 ; 
8, §§5, 6. 

Law, the, or convention, by which 
prisoners of war become slaves, 
i. 6, §§ 1, 5. 

Law, unwritten, importance of, 
iii. 16, § 9. 

Laws, the, of Hellenic cities gene- 
rally in a chaotic state, vii. 2,§ 9. 

Laws, the, of Plato {see Plato). 

Law Courts, the, oligarchical 
and democratical tricks with, 
iv. 9, § 2 ; 13, §§2, 5; 14, 
§ 12; the rich should be encour- 
aged to attend, even in demo- 
cracies, vi. 5, § 5 ; used by the 
demagogues to ruin the rich, v. 

3, §4; 5, §§ i-5J.vi. 5. §3- 
Law courts, the possible varieties 

of, iv. 16. 
Legislator, the, must have regard 
to the country and the people, 
ii. 6, § 7 ; 7, §§ 14-17; must 
pay attention to the foreign re- 
lations of the state, ib. ; ib. ; 
vii. 2, § 18; must secure leisure 
for his citizens, ii. 9, § 2 ; 11, 
§§10, 12; vii. 9, §§3, 7 (cp. 
vii. 12, § 7); must not trust to 
accidents, ii. 11, §§ 15, 17 ; vii. 
l Z> §§8-10; must regard the 
common good, iii. 13, §12; 
ought not to want such a princi- 
ple as ostracism, ib. § 23 ; v. 3, 



Index 



337 



§ 3 ; must know all possible 
forms of state, iv. i, §8; and 
the causes of their preservation 
and destruction, v. 9, § 9 ; vi. 5, 
§ 2 ; must be able to reform as 
well as to create a state, iv. i, 
§ 7 ; should favour the middle 
class, ib. 12, § 4 ; must consider 
the deliberative, executive, and 
judicial elements in relation to 
the constitution of each state, 
ib. 14, § 1 ; must be modest in 
his designs, ii. 6, § 7 ; viii. 4, 
§ 2 ; should not make conquest 
the aim of his state, vii. 2 ; 
must give all the citizens a share 
in the administration, ib. 14, 
§ 4 ; must have a care of edu- 
cation, ib. §§ 1, 8; 15, §8; viii. 
I, §§ I > 2 ; must not neglect 
physical education, vii. 16, § 1. 

Legislators, the best, belonged to 
the middle class, iv. 11, § 15. 

Leisure, the, of the citizens, the 
first object of the legislator, ii. 
9, §2; 11, §§10-12; vii. 9, 
§§3,4, 7 (cp.vii. 12, §7); the 
citizen must know the right uses 
of, vii. 14, §§13-22; viii. 3; 5, 
§ 4; needed for virtue, vii. 9, § 4. 

Leontini, v. 10, §6 ; 12, § 13. 

Lesbos, iii. 13, § 19. 

Leucas, ii. 7, § 7. 

Liberty, supposed to be the 
characteristic feature of demo- 
cracy, iii. 8, § 7 ; iv. 4, §§ 22, 
23 ; 8, § 7; v. 1, § 3; 8, §6; 
9, §§ 14, 15 ; vi. 2, §§ 1-4, 9; 
4, § 20 ; must not be confused 
with licence, v. g, § 15 ; — should 
be held out as a reward to slaves, 
vii. 10, § 14. 

Life, action, not production, i. 4, 
§ 5 ; pleasure of, iii. 6, § 5 ; is 
the speculative or the practical, 
better? vii. 2, §§5-18; 3 :— 
divided by the poets into periods 



of seven years, ib. 16, § 17; 17, 

§ 15 : — simplicity of, at Sparta, 

ii. 6, §17; iv. 9, §7. 
Life, the good, not desired by 

mankind in general, i. 9, § 16 ; 

the object of the existence of the 

state, ib. 2, § 8 ; iii. 9, §§ 6-14; 

iv. 4, §12; vii. 1, § 1 j 2, §17; 

4, § 11; 8, §4; is it the same 

for states and for individuals ? 

vii. 1 ; 2 ; 3, § 10. 
Limit, a, necessary in the arts, i. 

8, §14; 9, § 13; iii. 13, §21; 

vii. 4, § 10 ; in population, ii. 

6, §§6, 10; 7, §5 ; 9, §19; 

vii. 4, §§ 4-11; 5, §1; 16, 

§ 15 ; in the state, ii. 6, § 7 ; 

i". 3, §§4-7 5 vii. 4; 5, Si; 
in wealth, i. 8, §14; 9, §14; 
ii. 6, §§8, 9; 7, §§4-8; vii. 5, 
§ 1. 

Locri (in Italy), ii. 7, § 6; 12, 
§6; v. 7, § 10. 

Lot, use of the, characteristic of 
democracy, ii. 11, § 7; 12, §3; 
iv - 9> §4; J 5> §19; vi. 2, §§5, 
8 ; modes in which it may be 
used in elections of magistrates, 
iv. 15, §§ 16-22. 

Lycophron, the Sophist, iii. 9, 
§8. 

Lyctus, in Crete, ii. 10, § 2. 

Lycurgus,the author of the Lace- 
daemonian constitution, ii. 10, 
§ 2 ; 12, § 1 ; was the guardian 
of Charilaus, ib. 10, § 2 ; his 
visit to Crete, ib. ; his failure to 
bring the women under his laws, 
ib. 9, § § 1 1 , 1 2 ; said by some to 
have been a disciple of Thales, 
ib. 12, §7; belonged to the 
middle class, iv. 11, § 15. 

Lydian Harmony, the : see Har- 
mony. 

Lygdamis, tyrant of Naxos, v. 6, 

§1. 
Lysander, v. 1, § 10 ; 7, § 2. 



338 



Index 



Macedonia, v. 10, § 8; vii. 2,§ 10. 

Magistrates, power of calling to 
account [see Account, power of 
calling magistrates to] ; division 
of law-suits among the Lace- 
daemonians and Carthaginian 
magistrates, ii. u, §7; iii. 1, 
§ 10 (cp. iv. 14, § 3) ; election 
of magistrates by merit charac- 
teristic of aristocracy, ii. 11, 



>7> 9; iv. u 



§ 10; — for 



wealth, of oligarchy, ii. 6, § 19; 

11, §9 ; iv. 15, § 10; choice by 
lot, of democracy, ii. 6, § 19 ; 

12, § 3; iv. 15, § 19; vi. 2, 
§§ 5, 9; must be taken from 
those who carry arms, ii. 8, § 9 ; 
i v - J 3> §9; are vei T numerous 
in democracies, ii. 11, §14; 
ought to be only the guardians 
and interpreters of the law, iii. 
ii, §19; 16, §§5, 10-12; iv. 
4, §31; character and powers of 
the magistrates in aristocracies, 
iv. 14, § 10; 15, § 13; vi. 8, 
§ 22 ; in constitutional govern- 
ments, iv. 14, §§ 10, 16; in 
democracies, ib. §§1-7; 15, 
§§ 10-14; vi. 2, §§ 5-9; 8, 
§§17, 24; in oligarchies, iv. 
14, §§8,9; 15, §§ 10-14; vi. 
8, §§17, 24; the magistrates 
peculiar to each constitution, iv. 
i5> §§ n-13; vi. 8, §§ 17, 24; 
definition of the term 'magis- 
trate,' iv. 15, §§ 1-4; should he 
hold more than one office? ii. 

11, §13; iv - T 5> §§ 5- 10 ; vi. 
8, § 2 ; the various modes of 
appointment, iv. 15, §§ 14-21 ; 
vi. 5, §11 ; popular election 
dangerous, v. 5, § 10 ; 6, § 6 ; 
the magistrates should not be 
allowed to make money, ib. 3, 
§ 1 ; 8, § 15; vi. 7, §5 (cp. v. 

12, §14); undue power ac- 
quired by them a cause of revo- 



lution, v. 3, §3; 4, §§8-11 ; 
great authority of the ancient 
magistrates, iii. 16, §1; v. 1, 
§10; 5, §8; 10, §5 ; vi. 2, 
§ 8 ; the magistrates may pre- 
vent revolutions by prudence, v. 
8, § 8 ; manner in which they 
should act in oligarchies, vi. 
5,§§ 10, 11; 7, §§4-7; enume- 
ration of the different magis- 
trates required by states, vi. 8 ; 
the magistrates must know the 
characters of their fellow- 
citizens, vii. 4, § 13 ; must sup- 
press obscenity, ib. 17, § 10 : — 
Magistrates, certain, required 
by law to take their meals to- 
gether, vi. 2, § 7 ; vii. 12, § 2. 
Magnesia (on the Maeander), iv. 

3, § 3- 

Magnesians, the, ii. 9, § 3. 

Majority, the (in a state), diffi- 
culties about the power which 
should be possessed by, iii. 10 ; 
11 ; 13, §§4-7; vi. 3. 

Male and female, reason for the 
union of, i. 2, § 2 ; the relation 
of, part of the household, ib. 3, 
§ 2; 12, § 1. 

Male, the, intended by nature to 
rule over the female, i. 5, § 7 ; 
12, § 1. 

Malians, the, iv. 13, § 9. 

Man a political animal, i. 2, 
§§ 9> H» 1 5 J J"- 6, § 3; has 
a natural wish for posterity, i. 
2, § 2 ; alone has the faculty of 
speech, ib. § 10; — the sense of 
good and evil, ib. §12; — the 
power of reason, vii. 13, § 12 ; 
the worst of animals when not 
controlled by law and justice, 
i. 2, §§15, 16 ; must allow 
reason to direct nature and 
habit, vii. 13, §§11-13; should 
give the soul rule over the body, 
i- 5> §§4~7; the plants and 



Index 



339 



animals created for his sake, ib. 
8, § 12 : — Man, the virtue of 
the, different from that of the 
woman, ib. 13, §§ 3, 9-11 ;_ iii- 

4, § 16 : — Men are unlimited 
in their desires, i. 9, §§ 16-18 ; 
ii. 7, §§8, 19; are wicked by 
nature, ii. 5, § 12 ; are more 
desirons of gain than of honour, 
iv. 13, §8 ;< v. 8, §16; vi. 4, 
§ 3 ; are satisfied with a mode- 
rate amount of virtue, vii. 1, 
§ 5 : — Men, the first, were or- 
dinary, foolish people, ii. 8, 
§ 21. 

Mantinea, battle of, v. 4, § 9 ; 

government by representation 

at, vi. 4, § 4. 
Marriage, regulations respecting, 

vii. 16 ; — the marriage relation, 

i. 2, §2; 3, §§ 1-3; 12; iii. 4, 

§6. 
Massalia, v. 6, §§2,3; vi. 7, 

§4- 

Master, the, in relation to the 
slave, i. 2, §§ 2-5; 3, §§ 1-3; 
12, §1; 13, §§7, 12-14; h as a 
common interest with the slave, 
ib. 6, § 10; iii. 6, § 6 ; vii. 14, 
§ 6 ; ought to train the slave in 
virtue, i. 13, § 14; — the science 
peculiar to, ib. 3, § 4 ; 7, §§ 2- 
5 ; 13, § 14; — the rule of, ib. 
3, §4; iii. 4, §11; vii. 14, §6; 
wrongly supposed [by Plato] to 
be different from political rule, 
i. 1, §2 ; 3, §4. 

Mean, importance of the, in 
states, iv. 11; v. 9, § 6 ; in 
education, viii. 6, § 7; 7, § 15. 

Mechanic, the: see Artisan. 

Medes, the, iii. 13, §19; viii. 

5, §5- 



Medicine, i. 


% 


§§ 


13) 


17 


10, 


§§3, 4; 


ii. 


8, 


§ 


18. 


{See 


Physician.) 












Megacles, v. 


10 


5 


9. 







Megara, iii. 9, § 9 ; iv. 15, § 15 ; 

v. 3, §55 5> §§4, 9- 
Messenian War, the (Second), v. 

7, §3- 

Messenians, the, ii. 9, §§3, 11. 

Metics : see Aliens. 

Midas, i. 9, § 11. 

Middle class, virtues of the, iv. 
11; 12; the middle-class state 
the best, ib. 11, §§8-15; 12, 
§ 4 ; v. 8, § 14 ; 9, § 6 ; small- 
ness of the middle class in 
ancient states, iv. 13, § 11. 

Might and right, i. 6, § 3 ; vi. 3, 
§ 6; vii. 2, §13. 

Miletus, i. ii, § 9; v. 5, §8. 

Minos, ii. 10, § 3; vii. 10, §§ 2, 
6. 

Mithridates (? Satrap of Pontns), 
v. 10, § 25. 

Mitylene, iii. 14, § 10 ; v. 4, §§ 5, 
6 ; 10, § 19. 

Mixo-Lydian Harmony, the: see 
Harmony. 

Mnaseas, a Phocian, v. 4, § 7. 

Mnason, a Phocian, v. 4, § 7. 

Moderation in politics, necessary 
for the salvation of the state, iv. 
11, §§ 16-19; v - 9> § 6 J vi - 5» 
§2. 

Molossians, the, in Epirus, v. 10, 
§8; ii, § a. 

Monarchy, arguments for and 
against, iii. 15-17. 

Monarchy: see King, Royalty, 
and Tyranny. 

Money, origin of, i. 9, § 8 ; its 
conventional nature, ib. §11 ; 
ought not to be made from 
money, ib. 10, § 5. 

Money-making, the art of, how 
related to household manage- 
ment, i. 3, § 3 ; 8, §§ t, 2 ; 9, 
§§ 1, 12-18; 10, §§ 1-4; the 
natural kind, ib. 8, §§ 3-15; 9, 
§§1-8; 10, §§ 1-4; 11, §§ 1, 
2 ; the unnatural, ib. 9, § 1 foil.; 



Z 2 



340 



Index 



io, §§ 4, 5 ; ii, §3; the inter- 
mediate, ib. n, §4; the un- 
natural pursues its end without 
limit, ib. 9, §§ 13-15. 

Monopolies, a common method 
of gaining wealth, i. n,§§8-i3. 

Multitude, the, their claim to the 
supreme power, iii. 10, § 1 ; are 
better collectively than the in- 
dividual, ib. 11; 13, §4; 15; 
should have power only to elect 
and control the magistrates, ib. 

11, §7- 

Musaeus, quoted, viii. 5, § 11. 

Music, subject to a ruling princi- 
ple, i. 5, §4; better judged of 
by the many than by the indi- 
vidual, iii. 11, §3; useful (1) 
in education, viii. 3; 5 ; 7, §3; 
(2) for the intellectual employ- 
ment of leisure, ib. 3 ; 5, §§ 8, 
9 J 7> § 3 J (3) w ^h a view to 
purification, ib. 7, §§ 3-6 ; has 
an effect upon morals, ib. 5, 
§§7, T 5- 2 5; 6, §§1, 6; 7, 
§§ 3 _ 7 ! 110t taught at Lacedae- 
mon, ib. 5, § 7 ; naturally plea- 
sant to men, ib. §§8, 11, 25; 
7, § 6; produces enthusiasm, ib. 
5, §§ 16, 22; 7, §4; allays the 
passions, ib. 6, § 9 ; 7, §§ 4-6 ; 
a rattle for children of a larger 
growth, ib. 6, § 2 ; cannot be 
judged except by a performer, 
ib. § 4 {but cp. c. 5, § 7) ; 
must not be pursued to the 
point of professional excellence, 
ib. 6, § § 7, 1 5 ; includes a higher 
and a lower kind, ib. §8; 7, 
§ 6 ; is composed of melody 
and rhythm, ib. 5, § 18 ; 6, § 5 ; 

7, §1. 
Music, writers upon, viii, 5, § 23 ; 

7> §§2, 3, 8, 11, 14. 
Musical Harmony : see Harmony. 
Myron, tyrant at Sicyon, v. 12, 

§ 12. 



Mytilene : see Mitylene. 

Nature, implants in man a desire 
of posterity, i. 2, § 2 ; makes a 
distinction between the ruler 
and the ruled, ib. ; 4, § 6; 5 ; 
6, § 8 ; 12 ; 13, § 4 ; — between 
the female and the slave, ib. 2, 
§ 3 ; her designs must be sought 
in things which areuncorrupted, 
ib. 5, §5 J does nothing in a 
niggardly fashion, ib. 2, §3; 
creates nothing in vain, ib. §10; 
8, § 12 ; ii. 5, § 8; gives to man 
the social instinct, ib. 2, §§ 10- 
16; iii. 6, §§ 3-5 ; not always 
able to accomplish her inten- 
tions, i. 5, § 10; 6, §8; sup- 
plies food for all, ib. 8, §§ 9-1 2 ; 
10, § 3; has given all freemen 
a right to rule, ii. 2, § 6; iii. 16, 
§§ 2, 3 ; fits the young to obey, 
the old to command, vii. 9, § 6 ; 
permits proper relaxation, viii. 
3, § 2 ; herself suggests the pro- 
per harmonies for each age, ib. 
7j § 1 3 ; — forms one element in 
virtue, vii. 13, §§11-13; i5> 
§ 7 ; must be supplemented by 
art and education, ib. 17, § 15. 

Naval force, the, which should 
be possessed by the state, vii. 
6, §§6-9. 

Naxos, v. 6, § 1. 

Nobility, among Barbarians only 
partially recognized by Hellenes, 
i. 6, §7; confers a claim to supe- 
riority in the state, iii. 9, § 15 ; 
12, §9; 13, §§2-5; iv. 8, §3 ; 
may be defined (1) as excellence 
of race, iii. 13, §3 ; v. i, § 7; 
(2) as ancient wealth and virtue, 
iv. 8, § 9 ; confused by mankind 
with wealth, ib. §§4, 8; v. 7, 
§ i ; like virtue, is not often 
found, v. 1, § 14. 

Nobles, quarrels among, a cau?e 



Index 



341 



of revolutions, v. 1 , § 1 6 ; 4, § 1 ; 

6, § 5 ; 8, § 9 ; form a demo- 
cracy among themselves, ib. 8, 
§ 6 ; should be humane to the 
subject classes, iv. 13, § 8; vi. 

5, §§5-"- 
Notium, v. 3, § 15. 

Obedience, the necessary prelim- 
inary to command, iii. 4, §§ 10, 
14; vii. 9, §6; 14, §6. 

Odysseus, viii. 3, § 9. 

Oenophyta, battle of, v. 3, § 5. 

Oenotrians, the (in Southern 
Italy), vii. 10, §§3-5. 

Office, the * indefinite, ' in which 
all the citizens share, iii. 1, 
§§6-12; 2, §5. 

Office, lust of mankind for, iii. 6, 
§ 10; oligarchical tricksto keep 
the poor from, iv. 13, §§ 1-4; 
justice of the various claims to, 
iii. 10-13 :— Offices, the, of the 
state, posts of honour, ib. 10, 
§ 4 ; their distribution, iv. 15 ; 
vi. 8 ; their organization deter- 
mines the character of each 
constitution, iv. 1, § 10 ; 3, § 5 ; 
in small states must be com- 
bined, in large ones specialized, 
ii. 11, §14; iv. 15, §§5-7; vi. 
8, § 2 ; in democracies restricted 
to six months' tenure, v. 8, § 6 ; 
(cp. vi. 2, § 5) ; and rarely held 
more than once by the same 
person, iii. I, § 6 ; vi. 2, § 5 ; 
should be divided into two 
classes, v. 8, § 21 ; vi. 5, § n. 

Offices, sale of, and pluralism, at 
Carthage, ii. 11, §§ 10, 13. 

Oligarchy, the government of the 
few for their private interests, iii. 

6, § 2 ; 8, § 3;— or, more correctly, 
of the wealthy, ib. 7, § 5 ; 8, 
§§6, 7; iv. 4, §§1-6, 19; 8, 
§7 J IX > §§16-19; v. 1, §3; 
vi. 2, § 7; Plato wrong in think- 



ing that an oligarchy can ever be 
called 'good/ iv. 2, §3; oli- 
garchy the perversion of aristo- 
cracy, iii. 7, §5; 15, § 12 ; iv. 
2, §2; how distinguished from 
it, ii. 11, §§5-10; iv. 5, § 1; 
7; 8, §§ 2-10; 14, § 10; v. 7, 
§§5-8; popularly supposed, 
like aristocracy, to be a 'govern- 
ment of the best,' iv. 8, § 4 ; v. 
1, § 14; analogous to tyranny 
in love of wealth, v. 10, § 11 ; 
has more forms than one, iv. 1, 
§ 8; 4, §§ 20-22; 12, §3; 13, 
§ 12 ; the forms enumerated, ib. 
S, §§i-3J 6, §§7-11; 14, 
§ § 8-1 1 ; vi. 6 ; oligarchy less 
stable than democracy, iv. 11, 
§14; v. 1, § 15; 7, § 6; the 
shortest lived of all forms of 
governments, excepting tyranny, 
v. 12, § 1 (cp. vi. 6, §4); the 
extreme form apt to pass into 
tyranny, iv. 11, § 11 ; v. 10, § 5; 
12, §13; the causes of revo- 
lutions in oligarchies, v. 3, 
§ 14; 6; 12, §§ 15-18; the 
means of their preservation, ib. 

<5, §9J 8 , §§ 5-2i ; 9; vi - 6 > 
§ 5 ; 7 ; — the Lacedaemonians 
the champions of oligarchy in 
Hellas, iv. 11, § 18; v. 7, § 14 ; 
— the people to whom oligarchy 
is suited, iv. 2, § 4; 12, § 3 ; — 
the military strength of oligarchy 
derived from cavalry and heavy 
infantry, ib. 3, §3; 13, § 10; 
vi. 7, § 1 ;— oligarchical modes 
of appointing magistrates and 
judges, ii. 6, §§19, 20; iv. 14, 
§§77"; i5>§§ 14-31 ; 16, §8; 
magistracies peculiar to oli- 
garchy, i v. 14, § 14; 15, §11 ; 
vi. 8, §§17, 24; — luxury of 
the women in oligarchies, iv. 
15, § 13; bad education of the 
children, ib. 11, §6; v. 9, 



34 2 



Index 



§ 1 3 :— the oligarchs sometimes 
forbidden to engage in trade, v. 

12, § 14; their tricks to keep 
the power in their own hands, 
iv. 9, § 2 ; 13, §§ 1-4; 14, 
§12; they ought rather to give 
the people a share in the go* 
vernment, ib. 14, §14; vi. 5, 
§ 11 ; 7, § 4 ; they should not 
take oaths against the people, 
v. 9, §§10, ii; they should 
not be allowed to make money 
by office, ib. 3, § 1 ; 8, § 15; 
vi. 7, § 5- 

Olympic Games, the, viii. 4, § 8. 
Olympus, melodies of, viii. 5, 

§ 16. 
Onomacritus, the Locrian, ii. 12, 

§7. 
Onomarchus, a Phocian, v. 4, 

§7. 
Opici,the,orAusones,vii. 10, §5. 
Opus (in Locris), iii. 16, § 1. 
Oratory, v. 5, § 7. 
Oreus : see Hestiaea. 
Orthagoras, v. 12, § I. 
Ostracism, how far justifiable, iii. 

13, §§13-25; J 7> §7J v ' 3, 
§3; 8, § 12. 

Oxylus, king of Elis, vi. 4, § 9. 

Paches, v. 4, § 6. 

Painters, combine their works 
from scattered elements, iii. 11, 
§ 4 ; like other artists, observe 
a rule of proportion, ib. 13, 
§ 21 ; those who, like Poly- 
gnotus, express moral ideas, to 
be preferred, viii. 5, § 21. 

Paintings, obscene, not to be al- 
lowed, vii. 17, § 9. 

Panaetius, tyrant of Leontini, v. 
10, § 6; 12, § 13. 

Parent, the, relation of, to the 
child, i. 2, § 2 ; 3, § 2 ; 12 ; 
provides food for the ofTsoring, 
ib. 8, § 10; 10, §3. 



Parrhon, of Aenos, v. 10, § 18. 

Partheniae,the (at Lacedaemon), 
conspiracy of, v. 7, § 2. 

Passion, intended bynature to be 
controlled by reason, i. 5, § 6 ; 
present in the human soul from 
the first, iii. 15, §§5, 8 ; 16, 
§ 5 ; vii. 15, § 10 ; blinds men 
to danger, v. 10, §34; 11, §31 ; 
the multitude freer from passion 
than the individual, iii. 15, § 8. 

Patrimony, laws forbidding the 
sale of a, ii. 7, § 6 j 9, § 14 
(cp. v. 8, § 20). 

Pausanias, the assassin of Philip 
of Macedon, v. 10, § 16. 

Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, 
incorrectly called king, v. 1, 
§10; vii. 14, §20; his con- 
spiracy, v. 1, § 10 ; 7, § 4 ; vii. 
14, § 20. 

Pauson, paintings of, viii. q, 
§21. 

Payment of the democracy ; in- 
troduced at Athens by Pericles 
and Ephialtes, ii. 12, §4; bad 
effects of the practice, ib. 7, 
§19; iv. 6, § 5; vi. 2, § 6; 
how they may be counteracted, 

vi. 5, §5- 
Peace, the true object of war, vii. 

Hi §§!3) 22 ; J 5>§§ l > 5; the 

dangers of, ib. 15, § 3. 
Pediaei, the (or 'men of the 

plain'), at Athens, v. 5, § 9. 
Peisistratus, v. 5, §9; 12, 

§§2, 5; — Peisistratidae, the, 

v. 10, §§15, 34; 11, §9; 12, 

Peloponnesus, ii. 10, § 3; iii. 3, 
§ 5 ; — Peloponnesian War, the : 
see War, Peloponnesian. 

Penestae, the, ii. 5, § 22 ; 9, § 2. 

Pentacosio-medimni, the, in 
Solon's constitution, ii. 12, §6. 

Penthalidae, the, at Mitylene, v. 
10, § 19. 



Index 



343 



Penthilns (? tyrant of Mitylene), 

v. 10, § 19. 
Periander, tyrant of Ambracia, 

v. 4, § 9; 10, § 16. 
Periander, tyrant of Corinth, iii. 

13, §16; v. 10, §13; n, § 4; 

12, §3. 
Pericles, ii. 12, § 4. 
Perioeci (in Argos), v. 3, § 7 : — 

(in Crete), ii. 9, §3; 10, §§3, 

5, 8, 16 : — advantageous to have 
perioeci of foreign race as cul- 
tivators, vii. 9, § 8 ; 10, § 13. 

Perrhaebians, the, ii. 9, § 3. 
Persia, iii. 13, § 19; v. 10, 

§§8, 24; 11, §§4, 6; vii, 2, 

§ 10; viii. 5, § 5. 
Persian War, the : see War, 

Persian. 
Perversions, the, of the true forms 

of government, iii. 1, §§ 8-10; 

6, § 11; 7 ; 17, § 1 ; iv. 2, 
§§1-3; 8, §1; all governments 
perversions of the perfect state, 
iv. 8, § 1 (cp. ii. 11, § 5). 

Phalaris, of Agrigentum, v. 10, 
§6. 

Phaleas of Chalcedon, ii. 7, § 2 ; 
12, §§ 7, 12. 

Pharsalus, v. 6, § 10. 

Pheidon, tyrant of Argos, v. 10, 
§6. 

Pheidon, of Corinth, ii. 6, § 13. 

Philip, King of Macedonia, v. 1 o, 
§ 16. 

Philolaus, ii. 12, §§8, 10. 

Philosopher, the, may be allowed 
to discuss practical questions, i. 
11, §1; has no difficulty in 
acquiring wealth, ib. §§8-io; 
must go below the surface of 
things, iii. 8, § 1 ; his life as 
distinguished from that of the 
statesman, vii. 2, §6: — philo- 
sophers, the, not agreed about 
slavery, i. 6, § 2 ; the opinions 
of natural philosophers about 



marriage, vii. 16, § 11 ; philo- 
sophers who have treated of 
musical education, viii. 5, § 23 ; 
7, §§2, 3,8, 11,14. 
Philosophy, especially necessary 
in the prosperous, vii. 15, §§3, 

4- 

Philoxenus, viii. 7, §§ io, 11. 
Phocis, v. 4, § 7. 
Phocylides, quoted, iv. 11, § 9. 
Phoxus, tyrant of Chalcis, v. 4, 

§9- 

Phreatto, court of, at Athens, iv. 

16, §3. 

Phrygian harmony, the : see Har- 
mony. 

Phrynichus, v. 6, § 6. 

Phylarchs, magistrates at Epi- 
damnus, v. 1, § 10. 

Physician, the, must be judged by 
the physician, iii. 1 1 , § § 1 0-1 2 ; 
is healed by the physician, ib. 
16, § 8 ; is not expected to per- 
suade or coerce his patients, vii. 
2, § 13 ; must know both the 
end and the means of his art, 
ib. 13, § 2 ; precepts of the 
physicians about marriage, ib. 
16, § 11 ; law about physicians 
in Egypt, iii. 15, § 4. 

Piraeus, ii. 8, § 1 ; v. 3, § 15. 

Pittacus, ii. 12, §13; iii. 14, 
§§9, 10. 

Plato, criticisms of; — forms of 
government differ in kind, i. 1 , 
§ 2 J 3, § 4 ? 7> § * 5 th e virtue 
of men and women not the same, 
i* J 3) §§ 9-1 1 ; slaves not al- 
ways to be harshly treated, ib. 
§ 14 ; disadvantages of com- 
munity of wives and children, 
ii. 1, § 3-c. 5 ; of common pro- 
perty, ib. 5 ; vii. 10, § 9; 
the unity of the state may be 
carried too far, ii. 2, § 2-c. 3, 
§ 4 ; 4, § 6 ; 5, § 13 ; men and 
women ought not to have the 



344 



Index 



same pursuits, ib. 5, § 24 ; dan- 
ger from the rulers being always 
the same, ib. §§ 25, 26; hap- 
piness should not be confined 
to one class, ib. § 27 ; Plato 
has neglected the foreign rela- 
tions of his state, ib. 6, § 7 ; 
amount of property allowed by 
him insufficient, ib. § 9 ; he 
should have limited population 
as well as property, ib. §§ 10- 
14 ; 7, § 4 ; he has not said 
how the rulers and subjects are 
related, ib. 6, § 14; why should 
not property in land be increased 
to a certain extent ? ib. § 1 5 ; diffi- 
culty of living in two houses, 
ib. §16; the best state not 
made up of tyranny and demo- 
cracy, ib. § 18 ; the state of 
the Laws really a mixture of 
oligarchy and democracy, ib. 
§§18-22; Plato's distinctions 
between good and bad constitu- 
tions, iv. 2, § 3 ; his account of 
the classes necessary to a state, 
ib. 4, §§ 12-15 ; has not recog- 
nized the 'Polity' in his enu- 
meration of constitutions, ib, 7, 
§ 1 ; his theory of revolutions, 
v. 12, §§7-18; his error in 
saying that the guardians should 
be fierce to those whom they do 
not know, vii. 7, §§5-8 :— that 
a valiant city needs no walls, ib. 
II, § 8 :— that the crying of 
children should be checked, ib. 
17, §6; his inconsistency in 
retaining the Phrygian mode, 
viii. 7, §§ 8-13 : — the merits of 
Plato's writings, ii. 6, § 6 ; he 
departs from ordinary practice 
more than other legislators, ib. 
7, § 1 ; peculiarities suggested 
by him, ib. 1 2, § 1 2 : — justice of 
his censure of the Lacedae- 
monian constitution, ib. 9, § 34: 



— how far right in wishing that 
his city should not be near me 
sea, vii. 6, §§1-4 : — speech of 
Aristophanes in the Symposhm 
quoted, ii. 4, § 6 : — criticism of 
the Republic, ib. 1, § 3-c. 5; 
of the Laws, ib. 6. 

Pleasure, always sought by man- 
kind, i. 9, § 16; ii. 7, § 12 ; 
denied by Plato to his guardians, 
ii. 5, § 27 ; is regarded differ- 
ently by different persons, viii. 
3, § 5; the pleasure of living, 
iii. 6, §4; relation of pleasure to 
happiness, vii. i,§6; thenatural 
pleasure given by music, viii. 5, 
§§ 11, i 5j 17, 25; 6, §8:— 
Pleasures, the, which are unac- 
companied by pain, ii. 7, § 12. 

Poetry, better judged by the many 
than the individual, iii. 11, § 3. 

Polity: see Government, the Con- 
stitutional. 

Polycrates, v. 11, § 9. 

Polygnotus, the painter, viii. 5, 
§21. 

Poor, the, everywhere abound, 
iii. 8, § 6 ; v. 1, § 14 ; covet 
the goods of the rich, iv. 11, 
§ 9 ; their degraded state in 
Hellenic cities, ib. §§5-7; 
willing to fight if they are sup- 
ported by the state, ib. 13, § 9; 
equal to the rich in democracies, 
vi. 2, § 9 ; the surplus revenue 
distributed among them in the 
extreme democracy, ib, 5, § 7 ; 
may cause a revolution if their 
numbers increase, v. 3, §§ 6-S ; 
begrudge the extravagance of 
courts, ib. 11, § 19 ; should be 
humanely treated, ii. 7, §20; 
iv. 13, §8; should be helped 
by the rich, vi. 5, §§ 5-n, 

Population, decline of, at Sparta, 
ii. 9, § 16; importance of regu- 
lating, ib. 6, §§ 10-14; 7, §§4- 



Index 



34f 



6; 9, §§14-19; vii. 5, § 1 ; 16, 
§15; changes of government 
brought about by the natural 
increase of population in Hellas, 

i». i5> §13; iv. 6, §5J !3> 
§ 10 ; vi. 5, § 5 ; a limit of 
population necessary to good 
government, ii. 6, §§ 6, 10; 7, 

§5; 9> § *9; vii - 4> §§ 4- 11 ; 
5, §1 ; 16, § 15. 
Poverty, not the cause of the 
worst crimes, ii. 7, §10; always 
antagonistic to riches, iv.4, § 19 ; 
the parent of revolution and 
crime, ii. 6, § 13 {but cp. v. 12, 
§17); one of the essential 
characteristics of democracy, vi. 

2, §7- 

Priests, are not political officers, 
iv. 15, § 2 ; necessary to the 
state, vii. 8, §§ 7, 9; should be 
taken from the aged citizens 
who are past state service, ib. 
9, §9; their duties, vi. 8, §§ 1 8- 
20 ; required to take theirmeals 
at common tables, vii. 12, § 6. 

Property, a part of the household, 
i. 4, § J ; 8, § 1 ; a condition 
but not a part of the state, vii. 
8, § 4 ; in the sense of food, 
provided by nature for all, i. 
8, § 9 ; 10, § 3 ;— the pleasure of 
property, ii. 5, § 8 ;— Plato's 
limit of property unsatisfactory, 
ib. 6, § 9 ; the limit should be 
such as to enable a man to live 
both temperately and liberally, 
ib. ; vii. 5, § 1 ; — inequality of 
property at Sparta, ii. 9, §§ 14- 

19; v - 7, § 3, I0 ; I2 > § 15;— 
a great cause of revolutions, ii. 
7, §§2-6. 
Property, community of ; criti- 
cism of Plato's scheme, ii. 5 
{see Plato) ; common property 
opposed to human nature, ib. 
§§4, 16; exists in a modified 



degree among friends, ib. §§6, 
7 ; vii. 10, § 9 ; found to some 
extent at Sparta and Tarentum, 
"• 5* §75 y i* 5j § 1 ^i would 
destroy the virtues of temper- 
ance and liberality, ii. 5, §§ 8- 
10; would not produce the 
marvellous results which Plato 
expects, ib. § 11 ; — equalization 
of, proposed by Phaleas, ib. 7 ; 

12, §12; would not remedy 
the deeper evils of human nature, 
ib. 7, §§8-13, 18. 

Property qualification, required 
in the holders of various offices, 
iii. 11, §16; iv. 4, §24; 5, 
§1; 6, §§3, 7; vi. 4, §5; 
ought not to be excessive, iv. 

13, § 7 ; in oligarchies should 
be fixed according to two stan- 
dards, vi. 6, § 2 ; changes in, a 
cause of revolutions, v. 3, §§ 8, 
10; 6, §§ 16-18; 7, §9; the 
evil may be remedied by pe- 
riodical revisions of the census, 
ib. 8, §§ 10, 11. 

Proportion, importance of, iii. 

13, § 21; iv. 12; v. 1, §§ 12- 

15; 3, §6; 7, §8; 8, § 12 ; 9, 

§ 7 ; vii. 4, § 10. 
Psammetichus, son of Gordius, 

tyrant at Corinth, v. 12, § 3. 
Pyramids, the, of Egypt, v. 11, 

§9. 

Reason, an element of virtue, vii. 
i3> §§ 10-13; *5> §7; is the 
master artificer, i. 13, § 8; di- 
vided into two parts, the specu- 
lative and the practical, vii. 14, 
§ 10 ; is the end towards which 
nature strives, ib. 15, §8 ; in- 
tended by nature to control the 
passionate or irrational element 
in the soul, i. 5, §6; 13, §6; 
vii. 14, §9; 15, §8 ; is not 
found in the animals, i. 2, § 1 1; 



34* 



Index 



vii. 13, §12; exists in slaves to 
a limited extent, i. 5, §9; 13, §3; 
is not readily obeyed by those 
who have great advantages over 
others, iv. II, §5; may be 
overcome by passion, v. 10, 
§ 33 J 1 T > § 3 1 J m ay make mis- 
takes, vii. 15, § 7. 
Religion, matters of, used to be 
entrusted to the kings, iii. 14, 
§§3, 14 (cp. vi. 8, §20); the 
tyrant should have a care of 
religion, v. 11, §25; the ex- 
pense of public worship should 
be borne by the state, vii. io, 
§ 10: — the officers of religion, 
vi. 8, §§ 18-21 ; vii. 8, § 9 ; 

9, §9- 

Religious worship, one of the 
conditions of the state, vii. 8, 
§8. 

Representation, principle of, once 
existed in the government of 
Mantinea, vi. 4, § 4. 

Republic, the, of Plato : see 
Plato. 

Rest : see Leisure. 

Retail trade, not a natural mode 
of money-making, i. 9, §§ 4, 
12 ; arises out of the barter of 
necessary articles, ib. §§ 9-12. 

Revolutions, their objects, v. 1 ; 
their canses, ii. 7, §§ 2, 5, 10; 
v. 2; 3; 4; 10, § 13; 12, 
§§14-18; their occasions, v. 
4 ; 7, §11; the preventives of 
them, ii. 11, § 15 ; v. 7, § 6; 
8; 9; 11; vi. 4, §§ 16-20^5; 
6 ; revolutions in democracies, 
v. 5 ; — in oligarchies, ib. 6 ; — 
in constitutional governments, 
ib.§ 17 ; 7,§ 5 ; — in aristocracies, 
ib. 7; — in monarchies, ib. 10; 
— in tyrannies, ib. ; 11; Plato's 
theory of revolutions, criticized, 
ib. 12, §§ 7-18; — questions 
raised after revolutions: citizens 



dejure and de facto , iii. 2, §§34 
5 ; should old debts be paid- 
ib. 3, § 1 ;— democratic mea- 
sures taken by Cleisthenes and 
others after a revolution, ib. 2, 
§§ 3-5 J vi. 4, § 18; revolutions 
may happen withont an imme- 
diate change in the constitution, 
iv. 5, §3; v. 1, §8. 
Rhegium, ii. 12, § 14; v. 12, 

§13. 
Rhodes, ii. 10, §3; v. 3, §§4, 5; 

5, §2- 

Rich, the, one of the elements of 
the state, iv. 4, §15; every- 
where few compared to the poor, 
iii. 8, §6; v. 1, § 14 ; often 
hindered by the cares of property 
from attending to public busi- 
ness, iv. 6, §6 {but cp. i. 7, § 5) ; 
possess the external advantages 
of which the want occasions 
crime, iv. 8, § 4 (cp. ii. 7, § 10) ; 
have too much power in so-called 
aristocratical governments, iv. 
12, §6; v. 7, §7; their en- 
croachments more dangerous to 
the state than those of the poor, 
iv. 1 2, § 6 ; constantly in antago- 
nism to the poor, ib. 11, § 7 ; 
v. 9, § 10; should be protected 
against the demagogues, v. 8, 
§ 20 ; vi. 5, § 3 ; should be 
relieved from useless state ex- 
penses, v. 8, § 20 j vi. 5, § 9 ; 
should be generous to the poor, 
iv. 13, § 8 ; vi. 5, § 10 ; should 
be public-spirited and munifi- 
cent, vi. 7, § 6 ; are often spoilt 
by indulgence in childhood, iv. 
11, § 6 ; v. 9, § 13; can alone 
afford the expense of keeping 
horses, iv. 3, § 2. 

Riches and poverty, the opposing 
elements of the state, v. 1, 
§ 14; 8, § 14; riches more de- 
sired by men than houonr, iv. 



Index 



347 



13, § 8 ; v. 8, § 16 ; vi. 4, § 2 ; 
Solon wrong in thinking that 
1 no bound has been fixed to 
riches/ i. 8, § 14. See Wealth. 
Royalty, the form of government 
in which one rules for the best, 
iii. 7> § 3 J v. 10, § 3; analogous 
to aristocracy, v. 10, §§2, 7; 
opposed to tyranny, iii. 7, § 5 ; 
iv. 2, § 2 ; v. io, § 2 ; is it 
better than the rule of the law? 
iii. 15 ; 16; arose (1) from the 
government of families by the 
eldest, i. 2, § 6 ; 7, § 1 ; 12, § 3; 
(2) from services rendered by the 
first chiefs, iii. 14, §12 ; i5,§n; 
v. 10, §§3, 8 ; (3) from the 
weakness of the middle and 
lower classes, iv. 1 3, § 1 1 ; once 
existed in Crete, ii. 10, § 6 ; has 
various forms : (1) the Lacedae- 
monian (which is only a general- 
ship for life), ii- 9, § 33 ; iii. 14, 

§§3» 14; J 5> §§ 1 > 2 '> l6 > § l '> 
(2) the despotic (among Bar- 
barians), iii. 14, §§6, 14; iv. 
10, § 2 ; (3) the ancient Dicta- 
torships, iii. 14, §§ 8, 14 ; iv. 
10, § a ; (4) the monarchies of 
theheroicage, iii. 14, §§ n-14; 
(5) the absolute monarchy, ib. 
§ 15 ; — the people to whom 
royalty is suited, ib. c. 17; 
— causes of revolutions in mon- 
archies, v. 10 ; means of their 
preservation, ib. n, §§1-3; 
royalty more often destroyed 
from within than from without, 
ib. 10, §36; true royalty un- 
known in later Hellas, ib. § 37; 
vii.14, §3. See King, Monarchy. 
Rule ; the various kinds of rule 
essentially different from each 
other, i. 1, § 2; 3, § 4 ; 5, § 6; 
7, § 1 ; ia; 13, §§4-8; iii. 6, 
§§5-7; vii - 3, §2 ; 14, §6; 
the distinction between the 



ruler and the ruled found 
throughout nature, i. 2, § 2 ; 5, 
§§2-7; the better the ruled, 
the better the rule, ib. 5, §§ 2, 
7 ; v. 11, § 34; the rule of free- 
men better than despotic au- 
thority, vii. 14, § 19 ; rule over 
others, not the highest object of 
the legislator, ib. 14, §§ 14-22; 
rule must be learnt by obedience, 
iii. 4, §§ 10, 14; vii. 9, §6; 
14, § 6. 
Ruler, the, ought to have moral 
virtue in perfection, i. 13, § 8 ; 
the virtue peculiar to him, iii. 4, 
§ 17 ; must learn to govern by 
obedience, ii. 11, § 14 ; iii. 4, 
§ 14 ; vii. 9, § 6 ; 14, § 6 ; the 
rulers ought to remain the same, 
ii. 2, §§4-8; vii. 14, § 2 ; 
dangers arising from this 
arrangement, ii. 5, §§ 24-27 ; 
vii. 14, § 3; the difficulty solved, 
if the elder rule, and the younger 
obey, vii. 9, § 5; 14, § 5. 

Salamis, victory of, v. 4, § 8. 

Samos, iii. 13, § 19 ; v. 3, § 12 ; 
11, § 9. 

Sardanapalus, v. 10, § 22, 

Science, the, of the statesman, i. 
1, § 2 ; 10, § 1 ; iii. 12, § 1 ; 
i y « x > § 3; — of the master, i. 3, 
§ 4 ; 7, §§ 2, 4;— of the slave, 
ib. 7,§§ 2, 3; in all sciences the 
whole must be resolved into the 
parts, ib. 1, § 3 ; every science 
capable of improvement, ii. 8, 
§ 18 ; the philosophical student 
of science must not neglect any 
detail, iii. 8, § 1 ; all sciences 
aim at some good, ib. 1 2 , § 1 ; — 
the political science the highest 
of all sciences, iii. 1 2, § 1 ; aims 
at the good of the state, vii. 2, 
§ 4 ; the subjects which it in- 
cludes, iv. 1, §§3-11. 



34 8 



Index 



Scylax, vii. 14, § 3. 

Scylletic Gulf, the, vii. 10, § 3. 

Scythians, the, vii. 2, §§ 10, 11. 

Sedition : see Revolution. 

Self-sufficiency, the, of the state, 
the end and the best, i. 2, § 8 ; 
vii. 5, § 1 ; 8, § 8 ; would not 
be promoted by extreme unifi- 
cation, ii. 2, § 8. 

Senate : see Council of Elders. 

Senators : see Councillors. 

Servant, the, a kind of instrument 
in the arts, i. 4, § 2 ; many ser- 
vants often less efficient than a 
few, ii. 3, § 4 ; the servants 
who are employed in daily life, 
those with whom we most often 
disagree, ib. 5, § 4 ; children 
not to be left too much to ser- 
vants, vii. 17, § 7. See Slave. 

Sesostris, king of Egypt, vii. 10, 
§§i,6\ 

Seuthes, v. 10, § 24. 

Shepherds, lead the laziest life 
among men, i. 8, § 6 ; some- 
times combine brigandage with 
their other occupations, ib. § 8 ; 
form the second best material 
of a democracy, vi. 4, §§ 1, 11 ; 
make excellent soldiers, ib. § 1 1. 

Sicily, ii. 10, § 4 ; v. 12, § 13. 

Sicyon, v. 12, § 1. 

Simos (?), a party leader at 
Larissa, v. 6, § 1 3. 

Sirrhas, v. 10, §17. 

Slave, the, does he exist by nature? 
i. 4, § 6-c. 6 ; different from the 
female (except among Barba- 
rians), ib. 2, §§ 2-4 ; how re- 
lated to his master, ib. §§ 2-5 ; 

3, §§1-3; 4, §5; vii - 3, §5; 
not always distinguished by 
nature from the freeman, i. 5, 
§ 10 ; 6, § 8 ; the relation be- 
tween slave and master, when 
natural, does not exclude kind- 
ness, ib. 6, § 9 ; slave and 



master have a common interest, 
ib. 2, § 3 ; iii. 6, § 6 ; the slave 
must not be addressed in the 
language of command only 
[against Plato, Laws, vi. 777], i. 
1 3, § 1 4 ; place of the slave in the 
management of the family, ib. 
4 5 5) § 9 ; 8> § 1 ! tne slave an 
instrument taking precedence 
of other instruments, ib. 4, § 2 ; 
like the animals, ministers to 
the needs of life, ib. 5, § 9 ; 
the science proper to him, i. 7, 
§§ 2, 3 ; his share in virtue, ib. 
13, §§ 2-14 ;— in reason, ib. 5, 
§§ 8, 9; 13, §3 ; has not the 
deliberative faculty, ib. 13, § 7; 
is nearer to his master than the 
mechanic, ib. §13; ought to 
be trained in virtue by him, ib. 
§ 14 :— Slaves, how related to 
artisans, i. 13, § 13; ii. 7, § 22; 
iii. 4, § 12; 5, §3; forbidden 
gymnastic exercises in Crete, ii. 
5, § 19 ; difficulty in managing 
them, ib. § 22 ; 9, §§ 2-4; vii. 

10, §13; the different classes of 
slaves, iii. 4, § 12 ; children of 
slaves only admitted to citizen- 
ship in extreme democracies, ib. 
5, § 7 ; vi. 4, § 16; slaves can- 
not form a state, iii. 9, § 6 ; can- 
not be self-sufficient, iv. 4, § 11 ; 
licence allowed to them in 
democracies and tyrannies, v. 

11, §11; vi. 4, § 20 ; some- 
times emancipated by tyrants 
to serve as a guard, v. II, §32; 
should be encouraged by the 
hope of freedom, vii. 10, § 14; 
their company dangerous for 
children, ib. 17, § 7. 

Slavery, is it according to nature ? 
i. 5 ; 6. 

Slavery ; — men should not think 
it slavery to live according to 
the constitution, v. 9, § 15. 



Index 



349 



Slaves, the art of acquiring, a 
species of hunting or war, i. 7, 
§5; vii. 14, §21. 

Smerdis, v. to, § 19. 

Society, political, the highest of 
all communities, i. 1, § 1 ; exists, 
not for mere companionship, 
but for the sake of noble actions, 
iii. 9, §§ 12-14; man designed 
by nature to take part in society, 
i. 2, §§ 8-16; iii. 6, § 3; bene- 
fit conferred on mankind by the 
establishment of society, i. 2, 
§ 15 ; society cannot exist with- 
outjudicial decisionsand punish- 
ments, vi. 8, § 9 ; vii. 13, § 6. 

Socrates : see Plato. 

Soldiers, according to Plato, 
should be taught to use both 
hands alike, ii. 12, § 12; shep- 
herds make excellent soldiers, 
vi. 4, § 11 ; relation of the dif- 
ferent kinds of soldiers to the 
different constitutions, ib. 7, 
§§ 1-3 ; the soldier must have 
a good knowledge of the mili- 
tary art, vii. 11, § 12 ; soldiers 
as necessary to the state as 
artisans or husbandmen [against 
Plato, Rep. ii. 369], iv. 4, §§ 10- 
17; vii. 4, §§4-7; 8, §7; 9, 
§ 10 ; the soldiers should be 
taken from the youth, the coun- 
cillors from the old, vii. 9, 
§§ 3-10 ; 14, § 5 ; should form 
a separate caste, as in Egypt, ib. 
9, § 10 ; 10, § 1 ; position of 
the soldiers in the constitution 
of Hippodamus, ii. 8, §§ 2, 8- 
12. 

Soldiers,heavy-armed,citizenship 
in constitutional governments 
confined to the, ii. 6, § 16 ; iii. 
7, §4; 17, § 4; iv. 13, § 10; 
growth of their importance in 
Hellenic states, iv. 13, §§9-12 ; 
taken from the roll of citizens 



at Athens, v. 3, § 7 ; form (with 
cavalry) the natural military 
force of an oligarchy, vi. 7, 
§§ 1,2 ; generally worsted by the 
light-armed in popular insurrec- 
tions, ib, § 3 ; — the principal 
magistrates elected from those 
who are serving, or who have 
served, ii. 8, § 9 ; iv. 13, § 9. 

Soldiers, light-armed, always at- 
tached to democracy, vi. 7, § 2; 
generally master the heavy- 
armed in popular insurrections, 
ib. § 3 ; the younger citizens in 
oligarchies should be trained in 
the exercises of light infantry, 
ib. 

Solon, i. 8, § 14 ; ii. J, §6; 12, 
§§ 2-6 (cp. iii. 11, § 8) ; iv. 11, 

§15. 

Sophocles, quoted, i. 13, § 11. 

Soul, the, rules by nature over 
the body, i. 5, §§ 4-6 ; poste- 
rior to the body in order of 
generation, vii. 15, §9; more 
truly a part of an animal than 
the body, iv. 4, § 14 ; the beauty 
of the soul less easily seen than 
that of the body, i. 5, § 11 ; 
the interests of soul and body 
the same, ib. 6, §10; the ir- 
rational element in the soul 
subject to the rational, ib. 5, 
§6; 13, §6; vii. 14, §9; 15, 
§ 8 ; the divisions of the soul, 
i. 5, §§5-7J 13, §<5; iii. 4, 
§6; vii. 14, §9; 15, §9; the 
soul never wholly free from 
passion, iii. 15, § 5 ; said to be 
or to possess harmony, viii. 5, 
§25. 

Sparta : see Lacedaemon. 

Speculation, life of, opposed to 
that of contemplation, vii. 2 ; 

3 5 14* §§9" 22 - 
State, the, is the highest of com- 
munities, i. 1 , § 1 ; is based upon 



3ro 



Index 



the relations of husband and wife, 
father and child, master and 
slave, ruler and subject, ib. 2 ; 
1 3> § 15 ; formed of a union 
of villages, ib. 2, § 8 ; exists for 
the sake of a good life, ib. ; iii. 
9, §§ 6-14; iv. 4, §11; vii. 1, 
§1; 8, §§4, 8;— not for the 
sake of alliance and security, iii. 
9, §§6-14; is distinguished 
from an alliance because it has 
an ethical aim, ii. 2, § 3 ; iii. 9, 
§ 8 ; — from a nation, because it 
is made up of different elements, 
ii. 2, § 3 ; is not necessarily 
formed by a number of persons 
residing together, iii. 3, § 3 ; 9, 
§§9-12 ; {but cp. ii. 1, § a) ; 
is a work of nature, i. 2, §§ 8, 
9 ; prior to the family or the 
individual, ib. § 12; 13, § 15 : — 
composed of dissimilar parts or 
elements, ii. 2, § 3 ; iii. 1, § 2 ; 
4, §§6-8; iv. 3, §1 ; 4 , §7; 
12, §§ 1-4; v. 1, §§ 12-15; 3> 
§ 6 ; vii. 8 ; the parts not to be 
identified with the conditions of 
the state, vii. 8, § 1 ; the parts 
and conditions enumerated, iv. 

3, §§ 1-6; 4, §§7-20; vii. 8, 
§ 7 ; — compared to the parts of 
animals,! v. 4, §§7-9 : — the state 
depends for its identity mainly 
on the sameness of the constitu- 
tion, iii. 3 ; must be able to de- 
fend itself, ii. 6, § 7 ; 7, §§ 14- 
17 ; 10, § 15; iii. 12, § 9 ; iv. 

4, §10; vii. 4, §6; 15, §2; 
should be self-sufficing, i. 2, § 8 ; 
ii. 2, § S ; vii. 4, §11; 5, § 1 ; 8, 
§ 8 ; should not exceed a certain 
size,ii.6,§6;iii.3,§§4-7;vii.4; 

5, § 1 ; — has the same virtue, 
and therefore the same life and 
end, as the individual, vii. 1-3 ; 
13-15 ; may, like an individual, 
be wanting in self-discipline, v. 



9, § 12 ; must have the virtues 
of leisure, vii. 15, §1 ; can lead 
a life of virtuous activity isolated 
from others, ib. 2, § 16 ; 3, §§8~ 
10; is not made happier by 
conquest, ib. 2 ; 3 ; 14, §§ 14- 
22 ; rests upon justice, i. 2, § 16; 
vii. 14, §3 ; must have a care 
of virtue, iii. 9, § 8 ; vii. 13, § 9 
(cp. iv. 7, § 4) ; must be happy, 
not in regard to a portion of 
the citizens, but to them all, ii. 
5, § 27 ; vii. 9, § 7 ; is united 
by friendship among the citizens, 
ii. 5, §6; iii. 9, § 13; iv. n, 
§7; v. 11, §5 (cp.vi. 5, §7); 
must pay great regard to edu- 
cation, i. 13, § 15; ii. 7, § 8 ; 
v. 9, § 1 1 ; viii. 1 : — must not be 
left to fortune, ii. 11, §§ 15, 
16; vii. 13, § 9 ; is not the 
growth of a day, v. 3, § 11 ; is 
preserved by the principle of 
compensation, ii. 2, §§ 4-7 ; is 
sometimes left at the mercy of 
the army by the violence of 
faction, v. 6, §13; its perma- 
nence can only be secured by the 
toleration of all elements, ii. 9, 
§ 22 ; iv. 9, § 10; 12, § 1 ; v. 
8, § 5 J 9> § 5 J vi. 6, § 2 ; any 
state, however ill-constituted, 
may last a few days, vi. 5, § 1 : 
—the various claims to autho- 
rity in the state, iii. 9, §§ 1-5, 
14; 10; 12; 13; iv. 8, §9; vi. 
3> § § 1 —4 ; what share in the 
state may be allowed to the 
ordinary citizen? iii. 11, §§6~ 
8; iv. 13, §§5-8; vi. 4, §5; 7^ 
§ 5 (cp. ii. 12, §5). 
State, the ideal, of Aristotle, 
would require (1) a defensible 
position, vii. 5, § 3; (2) a mode- 
rate naval force, ib. §§6-9; 
(3) courageous and intelligent 
citizens, ib. 7 ; (4) the exclusion 



Index 



in 



of mechanics and tradesmen 
from citizenship, ib. 9, § § 1-8 ; 
(5) slaves and Perioeci to till 
the soil, ib. §8; 10, §§9, 13, 
14 ; (6) common meals, ib. 10, 
§§1-8, 10; (7) subdivision of 
the land into two parts, public 
and private, ib. § 11 ; (8) [for 
the city] a central situation, ib. 
5j § 3 J 1 1 3 § 2 ;— near, but not 
upon, the sea, ib. 6, §§ 1-6; a 
healthy site, ib. 11, § 1 ; a good 
water supply, ib. § 3 ; proper 
fortifications and walls, ib. §§5, 
8-12 ; an arrangement of houses 
and streets which will combine 
the advantages of beauty and 
security, ib. § 6 ; an acropolis, 
for the temples, and a * freemen's 
agora,' ib. 12, §§1-6; govern- 
ment buildings and a trader's 
agora, ib. 7. 

State, the best [absolutely], the 
enquirer into, must examine the 
best ideal and actual forms of 
government, ii. 1, § ijdiffers from 
the so-called aristocracies be- 
cause the citizens are absolutely 
good, iii. 13, § 12 ; iv. 7, § 2 
(<Wcp. iii. 4, §5); presupposes 
the best life, vii. 1 ; in compari- 
son with it, all existing govern- 
ments maybe called perversions, 
iv. 8, § 1. 

State, the best [under ordinary 
circumstances], iv. i,§ 3; 11, §21 
(cp. ii. 6, § 16). 

State, the best [for mankind in 
general], iv. 1, § 3 ; 11, § 1. 

Statesman, the, is properly con- 
cerned with the natural art of 
acquisition only, i. 8, § 15 ; 10, 
§ 1 ; ought also to be acquainted 
with the art of money-making, 
ib. 11, § 13; must be able to re- 
cognize evils at their commence- 
ment, v. 4, § 3 ; 8, § 9 ; must 



not despise small things, ib. 3, 
§10; 4, § 1; 7, §11; 8, §2; 
must he have virtue, or is skill 
alone snfficient ? ib. 9, §§1-4; 
must know the real effect of 
political measures, ib. § 9 ; 
will use fear as a means to bind 
the state together, ib. 8, § 8 ; 
will not suppose that the great- 
ness of the state depends merely 
on size, vii. 4, § 4; the life of the 
statesman contrasted with the 
life of the philosopher, ib. 2, § 6. 
Statesman, the, the rule of, dif- 
ferent from other kinds of rule, 

i. h §2; 3, §45 7) §1. 
Stentor, vii. 4, § 11. 
Sybaris, v. 3, §§ 11, 12. 
Symposium, the, of Plato : see 

Plato. 
Syracuse, i. 7, § 2 ; iii. 15, § 16; 

v. 3> §§5> 13; 4 ) §§ I "4,9J 5, 
§ 10; 6> §8; 10, §§6, 23, 28, 
30-2; 11, §§7, 10; 12, §§6, 
12. 
Syrtis (?), a district of Southern 
Italy, vii. 10, § 5. 

Tarentum, iv. 4, § 21 ; v. 3, § 7 ; 

7, §2; vi. 5, §10. 
Telecles, of Miletus, iv. 14, §4. 
Tenedos, iv. 4, § 21. 
Thales, of Miletus, i. 11, § 8 : — 

[probably the Cretan poet], ii. 

12, §7. 
Theagenes, tyrant of Megara, v. 

5, §9- 
Thebes; ii. 9, §§ 10, 16; 12, 

§10; iii. 5, §7; v. 3, §5J 6, 

§15; vi. 7, §4. 
Theodectes, quoted, i. 6, § 7. 
Theodorus, the actor, vii. 17, 

§13. 

Theopompus, king of Sparta, v. 

ii, § 2. 
Thera, one of the Sporades, iv. 

4) §5- 



3 5-2 



Index 



Thessaly, ii. 5, § 22 ; 9, § 2 ; 
vii. 12, §3. 

Thetes, the (in Solon's constitu- 
tion), ii. 12, § 6. 

Thibron, vii. 14, § 17. 

Thirty, the, government of, at 
Athens, v. 6, § 6. 

Thracians, the, vii. 2, § 10. 

Thrasybulus (brother of Hiero), 
v. 10, § 31 ; 12, §6. 

Thrasybulus, tyrant of Miletus, 
iii. 13, § 16; v. 10, § 13. 

Thrasyllus, viii. 6, § 12. 

Thrasymachus, v. 5, § 4. 

Thurii, v. 3, §§ 11, 12; 7, §§ 9, 
12. 

Timophanes of Corinth, v. 6, 
§ 12. 

Timophanes, of Mitylene, v. 4, 
§6. 

Trade : see Commerce. 

Traders, the employments of, de- 
void of moral excellence, vi. 4, 
§12; vii. 9, § 3 ; ought to be 
excluded from citizenship, vii. 

9, § 3 ; admitted to office at 
Thebes after they had retired 
from business ten years, iii. 5, 
§7 1 vi. 7, §4. 

Triopium, promontory near 
Cnidus, ii. 10, § 3. 

Troezen, v. 3, § 11 ; vii. 16, § 7. 

Tyrannicide, esteemed honour- 
able in Hellas, v. 10, § 26. 

Tyranny, the government of the 
monarch who rules for his own 
interests, iii. 7, § 5 ; 8, § 2 ; iv. 

10, § 3 ; v. ro, § 9 ; akin to 
democracy, iv. 4, §27; v. 10, 
§§ 11, 30 ; ii, § 12 ; hardly to 
be called a constitution, iv. 8, 
§ 1 ; 10, § 1 ; the perversion of 
royalty, iii. 7, § 5 ; 17, § 1 ; iv. 
2, § 2 ; 4, §27; 5, § 2; 10, 
§ 3 ; does not rest upon natural 
justice or expediency, iii. 17, 
§ 1 ; has all the vices both of 



democracy and oligarchy, v. 

10, §§ 11, 30, 35 ; is unendur- 
able to freemen, iv. 10, § 4 ; v. 

11, § 13 ; may arise either from 
extreme oligarchy or democracy, 
iv. 1 1 , § 1 1 ; v. 8, § 7 ; in Sicily, 
often arose out of oligarchy, v. 

12, § 13; was common in an- 
cient times, owing to the great 
powers of the magistrates, ib. 5, 
§ 8; 10, § 5 ; always a short- 
lived government, ib. 12, § 1 ; 
rarely becomes hereditary, ib. 
10 j § 33 ; causes of revolution 
in tyrannies, ib. 10 ; means of 
their preservation, ib. 11 ; 
governments into which tyranny 
may change, ib. 12, § 11. 

Tyrant, the, is the natural enemy 
of the freeman, iv. 10, § 4 ; v. 
11, §13; cuts off his rivals, iii. 

13, §§ 16-19; v. io, §13; II, 
§ 5 ; rules over involuntary sub- 
jects as the king over voluntary, 
iii. 14, § 7; aims at pleasure, 
the king at honour, v. 10, § 10 ; 
is guarded by mercenaries, iii. 

14, § 7 ; v. 10, § 10 ; sometimes 
obliged to emancipate the slaves, 
v. 11, § 32 ; is much under the 
influence of flatterers, iv. 4, 
§ 28 ; v. 1 1, § 1 2 ; destroys the 
spirit and confidence of his 
subjects, v. 11, §§4, 13, 15; 
sends spies among them, ib. § 7 ; 
incites them to quarrel, ib. § 8 ; 
oppresses them by war and taxa- 
tion, ib. ; distrusts his friends, 
ib. § 10 ; gives licence to slaves 
and women, ib. §11; vi. 4, § 20 ; 
loves the bad, v. 11, § 12 ; pre- 
fers foreigners to citizens, ib. 
§ 14 ; is capable of any wicked- 
ness, ib. ; is full of self-indul- 
gence and sensuality, ib. §23; 
may also preserve his tyranny by 
playing the ' father of his 



Index 



3f3 



country,' ib. §§ 17-33; must be 
on his guard against assassins, 
especially against those who 
think that they have been in- 
sulted, ib. § 30 ; roust conciliate 
the poor or the rich, whichever 
is the stronger, ib. § 32. 

Tyrants, the, of Hellenic cities 
put down by the Lacedae- 
monians, iii. 2, § 3 ; v. 10, § 30 ; 
of Sicily, by the Syracusans, v. 
10, §30. 

Tyrants, most of the ancient, 
originally demagogues, v. 5, 
§6; to, §4; sometimes great 
magistrates, or kings, ib. 5, § 8 ; 

10, §5- 

Tyrrhenians, the, iii. 9, § 6. 
Tyrtaeus, v. 7, § 4. 

Usury, the most unnatural mode 
of money-making, i. 10, § 5 ; 

11, §3- 

Utility, too much regarded by 
Hellenic legislators, vii. 14, 
§15; is not the sole aim of 
education, viii. 2, §3; 3, §11; is 
not sought after by men of noble 
mind, ib. 3, § 12. 

Village, the,acolony of the family, 
i. 2, § 6 ; the state a union of 
villages, ib. § 8. 

Virtue, the especial characteristic 
of aristocratical governments, ii. 
11, §§5-10; iv. 7; v. 7, §§ 5- 
7 ; often allied to force, i. 6, § 3 ; 
more a concern of household 
management than wealth, ib. 
1 3, § 1 ; depends upon the supre- 
macy of the rational principle in 
the soul, ib. §6; vii. 14, §9; 
J 5> §95 cannot be included 
under a general definition, i. 1 3, 
§ 10; must be taught to the 
slave by his master, ib. §12 ; 
ought to be the aim and care 



of the state, iii. 9, §§6-8; vii. 

13, § 9 ( C P- iv \ 1\ § 4) 5 gi ves a 
claim to superiority in the state, 
iii. 9, §§ 14, 15; 13, §1; has 
many kinds, ib. 7, § 4 ; cannot 
ruin those who possess her, ib. 
10, § 2 ; is a mean, iv. 11, § 3 ; 
how far required in the great 
officers of state, v. 9, §§ 1-4 ; 
must be at least pretended by 
the tyrant, ib. 11, §§ 25, 34 ; is 
regarded as a secondary object 
by mankind, vii. 1, §5: — can- 
not be separated from happiness, 
vri. 1, § 3; 2, § 2; 3, §1 ; 8, 
§ 5; 9> §3; *3> §5? results 
from nature, habit, and reason, 
ib. 13, §§10-13; *5> §§7-io; 
is not a matter of chance, ib. 13, 
§ 9 ; how far consistent with the 
political life, ib. 2 ; 3 ; should it 
be made the aim of education? 
viii. 2 ; consists in hating and lov- 
ing and rejoicing aright, ib. 5, 
§ 1 7 : — should not (as is done by 
the Lacedaemonians) be sup- 
posed inferior to external goods, 
"• 9, § 35 (cp.vii. 1, § 5) ; nor be 
practised with a view to the 
single object of success in war, 
ii- 9> §34; vii. 2, §9; 14, §16; 
15, § 6 : — the virtue proper to 
the slave, the woman, the child, 
i. 13, §§ 1-3; of the ruler and 
the subject different, ib. §§ 4-6; 
iii. 4, §§ 7-18; of the ruler, 
practical wisdom, of the subject, 
true opinion, iii. 4, § 18 ; of 
men and women not the same, 

i- I3> §§3, 9-"; i'i- 4> § l6 '> 
less required in the artisan than 
the slave, i. 13, § 12 (cp. vii. 
9 , § 7) ; of the citizen relative to 
the constitution, iii. 4, §§ 1-7 ; 
iv. 7, § 3 ; v. 9, § 1 ; of the good 
man absolute, iii. 4, §§ 1-7 ; 
vii. 13, §7; of the good citizen: 



3T4 



Index 



— is it identical with that of 
the good man ? iii. 4 ; 5, § 10 ; 
18; vii. 14, §8; of the citizen 
in the perfect state, iii. 4, § 5 ; 
13, § 12; iv. 7, § 2. 
Virtue, military, is found in the 
masses, iii. 7, §4; the social, 
is justice, i. 2, § 16; iii. 13, 

§3. 
Virtues, the, of women and child- 
ren important to the state, i. 
13. § 15 ? ,ii-9^ §5: of the state 
and the individual the same, 
vii. 1, § 12; of the military life, 
ii. 9, §§ 11, 34; vii. 15, §3; 
of leisure, vii. 15, § 1. 

War, a part of the art of acqui- 
sition when directed against 
wild beasts and against men who 
are intended by nature to be 
slaves, i. 7, § 5; 8, § 12 ; vii. 
2, § 15; 14, § 21 ; exists for the 
sake of peace, vii. 14, §§ 13, 22 ; 
J 5> §1; a school of virtue, ii. 
9, § 1 1 ; a remedy against the 
dangers of prosperity, vii. 15, 
§ 3 ; constant war a part of 
tyrannical policy, v. 11, §10; 
success in war the sole object of 
the Lacedaemonian and Cretan 
constitutions, ii. 9, §§34, 35; 
vii. 2, §9; 14, §16; 15, §6; 
progress in war : — invention of 
tactics, iv. 13, §10; — of siege 
machines, vii. 11, § 9 ; improve- 
ment of fortifications, ib. § 12. 

War, captives taken in, ought 
they to be made slaves? i. 6, 
§§1-8. 

A\ ar, the Peloponnesian ; losses 
of the Athenian nobility, v. 3, 
§ 7 ; battle of Oenophyta, ib. 
§ 5 ; — capture of Mitylene, ib. 
4, § 6 ; — battle of Mantinea, ib. 
§ 9 ; — the Sicilian expedition, 
ib. ; — the Four Hundred at 



Athens, ib. § 13 ; 6, § 6 ; — the 
Thirty, ib. 6, § 6. 
War, the Persian, v. 3, § 7 ; 4, 
§§ 4, 8 ; 7, § 4 ; effect of, upon 
Athens, ii. 12, § 5 ; v. 4, § 8 ; 
viii. 6, § 11 : — the Sacred, v. 4, 

§7. 

Wealth, always antagonistic to 
poverty, iv. 4, § 19; forms an 
element of the state, ii. 7, § 16 ; 
iv. 4. § 15; vii. 8, §§7,9; in- 
cludes many varieties, i. 8, § 3 ; 
iv. 3, § 2 ; [the true kind] has 
a limit, i. 8, § 14; 9, §§ 1,12; 
popularly confused with coin, 
ib. 9, §§ 10, 14 ; not so much a 
concern of household manage- 
ment as virtue, ib. 13, § 1; must 
be used with both temperance and 
liberality, ii. 6, § 8; vii. 5, § 1. 

Wealth, too highly valued at 
Sparta and Carthage, ii. 9, 
§§ 7, !3 J 11, §§ 8-12; iv. 7, 
§ 4 ; the chief characteristic of 
oligarchy, ii. ii, § 9 ; iii. 8, § 7 ; 
iv. 4- §§3> J 9; v. 10, § 11; vi. 
2, § 7 ; confers a claim to supe- 
riority in the state, iii. 9, §§ 4- 
6, 15; 12, §§8, 9; 13, §§ 1-5; 
popularly associated with good 
birth and education, iv. 8, §§4, 
8; v. 7, § 1. See Riches. 

Wealthy, the, have the external 
advantages of which the want 
tempts men to crime, ii. 7, § 10; 
iv. 8, § 3 ; are apt to be spoiled 
by the luxury in which they are 
reared, iv. 11, § 6; v. 9, § 13 ; 
form one of the classes necessary 
to the state, iv. 14, §15; vii. 
8, §§ 7, 9- See Rich. 

Whole, the, must be resolved into 
its parts, i. 1, § 3 ; 8, § 1 ; prior 
and therefore superior to the 
parts, ib. 2, §§12-14; iii- *7> 
§ 7 ; the part belongs entirely 
to the whole, i. 4, § 5 ; every 



Index 



3JJ 



whole has a ruling element, 
ib. 5, § 3 ; the whole and the 
part have the same interest, ib. 
6, § io ; the virtue of the parts 
relative to the virtue of the 
whole, ib. 13, § 15 ; the happi- 
ness of the whole dependent on 
the happiness of the parts, ii. 5, 
§ 27 ; vii. 9, § 7 ; the sophism 
that ' if the parts are little the 
whole is little,' v. 8, § 3 ; the 
care of the part and the care of 
the whole inseparable, viii. 1, 

Woman, the, has a different 
virtue to the man, i. 13, §§ 3- 
12 ; iii. 4, § 16 ; shares in the 
deliberative faculty, i. 13, § 7. 

Women, should be trained with 
a view to the state, i. 13, § 15 
(cp. ii. 9, § 5) ; cannot have 
the same pursuits as men, ii. 5, 
§24; said to have been common 
among certain Libyan tribes, ib. 
3, §9; have great influence 
among warlike races, ib. 9, § 7 ; 
caused great harm to Sparta by 
their disorder and licence, ib. 
§§ 5—13 ; possessed two-fifths of 
the land in Laconia, ib. § 15 ; 
too proud in oligarchies to be 
controlled, iv. 15, §13; have 
often ruined tyrannies by their 
insolence, v. 11, § 23 ; are 
allowed great licence in demo- 



cracies and tyrannies, ib. 11, 
§11; vi. 4, § 20 ; commonly 
cease to bear children after fifty, 
vii. 16, §§5, 16; should not 
marry too young, ib. § 6 ; im- 
part their nature to their off- 
spring, ib. § 14. 
Women and children, the com- 
munity of, proposed by Plato, 
ii. 1 , § 3 ; 1 2, § 1 2 ; he has not 
explained whether he would 
extend it to the dependent 
classes, ib. 5, §§ 18-24; — objec- 
tions of Aristotle : (1) unity 
would not be promoted, ib. 3, 
§2; (2)therewonldbeageneral 
neglect of the children, ib. § 4 ; 

(3) the parentage of the children 
could not be concealed, ib. § 8; 

(4) expiations would be impos- 
sible, ib. 4, § 1 ; (5) the conceal- 
ment of relationship would lead 
to unnatural crimes, ib. §§1-3, 
10; (6) affection would be 
weakened, ib. §§4-9; (7) the 
transfer of children to another 
rank would be found impractic- 
able, ib. § 10 ; (8) the household 
would be neglected, ib. 5, § 24. 

Xerxes, King of Persia, v. 10, 
§ 2r. 

Zaleucus, ii. 12, § 7. 
Zancle, v. 3, § 12. 



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2L17 



B Aristotle. 

448 Aristotle's Politics 

.A5 

J8 

1908